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ABSTRACT 
 
A number of attempts have been made to facilitate agricultural trade liberalisation 
over the last decades. In spite of these efforts, trade liberalisation of agricultural 
and food processed goods has been modest. 
 
It is argued that this lack of trade liberalisation is explained by the existence of 
governments that are politically biased in the sense that they place anti-trade 
policies in order to favour powerful sectors in the economy. 
 
While there exists some evidence supporting this argument, it is difficult to assess 
how these biases influence agricultural trade patterns because existing quantitative 
modelling approaches do not normally consider simultaneously key aspects that 
characterise the food industry such as intra-industry trade and the existence of 
intermediaries in the supply chain with significant market power, among others.  
 
The objective of this thesis is to offer an alternative theoretical model that has the 
potential to accommodate these key aspects and corresponds to an international 
trade network model that extends the framework developed by Goyal and Joshi 
(2006).  
 
The model was solved by means of simulations and the results revealed that policy 
biased indeed can prevent trade liberalisation of agricultural and food processed 
goods. However, other factors that apparently have not been reported so far and 
4 
 
that are related to the market power exercised by intermediaries were identified. 
They correspond to the position of a country in the trade network (i.e. a country 
occupying a central position in the network is less likely to support trade 
liberalisation independently of any policy bias), the possibility that global free trade 
is an unlikely outcome, and the possibility that the world is trapped in an inefficient 
international trade network.  
 
The results also revealed that the adoption of compensatory lump sum payments 
across countries (i.e. inter-node transfers) or across sectors within a country (i.e. 
intra-node transfers) could be used a potential tools to achieve global free trade in 
agriculture as they can compensate losers from trade by gainers achieving, as a 
consequence, Pareto improving outcomes.  
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Figure F.1. Global treaty networks when governments are biased in favour 
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DEFINITIONS 
 
Link deletion proof: A network g is link deletion proof if no country in the world is 
willing to break an existing agreement.  
 
Strong link deletion proof: A network g is strong link deletion proof if no country has 
an incentive to break one or more agreements simultaneously. 
 
Link addition proof: Network g is link addition proof when the following condition 
holds: If in this network there is a country willing to sign an agreement with another 
country, then the latter is not willing to sign this agreement.  
 
Global treaty proof: A network g is global treaty proof if at least one country i  N 
(i.e. the set of countries in the world) is not willing to sign a global agreement.  
 
Pairwise stability: A network g is pairwise stable if g is link deletion proof as well as 
link addition proof.  
 
Strongly pairwise stability: A network g is strongly pairwise stable if g is strong link 
deletion proof as well as link addition proof.  
 
Global treaty stability: A network g is said to be global treaty stable if g is strong 
link deletion proof as well as global treaty proof. 
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Inter-node transfer: An inter-node transfer Tij(g) ∈ R given from country i to country 
j in network g is a transfer such as Tij(g) = −Tji(g). 
 
Intra-node transfer: An Intra-node transfer correspond to a lump sum payment 
given by a particular sector in a country to another sector in the same country. 
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ABBREVIATIONS 
 
AMS: 
CAP: 
DDA: 
Eq: 
EU: 
FAO: 
FTAs 
INRA: 
NAFTA: 
NRA: 
OECD: 
PICTA: 
PTAs: 
R&D: 
RTAs: 
UNCTAD: 
URAA: 
USA: 
WTO:      
 
Aggregate Measure Support 
Common Agricultural Policy 
Doha Development Agenda 
Equivalent networks 
European Union 
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 
Free Trade Areas 
National Institute of Agricultural Research 
North American Free Trade Agreement  
Nominal rate of assistance 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
Pacific Island Countries Trade Agreement 
Preferential trade agreements      
Regional trade agreements 
Research and development 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture 
United States of America 
World Trade Organisation 
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CHAPTER ONE: Introduction 
 
Lack of agricultural trade liberalisation is a problem that has attracted the interest 
of researchers over a long period of time. This is reflected in the debate about the 
unsuccessful attempts to reach a global agreement, as well as to the current trade 
pattern that is explained mainly by regional agreements across the world. This 
pattern is characterised by the existence of trade concentrated in clusters of 
countries that belong to the same regional area, and by the existence of central 
countries that bridge these clusters by means of trade.  
 
Different explanations have been proposed to explain this phenomenon. However, 
it is still not well understood at the current state of the knowledge. It is argued in 
this dissertation that useful insights to explain the current lack of trade liberalisation 
in agricultural and food processed goods can be achieved by including the main 
key features that characterise the agricultural sector into a theoretical assessment.  
These features include the existence of clusters of trade (i.e. regionalism); 
countries that bridge the clusters (i.e. centrality); evidence of intra-industry trade; 
existence of intermediaries in the supply chain with significant market power; and 
governments that are politically biased.   
 
The research gap that was identified in this dissertation is that a suitable theoretical 
framework able to accommodate all these key features has not been developed so 
far. In considering this gap, the objective of the current investigation is to propose a 
modelling approach that has the potential to contribute to filling this gap. It 
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corresponds to an international network framework that extends the contribution by 
Goyal and Joshi (2006). It is important to clarify that this model can also be applied 
to other sectors because the features described above are not specific to 
agriculture. However, the aim of this thesis is to focus the analysis on trade of 
agricultural and food processed goods. 
 
In order to investigate how the proposed model can explain the lack of agricultural 
trade liberalisation, this dissertation is organised as follows.  
 
Chapter Two provides a literature review that provides the context of the research 
in terms of agricultural trade liberalisation. It justifies the research gap and explains 
why the international trade network model can be used to fill the gap. 
 
Given that the proposed international trade network model is an extension of the 
model developed by Goyal and Joshi (2006), Chapter Three describes the main 
features of the original model with the purpose of highlighting the novel extensions 
to the theoretical framework that have been introduced in this dissertation, namely: 
the introduction of the farming sector; the use of alternative stability concepts to 
determine possible stable international trade architecture; and the potential for 
compensatory lump-sum transfers to lead the world towards global free trade. The 
main results obtained by Goyal and Joshi are also described in order to used them 
as a benchmark to assess how the extensions described above cause deviations 
from the original model. The headline outcome is that the theoretical extensions 
result in significant deviations from the insights from the Goyal and Joshi model 
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and go some way to providing new insights towards explaining why liberalisation of 
trade in food and agricultural markets is difficult and which would not be apparent 
from the Goyal and Joshi model. 
 
Chapter Four formally introduces the proposed international trade model and the 
main features of this model are discussed. After that, a number of simulations 
under the concept of pairwise stability (i.e. the concept used by Goyal and Joshi) 
are explored to gain an understanding of the possible networks that the world may 
reach when countries are involved in bilateral agreements of food processed 
goods. These simulations consider different assumptions including asymmetry in 
market size and farmers‟ productivity.   
 
Chapter Five extends the analysis by introducing two different stability concepts. 
One of them is referred to as strongly pairwise stability and is a refinement of 
pairwise stability that is more suitable to predict the stability of networks when 
countries are engaged in bilateral agreements. The other stability concept is a 
novel contribution of this investigation and was introduced with the purpose of 
studying agricultural trade liberalisation of food processed goods when countries 
are involved in global agreements. This concept is named in this dissertation global 
treaty stability.  
 
The main results obtained in Chapters Four and Five are that global free trade is 
not always stable; multiple equilibria including regionalism can emerge in some 
determined scenarios; and centrality can emerge and can prevent the signature of 
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a global agreement. In considering these results, Chapter Six explores the use of 
lump-sum transfers to stabilise global free trade or to break inefficient stable 
networks in favour of free trade. Two different types of transfers are considered in 
this chapter: inter-node transfers (i.e. payments across countries); and intra-node 
payments (compensatory payments across sectors within the same country).  
 
Finally, Chapter Seven discuses and concludes by linking the current international 
trade network architecture with the results obtained in the previous chapters. The 
focus is placed on the stability of global free trade; regionalism; centrality; and the 
adoption of compensatory payments as a potential political tool to favour free trade 
in food processed goods. Given the observed difficulty in achieving free(r) trade in 
food and agricultural markets, the framework outlined in this thesis offers a number 
of new insights that can offer an interpretation for the difficulties in liberalising trade 
in these markets. 
 
To finish this chapter, note that the network model developed in this thesis uses 
the number of duty free tariff lines as a measure of trade liberalisation. However, it 
is a poor proxy of trade liberalisation intensity because it does not necessarily 
reflect trade flows. Other measures that could be considered are, for example, the 
bilateral trade intensity ratio (i.e. the ratio of bilateral trade flows between two 
countries divided by the sum of the total trade flows in these countries) and the 
openness index (i.e. the ratio between the sum of exports and imports in a country 
and the country‟s GDP) (see Calderón et al., 2007; Guerrieri and Caffarelli, 2012). 
These alternatives will be explored in future research. 
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CHAPTER TWO: Literature Review 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The debate on agricultural trade liberalisation has attracted the attention of 
researchers and policymakers over a long period of time. The argument that has 
dominated this debate is that this liberalisation would increase global welfare 
because this would lead to a more efficient trade system (Anderson, 2016; 
Anderson et al., 2001). In addition, it has been proposed the idea that trade 
liberalisation in the agricultural sector would promote global food security by 
making the international food system more efficient and more responsive to 
unexpected shocks that might threaten food security (Matthews, 2014). In spite of 
these arguments, little progress has been made to liberalise the agricultural trade 
system leading to a substantial body of research that have been developed to 
provide possible explanations to this fact.   
 
The objective of this chapter is to review the current debate on the issue of 
agricultural trade patterns and the explanations that have been offered to explain 
the lack of liberalisation in this sector with the purpose of highlighting the research 
gap that this thesis aims to fill. For this purpose, the chapter is organised as 
follows. Since agricultural and food trade form part of the international trade 
system, a description of the current trends in this system is provided in Section 2.2. 
After that, Section 2.3 focused on the evolution of agricultural trade liberalisation 
and the arguments that have been introduced to explain the little progress that 
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have been made to liberalise this sector. Section 2.4 highlights the research gap 
that is considered in this dissertation and explains why the international network 
approach has the potential to contributing in filling this gap. Finally, Section 2.5 
summarises and concludes.  
 
2.2 Current trends in the international trade system 
 
International trade agreements in general has been carried out by means of three 
different types of tariff reform agreements (Hartman, 2013): global or multilateral 
agreements (i.e. countries members of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
negotiate the reduction of barriers to trade among them); preferential trade 
agreements (PTAs) (i.e. reciprocal or non-reciprocal preference trade schemes 
typically between developed and developing nations); and regional trade 
agreements (RTAs) (i.e. reciprocal trade between two or more partners). 
 
It is recognised the fact that global agreements have made little progress and most 
of the existing agreements correspond to RTAs followed by PTAs, and they have 
proliferated dramatically from the last decade (Estevadeordal and Suominen, 2004; 
James, 2006; Freund and Ornelas, 2010; Hartman, 2013; Baier et al., 2014; Maggi, 
2014). In fact, about 267 bilateral and regional trade agreements have been 
reported by the WTO by 2016 (Grossman, 2016). In the case of PTAs, this 
increase is shown in Figure 2.1.  
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Figure 2.1. Cumulative number of PTAs in force, 1950-2010, notified and non-
notified PTAs, by country group  
 
According to this figure, the highest increment in PTAs occurred between 
developing countries followed by developed and developing countries. The 
smallest number is found between developed countries.  
 
In relation to RTAs, on the other hand, the database of the WTO shows that these 
agreements have significantly increased over the last decades1. Nowadays, they 
are concentrated in geographical areas, a fact that is explained by the nature of 
these agreements. For example, the Asia Pacific Trade Agreement includes 
Bangladesh, China, India, Republic of Kprea, Lao and Sri Lanka. A useful way to 
see the main features of the current configuration of RTAs is by means of a 
network representation as follows.  
                                                          
1
 See https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/regfac_e.htm 
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Figure 2.2. RTAs network in 2013 (source: elaborated by the author using Gephi 
software with statistic of WTO) 
 
 
In this figure, nodes correspond to countries and links to two-way preferences (i.e. 
tariff reduction agreements) between countries. For example, NAFTA was 
introduced by connecting the members of this Free Trade Area with each other.   
 
33 
 
This figure shows that RTAs are concentrated in clusters containing countries that 
belong to the same regional area (e.g. Pacific Island Countries Trade Agreement 
(PICTA) includes countries that are located in Oceania). It also shows bilateral 
agreements between countries (e.g. agreement between New Zealand and China) 
or block of countries with single countries (e.g. agreement between EU and Chile) 
because they also are classified as RTAs in the database of the WTO. In this 
network configuration, trade across clusters is not as significant as trade within 
each cluster and they are linked in general by few agreements. Clusters are also 
connected indirectly by countries or group of countries such as the European 
Union. In other words, they correspond to central countries in the sense that they 
bridge several clusters in the network. This configuration has also been noted by 
Salvatici and Nenci (2017) who explain that countries‟ efforts to obtain the benefits 
of trade have led to an intertwined network that is dense, reciprocal and clustered.  
 
In considering the proliferation of regional trade agreements, it is believed that 
RTAs rather than global agreements would eventually lead to global free trade 
(Ash and Lejarraga, 2014). However, it is also argued that agreements of this 
nature may become a stumbling block to multilateral liberalisation (for an early 
discussion see Lamy, 2002). For example, Baldwin (2006) explains that lobbying 
groups can prevent further liberalisation when able to influence policymakers. 
Likewise, Bhagwati et al. (2016) argue that lobbing groups can prevent further 
liberalisation by pushing non-trade agenda items consisting of intellectual property 
rights and labour standards. In addition, the same researchers explain that 
countries can maintain distortions in agriculture by preventing a multilateral 
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agreement. A final example is found in Krishna (2013) who argues that preferential 
agreements are not monotonic path to multilateral free trade because they can 
create incentives within member countries against further multilateral liberalisation.  
 
The claim that RTAs can lead to global free trade is partially supported by empirical 
evidence revealing a positive association between RTAs and trade (see for 
example Roy, 2014; Baier and Bergstrand 2007). However, the slowdown in the 
world trade growth may also indicate that a global trade has peaked and what is 
observed today (see Figure 2.2) is a new normal with weaker levels of trade 
(Hoekman, 2015). In the context of the new literature on international trade 
networks, this suggests that the world may be reaching a stable trade network 
different from global free trade (see for example Goyal and Joshi, 2006). This is 
also noted by Limao (2016) who explains that the interdependence between RTAs 
may lead to suboptimal outcomes (i.e. stable networks other than global free trade) 
from the global perspective.   
 
2.3 The evolution of the agricultural trade system 
 
This section discuses four key aspects that are related to the evolution of the 
agricultural trade system and that are the basis for the proposed network 
framework developed in this dissertation (see Section 2.4): attempts to reach a 
global agreement in agriculture; regional trade agreements; policy biases; and 
market power in the supply chain of the food processed industry. These aspects 
are discusses as follows.  
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2.3.1 Attempts to reach a global agreement in agriculture 
 
The agriculture sector in different industrialised countries has been protected over 
a long period of time in order to achieve some specific objectives. According to 
FAO (1988), these objectives were to maintain the parity between farm and non-
farm incomes; to guarantee the stability of farm incomes by means of import flow 
controls; and to ensure food security in order to guarantee a level of food self-
sufficiency. The last objective was considered to be particularly important for 
European countries who saw food security as a fundamental target to avoid the 
scarcity of food suffered during the Second World War (Gardner, 1996). In order to 
achieve these objectives, a number of policy support instruments have been 
adopted to protect agriculture such as price support systems, import barriers, 
supply controls, export subsidies, and import tariffs (Daugbjerg and Swinbank, 
2009; Agro Europe 2006; Frank, 1992; Harris et al., 1983; Marsh and Swanney, 
1980).  
 
The policy instruments adopted by industrialised countries to protect agriculture 
have been criticized because of the costs that they add to the economy (FAO, 
1988): costs to consumers; costs to taxpayers; and costs to the economy. 
Researchers also claim that a further effect of agricultural support policies has 
been a distortion of the prices of agricultural goods caused by oversupply of food 
commodities that were disposed in the international market. This led to a decrease 
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in the international prices and an increase in the volatility of these prices 
(Devadoss, 2006; Hopkins, 1992; Moyer 1992). 
 
During the 1980s, attention turned to the idea of carrying out a global reform with 
the purpose of eliminating the negative effects of agricultural protection described 
above (Chung and Veek, 1999). The main argument was that the removal of 
domestic support policies in developed countries would redirect the production and 
international trade of agricultural commodities to the most efficient producers. This, 
in turn, would lead to a more efficient trade system that would increase global 
welfare (Anderson, 2016; Anderson et al., 2001). This global reform materialised in 
the form of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA) which is the first 
global agreement in agriculture that has been negotiated by members of the WTO. 
The idea of the URAA was to follow the liberalisation path of manufacturing, with 
protection rates continuously declining (Aksoy, 2005). The URAA concluded in 
December of 1993 and included agreements on three sets of issues referred to as 
the three pillars: (i) market access; (ii) export competition; and (iii) domestic 
support.  
 
In the agreement on market access of the URAA, countries agreed to convert all 
import barriers to their tariff equivalents in a process called tariffication. The 
conversion of non-tariff measures into tariffs was based on the actual difference 
between internal and external prices from 1986-1988. Once the tariff equivalents 
were established, tariffs were supposed to be restricted (Matthews, 2001; 
Athukorala and Kelegama, 1998). Regarding export competition, the agreement for 
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developed countries consisted of a reduction of export subsidies from the 1986-88 
average level by 36% in value and 21% in volume over a period of six years 
starting in 1995. For developing countries, the agreement involved a reduction of 
export subsidies by 24% in value and 14% in volume over a period of ten years 
starting in 1995 (Khor, 2003; Josling, 1998). Finally, the URAA agreement on 
domestic support is applied specifically to the programmes included in the Amber 
Box. Programmes under this classification are calculated under the Aggregate 
Measure Support (AMS) which is determined by calculating a market price support 
estimate for each commodity receiving such support, plus non-exempt direct 
payments or any other subsidy not exempted from reduction commitments, less 
specific agricultural levies or fees paid by producers (OECD, 2000). In the URRA 
agreement, the AMS was subject to a 20% reduction for developed countries from 
its 1986-88 base, over six years starting in 1995. For developing countries, the 
agreement involved a 13% reduction over ten years starting in 1995 (Baffes and de 
Gorter, 2005; Khor, 2003). 
 
The URAA is considered as an important achievement because it provided for the 
first time a foundation for establishing a rule-based world trading system that 
included both developed and developing countries (Athukorala and Kelegama, 
1998; Anderson and Morris, 2000; Anderson et al., 2001). However, this 
agreement has been considered unsuccessful because tariffs in agriculture 
remained high and also because agricultural trade liberalisation post URAA was 
modest (Messerlin, 2003; OECD, 2001; Gale, 1995). According to Josling (1998), 
tariffs on manufactured goods in the second half of the 1990s were of the order of 
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5-10%. In contrast, agricultural tariffs were on average 40% with tariffs peaks of 
over 300% revealing that the URRA did little to liberalise trade in agriculture.  
 
The unsuccessful outcome of the URAA has also been noted by Aksoy (2005) who 
argued that the lack of agricultural trade liberalisation is associated with the actual 
levels of protection. This author provided some facts supporting this argument. 
First, the post-Uruguay Round agricultural tariffs remained high and they 
constituted the major protection policy, accounting for about 70 per cent of the total 
protection in OECD countries. Second, the magnitude of international trade of 
agricultural commodities was higher in developed countries which had preferential 
tariff agreements among them. This can be explained by the absence of tariffs 
barriers among the partner countries. Third, the expanding groups of agricultural 
goods, like fruits and vegetables, had low rates of protection in contrast with the 
declining groups, like grains and coffee, which had high rates of protection in 
industrial countries. Fourth, the export of protected goods between industrial 
countries decreased. This is because protection generated greater production, 
making many industrial countries more self-sufficient. 
 
During the second half of the 1990s, the next step in promoting further integration 
of the agro-food sector into the multilateral trading system was carried out. This 
was triggered by three main factors: (i) lack of agricultural trade liberalisation post 
URAA; (ii) export subsidies and domestic support policies still being used by 
developed countries after this agreement; and (iii) the mandate in Article 20 of the 
URAA to hold new negotiations (Young et al., 1999; Coleman and Meilke, 2000; 
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Josling, 2000; OECD, 2001). These three factors led to new multilateral trade 
negotiations on agriculture with the purpose of strengthening the disciplines 
already established under the URAA (Devadoss, 2002). These negotiations were 
formally included in a round referred to as the Doha Round or the Doha 
Development Agenda (DDA). The DDA was launched at the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO)‟s Fourth Ministerial Conference in Doha (Qatar) in November 
2001, and was planned for conclusion in January 2005 (WTO, 2011b; and 
Matthews, 2001). 
 
After more than ten years of talks, the Doha Round still did not have a framework 
(modalities) deal. In fact, the Geneva Ministerial Meeting in December 2009 ended 
without any substantial progress (Cho, 2010). As a consequence of this Doha‟s 
failure, it was suggested by a number of researchers that a global agreement in 
agriculture might never be attainable (see, for example, Scott and Wilkinson, 2010; 
Anderson et al., 2013; Bagwell et al., 2016). In this respect, some researchers 
argue that it would appear difficult to finalise the Doha Round in the near future 
because the central dossiers of the Doha Round negotiations (i.e. market access 
for non-agricultural goods and services, domestic agricultural subsidies, and 
agricultural import tariffs) remain unresolved (Scott, 2017; Koopmann and Stephan, 
2014; Wilkinson et al. 2014).  
 
In sum, there are observations from the above discussion. First, agriculture was 
largely left untouched in early rounds of trade negotiations at least prior to the 
Uruguay Round. Second, despite being integrated into the WTO framework 
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following the completion of the Uruguay Round, protection in the agricultural sector 
across many countries is still a dominant feature of world trade. Third, there is a 
lack of progress in the Doha Round of negotiations in large part reflecting the 
unwillingness of countries to promote the liberalisation of trade involving food and 
agricultural products.  
 
2.3.2 Regional trade agreements 
 
The failure of an eventually global agreement in agriculture has not prevented 
countries from being involved in agricultural trade liberalisation. On the contrary, as 
explained in Section 2.2, about 267 RTAs have been reported to be in effect by the 
WTO in 2016 and many of them include both agricultural commodities and food 
processed goods (see for example Baker et al., 2016; Friel et al., 2016; Parra et 
al., 2016; Regmi et al. 2005). In fact, most of the existing agreements correspond 
to free trade areas (FTAs) and current levels of agricultural trade liberalisation are 
explained mainly by these agreements (Estevadeordal and Suominen, 2004; 
James, 2006; Freund and Ornelas, 2010; Baier et al., 2014). 
 
It is not clear, however, whether there will be a significant increase in trade of 
agricultural goods and processed goods in the future. This is because, as 
explained in Section 2.2, it is argued that it is unlikely that a global free trade will be 
reached from RTAs. That is, while there is partial evidence suggesting a positive 
effect of RTAs on trade, there is also evidence suggesting that the world is 
reaching a normal with weaker levels of trade (Hoekman, 2015). In terms of the 
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network approach, this means that the world may be reaching a stable trade 
network different from global free trade (Limao, 2016: Goyal and Joshi, 2006). 
Since agricultural trade liberalisation is mainly explained by the existing RTAs, this 
suggests a similar trend in the international trade of agricultural and food 
processed goods.  
 
Unfortunately, it was not possible to find information about RTAs in the agricultural 
sector in the public domain to support this claim. However, some insights can be 
obtained from information on trade flows of determined food processed goods 
available in FAO statistics2. In order to show a possible correlation between the 
paucity of RTAs and trade flows of food processed goods, Chile was considered as 
an example because this is one of the countries having more FTAs in the world 
accounting for about 30 agreements in force. This is shown in the following figure.  
 
                                                          
2
 Available at http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data  
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Figure 2.3. Number of RTAs signed in Chile (own‟s author based on WTO 
statistics) 
 
According to this figure, Chile started to sign RTAs in the second half of the 1990s. 
The higher number of agreements per five-year period occurred between 2006 and 
2010. After that, there was a decline in the number of new agreements which is 
consistent with the argument that trade in the world is slowing down (Hoekman, 
2015). A similar trend is found in terms of trade flows of some processed foods that 
are relevant for this country. In order to show this fact, let us consider the cases of 
beef (i.e. meat, cattle, boneless (beef & veal)) and wine. The following figures show 
the exports (quantity and value) and imports (quantity and value) of beef from 1987 
to 2013.  
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Figure 2.4. Export of beef (meat, cattle, boneless (beef & veal)). Source: Own‟s 
author based on FAO statistics 
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Figure 2.5. Import of beef (meat, cattle, boneless (beef & veal)). Source: Own‟s 
author based on FAO statistics 
 
These figures show that there was a significant increment in both exports and 
imports of beef in terms of quantity and value by the time when RTAs started to be 
signed in Chile. This is suppoeted by the trend lines used in these figures.  
 
On the other hand, in order to determine whether there is a possible association 
between the decrease in the number of RTAs in Chile after 2011 and trade flows of 
beef, the annual growth rate of exports and improts of this good are considered  in 
the following figures.  
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Figure 2.6. Annual growth rate of exported beef (meat, cattle, boneless (beef & 
veal)). Source: Own‟s author based on FAO statistics 
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Figure 2.7. Annual growth rate of imported beef (meat, cattle, boneless (beef & 
veal)). Source: Own‟s author based on FAO statistics 
 
According to Figure 2.6, the annual rate of expoerted beef increased dramaticly 
during the periods where more RTAs were signed in Chile. After that, there was a 
clear decrease in the rates wich is consistent with the decrease in the number of 
new RTAs. In relation to imports, the association between annual rates and RTAs 
is not so clear. However, the trend indicates that in general the the annual rates 
have decreased over the last decades. In considering figures 2.6 and 2.7, it is 
concluded  that the argument claiming that the world is reaching a normal with 
weaker levels of trade seems to be supported in this example.  
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Let us now consider the case of wine. Exports and imports (in tonnes and values) 
of this good and the annular rate changes are presented in the following figures. 
 
 
Figure 2.8. Export of wine. Source: Own‟s author based on FAO statistics 
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Figure 2.9. Import of wine. Source: Own‟s author based on FAO statistics 
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Figure 2.10. Annual growth rate of exported wine. Source: Own‟s author based on 
FAO statistics 
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Figure 2.11. Annual growth rate of imported wine. Source: Own‟s author based on 
FAO statistics 
 
As in the previous case, these figures show a significant increase in exports and 
imports of wine by the time when Chile signed a significant number of RTAs, but 
the annual growth rates of export and import of this good have decreased over the 
last decades. This evidence, again, is consistent with the suggestion that the world 
is reaching a new normal with weaker levels of trade and this apparently is also 
affecting trade of food processed goods. 
 
Another consideration in relation to the association between RTAs and the flow of 
food processed goods is whether the regionalism shown in figure 2.2 (i.e. RTAs 
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are concentrated in regions and there are countries that bridge these regions by 
means of bilateral agreements) is also presented in the flows of agricultural and 
food processed goods. This is indeed a plausible possibility because there exists a 
correlation between the concentration of RTAs in geographical areas and world 
trade flows in these areas. In this respect, UNCTAD (2015) points out that a very 
large part of world trade is clustered around three regions: North America, Europe 
and East Asia. Trade flows have generally grown for the core regions since 2011, 
especially those relating to East Asia, but the value of trade flows has contracted in 
the periphery, especially for Latin America. This is shown in the following figure. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.12. World trade flows (source: UNCTAD, 2015) 
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In order to determine whether a similar pattern exists in trade flows of food 
processed goods, an online software of the WTO developed in partnership with 
other organisations was considered to obtain trade flow network graphs of selected 
goods3. Unfortunately it was not possible to consider all the goods and countries 
that are available in this source because of the limit constraints of this thesis. In 
considering these constraints, meat and wine were selected to illustrate the flow 
patterns, and this choice was made because these goods are commonly traded 
across countries in the world. Likewise, Germany, Spain, France and China where 
selected to illustrate the fact that flows of trade in these countries have a tendency 
to be concentrated in regions, even when some of them are major exporters. For 
example, France is a major exporter of wine (Meloni and Swinnen, 2014) and, as 
shown below, trade of wine in this country is concentrated in Europe. On the other 
hand, Chile and USA were selected to show the existence of central countries in 
terms of trade flows of food processed goods. This choice was made because, 
according to the statistics of the WTO4, these countries have a large number of 
agreements across the world suggesting that centrality is likely in these countries.  
 
In these networks, nodes correspond to countries, links are defined as the role of 
each country (i.e. the thickness of the link) in terms of either import market share 
(i.e. buyers) or export market share (i.e. sellers), and the size of the nodes 
represent the size of market share of each country. This is shown as follows.  
                                                          
3
 Available at https://wits.worldbank.org/GlobalNetwork.aspx?lang=en 
4
 See http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicMaintainRTAHome.aspx 
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Figure 2.13. Export flow of meat in Germany. Source:  
https://wits.worldbank.org/GlobalNetwork.aspx?lang=en  
 
This figure shows export flows of meat in Germany and is represented in the 
network as a light orange node. According to this network, Germany exports meat 
mainly to other European countries (i.e. other light orange nodes) being the United 
Kingdom, Poland and Italy important partners in terms of export share (i.e. the 
thickness of the links with these countries). Some of them like the Netherlands and 
Spain are also larger exporters of meat which is noted by the size of their 
respective nodes. This is a clear evidence of regionalism in trade. However, 
exports from Germany to countries located in other continents is also present (e.g. 
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Canada in light green, South Africa in dark green, and East Asia and Pacific 
countries in dark orange). 
 
Figure 2.14. Export flow of meat in Spain. Source:  
https://wits.worldbank.org/GlobalNetwork.aspx?lang=en  
 
Figure 2.14 shows export flows of meat but from the point of view of Spain. As in 
the previous figure, there is a clear evidence of regionalism. That is, the main 
partner countries of Spain are other European countries represented as light 
orange circles. In considering the thickness of the links, France is an important 
partner of Spain in terms of export share. However, there are other relevant partner 
countries located in other continents such as Canada in light green and China in 
dark orange. 
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Figure 2.15. Export flow of meat in China. Source:  
https://wits.worldbank.org/GlobalNetwork.aspx?lang=en  
 
The same regionalism pattern is seen in this figure which shows export flows of 
meat from the point of view of China (note that the small size of the node of this 
country indicates that this is not a major exporter country in the world). That is, 
China exports this good mainly to other East Asia and Pacific countries 
represented in dark orange being Hong Kong an important destination in terms of 
export share. China also exports meat to the United States, but the export share in 
this case is not as significant as the export share in other countries in the Region 
(see the thickness of the links in the figure). 
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Figure 2.16. Export flow of wine in France. Source:  
https://wits.worldbank.org/GlobalNetwork.aspx?lang=en  
 
According to this figure, regionalism is also present in the market of wine. This 
network is seen from the point of view of France, a major exporter of this product in 
terms of global export share (see the size of the node of this country). In spite of 
this share, the export destinations are mainly European countries (in light blue). 
However, France also exports wine to countries located in other regions. Important 
non-European destinations in terms of export share are Canada (in dark green), 
and several East Asia and Pacific countries (in light orange) such as China, Hong 
Kong and Singapore.   
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Figure 2.17. Export flow of wine in Germany. Source:  
https://wits.worldbank.org/GlobalNetwork.aspx?lang=en  
 
The same regionalism pattern identified in the previous figure is observed in the 
case of Germany. That is, this country exports wine mainly to other European 
countries (in light blue) being the UK and the Netherlands relevant destinations in 
terms of market share. In spite of this regionalism, Germany also exports wine to 
non-European countries such as Chile and Mexico (in dark blue), Canada and the 
United States (in dark green), and several East and Middle East countries (in light 
and dark orange, respectively).  
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Figure 2.18. Export flow of wine in China. Source:  
https://wits.worldbank.org/GlobalNetwork.aspx?lang=en   
 
Figure 2.18 shows that regionalism in the market of wine is also present in the East 
Asia and Pacific Region. The network in this figure, seen from the point of view of 
China, shows that this country exports wine mainly to other countries in the region 
(in light orange) being Hong Kong a major destination in terms of market share 
(see the thickness of the link between this country and China). However, as in the 
previous cases, China also exports wine to countries located outside the region 
such as the United States and Canada in North America (nodes in dark green); 
and United Kingdom, France and Germany in Europe (nodes in light blue). 
 
59 
 
In summary, according to Figures 2.13 and 2.14, the destination of export flows of 
meat from Germany and Spain are mainly European countries. A similar trend is 
found in other European countries from the same source of information. In 
contrast, Figure 2.15 shows that China exports meat mainly to East Asian 
countries (the same trend is found when considering other countries in the region). 
In relation to wine, similar evidence of regionalism in terms of export trade flows 
are found in Europa and East Asia (see Figures 2.16, 2.17 and 2.18). For example, 
France is a major exporter of wine and it supplies countries in several continents. 
However, there is a concentration of trade in Europe. While this evidence does not 
imply that the existence of regionalism in RTAs has caused regionalism in trade of 
food processed goods, it is interesting to note that a possible association exists.  
 
In considering centrality, on the other hand, note in Figure 2.2. that there are 
countries that link different free trade areas located in different continents by 
means of bilateral agreements. An example is Chile. The following figures shows 
that the same trend is found when considering export flows of meat and wine in 
this country as well as the United States.  
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Figure 2.19. Export flow of meat in Chile. Source:  
https://wits.worldbank.org/GlobalNetwork.aspx?lang=en   
 
This figure shows the export flow of meat from the point of view of Chile. According 
to the network in this figure, Chile is not a major exporter of meat in terms of 
market share (its node is relatively small in size), and there is no evidence of 
regionalism. This can be seen from the fact that this country exports this good to a 
range of destinations that include European countries (in light orange), East Asia 
and Pacific countries (in dark orange), other Latin American countries (in dark 
blue), and the United States (in light green). In addition, the most relevant 
destinations are countries outside the region (see the thickness of the links). This 
evidence suggests that Chile has a central position in the trade market of meat.  
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Figure 2.20. Export flow of wine in Chile. Source:  
https://wits.worldbank.org/GlobalNetwork.aspx?lang=en   
 
This figure shows that Chile also occupies a central position in the export network 
of wine. That is, there is no evidence of regionalism because the destinations of 
wine from Chile include several countries in Europe (in light blue), Latin America (in 
dark blue), East Asia and Pacific (in light orange) and North America (in dark 
green). In considering the thickness of the links, the network shows that the main 
destinations in terms of export share are countries located in other regions (e.g. 
United Kingdom, United States and Japan, among others). 
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Figure 2.21. Export flow of meat in USA. Source:  
https://wits.worldbank.org/GlobalNetwork.aspx?lang=en   
 
According to this figure, the United States also occupies a central position in the 
market of meat. This country is a major exporter of this product as revealed by the 
large size of its node, and is connected to several countries located in different 
continents across the world. In terms of export share of meat, the most relevant 
destinations correspond to countries in the East Asia and Pacific region and 
Europe confirming that USA plays a role in linking different regions in the world.  
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Figure 2.22. Export flow of wine in USA. Source:  
https://wits.worldbank.org/GlobalNetwork.aspx?lang=en   
 
As in the previous case, this figure shows that USA occupies a central position in 
the export network of wine in terms of linking different regions across the world. In 
particular, this country supplies a range of destinations in North America (in dark 
green), Latin America (in dark blue), Europe (light blue), East Asia and Pacific (light 
orange), and Middle East (in dark orange).  
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The main feature that is identified in Figures 2.19, 2.20, 2.21 and 2.22 is that Chile 
and USA supply meat and wine to countries in different continents. Moreover, most 
of the countries involved in this trade have an RTA with Chile or USA. For 
example, the countries that are linked to Chile through export flow of wine in Figure 
2.20 have all an international trade agreement with Chile. This evidence suggests 
that Chile and USA are central countries in the export networks of meat and wine. 
 
In summary, in considering Figures 2.1 and 2.2 and the ones presented in this 
section, it is suggested a correlation between RTAs and trade flows of food 
processed goods in three main aspects. Firstly, it appears that trade growth rate 
flow of these goods is slowing down. Secondly, RTAs and trade flows of food 
processed goods have in common that they are concentrated in clusters of 
countries located in determined geographical areas. Thirdly, there are countries 
that play a central position in the network in the sense that they bridge the existing 
clusters. These similarities reinforce the claim that current levels of agricultural 
trade liberalisation reflect the existing regional agreements. 
 
Let us now describe in more detail the liberalisation process of agricultural and 
food processed goods. In relation to agricultural commodities, this has formally 
been studied by Fulponi et al. (2011) who found that substantial agricultural trade 
liberalisation is explained by the RTAs included in their investigation. They found in 
particular that about 90% of tariffs lines (averaged across individual tariffs 
concessions and sectors) of agricultural products were duty free by the end of the 
implementation period. In terms of geographical aggregates, the researchers found 
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that Asia-Pacific agreements (i.e. tariff concessions between Asia-Pacific 
countries) achieved the highest liberalisation in terms of tariffs lines with 97% being 
duty free when fully implemented. Latin America agreements (i.e. tariff concessions 
between Latin American countries) have also achieved a dramatic liberalisation 
from an initial share of duty free tariff line of 27% to 85% over a period of ten years, 
and 95% when the implementation is completed. Finally, RTAs concluded between 
countries from different regions have achieved a more modest trade liberalisation 
from 68% to 86% of duty free lines at the end of the implementation period. The 
researchers also aggregated countries into North and South aggregates and found 
that the average share of duty free tariff lines increased from 28% to 92% in the 
South-South aggregates, and from 68% to 87% in the North-South aggregates.  
 
However, while much of the literature on agricultural trade liberalisation focuses on 
bulk or raw commodities (e.g. cereals, rice, sugar and so on), this overlooks the 
fact that a high proportion of international trade involves sectors downstream from 
agriculture where trade is in semi-processed or highly processed food products. 
Regarding food processed goods, trade liberalisation has resulted in large 
increases in imports and domestic production of highly processed foods (Friel et 
al., 2016). Moreover, they represent the largest share of agricultural trade, a fact 
that is reflected as a significant change in dietary habits in several countries across 
the world (Liapis, 2011, 1012; Thow et al. 2010). In relation to this trade share, 
trade in food processed goods is dominated by high income OECD countries, 
followed by emerging economics. However, the share of trade of these goods in 
low income countries is smaller.  
66 
 
 
According to Liapis (2011), trade flows of processed foods across countries have 
at least doubled between 1995 and 2008. In this period, trade among rich countries 
increased at an average annual rate of 6.1%, and trade among lower income 
countries grew at an average annual rate of 11.6%. In spite of these rates, trade of 
processed goods at that time was mainly among high income countries. For 
example, in 2008 trade flows among rich countries accounted for around US$ 
334bn. In contrast, trade flows among low income countries accounted for 
US$49bn. In relation to trade flows from rich to low income countries accounted for 
US$60bn, and from low income to rich countries accounted for US$54bn.  
 
Another interesting aspect of international trade of food processed goods is that 
there is evidence of intra-industry trade of processed goods. An early work by 
Hartman et al. (1993) adopted the Grubel and Lloyd index (i.e. an index that 
measures the absolute value of industry i‟s exports offset by industry i‟s imports, 
expressed as a proportion of that industry‟s total trade) and found high levels of 
intra-industry trade in meat packing, butter, fluid milk and breakfast cereal, among 
others. According to the results by these researchers, intra-industry trade is more 
likely when products are differentiated, when tariffs are similar between countries, 
when there are economies of scope and when markets are not highly 
concentrated. On the other hand, Qasmi and Fausti (2001) found using the same 
index that intra-industry trade of processed food products (e.g. processed cereal, 
sugar and confectionery, processed fruit and vegetable, and the processed meat) 
increased between USA, Canada and Mexico since the passage of the NAFTA 
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agreement. However, intra-industry trade did not occur in bulk commodities with 
little or no processing. Finally, Anderson et al. (2016a) found evidence of intra-
industry trade in wine and concluded that the growing demand for wine over the 
last decades is increasingly being served by new wine exporters, without 
displacing the historical core of the wine producers.  
 
This evidence and the apparent correlation between the concentration of RTAs in 
geographical areas and trade flows of food processed goods are both relevant 
aspects that are considered in this dissertation. They are used in Section 2.4 as 
antecedents to support the adoption of the proposed international trade network 
that is developed in the current investigation.  
 
2.3.3 Policy biases 
 
There is an extensive literature in relation to the existence of policy bias in terms of 
policies that are placed to maximise objectives other than social welfare. In this 
regard, Rausser et al. (2011) provide a detailed review of the subject and explain 
that there are conflicts between the public interest and special interests in the 
design of public policies. In this context, the implementation of a public policy can 
be the result of manipulation by powerful groups actively engaged in the pursuit of 
their own self-interest. Evidence of this phenomenon has been found in the 
agricultural sector in which policy biases arise as a consequence of the intention of 
governments to put policies in place in order to be re-elected (see for example, de 
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Gorter and Tsur, 1991; Ames, 1992; de Gorter and Swinnen, 1994; Swinnen, 
1994). 
 
Policy bias has also been identified in relation to international trade. For example, 
Grossman and Helpman (1994) and Grossman (2016) argue that this bias reflects 
governments‟ intention to capture voter. In this context Conforti and Salvatici 
(2004) explain the following: “In terms of expected total economic benefits, free 
trade or “strong” trade liberalization would be the dominant strategy for both 
groups. At the same time, this result highlights the extent to which the analyses 
that assume a “neutral” government are ineffective for understanding countries’ 
behaviour in the negotiations. Apparently, there are other variables that explain 
governments’ behaviour, such as sensitivity to agricultural lobbies, and the 
attempts to maintain long standing protection ” (p. 13). 
 
In considering policy biases in international trade, it is argued that the lack of 
progress in a global agreement in agriculture has been attributed by a number of 
researchers to the existence of governments that are politically biased in favour of 
specific groups within a country (see for example Cho, 2010; Regmi et al. 2005; 
Khor, 2003). According to Anderson et al. (2013), this is reflected in the high level 
of protection to farmers through policy intervention. For example, tariffs that apply 
to EU food and agricultural imports are considerably higher compared with other 
sectors, and non-tariff measures are much more significant (McCorriston, 2018). 
This evidence is presented in the following figure. 
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Figure 2.23. EU Average Final Applied Tariffs by Industry (Source: House of Lords, 
2017) 
 
Anderson et al (2008) have attempted to present an overview of the extent of 
protection in the agricultural sector across a wide range of countries by using the 
nominal rate of assistance (NRA). This is defined as “the unit value of production at 
the distorted price less its value at the undistorted free market price expressed as a 
fraction of the undistorted price” (p. 681). A positive (negative) value of NRA 
indicates that governments‟ policies have increased (decreased) gross return to 
farmers with respect to the gross return that they would have obtained without 
policy intervention. The NRA includes all types of assistance to agriculture 
including import tariffs, export subsidies and domestic support, among others. 
Figure 2.24 shows the evolution of NRA in some relevant groups of countries 
considering five-year average from 1980. 
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Figure 2.24. Evolution of NRA (Source: Anderson and Valenzuela, 2012) 
 
This figure shows that until 2005, Asian, Latin American and Europe‟s Transition 
countries have shifted from taxing (i.e. negative NRA) to assisting agriculture (i.e. 
positive NRA) in the period of time 1981-2005. African countries, on the other 
hand, have sustained a taxation policy to agriculture while high-income countries, 
in contrast, have sustained support to this sector although the level of support has 
decreased. According to Anderson (2009), this trend suggests that governments 
have initially taxed agriculture with the purpose of promoting the manufacturing 
sector. When countries reach certain level of industrialisation, they reverse their 
agricultural policy in order to protect agriculture. This trend also reveals that the 
efforts made after the Uruguay Round to reduce the levels of protection to 
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agriculture have been unsuccessful. Moreover, a number of developing countries 
have increases the levels of support since the 1990s.  
 
In relation to exportable and import-competing agricultural goods, the following 
figures provide key information based on the NRAs to exportable and import-
competing agricultural goods for the same groups of countries.  
 
 
Figure 2.25. NRA to exportable agricultural goods. (Source: Anderson and 
Valenzuela, 2012) 
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Figure 2.26. NRA to import-competing agricultural goods. (Source: Anderson and 
Valenzuela, 2012) 
 
According to Figure 2.25, most of the groups of countries have decreased the 
levels of taxation to the exportable goods. The only exception is the group of high-
income countries who have supported their exportable goods, although this 
support has decreased during the last two decades. Figure 2.26, in contrast, shows 
that all the groups of countries have supported the import-competing agricultural 
goods. These figures also show that the levels of support to import-competing 
agricultural goods in these countries are much larger than the levels of support to 
exportable goods. This implies that both developing and developed countries have 
biases in favour of antitrade policies and this supports the argument that policies 
are placed in order to satisfy political objectives.  
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It is important to recognise, however, that this conclusion has to be made with 
caution for three reasons. Firstly, support to agriculture is above average in the top 
20 OECD trading nations. This suggests that the impact of distortions on trade 
could be significant in this group of countries because they accounts for about 70 
present of total agro-food exports and imports (Greenville, 2017). Nonetheless, the 
average NRA from output subsidies in these countries has decreased over the last 
decades as shown in the following figure. 
 
 
2.27. Average NRA from output of the major agro-food traders (source: Greenville, 
2017) 
 
It appears that this decrease in NRAs has not facilitated a global agreement in 
agriculture suggesting either that the levels of protection as a consequence of 
policy biases still remain high, or that there are additional factors that play against 
an agreement that have not been identified yet.  
 
Secondly, it could be the case that there is protection of the agricultural sector not 
per se to give farmers higher incomes but to promote food security and this may be 
a valid policy for the government to pursue and will be reflected in the biased 
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welfare function (see for example Bellemare and Novak, 2017). This means that 
biased welfare may not necessarily reflect policy biases.   
 
Finally, it may not only be farmers who are protected but that there are high levels 
of protection involving intermediaries in the food sector. This would indicate that 
lack of agricultural liberalisation may not only reflect policy biases in favour of the 
farming sector, but also in favour of other firms such as intermediaries. Actually, as 
shown in the figure below, protection in terms of non-tariff measures is higher in 
processed food than in other sectors suggesting some sort of policy bias in higher 
levels in the food sector supply chain.  
 
 
Figure2.28. Comparison of the Tariff (Ad Valorem) Equivalent Effects of Non-Tariff 
Measures in EU (Source: McCorriston, 2018).  
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2.3.4 Market power in the food processed industry 
 
Traditional models used to simulate agricultural and food scenarios assume that 
international markets of agricultural goods operate under perfect competition 
(Soregaroli and Sckokai, 2011). Examples of these approaches are the AGLINK 
model (OECD, 1998), the FAPRI model (Devadoss et al, 1993), and the WEMAC 
model (INRA, 2010). In spite of these commonly used models, the assumption of 
perfect competition in international markets of agricultural goods have been 
questioned by a number of researchers. In particular, it is argued that imperfect 
competition arises from the highly concentration of intermediaries in the food 
industry. For example, the vertical relationship between suppliers and retailers of 
fresh and food processed goods in the UK is dominated by nine large retailers, 
Tesco being the largest of these (Duffy et al., 2003; and White, 2000). In line with 
this argument, Sexton (2013) explains that food industries with highly concentrated 
intermediaries have structural oligopolies/oligopsonies, and that even with modest 
amounts of market power, welfare transfers between groups can be significant. 
 
In the context of international markers of agricultural and food processed goods, on 
the other hand, McCorriston (2002) explains that the assumption of perfect 
competition in international markets does not captures the growing market power 
of food retailers across EU countries. In this regard, this author points out: 
“Arguably, it is the high and increasing concentration in food retailing that is the 
most distinguishing feature of the European food chain. Taken together with the 
oligopolistic nature of food manufacturing in many European countries, the food 
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chain as outlined in Figure 1 is perhaps best described as a successive multi-stage 
oligopoly. In this case, an oligopolistic sector sells its output to another oligopolistic 
sector that distributes the final good to consumers” (p. 354).  
 
The existence of imperfect competition in international markers of agricultural and 
food processed goods has important implications in terms of international trade 
policy outcomes. This has formally been explored by Sexton et al. (2007) from a 
model that considers oligopolies/oligopsonies structures in the food industry. 
According to these researchers, even relatively modest departures from perfect 
competition can cause much of the benefits from trade liberalisation to flow to 
marketing firms instead of producers. They also found that the impact of a trade 
reforms is affected by the extent of competition in the downstream food sector and 
the extent of buyer oligopsony power.  
 
2.4 Research gap and the international trade network approach 
 
In order to highlight the research gap that this dissertation aims to contribute to fill, 
the following key ideas discussed in the previous sections are considered: it is 
unlikely that a global agreement in agriculture can be signed; trade of agricultural 
and food processed goods are concentrated in geographical regions and this might 
reflect regional agreements signed by countries located in the proximity (e.g. Asia 
Pacific Trade Agreement); the lack of agricultural trade liberalisation seems to be 
explained by policy biases; there is imperfect competition in the supply chain of 
food processed goods that are traded internationally that is associated with the 
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existence of potentially powerful intermediaries; and there is evidence of intra-
industry trade of food processed goods. 
 
The research gap that was identified is that while these key ideas are well-known, 
they seldom appear altogether explicitly in quantitative assessments of trade 
liberalisation. For example, most of the research on agricultural trade assumes 
inter-industry trade. Likewise, several studies on the industrial organisation of the 
food sector recognise the importance of limited firms with market power and have 
made important contributions for the understanding of the impact of imperfect 
competition on the food industry. However, these contributions seldom features in 
assessments of trade liberalisation in agricultural markets and where 
intermediaries with market power coexist with political economy and policy motives 
by government. 
 
The existence of this research gap has an important implication: it is not possible 
either to predict outcomes of agricultural trade negotiations or to propose possible 
policy strategies to facilitate agricultural trade liberalisation from existing modelling 
approaches because either most of them assume perfect competition in these 
markets, or they do not consider some of the key ideas described above. That is, 
they largely ignore the influence of intermediaries in agricultural markets that have 
the potential to exercise market power as well as the influence of policymakers that 
are politically biased. 
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In considering this gap, the following research questions have been established in 
this thesis:  
 
a) Is the possibility of a global agreement in agriculture influenced by the presence 
of biased policymakers and intermediaries who exercise market power in the 
supply chain of food processed goods?  
 
b) Are the existence of FTAs influenced by the presence of biased policy-makers 
and intermediaries who exercise market power in the supply chain of food 
processed goods? 
 
c) What policies may be implemented to facilitate agricultural trade liberalisation 
when there are biased policymakers and intermediaries that exercise market power 
in the supply chain of food processed goods? 
 
In order to answer these questions, an extended version of the international 
network model by Goyal and Joshi (2006) was adopted. The main contribution of 
the thesis is, therefore, the introduction of the key ideas described at the beginning 
of this section into the debate on agricultural trade liberalisation using an 
international trade network approach. It would appear that the present dissertation 
is the first theoretical academic work to consider this extension in the issue of 
agricultural trade liberalisation5. In this respect, Salvatici and Nenci (2017) explain 
that a network framework to study agricultural trade has not been developed and 
                                                          
5
 There is some research that has included the agricultural sector. However, these works only describe the 
topological property of the network of selected agricultural goods but not the theoretical foundations that 
explain these networks (see for example De Benedictis et al., 2014).  
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they argue that this framework would play a larger role as a tool in agricultural 
trade analysis. The aim of the research here is to make a contribution to this 
emerging research area. 
 
The international trade network approach considered in this thesis was 
independently developed by Goyal and Joshi (2006) and Furusawa and Konishi 
(2007) as an extension of the social network model proposed by Jackson and 
Wolinsky (1996). In this extension, countries are represented as nodes and 
bilateral agreements as links (a formal mathematic description of this model is 
presented in Chapter Three).  
 
In this setting, what motivates countries to form bilateral agreements or break 
existing ones depends on the objective function of the government. For example, 
Furusawa and Konishi (2007) assume that governments care about maximising 
welfare. In this context, a particular country will have an incentive to sign an 
agreement with another country if and only if this agreement increases domestic 
welfare in the former. Likewise, a particular country will break an existing 
agreement with another country if and only if this allows the government to 
increase domestic welfare. In order to determine the stability of the network, these 
authors adopted the pairwise stability concept of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996). 
According to these researchers, a network is stable if and only if no country has an 
incentive to break an existing agreement, and if two countries do not have an 
agreement, then at least one of them is not willing to form one.  
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The alternative framework developed by Goyal and Joshi (2006) adopted the same 
equilibrium concept. However, they assumed that governments care about 
maximising a weighted welfare function in order to determine the influence of policy 
biases on the stability of the international trade architecture. It was found that the 
framework by Goyal and Joshi (2006) was the most useful approach to study 
agricultural trade liberalisation for the following different reasons.  
 
1. The international network model developed by Furusawa and Konishi (2007) 
is more general and complex in terms of market structure because it assumes 
that firms produce differentiated goods. In contrast, the model of Goyal and 
Joshi (2006) assume that firms produce a homogeneous good which is 
traded internationally. Nonetheless, the framework by Goyal and Joshi (2006) 
is more general in terms of political incentives given by their weighted welfare 
function. This makes Goyal and Joshi‟s model richer and more realistic in 
terms of political influence and, therefore, more suitable to study agricultural 
trade liberalisation when allowing for policy biases.  
 
2. The network model by Goyal and Joshi (2006) assumes that a country is 
composed of two sectors: consumers; and firms that exercise market power. 
The advantage of this assumption is that these firms can be considered as 
intermediaries in the extended version of the model developed in this 
dissertation. In addition, the original version of the model by Goyal and Joshi 
(2006) is flexible enough to introduce a third sector which corresponds to the 
farming sector. This can be done by including this sector as an additional 
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economic group into the weighted welfare function. This extension has 
already been adopted McCorriston and MacLaren (2012, 2013) but in another 
research context. The introduction of this sector into this framework has the 
advantage that the resulting model is based on an explicit description of the 
supply chain in agriculture. This makes this model a more realistic approach 
with respect to alternative models proposed by related academic works. The 
introduction of the farming sector into the model by Goyal and Joshi (2006) is, 
consequently, one of the main novel contributions of this dissertation.    
 
3. Regarding the weighted welfare function adopted by Goyal and Joshi, it not 
only can be used to analyse policy incentives within a single country, but also 
to represent real situations such as heterogeneous policy incentives across 
countries. In relation to this point, the bias in agricultural policy towards 
producers in developed countries or towards consumers in developing 
countries is well-known and this fact can easily be introduced into Goyal and 
Joshi‟s framework. Moreover, the proposed extended version of this model 
can also be used to explore the trade implications of putting policy weights on 
the food industry (i.e. the intermediaries) in some countries. This extension is 
important for two reasons. Firstly, the existence of intermediaries exercising 
market power in the agricultural sector has largely been ignored, and the 
network model offers an opportunity to fill this gap. Secondly, there is 
evidence that backs up the assumption that the food industry in some 
countries is favoured by policy biases. For example, Gawande and 
Bandyopadhyay (2000) show the following: industries that are well organised 
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get more protection; the concentration ratio also matters; and when the 
upstream sector is protected (agriculture in this case), the downstream sector 
gets more protection (the food industry) which relates to the issue of 
contingent protection (i.e. protection in one sector is contingent to what 
happens elsewhere). Another example is the work by Lopez (2008) who, 
using data for the US food sector, found empirical evidence of political 
weights in the food manufacturing industry.  
 
4. The majority of the related research has studied the incentives of countries to 
reduce tariffs on third countries and the welfare trade liberalisation effect. 
However, this research has taken as given a fixed trading structure meaning 
that they not evaluate whether this structure is stable (see, for instance, 
Baldwin, 1999; Bond et al., 2004; Devadoss, 2006). It is for this reason that it 
is not possible to infer from this research the incentives of countries to sign 
global or bilateral agreements in agriculture for any trading structure. As a 
consequence, they cannot be used to determine under which conditions 
these agreements may lead to global free trade. In contrast, the network 
model formally analyses the stability of any trading structure making this 
approach an important extension to existing research in the area of 
agricultural trade. 
 
5.  The fact that the network model assumes oligopolistic international markets 
makes this framework highly suitable to study the trade implications of having 
intermediaries exercising market power in the food industry. 
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6. The proposed model allows for intra-industry trade which is one of the key 
observations described for the case of food processed goods. 
 
7. While the original network model developed by Goyal and Joshi (2006) was 
designed to study the formation of bilateral agreements in a network context, 
this framework can easily be adapted to study global free trade by modifying 
the stability concept. The introduction of a stability concept of this nature is 
another novel innovation offered by this thesis making this an additional 
contribution to the subject (this is formally explained in Chapter Five). 
 
8. Finally, traditional models in economics can broadly be grouped in two 
groups, namely: (i) models that study the interaction of small groups of 
individuals (game theory); and (ii) models that study the interaction among 
large groups (competitive markets and general equilibrium). This is actually 
the types of models that have been adopted to study issues related to 
agricultural trade policies (see for example Karp and Perloff, 1994; Deodhar 
and Sheldon, 1997; Conforti and Salvatici, 2004; Hoekman and Olarreaga, 
2004; Han and Lee, 2010). According to Goyal (2015), a number of 
phenomena appear to arise in between these two extremes and the network 
model approach has the potential to identify heterogeneous economic 
behaviour of individual inserted in a network, and how this behaviour is 
affected by their relative position in the network. The same applies to 
agricultural trade: the international trade network has the potential to identify 
phenomena arising in between the two extreme traditional approaches and it 
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can identify heterogeneous economic behaviour of individual countries 
inserted in the international network. As shown in this dissertation, this 
property of the international network model makes it possible to identify, for 
example, alternative explanations for the failure of a global agreement in 
agriculture that apparently have not been proposed to far. One of them is the 
behaviour of countries that occupy a central position in the network (i.e. 
centrality) as a key factor in explaining the lack of progress in agricultural 
trade liberalisation.  
 
It important to recognise, however, that the model by Goyal and Joshi (2006) has a 
major disadvantage. That is, it is very complex in mathematical terms and 
becomes untreatable under the assumption of endogenous tariffs (i.e. when it is 
assumed that governments place the tariffs that maximises welfare) a fact that is 
explicitly recognised by these researchers: “Given the complexity of the 
computations involved, we have been unable to completely characterize the nature 
of stable networks in this setting. We do have some interesting partial results” (p. 
768). The tractability problem not only is present in international trade networks, 
but in many theoretical applications based on the network approach in general. 
This is formally stated by Goyal (2015) who explains: “The tension arises from 
problems of tractability: models with fully rational agents and general network 
structures are difficult to analyze, especially in terms of deriving a clear relation 
between the network structure and individual behaviour. It is also difficult to 
incorporate heterogeneity in a tractable way within a network model with fully 
rational agents” (p. 4). 
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Given that the international network developed in this dissertation is a much more 
complex extension of the original model by Goyal and Joshi, the tractability 
problem has unfortunately been inherited. In order to deal with this problem, some 
strategies were adopted. They are explained as follows. 
 
Firstly, we have assumed a world composed of four countries. This extension was 
useful to solve the equations of the model assuming simulated vales of some key 
parameters for each network that can be formed using four countries. Even using 
this simplification, it was possible to identify interesting and relevant deviations 
from the results obtained by Goyal and Joshi (2006). For example, they found that 
global free trade is always a stable network. In contrast, it was found in this 
dissertation that global free trade may be unstable when there is a farming sector 
linked to intermediaries having market power. Note that simulations to extensions 
of Goyal and Joshi‟s model have also been adopted by Daisaka and Furusawa 
(2011).   
 
It is important to highlight the fact that the use of a reduced number of countries to 
explore the issue of international trade has also been adopted by a number of 
researchers. For example, Facchini et al. (2013) adopted a three country trade 
model to investigate the formation of free trade areas and custom unions when 
governments have political incentives. Chen and Joshi (2010) used a three country 
trade model to study the effect of having free trade agreements with third countries 
on a country‟s incentive to sign an additional one. These researchers cited the 
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work by Goyal and Joshi (2006) to explain that they obtained the same result 
referred to as concession erosion (i.e. profits made by an exporter firm is smaller 
when the importer country has already a number of agreements).  Other examples 
are found in Saggi and Yildiz (2010, 2011) and Saggi et al. (2013) who studied 
whether multilateralism and bilateralism may lead to a global free trade using a 
model that considers three countries. These researchers formally explain that they 
obtained the same results of Goyal and Joshi (2006) for the case of symmetrical 
countries: bilateral agreements leads to global free trade. Another example is the 
research by Seidmann (2009) who also adopted a three countries model to study 
the formation of bilateral free trade areas, bilateral customs unions and trilateral 
preferential trading arrangements. This researcher compares his results with those 
obtained by Goyal and Joshi (2006) to show that when the trade negotiation 
process is dynamic and when countries are impatient, their dynamic approach can 
be used to refine the set of pairwise stable networks. Lake (2017) extended the 
work by Seidmann (2009) and developed a dynamic game network formation 
model with three countries to explore whether free trade agreements can lead to 
global free trade when countries are asymmetric. On the other hand, Zu et al. 
(2011) and Tran and Zikos (2014) adopted a version of Goyal and Joshi‟ s 
international trade network model to study the influence of R&D collaboration 
between firms in different countries on the trade system. In order to carry out this 
analysis, these researchers assumed a world composed of three countries. These 
examples illustrate how Goyal and Joshis‟ model can be used to contrast related 
framework composed of a reduced number of countries, and this provides support 
to the approach adopted in this dissertation. Finally, the strategy of considering a 
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reduced number of nodes (i.e. normally three) is a practice that not only has been 
adopted in the research on international trade, but also in a number of network 
applications. See for example Kesavayuth and Zikos (2013), Rickman and Zikos 
(2016) and Lake (2016). 
 
Secondly, in order to deal with the tractability problem, Goyal and Joshi (2006) 
adopted the following strategy. They developed most of the trade network analysis 
by assuming exogenous tariffs (i.e. each country establishes a prohibitive tariff 
avoiding any trade between them. If two countries decide to sign an agreement, 
then each one offers the other a free market access). This assumption allowed the 
researchers to simplify the mathematical complexity of the model significantly and 
to explore the effect of policy biases and asymmetry in market size across 
countries on the network trade architecture. They also analysed the network model 
under endogenous tariffs but only for the case of symmetric and politically 
unbiased countries given the complexity of involved the mathematical 
computations. Since the international network proposed in this dissertation is an 
extension of Goyal and Joshi‟s model, the same approach was adopted. This not 
only was useful to deal with the tractability problem, but also to identify deviations 
from the original version of the international trade model. In addition, the current 
research extends the analysis by exploring other situations that are relevant for the 
issue of agricultural trade liberalisation and that were not investigated by Goyal and 
Joshi, namely: asymmetry in policy biases; and biased governments when 
countries are asymmetric in market size and farmers‟ productivity. These 
extensions not only revealed deviations from the original network model, but also 
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provided novel insights that explain some of the international patterns observed in 
the agricultural sector in the real world.  
 
Thirdly, extreme political biased cases were considered to explore stable 
international trade networks under the assumption of exogenous tariffs. They 
correspond to the following: (i) governments are completely biased in favour of 
consumers (i.e. social welfare is equal to consumer surplus); (ii) governments are 
completely biased in favour of intermediaries (i.e. social welfare is equal to the total 
profits made by intermediaries); (iii) governments are completely biased in favour 
of the farming sector (i.e. social welfare is equal to producer surplus); and (iv) 
governments are politically unbiased (i.e. social welfare is equal to the unweighted 
welfare function). These extreme cases were useful to identify general patterns, to 
make extrapolations and also to focus on non-extreme cases that were found 
relevant for the debate of agricultural trade liberalisation.    
 
In relation to the general research on international trade networks, some alternative 
network analyses have been introduced over the last years. However, they have a 
completely different focus and they are not appropriate to study agricultural trade 
liberalisation. For example, Pandey and Whalley (2004) studied how individuals‟ 
participation in networks (i.e. family members interacting with other family 
members in the location who value joint consumption, emotional support, etc) can 
affect the desirability of trade liberalisation under the existence of differential 
network properties in rural and urban areas. Chaney (2011), on the other hand, 
developed a network model with the purpose of evaluating the ability of individual 
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exporters to access foreign markets, and how this ability is influenced by the 
number of connections they have with foreign importers. This network approach 
differs from the one adopted in this thesis in that it formally analyses how non-tariff 
barriers may prevent exporters from expanding their trade activities, being the 
number of links with foreign importers one of these barriers. A final example is the 
work by Zu et al. (2011) who developed a R&D collaboration network model in the 
open economy framework. These researchers introduced a double-layer pairwise 
stability concept to explore the network impact of two types of links across 
countries: bilateral trade agreements; and research joint venture links between 
firms in different countries. This research differs from the one developed in this 
dissertation because the aim of the current investigation is to explore the network 
trade impact of having intermediaries with market power in the agricultural sector, 
but not the impact of  being involved in R&D collaboration. An exception is the work 
by Zhang et al. (2014) who developed an extended version of Goyal and Joshi‟s 
model to study the evolutionary dynamics of free trade agreement network 
formation when there are random perturbations that affect the model. These 
perturbations are defined by the authors as mistakes made by governments when 
signing bilateral agreements. This approach could be extended by allowing for 
intermediaries with market power in the food industry and when governments are 
boundedly rational and make mistakes sometimes. This possibility is considered 
for future research.   
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2.5 Summary and Conclusions 
 
Trade liberalisation in the international trade system is explained mainly by the 
proliferation of regional agreements. This has led to a network characterised by the 
existence of trade concentrated in clusters of countries that occupy the same 
geographical area. International trade across clusters exists but is not as significant 
as trade within the clusters. There are also countries or group of countries that 
occupy a central position in the network in the sense that they bridge several 
clusters by means of bilateral trade agreements.  
 
International trade liberalisation of agricultural and food processed goods are 
concentrated in geographical areas. This might reflect the existence of regional 
agreements that have been signed by countries located in the proximity (e.g. Asia 
Pacific Trade Agreement). In this regards, it is argued that lack of progress for 
additional liberalisation and for a global agreement in agriculture is explained by 
policy biases of governments who place policies in order to be re-elected.  
 
There are other features associated to the agricultural sector that may explain the 
current international network configuration of agricultural and food processed 
goods but that have not fully been explored such as the existence of intermediaries 
in the supply chain that exercise market power, and intra-industry trade of food 
processed goods.  
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In considering all these aspects of the agricultural trade systems, a research gap 
was identified: while these key aspects are well-known, they seldom appear 
altogether explicitly in quantitative assessments of trade liberalisation. Given the 
relevance of the international trade network model by Goyal and Joshi (2006) as a 
potential tool to contribute to filling this gap, a formal description of this model and 
is provided in the next chapter.  
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CHAPTER THREE: The International Trade Network Model 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter, a research gap was identified: a modelling approach to 
study the issue of food and agricultural trade liberalisation that includes 
intermediaries with potential to exercise market power has not been developed so 
far. As explained in that chapter, an extension of the international trade network 
model developed by Goyal and Joshi (2006) is proposed to contribute to filling this 
gap.  
 
It is argued in this dissertation that this extension offers results that cannot be 
identified from the contribution by Goyal and Joshi and that can explain some 
observed patterns in the real world. While these results are fully explored in the 
next chapters, it is important for illustrative purposes to highlight from the beginning 
the sources that explain these differences. 
 
In Goyal and Joshi, there are two issues at play when networks evolve: what 
happens to consumer surplus and what happens to firms‟ profits. Consumer 
surplus increases when a country signs additional agreements because this 
increases the level of competition in the domestic market of this country. This, 
however, reduces profits from the domestic market for the domestic firm because 
they receive a lower price for the selling output. But the new agreement offers this 
firm the opportunity to make additional profits from exporting to other markets. Of 
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course, the wider (more countries) in the network that can trade with each other, 
the export profit effect will diminish implying that the loss of profits in the domestic 
market may not be compensated by the export profits. So, depending on the 
current structure of the network, the gains from an international trade agreement 
(i.e. gains in consumer surplus and export profits) can either be larger or smaller 
than the loss of domestic profits and this has important implications in the stability 
of international trade networks.  
 
On the other hand, when the farming sector is introduced into the model (i.e. the 
extended version of the model), a new mechanism is added, and this mechanism 
plays a key role in explaining deviations from the original work by Goyal and 
Joshis‟ model. That is, firms (i.e. intermediaries) face a supply function reflecting 
the monopsonistic power exercised by them. This monopsonistic power implies 
that the intermediaries face an increasing marginal cost when they increase the 
level of food processed goods that are traded domestically and in external markets. 
In other words, they have to pay higher agricultural prices to the farming sector in 
more integrated networks. Consequently, the export profit effect is weaker not just 
because of the effect of competing in other export markets, but also because the 
costs faced by intermediaries rise. This effect is not present in the model by Goyal 
and Joshi because they assume that firms face a fixed marginal cost that is not 
affected by the degree of international integration. 
 
The existence of an increasing marginal cost brings new effects on the welfare 
function when an agreement is signed. Firstly, the balance between the loss of 
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profits in the domestic market and the export profits after the agreement is affected 
by the highest price that the intermediaries have to pay to the farming sector. This, 
in turn, can affect the trade-off between the gain in consumer surplus and the loss 
of profits and, therefore, the network stability. Secondly, the existence of a farming 
sector adds a new component in the welfare function which is producer surplus. 
This new component also affects the trade-off between the gains and losses from a 
bilateral agreement, and this brings important implications to the network stability 
that are not present in the original model by Goyal and Joshi.  
 
It should also be noted that the effect of the increasing marginal cost on global free 
trade is also important in this new paradigm: as one additional node is connected, 
export sales will drive up the costs to intermediaries as they serve all destinations. 
So, while consumers and farmers may prefer global free trade, to the extent that 
the government „cares‟ about intermediaries, global free trade may not be 
desirable. This is in contrast to the results by Goyal and Joshi who found that 
global free trade is always stable independently of any political bias of the 
government. This example illustrates the relevance of the extended version of the 
model in explaining current patterns in the real world that cannot be elucidated 
from the original model by Goyal and Joshi. 
 
As explained above, relaxing the assumption of fixed marginal cost in models of 
imperfect competition informs about important deviations in terms of decision 
making of key players in the economy. However, this is also true in wider modelling 
approaches. For example, it is likely that non-fixed costs exist in other sectors. This 
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means that, in the context of general equilibrium models, an increase in the 
marginal cost in a sector other than agriculture as a consequence of trade can 
potentially affect both the outcome in agricultural markets and the outcome of trade 
negotiations, particularly in cases where governments have biases in favour of 
specific sectors. This possible interrelation across sectors due to increasing 
marginal cost is not explored in the international trade network approach 
considering in this thesis. The reason is because the aim of the current 
investigation is to extend current approaches to study agricultural trade that 
normally assume either perfect competition or where the food sector is 
acknowledged, it plays no formal role in determining the outcomes. For example, 
the food sector may be introduced where there is a fixed margin between the farm 
level price and the consumer price. In contrast, the model adopted in this study 
departs from the conventional literature of agricultural trade and expands beyond 
the political economy focus in agricultural trade models. Nonetheless, the 
relevance of the impact of introducing non-fixed marginal costs on interrelated 
sectors is recognised, and this certainly can be identified from general equilibrium 
and multi-sectors models. This potential extension is left for future research.   
 
Having described the main key differences between both versions of the model, 
the objective of the current chapter is to formally introduce the model by Goyal and 
Joshi and to explain the main results obtained by these researchers. For this 
purpose, this chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2, describes the network 
model developed by Goyal and Joshi (2006) in order to highlight the main 
characteristics of this framework. Section 3.3 describes the main results obtained 
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by these researchers with the purpose of using them as a benchmark for the 
extended version of the model. It is also discussed in this section some potential 
deviations that may arise when the farming sector is introduced into the analysis. 
Finally, Section 3.4 summarises and concludes the chapter. 
 
3.2 The International Trade Network Model by Goyal and Joshi (2006) 
 
In order to facilitate the description of the original model by Goyal and Joshi, this 
section was subdivided into two parts. The first one provides an informal (i.e. 
graphical) description of the international trade network model by Goyal and Joshi 
(2006) with the purpose of showing the main ideas and principles behind this 
framework. The second provides a formal (i.e. mathematical) description of the 
model. 
 
3.2.1 Informal Description of the International Trade Network Model 
 
While the mathematical representation of the International Trade Network by Goyal 
and Joshi (2006) is complex, the idea behind it is very simple and can easily be 
understood by using a graphical representation. This is shown in Figure 3.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
97 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1. The International Trade Network Model 
 
There are five countries in this figure represented as nodes i, j, k, l and m. Country 
i, in particular, is connected with countries j, k and m by means of links. These links 
represent bilateral agreements that country i has with countries j, k and m. In the 
figure, country i is not connected to country l implying that these two countries do 
not have a free trade agreement with each other. This is formally illustrated by a 
binary variable gij  {0,1}.  If gij = 0, then no agreement exists between countries i 
and j. Conversely, if gij = 1, then these countries have an international agreement. 
Because an agreement between countries i and j is equivalent to an agreement 
between countries j and i, it holds that gij = gji. Using this terminology, the countries 
in Figure 3.1 can be characterised in terms of their international agreements as 
follows: gij = gik = gim = gjm = gkl = 1; and gil = gjk = gjl = gkm = glm = 0. The set of 
these links is referred to as a network g. That is, g is a description of the 
international agreements between the countries in N, where N is the set of 
countries in the world. The network in Figure 3.1 is therefore described as g = { gij 
i 
  j   k 
  l   m 
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=1; gik =1; gim =1; gjm =1; gkl = 1; gil = 0; gjk = 0; gjl = 0; gkm = 0; glm = 0}. Now, 
consider the networks presented in Figures 3.2(a) and 3.2(b): 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2. Alternative International Networks 
 
The only difference between the network presented in Figure 3.1 (i.e. network g) 
and that presented in Figure 3.2(a) is that in the latter countries j and k have an 
international agreement. That is, in Figure 3.1 it holds that gjk = 0 but in Figure 
3.2(a) it holds that gjk = 1. In the network terminology, if the network presented in 
Figure 3.1 is defined as g, then the network that results when linking countries j 
and k is given by g + gjk. Likewise, the only difference between the network 
presented in Figure 3.1 and that presented in Figure 3.2(b) is that in the latter, 
countries i and m have broken their international agreement. That is, in Figure 3.1 
it holds that gim = 1 but in Figure 3.2(b) it holds that gim = 0. In the network 
terminology, if the network presented in Figure 3.1 is defined as g, then the 
network that results when countries i and m break their agreement is given by g – 
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gim. On the other hand, Figure 3.3 shows two important networks for the current 
investigation: the complete network and the empty network. 
 
 
Figure 3.3. The complete and the empty networks 
 
The complete network, denoted by gc, is presented in Figure 3.3(a). The main 
characteristic of this network is that all countries have an international agreement 
with each other. In other words, the complete network corresponds to global free 
trade. Figure 3.3(b), on the other hand, corresponds to the empty network which is 
denoted by ge. The main characteristic of this network is that no country in the 
world has an international agreement.  
 
In terms of market structure, on the other hand, the original model by Goyal and 
Joshi (2006) assumes that countries compete in Cournot oligopolistic markets. For 
example, in Figure 3.1 countries i, j, k and m play Cournot in the domestic market 
of country i. Countries i, j, and m play Cournot in the domestic market of country m. 
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Countries  j and k play Cournot in the domestic market of country j, and so on. 
Cournot is relevant in this setting due to the fact that though we start with 
monopoly in the domestic context, the interaction between firms in different 
countries will bring about the pro-competitive effects. 
 
3.2.2 Formal Description of the International Trade Network Model  
 
Having informally described the main features of the international trade network 
model, let us now describe the model using formal mathematical notation. An 
international agreement between countries i and j is described by a link, given by a 
binary variable gij  {0,1} with gij = 1 if an agreement exists between countries i and 
j and gij = 0  otherwise. A network g = {(gij)ijN } is a description of the international 
agreements that exist among a set N = {1,…,N} of identical countries, where N is 
the total number of countries. Networks gc and ge are the complete network (i.e. gij 
= 1 for all i, j  N) and the empty network (i.e. gij = 0 for all i, j  N) respectively. Let 
G denote the set of all possible networks, g + gij denotes the network obtained by 
replacing gij = 0 in network g by gij = 1, and g − gij denotes the network obtained by 
replacing gij = 1 in network g by gij = 0. Let Ni(g) = {j  N: gij = 1} be the set of 
countries with whom country i has an international trade agreement in network g. 
Assume that i Ni(g) so that gii = 1. The cardinality of Ni(g) is denoted i(g). In this 
model i(g) is also the number of active firms in country i because of the 
assumption that each country has only one firm. Note that the domestic firm in 
country i is included in i(g) meaning that when a country does not have any 
agreement, i(g) = 1. Let Li(g) = {(gij)ijN : j  Ni(g)} be the set of links existing in 
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country i in network g. Note that gii  Li(g). Let hi  Li(g) – {gii} be a link subset, and 
let i be the cardinality of hi. This latter notation is used in the definition of the 
alternative stability concept adopted in this research. Let (g) be a subset of 
countries in network g. (g) is said to be a complete component if: (i) gij = 1 for all 
i,j  (g); and (ii) gik = 0 for all i  (g) and all k  (g). However, (g) is said to be 
an incomplete component if there exists at least two countries i,j  (g) such that 
gij = 0. 
 
3.2.3 Market Structure adopted by Goyal and Joshi (2006) 
 
In Goyal and Joshi‟s model, each country in the world has only one firm which 
produces a homogeneous good that can be traded internationally. When two 
countries form an agreement, their domestic firms play Cournot in the domestic 
market of these countries. The selection of Cournot game is appropriate for three 
reasons. Firstly, the alternative Bertrand oligopoly model leads to the competitive 
equilibrium under standard assumptions of homogeneous good at constant and 
identical marginal cost (for a discussion, see Burguet and Sákovics, 2017). The 
adoption of this model would, therefore, prevent researchers in the area of 
international trade networks from gaining an understanding of the factors that 
explain deviations from perfect competition that are observed in the real world. 
Secondly, intra-industry trade is more likely in Cournot competition. This was 
formally studied by Brander and Spencer (2015) who found that trade in 
homogeneous products never takes place under Bertrand competition because 
Bertrand firms have an incentive to differentiate their products when being exposed 
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to international trade. Since intra-industry trade is observed in the real world, the 
use of Cournot is more suitable to explain the existence of this type of trade.  
Finally, given the simplicity of Cournot competition, the use of this approach 
contributes in decreasing the degree of complexity of the international network 
model. However, the adoption of the Stackelberg model would be an interesting 
alternative to study the effects of leader intermediaries in the network when the 
game is played sequentially (for a recent application of the Stackelberg competition 
model to study issues related to international trade, see Ferreira and Ferreira, 
2018). Given the potential of this oligopoly game to study international trade 
networks, this extension is left for future research.   
 
In this framework, Goyal and Joshi consider two alternative solutions: (i) the 
solution under exogenous tariffs (i.e. each country establishes a prohibitive tariff 
avoiding any trade between them. If two countries decide to sign an agreement, 
then each one offers the other a free market access); and (ii) the solution under 
endogenous tariffs (i.e. the tariff that a country applies to non-partner countries is 
the one that maximises the social welfare function. If two countries decide to sign 
an agreement, then each one offers the other free market access). 
 
The reason of why Goyal and Joshi adopted two alternative solutions is because 
the model becomes untractable in mathematical terms when considering 
endogenous tariffs. This complexity made it impossible to identify the stable 
networks from the generic equations that resulted when solving the model under 
endogenous tariffs. In relation to this technical problem, the authors formally state 
103 
 
that “Given the complexity of the computations involved, we have been unable to 
completely characterize the nature of stable networks in this setting” (p. 768). In 
considering this limitation, the researchers use the endogenous tariffs solution only 
to explore the stability of global free trade. But in order to identify all potential 
stable networks, they adopted the exogenous tariffs solution as the analysis 
becomes much less complex. Thus, conducting the analysis under exogenous 
tariffs as a first approximation offered by these researchers an easier way to 
identify relevant results without complicating the analysis in excess. These two 
solutions considered by these researchers are described as follows. 
 
3.2.3.1 Solution under Exogenous Tariffs 
 
Let Pi = αi – Qi be the inverse demand of the unique good in country i  N, where 
Pi is the price of this good in the domestic market of country i, αi represents the 
size of this market, and Qi is the total quantity of the good demanded in this 
country. Let γi < αi be the marginal cost faced by the domestic firm of country i. It is 
assumed that all countries are symmetrical (i.e. αi = α and γi = γ for all i  N). It is 
also assumed that firms play Cournot in each market where they compete. The 
equilibrium output of the firm in country i in the domestic market is given by Qi
i(g) = 
(α – γ)/(i(g) + 1), and the total output of equilibrium in this market is given by Qi(g) 
= (α – γ)i(g)/(i(g) + 1). Likewise, the equilibrium output of the domestic firm of 
country i that is sold in country k is given by Qk
i(g) = (α – γ)/(k(g) + 1). 
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Consumer surplus in country i (i.e. CSi(g)), the profit that the firm in country i 
makes in the domestic market (i.e. i
i(g)), and the profit that the same firm makes 
in country k (i.e. k
i(g)) are given by Qi(g)
2/2, (Pi – γ)Qi
i(g), and (Pk – γ)Qk
i(g), 
respectively. By replacing the equilibrium quantities and the inverse demand into 
these definitions, the following expressions are obtained: (i) CSi(g) = (α – 
γ)2i(g)
2/2(i(g) + 1)
2; (ii) i
i(g) = (α – γ)2/(i(g) + 1)
2; and (iii) k
i(g) = (α – γ)2/(k(g) + 
1)2. 
 
Finally, total profit made by the domestic firm of country i in network g is given by 
i(g) = 
 )(
)(
gNk
i
k
i
g . From these expressions and by assuming that α – γ = 1 without 
loss of generality, the welfare function becomes: 
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Where ai and bi represent exogenous weights that the government in country i puts 
on consumer surplus and total profits, respectively. In this representation if ai > bi, 
then the government is biased in favour of consumers. In contrast, if ai < bi, then 
the government is biased in favour of the domestic firm. Finally, if ai = bi, then the 
government is politically unbiased.  
 
Note that the exogenous tariff creates the benchmark as no trade between nodes 
in the network as the tariff is prohibitive. There is obviously no need for a formal 
expression for this tariff as, by definition, between potential partners is zero. 
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3.2.3.2 Solution under Endogenous Tariffs 
 
Let us now assume endogenous tariffs. Let Tij(g) be the tariff faced by country i in 
country j and in network g, and let TRi(g) denotes tariff revenue in country i and in 
network g.  Because both Tij(g) = Tji(g) = 0 for all j  Ni(g) and Qi
k(g) = Qi
l(g) for all 
k,l  Ni(g), it holds that Tki(g) = Ti(g) for all k  Ni(g). The Cournot equilibrium 
outputs in the domestic market of country i are: (i) Qi
j(g) = [1 + (N − i(g))Ti(g)]/(N + 
1) for all j  Ni(g); and (ii) Qi
k(g) = [1 – (i(g) + 1)Ti(g)]/(N + 1) for all k  Ni(g). From 
these expressions: (i) CSi(g) = [N – (N – (i(g))Ti(g)]
2/2(N + 1)2; (ii) j
i(g) = [1 + (N – 
j(g))Tj(g)]
2/(N + 1)2 for all j  Ni(g); (iii) k
i(g)= [1 – (k(g) + 1)Tk(g)]
2/(N + 1)2 for all 
k  Ni(g); (iv) 


)()(
)(
gZk
i
k
gZj
i
ji
ii
g  ; and (v) TRi(g) = {(N − i(g))Ti(g)[1 – (i(g) + 
1)Ti(g)]}/(N + 1). Using these expressions and assuming that α – γ = 1 without 
losing generality, the welfare function becomes: 
 










































 
 )( )(
22
2
1
)()1)((1
1
)())((1
1
)()1)((1
)())((
1
)())((
2
1
)()()()(
gNj gNk
kkjj
i
ii
iii
ii
i
iiiiiii
i i
N
gTg
N
gTgN
b
N
gTg
gTgNc
N
gTgNN
a
gTRcgbgCSagW





 (3.2) 
 
Where ai, bi and ci represent exogenous weights that the government in country i 
puts on consumer surplus, total profits and tariff revenue, respectively. The optimal 
tariff that maximises this function corresponds to: 
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This tariff depends on who the other partners in the network are. They probably 
vary when asymmetry applies. However, this was not explored by the authors. 
Nonetheless, interesting insights were obtained by these Goyal and Joshi for the 
case of symmetric and unbiased governments (i.e. ai = bi = ci). 
 
Firstly, in considering this tariff in the welfare function, Goyal and Joshi identified 
three effects of increasing this tariff on welfare. The first one is that it lowers 
competition in the domestic market positively affecting the profits made by 
domestic firm. The second effect is that the lower competition negatively affects 
consumer surplus. And finally, the third effect is on the aggregate level of tariff 
revenue. This can be either positive or negative depending on the size of the tariff 
as can be inferred from the expression (v) above. The first derivative of this 
expression with respect to the tariff reveals that an increase in tariff will increase 
tariff revenue only when Ti(g) < 1/(ηi(g) + 1). If a tariff is larger, then it will have a 
large impact on imports negatively affecting tariff revenue. 
 
Secondly, by taking the first derivative of expression 3.3 with respect to the number 
of agreement in country i, the following expression is obtained:   
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According to this result, additional agreements signed by country i lowers the 
optimal tariff when iiii bcacN 2)(   ≥ 0. Goyal and Joshi concluded this result 
under the assumption of unbiased governments which satisfies this condition. Note 
that this condition has to be satisfied in order to be consistent with the tariffs 
observed in the real world. Otherwise, countries would apply negative tariffs as 
inferred from Expression 3.3.  
 
Thirdly, it can infer from expression 3.3 that governments biased in favour of 
consumers have a tendency to place lower optimal tariffs. While this result was not 
studied by Goyal and Joshi, this can be seen by taking the first derivative of this 
expression with respect to the weight ai: 
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The reason is because lowering tariffs increases the level of competition in 
domestic markets positively affecting consumer surplus which is what it is expected 
from governments biased in favour of consumers.  
 
Finally, it can be inferred from the first derivative of Expression 3.3 with respect to 
the weight bi that governments biased in favour of the domestic firm have a 
tendency to place higher tariffs. This is shown in the following expression. 
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This result neither was studied by Goyal and Joshi, but the intuition is 
straightforward. Raising the optimal tariffs reduces the level of competition in the 
domestic market and this increases the profit made by the domestic firm in this 
market. 
 
3.2.4 Stability Concept Adopted by Goyal and Joshi (2006) 
 
In order to determine the stability of international trade networks, Goyal and Joshi 
(2006) adopted a stability concept referred to as pairwise stability. This concept 
was introduced by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) and assumes that countries can 
only break one international trade agreement at a time, and that countries can only 
form one agreement at time. Under this assumption, a country will break or sign 
additional international agreements only when the effect of this action on welfare 
(weighted welfare) is positive. Consequently, a network g is pairwise stable if and 
only if: (i) Wi(g) > Wi(g  gik) for all i  N; and (ii) if Wi(g) > Wi(g + gij), then Wj(g) < 
Wj(g + gij). In words, pairwise stability establishes that a network g is stable when 
no country has an incentive to break an existing agreement (i.e. condition (i)); and 
if a determined country i has an incentive to sign an agreement with country j, but 
the latter does not have an incentive to form one with the former.  
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The main implication of this stability concept is that what determine the existence 
of bilateral agreements are the gains or losses in social welfare (or weighted 
welfare function if governments are politically biased). That is, countries in a 
pairwise stable network would prefer to stay in their current position in the trade 
network because any change would cause a loss in social welfare. Actually, there 
could be networks having a country willing to sign an agreement. But this 
agreement would not be signed because there are not potential partners that would 
be interested in the agreement because this would mean for them a loss in social 
welfare.  
 
The current level of welfare in a stable network, however, does not mean that 
everyone supports this network. For example, consumers would prefer more 
integrated networks because they offer higher levels of consumer surplus. In 
contrast, domestic firms would prefer less integrated networks in order to obtain 
higher profits in less competitive markets. Thus, being in a determined network 
implies a situation where there exists tension faced by the government that arises 
from the trade-off between the interests of consumers and domestic firms. 
However, this trade-off in a pairwise stable network is in balance from the point of 
view of the government. Of course, this balance can be broken when governments 
become politically biased in favour of one of these groups of individuals leading to 
other stable networks. This is the key aspect that the pairwise stability can capture. 
In considering this property of the pairwise stability, the following section describes 
the results identified by Goyal and Joshi under different policy biases.  
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3.3 The results by Goyal and Joshi 
 
The objective of this section is to describe the main results obtained by Goyal and 
Joshi. These results will be used as a benchmark for the extended version of the 
model. In order to illustrate the advantage of the extended model to study the issue 
of agricultural trade liberalisation, it is also discussed possible deviations from the 
original model when the farming sector is introduced into the analysis. 
 
In relation to the results obtained by Goyal and Joshi (2006) under the assumption 
of exogenous tariffs, these researchers found that the pairwise stability of networks 
depends on the weights that policymakers put on the components on the welfare 
function. In particular, when governments are politically biased in favour of 
consumers, the pairwise stable network is the complete network and is unique. The 
reason is because more trade increases competition in the domestic market of the 
countries in the world. As a consequence, consumers obtain higher levels of 
consumer surplus in more integrated network. In relation to the extended version of 
the model, the same result is expected to be found. To understand this prediction, 
note that free trade increases the quantity of processed food goods that is traded 
by the intermediaries. This higher quantity has two effects on the supply chain. 
Firstly, it increases the price paid to producers implying that free trade makes 
agricultural goods more expensive. Secondly, the higher quantity of processed 
goods increases the level of competition in the competitor countries implying that 
intermediaries receive a lower price for these goods in more integrated networks. 
In considering these effects, it is concluded that having a farming sector into the 
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analysis negatively affects the level of gross margin obtained by intermediaries, but 
not the gains on consumer surplus as a result of higher competition. 
 
On the other hand, Goyal and Joshi found that when governments are biased in 
favour of domestic firms, the empty network, the complete network and networks 
formed of complete components of different size with or without singletons are all 
pairwise stable. This result is explained by the trade-off faced by domestic firms 
when an agreement is signed. That is, if a country signs an agreement, the level of 
competition in the domestic market increases negatively affecting the profit made 
by the domestic firm in this market. However, this firm makes additional export 
profits in the new partner country. If the loss in profits in the domestic market is 
larger than the gain in export profits, then the agreement will not be signed by the 
country. The same analysis applies when a country is evaluating the possibility of 
deleting an agreement. If the gain in domestic profit is lower than the loss of export 
profits when breaking the agreement, then the agreement will not be broken.  
 
In the case of the empty network, the pairwise stability is explained by the fact 
singletons are unwilling to sign an agreement with each other because it would 
cause a net loss in profits: the loss of profit in the domestic market offsets the 
export profits. In the extended version of the model, this net loss in profit would be 
reinforced by the higher price that intermediaries have to pay to the farming sector 
after the agreement. It is expected to be found, therefore, that the empty network is 
also pairwise stable network when there exists a farming sector.  
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On the other hand, the complete network (i.e. global free trade) is pairwise stable 
in Goyal and Joshi because breaking an agreement causes a net loss in profits. 
This is because countries in this network are highly integrated and the gain in profit 
in the domestic market after breaking an agreement is not significantly large to 
offsets the loss in the export profits. In relation to the extended version of the 
model, global free trade might not be stable because of the higher cost faced by 
the intermediaries in this network. It may be possible that deviating from global free 
trade would allow the intermediaries to reduce the price paid to the farming sector 
causing a net gain in profits.  
 
Finally, in relation to the networks composed of complete components of different 
size with or without singletons, a country in a large complete component has an 
incentive to sign an agreement with a country that belongs to a small complete 
component. This is because in this case the loss in domestic profit is lower than 
the gain in export profit. This is due to the fact that the country in the large 
component is more integrated implying that the impact of the agreement in 
increasing competition is not significantly large. In contrast, the country in the small 
component is less integrated implying that the impact of the agreement on 
increasing competition would be more severe. As a consequence, this country is 
unwilling to sign an agreement with a country of the large component. In the 
extended version of the model, it is expected a similar result for the case of 
countries in the small component because the intermediaries in these countries 
face higher costs when signing an agreement with a country of the large 
component. However, the presence of a farming sector can potentially affect the 
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stability of the complete components themselves. In Goyal and Joshi these 
components are stable because no country has an incentive to deviate by breaking 
an existing agreement with another country that belongs to the same component. 
However, as discussed in the case of global free trade, having an agreement with 
all countries in the component can be expensive from the point of view of the 
intermediaries as they have to pay higher prices to the farming sector. This 
suggests that the pairwise stability of a complete component can be compromised 
when the farming sector is introduced into the analysis.  
 
A final result identified by Goyal and Joshi is in the case of politically unbiased 
governments. In this case, global free trade and a network composed of a 
complete component and a singleton are both pairwise stable. The complete 
network is stable because no country has an incentive to break an existing 
agreement. If they did, then the losses in consumer surplus and export profits 
would not be compensated by the gain in profit in the domestic market as a 
consequence of the resulting lower competition. In the extended version of the 
model, it is difficult to predict the stability of this network because there are other 
effects that are in place. Firstly, the gain in the domestic profit after an agreement 
is broken is larger given by the lower price that the intermediary has to pay to the 
farming sector. But there is also a loss in producer surplus for the same reason: 
farmers get paid a lower price. Consequently, a deviation from global free trade 
would cause a loss in consumer surplus, producer surplus and export profit that 
may or may not be compensated by the gain in the domestic profit.  
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In relation to the other stable network when governments are unbiased, the same 
analysis applies to the complete components. That is, in Goyal and Joshis‟ world 
no country in the complete component is willing to break an existing agreement 
because this would cause a net loss in welfare. Likewise, in the extended version 
of the model, it is not clear whether a deviation would cause either a gain or loss in 
welfare because the additional domestic profit made by the intermediary when 
paying a lower price to the farming sector may not be enough to compensate the 
losses in consumer surplus, producer surplus and export profits. In relation to the 
singleton, on the other hand, this country is unwilling to sign an agreement with any 
country of the complete component. The reason is because the latter are highly 
integrated implying that their domestic markets have a high degree of competition. 
This means that the export profit that the intermediary of the singleton can make 
after an agreement is signed is not large enough to compensate the loss of 
domestic profit. This net loss in profits offsets the gain in consumer surplus which 
is what explains why this country is unwilling to sign an agreement. In the extended 
version of the model, this incentive may be reversed because the agreement also 
increases producer surplus and this can change the trade-off balance faced by the 
government.  
 
On the other hand, the analysis developed by Goyal and Joshi under endogenous 
tariffs was based on the case of unbiased governments. They found that in this 
case global free trade is pairwise stable. This stability is explained by the fact that a 
deviation from global free trade causes a loss in consumer surplus and export 
profits that are not compensated by the gain in domestic profits and tariff revenue. 
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As in the case of exogenous tariffs, it is not clear whether the same result holds in 
the extended version of the model because it is not known the impact of the 
additional gain in domestic profits as a result of the lower price paid to the farming 
sector and the loss in producer surplus in the welfare function. 
 
As illustrated in this section, there are possible deviations from the original work by 
Goyal and Joshi that are attributed to the existence of a farming sector. Potential 
deviations can also be predicted when countries are asymmetric in terms of market 
size and farmers productivity. A more detailed explanation of these possible 
deviations and the rationale behind them is explained in more detail in the next 
chapter. 
 
3.4 Chapter Summary 
 
The previous chapter identified a research gap which corresponds to the fact that a 
modelling approach to study the issue of agricultural trade liberalisation that 
includes intermediaries with potential to exercise market power has not been 
developed so far. It is argued in this dissertation that key extensions of the 
international trade network model developed by Goyal and Joshi (2006) can be 
employed to contribute to filling this gap.   
 
The objectives of this chapter is to introduce the international trade network model 
by Goyal and Joshi (2006), describe the main results obtained by these 
researchers, and illustrate potential deviations that are expected to be found when 
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the farming sector is introduced into the analysis. The focus is placed on the 
alternative mechanisms that explain the differences between both versions of the 
model. 
 
In the original model by Goyal and Joshi, the mechanism that explains the 
incentives of a country to sign or break an existing international trade agreement is 
related to the fact that free trade affects the level of competition in the domestic 
market of the player countries. An additional agreement increases the level of 
competition and this causes both a gain in consumer surplus and a gain in export 
profits. However, this also causes a negative effect on the domestic profits made 
by the intermediaries. Thus, depending on the current structure of the network, 
there could be a net loss of profits (i.e. the loss in domestic profit is larger than the 
gain in export profits) that originates a trade-off between the gain in consumer 
surplus and the loss of net profits when a trade agreement is signed (and the 
reverse holds when an existing agreement is broken). In order to deal with this 
trade-off, governments decide whether to sign or break bilateral agreements in 
order to favour a net gain in welfare. Nonetheless, this decision is affected when 
governments are politically biases. 
 
When the farming sector is introduced into the model, an additional mechanism 
arises. That is, more free trade implies a larger quantity of the processed food 
good that is traded by the intermediaries. This pushes the price paid to the farming 
sector up implying that these individuals face higher costs in more integrated 
networks. Thus, the lower price obtained for the processed food good and the 
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higher cost faced by the intermediaries implies that these individuals suffer a more 
severe loss in profits in more integrated networks than in Goyal and Joshis‟ world. 
This effect of the farming sector on profits can cause important deviations from the 
results obtained by these researchers. In addition, the farming sector adds a new 
component in the welfare function with respect to the model by Goyal and Joshi 
which is producer surplus. This new element can also cause important deviations 
from the original model because it affects the trade-off faced by governments in the 
network. 
 
The deviations on the international trade system that arise when introducing the 
farming sector into the analysis are formally studied in the next section. The 
analysis considers deviations with respect to the results obtained by Goyal and 
Joshi under pairwise stability.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: Stable Trade Networks under Pairwise Stability  
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
One of the key aspects discussed in the literature review is that current empirical 
evidence has revealed the existence of imperfect competition in domestic and 
international markets of agricultural and food processed goods. According to this 
evidence, this imperfection is characterised by powerful intermediaries in the 
supply chain of food industry who buy agricultural goods to the farming sector and 
sell proceeded foods in domestic as well as international markets for these goods.  
These firms exercise market power in two ways, namely: oligopolistic competition 
in international markets when they compete with other foreign intermediaries; and 
monopsonistic power when they buy agricultural output from the domestic farming 
sector.  
 
It was found in the literature review that a framework that includes these 
intermediaries from a global perspective to analyse agricultural trade policies have 
not been developed so far. On the contrary, the influence of these firms in the trade 
system has largely been ignored and most of the analysis in this area still uses 
theoretical and empirical approaches based on either the assumption of perfect 
competition or imperfect competition between two single countries.  
 
It is argued in this dissertation that an extended version of the international trade 
network model developed by Goyal and Joshi (2006) can be adopted to explore 
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trade policies and the potential for trade agreements (including global free trade) 
when there are intermediaries exercising market power in the food industry from a 
wider perspective than the current modelling approaches. This is because the 
original model includes domestic firms that can act as intermediaries in the 
extended version of the model that is proposed in this dissertation. However, the 
extended version also includes the farming sector in order to capture the 
monopsonistic power effect caused by intermediaries on this sector. 
 
The aim of this chapter is to present the extended version of the model by Goyal 
and Joshi and to use this framework to investigate how the international trade 
system in the food industry is affected when there are intermediaries with market 
power and when there is a farming sector. For this purpose, the original results 
obtained by Goyal and Joshi are used in this context as a benchmark. That is, 
because the analysis developed by these researchers was carried out using the 
pairwise stability concept, this chapter uses the same concept to explore deviations 
from the original model that are attributed to the monopsonistic power exercised by 
intermediaries on the farming sector. To recall, the pairwise stability concept is 
defined in Section 3.2.4 as follows. Let D be the set of link deletion proof networks 
(i.e. the set of networks in which no country has an incentive to break an existing 
agreement); and let A be the set of link addition proof networks (i.e. the sets of 
networks in which signing additional agreements is not feasible). Using these 
notations, the set of pairwise stable network, P, is defined as the intersection 
between the set of link deletion proof networks and the set of link addition proof 
networks (i.e. P = D  A). 
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As explained in Chapter Three, the extended version of the international trade 
model is extremely complex in mathematical terms, a problem that has been 
named the tractability problem in other network applications (Goyal, 2015). In order 
to deal with this problem, simulations based on the assumption of a world 
composed of four countries were adopted. In spite of this simplification, it was 
possible to identify a number of deviations from the original work by Goyal and 
Joshi (2006) that are attributed to the existence of a farming sector in the countries 
of the world. In these simulations it was found that the existence of a farming 
sector can either positively or negatively affect free trade depending on the political 
biases of the governments as well as the existence of asymmetries across 
countries.  
 
In particular this chapter shows that global free trade is not always stable. This 
happens when governments are biased in favour of intermediaries. This is 
explained by the fact that more free trade pushes the agricultural prices up as a 
consequence of monopsonistic power, and the price of food processed goods 
down as a consequence of higher competition. This in turn negatively affects the 
profits made by the intermediaries in more integrated networks.  
 
Another key result is that the farming sector can positively affect free trade when 
governments are politically unbiased. This is because more trade implies higher 
agricultural prices and, therefore, higher levels of producer surplus. This gain in 
producer surplus plus the gain in consumer surplus are both large enough to 
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offsets the associated loss of profits faced by intermediaries. However, when 
countries are asymmetric in terms of market size, this positive effect vanishes in 
some networks when a large country is dealing with a small country. This is 
because the export profit made in the small country in these networks is not large 
enough to compensate for the loss in both domestic profits and producer surplus. A 
similar result was found in the case of asymmetric countries in terms of farmers‟ 
productivity. In this case a farming sector positively affects the incentives of 
efficient countries to sign additional bilateral agreements. However, in less efficient 
ones this is not always the case because an agreement has a significant effect on 
agricultural prices that causes a more severe impact on the profits made by the 
intermediaries of these countries.  
 
Finally, other key results found in this chapter are related to the case of 
governments biased in favour of the farming sector. That is, it was found that when 
countries are symmetric, this sector contributes to free trade. This is explained by 
the fact that more trade pushes the price paid to the farming sector up positively 
affecting producer surplus. However, when countries are asymmetric in market 
size, this positive effect only holds in countries with similar sizes. However, a large 
country is unwilling to sign an agreement with a smaller country because the 
additional export output in the latter is not large enough to compensate for 
decrease in the output that is sold in the domestic market of the former. This net 
decrease in total output sold by the intermediary of the large country depresses the 
agricultural price negatively affecting producer surplus in this country.  
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The chapter is organised in three main parts. Part 1 deals with theoretical 
considerations of the work developed in the chapter. It contains Section 4.2 which 
formally presents the extended version of the model. As in Goyal and Joshi‟s work, 
different solutions of the model are considered with the purpose of introducing 
some relevant considerations such as asymmetries across countries (i.e. 
differences in market size and farmers‟ productivity) and different ways by which 
tariffs are placed (i.e. exogenous vs. endogenous tariffs). Expected possible 
patterns from the generic equations obtained from these solutions and the intuition 
behind them are also discussed. Part 2 studies the simulations carried out in this 
research. Section 4.3 in particular studies the issue of bilateral agreements in 
agriculture and the pairwise network stability under the assumption of symmetric 
countries in terms of market size, farmers‟ productivity and governments‟ policy 
biases. This case is used as a benchmark for the analysis of international network 
stability under different types of asymmetry. Section 4.4 extends the analysis to 
explore the issue of bilateral agreements under the assumption of asymmetry in 
market size and farmers‟ productivity, respectively. Finally, Part 3 contains Section 
4.5 which summarises and concludes the chapter.       
 
PART I: Theoretical Considerations of the Proposed Model  
 
In this first part of the chapter, a formal presentation of the extended version of the 
international model is provided. Key aspects of this model and general patterns 
that can be identified from this framework are discussed. 
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4.2. The Extended International Trade Network Model 
 
As explained in Chapter Two, one of the advantages of Goyal and Joshi‟s model is 
that it assumes that a country is composed of two economic groups: consumers; 
and domestic firms that exercise market power. The last group can be considered 
as intermediaries in the supply chain of agri-food goods which is what is missing in 
current modelling approaches used to study agricultural trade liberalisation from a 
global perspective. However, the original version Goyal and Joshi‟s model is not 
suitable to study this liberalisation because the farming sector is not included in it.  
 
The first extension of the original model by Goyal and Joshi (2006) that is 
introduced in this chapter is precisely the introduction of the farming sector. As 
explained in the previous chapter, this extension adds an important mechanism 
that contributes in explaining the motivations of private firms and policymakers in 
relation to the issue of agricultural trade liberalisation. This mechanism contains 
two main elements. Firstly, the intermediaries in the extended model face a 
marginal cost that increases in more integrated networks. That is, the additional 
processed food that is traded in more integrated networks by the intermediaries 
implies that these firms have to increase the demand for agricultural goods to the 
farming sector pushing the price paid to farmers up. This means that in the 
extended version of the model the losses in profits faced by the intermediaries that 
are attributed to free trade are more severe than in Goyal and Joshi‟s world. 
Linking this effect on profits to the motivations of policymakers, there are some 
networks where policymakers face a trade-off between the increase in consumer 
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surplus and the decrease in net profits (i.e. when the loss of profit in the domestic 
market is larger than the gain in export profits) when deciding whether to sign a 
new agreement. This trade-off is affected by the increasing marginal cost faced by 
the intermediaries and this can potentially affect the decision made by 
policymakers in relation to signing new agreements or maintaining existing ones. 
Secondly, the existence of a farming sector adds an additional component to the 
welfare function which corresponds to producer surplus. This new component with 
respect to the original model also affects the trade-off faced by governments and, 
therefore, the pairwise stability of international networks.  
 
In order to introduce the farming sector into the original framework by Goyal and 
Joshi, a parsimonious version of the food supply chain is adopted where 
agriculture and food can be seen a chain of vertically linked markets. In this chain, 
farmers purchase inputs from an upstream input sector. The output produced by 
farmers is sold to first stage food processors who, in turn, sell processed product to 
food retailers. Finally, food retailers sell the final product to consumers. 
 
In order to simplify the analysis concerning the identification of international trade 
networks in agriculture, the food chain considered in this chapter is characterised 
by two main actors: farmers and intermediaries. Farmers in this case are assumed 
to be input and output price takers. This assumption was introduced to reflect the 
fact that farmers are in general highly atomised (Evidence supporting the argument 
that farmers are price takers can be found, for example, in Brown and Miller 
(2008)). It is also assumed the existence of one intermediary in each country of the 
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world who purchases the agricultural output produced by domestic farmers and 
sells a processed food product. In order to keep the model as simple as possible, 
the transformation process of the agricultural output into a processed food good is 
assumed to be a fixed proportion (Leontief) technology of agricultural goods. For 
example, milk supplied by farmers is closely related to the milk that is sold at the 
retail level. Likewise, cheese is normally produced using a fixed proportion of milk. 
Specifically, the Leontief relationship between the output of a processed food good 
( iq ) in an arbitrary country i and the output of an agricultural good produced by the 
farming sector ( fiq ) that is commonly applied in vertical models is given by  
)()( gqgq fii   and, with no loss in generality,  = 1(see for example Schmit and 
Kaiser, 2006).  
 
The advantage of considering a supply chain based on a single homogenous good 
is that the complexity of the extended version of the international trade network 
model is significantly reduced. In this model, each intermediary is assumed to have 
monopsonistic power in the inter-play between farmers and the intermediary and 
with oligopolistic power at the consumer end through trade, but with monopoly with 
no trade. A scheme of this food chain description is presented in Figure 4.1.  
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Figure 4.1. Vertically related food chain. 
 
In order to facilitate the explanation of the extended model and its main 
implications, this section is organised in two sub-sections. Sub-section 4.2.1 
describes the solution of the Cournot game under different assumptions: symmetric 
countries; asymmetry in market size, asymmetry in farmers‟ productivity; and 
endogenous tariffs. Sub-section 4.2.2 describes some possible patterns that can 
be identified from the generic equations obtained in sub-section 4.2.1. The 
emphasis is placed on the endogeneity that arises when there is a farming sector 
and how this endogeneity creates a number of externalities that can only exist 
when there is a farming sector. The second sub-section presents the information 
that shows key differences between the original model by Goyal and Joshi and the 
extended version of the model. The discussion here also illustrates why there is a 
need to rely on simulations given the intractability of obtaining closed form 
solutions. 
 
 
 
 
Farmers 
Intermediary  
Domestic and International Markets of Food Goods  
Monopsony 
Oligopoly 
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4.2.1 Solving the extended international network model 
 
This sub-section presents the main results of the extended model after solving the 
Cournot game. Intuition behind some of the resulting equations is formally given in 
sub-section 4.2.2. 
 
4.2.1.1 Solution under the assumptions of exogenous tariffs and symmetric 
countries 
 
In order to solve the Cournot game of this model, a characterisation of the firms 
that participate in this framework is provided as follows.  
 
The farming sector 
 
In this model, it is assumed that the farming sector is formed of a single group of 
farmers who are price takers and produce a homogeneous crop denoted by )(gq fi  
(i.e. this is the total output produced by the farmers in country i and in network g). It 
is assumed that this output is the input purchased by the domestic intermediary. 
Since the latter is the only buyer of this input, this firm faces a non-horizontal 
inverse supply function of the homogeneous crop (White, 1996): 
 
)(
2
1
)( gqgp fii
f
i       (4.1) 
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where )(gp
f
i is the price of the homogeneous good that is paid to farmers, i is a 
positive coefficient that captures how sensitive the price paid to farmers to changes 
in the total output sold by these firms is, and the term ½ is used to simplify terms 
when maximising a quadratic expression that is originated when substituting the 
Expression 4.1 into the profit function of the intermediary.  
 
Note that this expression is not directly comparable to the one used by Goyal and 
Joshi (2006) because it does not included a fixed cost. There are two reasons for 
not adopting a fixed cost in the extended version of the model. Firstly, the pairwise 
stability of international networks is not affected when countries face the same 
fixed cost. Consequently, it can be standardised by assuming that this cost is equal 
to zero without losing generality. The advantage of using this simplification is that 
the complexity of the model is reduced because it contains one less parameter. 
Secondly, as explained above, the additional mechanism that plays a key role in 
explaining the stability of agricultural trade networks is the increasing marginal cost 
to free trade. This is why the current dissertation is focussed on this cost rather 
than on fixed costs 
 
Using the Expression 4.1, producer surplus in network g (i.e. PSi(g)) is given by:   
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1
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0
gqdgqgqpgPS fi
q
f
ii
f
i
f
ii
f
i
     (4.2) 
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To understand the sources of producer surplus that are associated with this 
expression, let us replace the Equation 4.1 into Equation 4.2 and let us solve the 
integral. The resulting expression is )(
4
1
)(
4
1
)(
2
1
)( 222 gqgqgqgPS fii
f
ii
f
iii   . A 
key feature that needs to be considered in this expression is the meaning of the 
term )(gq fi . That is, how the total production that is sold by the farming sector to 
the intermediary affects producer surplus from the point of view of the network 
approach. To understand this term, assume that the production function of the 
intermediary is characterised by the following Leontief function: )()( gqgq i
f
i  , 
where )(gqi  is the total output of the food processed good that is sold in the 
domestic market as well as in foreign markets. Now, suppose that the intermediary 
supplies N markets including the domestic market (i.e. this firm exports the food 
processed food to N  1 countries). This means that the total output traded by the 
intermediary can be expressed as )(...)()()( 21 gqgqgqgq Ni   and, therefore, 
the producer surplus expression becomes:  221 )(...)()(
4
1
)( gqgqgqgPS Nii  
=  ...)()(...)()(...)()(...)(...)()(
4
1
212
22
2
2
1  gqgqgqgqgqgqgqgqgq NNiNi .  
 
As can be seen in this expression, producer surplus contains square and cross 
terms, and they correspond to the sources of producer surplus. The square terms 
reflect the sources of producer surplus that are obtained in specific markets. For 
example, )(21 gq  is the source of producer surplus obtained in the domestic market 
of country 1. The cross terms, on the other hand, represent the sources of 
producer surplus that arise from the farming price effect of market interaction given 
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the existence of a single farming sector in the country. For example, consider the 
term )()(1 gqgq N . In this case the intermediary supplies the food processed good to 
markets 1 and N. However, because this individual buys the agricultural good that 
is processed and sold to these markets to the same farming sector, the outputs 
)(1 gq  and )(gqN are introduced into the same single farming supply causing a 
dramatic increase in the agricultural price. In contrast, if there were different 
farming sectors, the outputs )(1 gq  and )(gqN would be introduced into different 
supply function resulting in a less dramatic increase in price. In other world, there 
would not be cross terms. Note that this approach is appropriate when working in a 
partial equilibrium model. However, because the farming supply function was 
introduced exogenously in the network model, and because interactions across 
different industries are not considered, welfare analysis from the partial equilibrium 
approach have to be considered with caution.  
 
The intermediary 
 
Since the output produced by the agricultural sector is at the same time the input 
purchased by the intermediary, the production function of the latter corresponds to 
a Leontief production function. This function is represented as noted above:  
 
)()( gqgq fii       (4.3) 
 
131 
 
where qi(g) is the total output of the processed good that is sold by the 
intermediary in network g in the domestic and international markets. For 
convenience, this output is expressed as: 
 
)(...)(...)()()( )()()(2
)(
1 gqgqgqgqgq
i
N
i
j
ii
i i
    (4.4) 
 
where )()( gq ij  is the output exported by country i to country j (note that )(
)( gq ii  is the 
output sold by the intermediary in country i in the domestic market). Using 
expressions 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3, the total cost incurred by the intermediary of country i 
in network g when exporting to an arbitrary country j is:  
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j     (4.5) 
 
The inverse demand function faced by intermediaries who compete in country j is 
assumed to be the following linear function: 
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jijjj
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where )()(
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)( gqgQ
gNi
i
jj
j


  is total output sold in the domestic market of country j 
and in network g; and Pj(g) is the retailer price of the processed good in this 
market. Using expressions 4.5 and 4.6, each intermediary i  Nj(g) (i.e. 
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intermediaries competing in country j) is assumed to choose )()( gq ij  that maximises 
the following profit function: 
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  (4.7) 
 
The government 
 
In order to evaluate policy biases in favour of any of the main actors considered in 
the model (i.e. consumers, intermediaries and producers), the weighted welfare 
function used by McCorriston and MacLaren (2012, 2013) to represent the 
objective function of the government was adopted in the current research. This 
function is given by:  
 
)()()()(
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)( gPScgbgCSagW ii
gNj
i
jiiii
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 

    (4.8) 
 
where 2/)()( 2 gQgCS ii   is consumer surplus; )(
)( gij  is the profit that the 
intermediary of country i makes in country j; )(gPSi denotes producer surplus; and 
ai, bi and ci are exogenous weights that the government puts on consumer surplus, 
total profits made by the domestic intermediary, and producer surplus, respectively.  
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Solving the game when countries are symmetric 
 
Assume exogenous tariffs and symmetric countries in terms of market size and 
farmers‟ productivity (i.e. i =  and i =  for all i  N). After solving the Cournot-
Nash game played by the intermediaries, the following expression for the output 
exported by the intermediary in country i to country j is obtained: 
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where the term )(gq ji  correspond to the total output exported by country i minus 
the output that this country exports to country j (i.e. )()()( )( gqgqgq ijiji  ).  
 
Using the Equation 4.9, the total output that is traded by country i to the domestic 
and foreign markets is: 
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On the other hand, the total output that is traded in the domestic market of country i 
is: 
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This term has a number of implications related to externalities that arise when 
there is a farming sector. These externalities and the intuition behind this 
expression are formally discussed in the next sub-section. 
 
Using the Equation 4.11, the following expression for consumer surplus is 
obtained:  
 
 2)(
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)( gQgCS ii       (4.12) 
 
This expression corresponds to consumer surplus in country i and is a monotonic 
transformation of the total output that is traded in the domestic market of this 
country. This implies that any externality caused by the existence of a farming 
sector on this output will affect the component of the welfare function. This is 
formally discussed in the next sub-section. 
 
The other relevant term that results from the Cournot solution is the profit obtained 
in country j by the intermediary of country i: 
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This profit is a monotonic transformation of the output that is exported by the 
intermediary in country i to country j. It is inferred therefore that changes on this 
output that are caused by the existence of a farming sector will also affect the profit 
made by this intermediary as discussed in the next subsection. 
 
A related term that is important to consider for the extended version of the model is 
the total profit made by the intermediary of country i. This corresponds to: 
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A final result is the following expression for producer surplus: 
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This expression is a monotonic transformation of the total output traded by the 
intermediary of country i. It differs from the total profit function (i.e. Expression 
4.14) in that the latter is the sum of monotonic transformations rather than a 
monotonic transformation of the sum. Some implications of this difference are 
described in the next sub-section. 
 
Afinal expression that is needed in the extended version of the model is the 
weighted welfare function. In considering the Expressions 4.12, 4.14 and 4.15, this 
function is given by: 
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The impact of the potential network and the trade-off faced by the government can 
be seen in this expression: as the network expands, agricultural prices rise in 
relation to trade across all nodes. This benefits producers but impacts on the 
profits of the intermediary who also face the impact of competition on the output 
price. The latter impact, however, benefits consumers. The positive net effect of 
the trade-off and the weights that governments put on the components of the 
welfare function is what dictates whether a new agreement is signed and whether 
an existing agreement is maintained.  
 
4.2.1.2 Solution under the Assumptions of Exogenous Tariffs and Asymmetry in 
Market Size  
 
The solution of the extended international model under the assumption of 
symmetric countries offers a convenient way to explore the network impact of the 
farming sector in a world with intermediaries with market power. However, 
symmetry does not fit with reality. On the contrary, one of the key aspects of the 
debate on the issue of international trade liberalisation is the relationship between 
developing and developed countries (see for example Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008; 
Fulponi et al. 2011). In this regard, it is argued that market size is related to the 
degree of industrialisation implying that developed countries are more likely to 
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have larger markets (Faber, 2014). Introducing this type of asymmetry into the 
proposed model not only makes this framework more realistic, but also provides 
the theoretical basis to identify how the international trade structure is affected 
when countries have differences in market size and, therefore, differences in the 
degree of industrialisation.   
 
It is important to clarify the fact that market size does not necessarily reflect 
country size in terms of area of land. The latter may be relevant on the supply side 
in determining capability to export. Given the complexity of the international trade 
model, this possibility is not explored in the current investigation and is left for 
future research. The use of the term country size in this thesis refers to market size 
and level of industrialisation and is captured by the parameter  in Expression 4.6. 
 
To illustrate how the network can be affected by this type of asymmetry, consider 
the following key question: are large countries willing to sign international 
agreements with small countries? While this question seems to have an obvious 
answer at first, it is not by any means clear whether there is a single answer when 
the problem is analysed from a network point of view. For example, in some 
network structures a large country could be unwilling to sign a bilateral agreement 
with a very small country because the export profit that the large country makes in 
the very small country is probably too small to compensate the loss in the domestic 
profit as a consequence of more intense competition. However, in other structures 
it can be strategically convenient to sign an agreement with a very small country 
because this can increase the competitive position of the intermediary of the large 
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country when competing with other large countries. The reason is because an 
agreement with a small country increases the level of competition in the large 
country and this reduces the price paid to the farming sector. As a consequence, 
the intermediary faces a lower marginal cost that increases the competitive position 
of this firm with respect to other large countries. Note that this second possibility is 
only possible in the extended version of the model because it holds only when 
there is a farming sector with an upward sloping supply function.  
 
Asymmetry in market size is introduced by means of the same equations 
presented in the previous subsection. The only difference is that it is assumed now 
the existence of two subsets of countries. Subset  includes all countries having 
the same market size denoted by . On the other hand, the subset  includes all 
the countries having the same market size denoted by  ~ . The cardinality of 
sets  and  is given by N  and N, respectively. Since there are only two 
subsets in the worlds, it holds that N = N  + N. Finally, because asymmetry in 
market size is the only type of asymmetry considered in this case, it is also 
assumed that i = , ai = a, bi = b and ci = c for all i  N. 
 
To accommodate asymmetry, the welfare functions have to be re-written. Let i   
and j  . Using Equation 4.16, the welfare functions considered by the 
governments of countries i and j in network g are, respectively: 
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4.2.1.3 Solution under the Assumptions of Exogenous Tariffs and Asymmetry in 
Farmers’ Productivity 
 
Another type of asymmetry that is relevant for the current investigation 
corresponds to differences in farmers‟ productivity. This is important because this 
asymmetry reflects different degrees of competitiveness across countries that can 
potentially affect the stability of international trade networks. For example, 
countries with less efficient farmers imply that the intermediaries in these countries 
face higher agricultural prices that negatively affect their competitive position. As a 
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consequence, these countries are probably less integrated than more efficient 
countries in a determined stable network. This can be particularly true when 
governments are biased in favour of intermediaries. Note that these deviations can 
only be identified in the proposed framework because the original model by Goyal 
and Joshi does not consider a variable marginal cost.  
 
Having described some potential effects of asymmetry in farmers‟ productivity, let 
us now introduce this asymmetry into the proposed model. In this case, it is 
assumed that there are two subsets of countries in the world. Countries within a 
determined subset have the same productivity, and countries that belong to 
different subsets have different productivity. Let  and  be these two subsets. 
The cardinality of  and  is given by N  and N, respectively. Because there are 
only two subsets in the worlds, it holds that N = N  plus N. Finally, because 
asymmetry in farmers‟ productivity is the only type of asymmetry considered in this 
case, it is assumed that i = , ai = a, bi = b and ci = c for all i  N. 
 
Different productivity is captured by parameter . In particular it is assumed that   
1 for all i   and  = 1 for all k  . The supply functions of the farmers in 
countries i   and k   are given respectively by: 
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Note that as in the symmetrical case, the fixed cost is assumed to be equal to zero 
because the aim of this investigation is to explore how international trade structure 
is influenced when the agricultural price increases as a consequence of 
monopsonistic power. This is why the intercept in Equations 4.19 and 4.20 was not 
included. Thus rather than exploring asymmetry across countries by allowing for 
different fixed costs, this dissertation is focussed on asymmetries in the variable 
cost that is captured by the parameter  in the inverse supply functions in 
Expressions 4.19 and 4.20.  
 
The intuition behind these expressions is as follows. When  > 1, the impact of an 
increase in the agricultural output demanded by the intermediary to the farming 
sector on the agricultural price is stronger than when  = 1. This is caused by the 
fact that the farming sector is less efficient when  > 1. Note that this is equivalent 
to have asymmetry in terms of monopsonistic power. That is, intermediaries 
exercise more monoponistic power when  > 1 since the marginal outlay curve will 
be correspondingly steeper thus resulting in a relatively greater mark-down in 
agricultural prices. 
 
Using Expressions 4.19 and 4.20, and because it is assumed that there is only a 
single group of farmers in each country, producer surplus in countries i   and k 
  are given, respectively, by: 
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The production function of the intermediary is: 
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where, as before, )( )(
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qqgqgq  . Using expressions 4.19 and 4.23, 
the total cost faced by the intermediary in country i   when exporting the output 
)()( gq ij  to country j in network g is, therefore:  
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Likewise, using expressions 4.20 and 4.23, the total cost faced by the intermediary 
in country k   when exporting to country j in network g is, therefore:  
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Assume that countries i   and k   compete Cournot in country j. The inverse 
demand in the latter country is assumed to be the following linear function: 
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
  is total output sold in the domestic market of country j 
and in network g; and Pj(g) is the retailer price of the homogeneous agricultural 
good in this market. Using expressions 4.24, 425 and 4.26, the profits that the 
intermediaries in countries i   and k   make in country j are given, 
respectively, by: 
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where )()( gij is the profit made by the intermediary of country i in country j and in 
network g, and )()( gq ij is the output sold by this firm in country j and in network g. 
As in the symmetric case, governments are assumed to maximise a weighted 
welfare function.  
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In order to solve the Cournot-Nash game played by the intermediaries in the 
arbitrary country j, it is assumed that j(g) countries that compete in this country 
belong to the subset  and the rest j(g)  j(g) countries belong to the subset . 
After solving the Cournot-Nash game, the following results are obtained: 
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In these formulations, the interpretation of Expressions 4.34 and 4.36 has to be 
made with caution because the parameter   appears explicitly in these equations 
suggesting, at face value, that a country with an inefficient farming sector (i.e.  > 
1) obtains higher profits and higher producer surplus. However, the effect of  > 1 
also works through   
( )( )  Specifically, the parameter  also affects implicitly the 
outputs that are traded by the intermediary to different markets (see Expression 
4.30). In fact, as shown in the simulation presented in Section 4.5, profits and 
producer surplus decrease when the parameter  increases (the only exception is 
in the empty network as producer surplus is higher in the inefficient country). The 
effect of the parameter   on the components of the welfare function is studied in 
more detail in this simulation. 
 
To finish this sub-section, the expressions that were obtained after solving the 
Cournot game are used to derive the following expressions for the welfare function 
in countries i   and j   are, respectively:  
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Note that the parameter   also appears explicitly in Expression 4.38. However, the 
same observations made for Expressions 4.34 and 4.36 apply in this case. That is, 
this parameter also affects the outputs contained in the Expression 4.38, and an 
increase in this parameter (i.e. a country having a less efficient farming sector) 
causes a decrease in the level of welfare as revealed by the simulation presented 
in Section 4.5.  
 
4.2.1.4 Solution under the Assumptions of Endogenous Tariffs 
 
As explained in the previous chapter, Goyal and Joshi extended the analysis by 
studying the stability of global free trade when tariffs are placed endogenously and 
when governments are politically unbiased. While this extension provides a more 
realistic description of the world in terms of the way by which international 
agreements are negotiated, the complexity of the extended version of the model 
increases significantly because this increases the level of endogeneity across 
countries. As a consequence of this complexity, it is not possible to obtain a 
specific expression for the optimal tariffs. In spite of this disadvantage, some 
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general patterns can be identified from the relevant equations presented below. In 
general terms, these patterns are consistent with some trends identified by Goyal 
and Joshi. Firstly, a decrease in tariffs increases the level of competition positively 
affecting consumer surplus. Secondly, this higher competition negatively affects 
the profits made by the intermediary in the domestic market. Finally, tariff revenue 
can either increase or decrease depending on the size of the tariff.  
 
In addition to these patterns, it is possible to identify additional effects of a 
decrease in tariffs in the extended version of the model. Firstly, a tariff reduction 
increases competition in the domestic country causing a negative impact on the 
domestic profit and a positive impact on export profit. Depending on the relative 
number of links in the competing countries, the loss in domestic profits can be 
either larger or smaller than the gain in domestic profits. If there is a net loss (gain) 
in profits, then the intermediary will reduce (increase) the demand for the 
agricultural good pushing the agricultural price down (up). This decrease in 
agricultural price means that the intermediary becomes more competitive positively 
affecting the export profits obtained in other third countries. Secondly, if the 
intermediary faces a net loss of profits after the tariff is reduced, then the lower 
demand for the agricultural good will cause a decrease in the price paid to the 
farming sector negatively affecting producer surplus. These examples illustrate the 
relevance of extending the analysis for the case of endogenous tariffs. This is 
shown as follows. 
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In order to obtain expressions for the model under endogenous tariffs, note that if 
countries i and j have an agreement (i.e. gij = 1), then 0)()(  gTgT
i
j
j
i , where 
)(gT ji is the tariff applied by country i  to country j. On the other hand, because 
countries are symmetric, it holds that )()( )()( gqgq li
k
i  for all k,l  Ni(g) (i.e. countries 
that do not have an agreement in country i but they export to this country). This 
implies that )()( gTgT i
k
i  for all k  Ni(g). Using this simplification, the output 
exported by country j to country i (where gij =1) is the output that results from the 
following maximisation problem: 
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The first order condition of this maximisation problem leads to the following 
expression: 
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By taking summation in both sides of this expression and by rearranging terms, the 
following expression is obtained: 
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On the other hand, the output exported by country k to country i (where gik =0) is 
the output that results from the following maximisation problem: 
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The first order condition of this maximisation problem leads to the following 
expression: 
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By taking summation in both sides of this expression and by rearranging terms, the 
following expression is obtained: 
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By substituting Equation 4.45 into 4.42, an expression for 
 )(
)( )(
gNk
j
i
i
gq is obtained: 
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Likewise, by substituting Equation 4.42 into 4.45, an expression for 
 )(
)( )(
gNk
k
i
i
gq is 
given by:   
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The total output in equilibrium that is demanded by Country i is obtained by adding 
expressions 4.46 and 4.47. This output is given by: 
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The outputs in equilibrium exported by countries j  Ni(g) and k  Ni(g) exported to 
country i are obtained by substituting expression 4.48 into expressions 4.41 and 
4.44, respectively. These outputs are: 
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  (4.49) 
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By using Equation 4.48 and the generic definition for consumer surplus, CSi(g) = 
2/)(2 gQi , the following expression for consumer surplus is obtained: 
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Profit made by country j  Ni(g) in country i is obtained by introducing expressions 
4.48 and 4.49 into Equation 4.40. This profit is given by: 
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Likewise, the profit made by country k  Ni(g) in country i is obtained by introducing 
Expressions 4.48 and 4.50 into Equation 4.43. This profit is given by: 
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In relation to producer surplus, it is defined:  
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Tariff revenue is defined as: 
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Using Expressions 4.51, 4.52, 4.53, 4.54 and 4.55, welfare in country i is defined 
as: 
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where ai, bi, ci and di are the weights that the government puts on consumer 
surplus, profits, producer surplus and tariff revenue, respectively. 
 
This weighted welfare function is the objective function of the government. In order 
to obtain the optimal endogenous tariff, this expression has to be maximised. As 
explained above, unfortunately it is not possible to obtain a generic expression for 
this tariff given the high degree of endogeneity and complexity of the model. 
However, optimal tariffs were obtained using a simulation (see Section 4.3.2). In 
this simulation, a system of sixteen equations was employed. Each equation 
represents the output traded by an intermediary to a determined market. Solving by 
substitution, it was possible to express the sixteen equations in function of the 
tariffs applied by each country. These equations were introduced into the welfare 
function presented in expression 4.56. After maximising this expression, optimal 
endogenous tariffs were obtained for each network considered in the simulation. 
 
4.2.2 Some general possible patterns 
 
As noted, one of the main disadvantages of the proposed international network 
model is its complexity. This complexity arises from the fact that the addition of a 
farming sector creates high degree of endogeneity across countries that are 
explained by the influence of this sector on the marginal cost faced by the 
intermediaries. In order to deal with this endogeneity, expressions for the optimal 
outputs traded by these firms that are needed in the weighted welfare function can 
only be obtained by solving a matrix system. Unfortunately, given the large number 
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of parameters in the model, solving a generic NxN matrix is virtually impossible. It 
is for this reason that simulations were adopted to obtain numerical solutions for 
the involved equations. In order to simplify the analysis, the simulations consider a 
world composed of four countries. The reason for this choice is because this is the 
minimum number of countries that can be used to explain observed features in the 
real world such as regionalism, centrality (countries that are highly connected with 
other less connected countries), among other considerations. Even with this small 
number of countries, solving the model becomes a challenging task because it 
involves in several cases solving a matrix of 16x16 (i.e. each intermediary can 
supply up to four countries). 
 
In spite of this simplification, it is still possible to identify some possible patterns 
from the equations presented in the previous section. The objective of this 
subsection is to show these patterns and the intuition behind them and the 
equations involved. However, before doing this exercise, it is important to explain 
first the endogeneity of the extended model because this is a key aspect that 
needs to be considered in the description of possible general patterns of the 
model, and also because this is the key difference between the model by Goyal 
and Joshi and the extended version of the model.  
 
4.2.2.1 The endogeneity of the model 
 
As mentioned above, the extended version of the model has a high degree of 
endogeneity that is caused by the existence of a farming sector with an upward 
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slopping supply function. To illustrate this endogeneity, consider the networks 
presented in the following figure. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(a) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(b) 
Figure 4.2. Networks composed of three countries 
 
Figure 4.2(a) shows a network formed of countries i, j and k. In this network, 
referred to as network g, countries i and j have an agreement, and country k is a 
singleton. Figure 4.2(b), shows the network that results when countries j and k sign 
an agreement. This network is referred to as network g + gjk. The idea of this 
exercise is to show that as a consequence of endogeneity, the output sold by the 
intermediary of country i in the domestic market of this country (i.e. )()( gg ii ) is 
affected when countries j and k sign the agreement. To show this, consider the 
generic Equation 4.9. According to this equation, the output sold by the 
intermediary of country i in country j depends on the size of the market in the latter 
(i.e. α), the number of agreements in country j (i.e. ηi(g), the level of monopsonistic 
power exercised by the intermediaries (i.e. ϕ), and the outputs that are exported by 
i i 
j j 
 k 
k 
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the partner countries of county j to other markets (i.e. 


)(
)(
gNi
ji
j
gq ). These outputs 
reflect the endogeneity of the model as is illustrated as follows. 
 
Let us use this equation to get an expression for the output sold by the 
intermediary of country i in the domestic market of this country in the networks 
presented in Figures 4.2(a) and 4.2(b): 
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By subtracting these equations, the following expression is obtained: 
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An interesting feature of this expression is that when ϕ = 0 (i.e. when there is no 
monopsonistic power), this expression converges to )()( )()( gqggq iijk
i
i  . This 
means that a new agreement between countries j and k does not affect the output 
sold by the intermediary of country i in the domestic market of this country when 
there is not a farming sector. This is actually what the original model by Goyal and 
158 
 
Joshi predicts. However, when there is a farming sector, a number of externalities 
that affects this output arise.  
 
The first externality is captured by the term  )()( )()( gqggq jjjkjj  . In this term, it 
holds that )()( )()( gqggq jjjk
j
j   because the output that is sold by the intermediary 
of country j in the domestic market of this country decreases as a result of the 
higher level of competition after the agreement between countries j and k is signed. 
Thus, because the term  )()( )()( gqggq jjjkjj   is negative, it is seen from the point 
of view of the intermediary of country i as a negative externality on the output 
)()( jk
i
i ggq  . The reason is because a decrease in )(
)( gq jj  implies that the 
intermediary of country j pays a lower price to the farming sector after the 
agreement. This lower marginal cost allows this firm to increase the output that is 
exported to the existing partner country i increasing the level of competition in the 
latter which is what explains the negative impact on )()( jk
i
i ggq  . 
 
The second externality on )()( jk
i
i ggq   is captured by the term )(
)(
jk
j
k ggq   in 
Equation 4.59. This is the additional output that is exported by the intermediary of 
country j to country k after the agreement between these countries and 
corresponds to a positive externality on )()( jk
i
i ggq   from the point of view of the 
intermediary of country i. The reason is because the additional output that is 
exported by the intermediary of country j pushes the price paid to the farming 
sector up. In response to this higher cost, this intermediary reduces to some extent 
the output that is exported to the existing partner country i. This makes the 
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domestic market of the latter less competitive positively affecting )()( jk
i
i ggq  . In 
considering the first and second externalities, it is concluded that the net effect of 
the actions of the intermediary of country j on the output sold by the intermediary of 
country i in the domestic market depends on whether the decrease in )()( gq jj  is 
larger or smaller than the additional export output )()( jk
j
k ggq  . 
 
 
The final externality is captured by the term  )()()2( )()( gqggq ijikij    in 
Equation 4.59. In this case it holds that )()( )()( gqggq ijik
i
j   because the output 
that is exported by the intermediary of country i to country j is negatively affected 
by the agreement signed by the latter with country k as a consequence of higher 
competition. This implies that the term  )()()2( )()( gqggq ijikij    is positive 
meaning that this corresponds to a positive externality on )()( jk
i
i ggq   from the 
point of view of the intermediary in country i. This is explained by the fact that a 
decrease in the output sold by this firm to country j reduces the price paid to the 
farming sector in country i. As a result of this lower cost, the intermediary of the 
latter country increases the output that is sold in the domestic market of this 
country. 
 
This simple example demonstrates how the endogeneity of the model creates 
externalities on the output that is traded by the intermediaries of the world. 
Obviously the number of externalities increases in larger networks which is why the 
model becomes untractable in mathematical terms when there are N countries.  
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In spite of this limitation, a generalisation can be proposed from the example given 
in Figure 4.2. That is, it is expected that the positive externalities on )()( jk
i
i ggq 
 
dominate the negative externalities. While this cannot be proved without solving 
the model, this is inferred from the fact that the higher competition in country j 
resulting from the new agreement causes a general decrease in the output that is 
sold by an existing partner in this market. This lower output causes a decrease in 
the price paid to the farming sector by the intermediary of the partner country 
positively affecting the output that is traded by this firm to other third markets. This 
is confirmed in the simulations developed in the sections below. 
 
The effect of the endogenous externalities on the outputs that are traded by partner 
countries to third markets is the basis for the identification of possible patterns from 
the equations representing the components of the welfare function. This is because 
these components depend on these outputs as can be seen in the equations 
obtained in the previous section (see for example Equation 4.16). In considering 
these externalities, some possible patterns are described as follows.  
 
4.2.2.2 Consumer surplus 
 
The first possible pattern that is considered in this part is associated with the effect 
of free trade on consumer surplus. To explore this effect, note first that according 
to equation 4.12, consumer surplus in an arbitrary country i is a monotonic 
transformation of the total output that is sold in the domestic market of this country 
(i.e. )(gQi ). In considering the example presented in Figure 4.2, this implies that 
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the externalities caused by the endogeneity of the model also affect this 
component of the welfare function. To see this, consider the first derivative of 
Equation 4.12 with respect to the term ηi(g): 
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Consider now the total output that is traded in the domestic market of country i 
which is represented by Equation 4.11. The first derivative of this expression with 
respect to the term ηi(g) is: 
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(4.61) 
 
Note that in Goyal and Joshi‟s world the parameter ϕ = 0 implying that this 
derivative converges to: 
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This means that in their model it always holds that 
)(
)(
g
gCS
i
i


> 0. That is, additional 
agreements always increase consumer surplus because these agreements 
increase the level of competition in country i. In this case the individual output that 
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is traded by existing partners in this country decrease but the addition of new 
players increases the aggregate level of output.  
 
In contrast, in the extended version of the model this is not so clear because the 
externalities on the outputs that are traded by the partner countries in third markets 
(i.e. the endogeneity characteristic of the model) affects the derivative shown in 
Expression 4.61. These externalities are captured by the terms 
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 in Equation 4.61. The first term is a positive externality 
on the total output and is explained by the fact that higher competition decreases 
the marginal cost faced by the intermediaries of the partner countries positively 
affecting the individual output that is sold by these countries in the domestic market 
of country i. The impact of this decrease in marginal cost depends on the existing 
levels of output already traded in third markets (i.e. 


)(
)(
gNj
ij
i
gq ).  
 
The second externality is expected to be negative as argued in the previous sub-
section. This is because the effect of bilateral agreements on the output sold by the 
partner countries to third countries is positive. That is, the resulting higher 
competition in country i lowers the price paid to the farming sector by the partner 
countries positively affecting the output exported by these countries to third 
markets. But this increase mitigates the effect of the first externality on the 
agricultural price because the increase in the output exported to third markets 
increases the cost faced by the intermediaries. While it is not possible to determine 
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which of these externalities dominate, it is conjectured that the positive influence of 
bilateral agreements on the total output that is traded in country i (see Equation 
4.62) dominates a net negative externality because the first and second 
externalities have a tendency to cancel each other. If this is the case, then it would 
hold that 
)(
)(
g
gCS
i
i


> 0. An important implication of this possibility is that if this 
inequality holds, then the only pairwise stable network when governments are 
biased in favour of consumers is global free trade. The reason is because when 
)(
)(
g
gCS
i
i


> 0, this country would always be willing to sign an additional agreement, 
and would never be willing to break an existing one. Since this would hold for an 
arbitrary country i, the same would be valid for the rest of the countries. This 
prediction is explored in the simulations offered in the next sections. 
 
A second possible pattern is related to the effect of market size on consumer 
surplus. In order to show this pattern, consider again the Equation 4.12. The first 
derivative of this expression with respect to the parameter α is: 
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Now consider the Equation 4.11. The first derivative of this expression with respect 
to the parameter α is: 
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Note that in Goyal and Joshi, this derivative converges to 
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meaning that in the original network model it always holds that 

 )(gCS i  > 0. That 
is, an increase in the size of the domestic market of country i increases the total 
output that is traded in this country pushing the price paid by consumers down and, 
therefore, increasing the level of consumer surplus. 
 
The same pattern is expected to be found in the extended version of the model. 
However, this effect is reinforced by the externality presented in the Expression 
4.64. This is captured by the term 

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 in that expression. This term is 
positive because an increase in the market size of country i positively affects the 
output that is traded in this market by the partner countries. As a result, the 
intermediaries of these countries have to pay higher prices to the farming sector 
negatively affecting the output that these firms trade in other third markets. This 
implies that the derivative in Expression 4.64 is positive and, therefore, 

 )(gCS i  > 
0. 
 
This result has important implications for the case of asymmetry in market size 
developed in Subsection 4.2.1.2. In considering the welfare Expressions 4.17 and 
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4.18, it is concluded not only that large countries obtain higher levels of consumer 
surplus, but also that the detrimental effect of the externality on the output traded 
by partner countries to other markets is more severe in large countries. By 
contrast, in a very small country this externality is not present. To see this, consider 
the following limit applied to Equation 4.11: 
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In this expression, 


)(
0 )(lim
gNj
ij
i
gq is zero because the optimal outputs that are 
traded by partner countries after solving the model depend on the coefficient α. 
Now, because )(gQi = 0 in the limit shown in expression 4.65, consumer surplus is 
also zero as this is a monotonic transformation of this output. This is an obvious 
result because the level of consumer surplus in a country with an irrelevant 
domestic market tends to zero. But this means that a very small country is 
harmless in terms of the externality on third countries identified in the Expression 
4.64. As shown in the simulation for the case of asymmetric countries in market 
size, this difference between large and small countries explains interesting 
deviations from the symmetrical case in terms of the possible stable international 
networks when governments are biased in favour of consumers.  
 
Another possible pattern is associated with the effect of an increase in the general 
level of monopsonistic power in all countries of the world on consumer surplus. 
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This is explained as follows. The first derivative of Expression 4.12 with respect to 
the parameter ϕ is:  
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Now consider the Equation 4.11. The first derivative of this expression with respect 
to ϕ is: 
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(4.67) 
 
  
According to this equation, there are three factors that affect this derivative. The 
first one corresponds to the term 








)(
)(
))(1(
gNj
ij
i
i
gq
g . It is difficult to 
predict the sign of this term because a generalised increase in the level of 
monopsonistic power increases the cost faced by all the intermediaries of the world 
and this negatively reduces the output that is traded in different markets. However, 
the decrease in the output that is traded in the domestic market of country i makes 
this country less competitive and this mitigates the decrease in output the output 
exported to other countries. Therefore it is not clear how this externality affects the 
output that is sold in country i when monopsonistic power increases. On the other 
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hand, the term 


)(
)())(1(
gNj
iji
i
gqg  indicates that an increase in the output that is 
traded by partner countries to third countries reduces the impact of an increase of 
monopsonistic power on the total output sold in country i. This is explained by the 
fact that more output traded to third markets increases the marginal cost faced by 
famers negatively affecting the output that is sold by the partner countries in 
country i. Thus, if in addition this cost is increased exogenously (i.e. if 
monopsonistic power increases), then the negative impact on the output sold in 
country i is more severe. Finally, the term )(2 gi  
indicates that the negative 
effect of increasing the level of monopsonistic power on the total output sold in 
country i is amplified when the size of the market in this country is larger. This 
happens because a larger market size is associated with more output sold in the 
country and this implies that intermediaries pay a higher agricultural price. 
Therefore when the intermediaries are already paying a higher agricultural price, 
the negative effect of an increase in monopsonistic power on the total output sold 
in country i is more severe.  In considering these effects, it is not possible to predict 
with certainty the net effect of a global increase in the total output sold in country i. 
But it is likely that this effect is negative because intermediaries in general face a 
higher marginal cost. This would mean that it is likely that the Expression 4.67 is 
negative suggesting that an increase in monopsonistic power may lower consumer 
surplus (i.e. 

 )(gCS i  < 0). This prediction is studied in the simulations developed in 
this chapter.  
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In relation to the case of asymmetric countries in terms of farmers‟ productivity, it is 
more difficult to analyse the effect of key variables on consumer surplus from the 
generic equations used in this case. This is due to the complexity of these 
expressions and the significant number of externalities involved (see Equations 
4.29 and 4.32). Likewise the case of endogenous tariffs is extremely complex 
because the endogeneity of the model increases through the impact of marginal 
cost on tariffs and vice versa. 
 
In summary, some possible patterns on consumer surplus were possible to identify 
from some of the equations presented in the previous section. However, it was not 
possible to deal with the case of asymmetry in farmers‟ productivity and 
endogenous tariffs. Neither was also possible to gain a full understanding of the 
possible stable networks that may arise in the extended version of the model. 
However, these considerations are fully explored in the simulations presented 
below.  
 
4.2.2.3 Profits 
 
The Equation 4.13 represents the profit obtained by the intermediary of country i in 
country j. This is a monotonic transformation of the output that is exported by this 
intermediary to this country (i.e. Equation 4.9). As in the case of consumer surplus, 
this equation has implicitly some externalities that capture the endogeneity of the 
model. In order to show these externalities, consider the effect of an increase in the 
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number of agreement in country j on the profit made by the intermediary of country 
i on the former country: 
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Consider equation 4.9. The first derivative of this expression with respect to the 
term ηj(g) is: 
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(4.69) 
 
Note in this equation that when there is no monopsonistic power (i.e. when ϕ = 0), 
this expression converges to: 
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(4.70) 
 
This means that in Goyal and Joshi‟s world, additional agreements signed by 
country j decreases the output exported in this country by the intermediary of 
country i. This is not surprising because this model only considers the effect of 
higher competition on this output that result from more trade. By introducing the 
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Expression 4.70 into 4.68 it is concluded therefore that in Goyal and Joshi always 
holds that 
)(
)()(
g
g
j
i
j




 < 0. That is, higher competition in country j negatively affects 
the profit made by the intermediary of country i. 
 
In the extended model, however, this is more complex because it also considers 
the externalities caused by the farming sector. Unfortunately the expression 4.69 is 
too complex to fully understand these externalities. However, some intuition can be 
provided as follows. When the number of agreements increases in country j, the 
domestic market of this country becomes more competitive negatively affecting the 
output that is traded in this market by the competitor partner countries. This 
decreases the price paid to the farming sector by the intermediaries of these 
countries. This causes a number of effects in the network. Firstly, the resulting 
lower agricultural price paid by these firms mitigates the negative effect of 
competition on their exported output. Secondly, this lower cost also affects the 
level of output that is traded by the partner countries to third markets. As a result, 
of this increase in output the agricultural price is also impacted to some extent.  
This generates other externalities on the output that is traded by these countries. 
As can be seen from this analysis, it is difficult to assess the net effect of these 
externalities. However, it is expected that the increase in the number of 
agreements by country j has a net negative impact of the profit made by the 
intermediary of country i. This is because it is likely that opposite externalities have 
a tendency to cancel each other. It is impossible to confirm this prediction without 
solving the model. However, this is explored in the simulations presented below.  
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The relevance of the externalities caused by the farming sector not only is relevant 
to identify the effect of free trade on the profits made by the intermediaries, but also 
to understand the trade-off faced by these firms when a new agreement is signed 
or when an existing agreement is broken. To illustrate the role of the externalities 
on this trade off, consider the following example. Suppose that country i is only 
connected to country j. In this case the total profit made by the intermediary of this 
country is )()()( )()( ggg ij
i
ii   where  
2)()( )(
2
)2(
)( gqg ii
i
i



  is the profit made 
in the domestic market and  2)()( )(
2
)2(
)( gqg ij
i
j



  is the export profit made in 
country j. Now suppose that country i signs an agreement with country k. In this 
case the total profit made by the intermediary of country i is )( iki gg   = 
)()( ik
i
i gg 
 
+ )()( ik
i
j gg 
 
+ )()( ik
i
k gg  , where ikgg   is the network that results 
after the agreement between countries i and k is signed.  As explained in above for 
Expression 4.9, it is expected that the output that is sold by an intermediary in a 
determined market decreases as the number of players increases in this market. If 
this holds, then )()( gii  > )(
)(
ik
i
i gg  . In other words, the intermediary of this 
country faces a loss in the domestic market after the agreement given by the 
higher degree of competition under the assumption that this inequality is not 
reversed by the externalities. On the other hand, the new agreement offers the 
intermediary of country i access to the domestic market of country k. This implies 
that this firm makes the new export profit )()( ik
i
k gg  . Thus, if the loss of profits in 
the domestic market is larger than the additional export profit (i.e. if )()( gii   
)()( ik
i
i gg  > )(
)(
ik
i
k gg  ), then the intermediary will not support the agreement.  
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This trade-off is also present in the original model by Goyal and Joshi. However, in 
the extended model this trade-off can directly and indirectly be affected when there 
is a farming sector. The direct effect is on the price that the intermediary of country 
i has to pay to farmers. That is, when this country signs the agreement, the 
domestic market becomes more competitive reducing in this way the price paid to 
the farming sector. This lower marginal cost can have a positive effect on the 
output that is exported to the existing partner country j meaning that the export 
profits made by the intermediary of country i in country j increases (i.e. )()( ik
i
j gg   
> )()( gij ). However, the new output that is exported to the new partner country k 
has the opposite effect meaning that the profit made in country j decreases. The 
net effect on this profit will depend on the relative number of links that countries i 
and k have before the agreement.  
 
This differs from the model by Goyal and Joshi because countries are not 
interdependent through the influence of the farming sector on the marginal cost 
faced by the intermediaries. That is, in Goyal and Joshi it always holds that 
)()( ik
i
j gg   = )(
)( gij . On the other hand, the indirect effect arises when country j 
has already an agreement with country k. Thus, if the latter signs an agreement 
with country i, then the marginal cost faced by the intermediary in country k will be 
affected. Now, because this country is already connected to country j, this will 
affect the degree of competition in the latter. This in turn will affect the export profit 
made by the intermediary of country i in country j. This example illustrates the high 
degree of endogeneity that is present when there is a farming sector, and this is 
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the key difference between the original model by Goyal and Joshi and the 
proposed extension. 
 
The same complexity is present when changing other parameters such as those 
representing market size and the level of monopsonistic power. And the model 
becomes even more complex when countries are asymmetric in terms of farmers‟ 
productivity and when tariffs are placed endogenously. As a consequence of this 
complexity, it is not possible to fully understand the possible stable networks when 
governments are biased in favour of firms. This is why the simulations were 
necessary to identify the nature of the extended network and to make reasonable 
predictions concerning possible stable structures of the international trade system 
of processed food goods.  
 
4.2.2.4 Producer surplus 
 
As explained in Section 4.2.1.1, the expression for producer surplus (see Equation 
4.15) is a monotonic transformation of the total output traded by the intermediary of 
country i and differs from the total profit function (i.e. Expression 4.14) in that the 
latter is the sum of monotonic transformations rather than a monotonic 
transformation of the sum. This difference has important implications for the 
stability of international networks because the producer surplus function has cross 
terms that increase significantly the complexity of the model. To see this fact, 
consider this simple version of Expression 4.15:  2)()( )()(
4
)( gqgqgPS ij
i
ii 

= 
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contributes to producer surplus because it reflects the interaction that there exists 
between the domestic markets of countries i and j and the influence of this 
interaction of the price paid to the farming sector. That is, because the intermediary 
demands the agricultural good to the same farming sector, exporting an additional 
output to country k will increase the price paid to this sector and this will also affect 
the output that is traded in the domestic market. Because the cross term is 
positive, it is inferred therefore that this interaction has a positive net effect on the 
price paid to the farming sector.  
 
While it is not possible to derive a clear pattern from the generic equations 
representing producer surplus under different assumptions, it can be proposed the 
idea that the farming sector may be favoured by global free trade as this increases 
the general level of agricultural prices throughout the interaction of the outputs in 
the involved cross terms. This prediction is explored in the simulations developed 
below. 
 
4.2.2.5 A final comment 
  
The analysis developed in this sub-section reveals that while it is possible to 
propose some possible patterns from the generic equations of the extended 
version of the model, it is not possible to fully understand the impact of key 
variables on the international trade system. This is a consequence of the 
endogeneity of the model that is caused by the presence of a farming sector that 
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not only connects the intermediaries through the impact on marginal cost, but also 
originates a number of externalities that affect the output traded by these firms. As 
a result of this complexity, it is not possible to assess the trade impact on welfare 
and, therefore, the possible behaviour of policymakers. 
 
This endogeneity is the key difference between the model by Goyal and Joshi and 
the extended version of this model. In the original model there are no externalities 
and this is why Goyal and Joshi were able to derivate general conclusions for the 
case of exogenous tariffs. However, they were unable to identify the possible 
stable networks under endogenous tariffs because the original model becomes 
intractable in mathematical terms. Obviously this also holds in the extended 
version because it is even more complex. This is why this dissertation is focussed 
mainly on the solutions under exogenous tariffs. However, endogenous tariffs are 
also considered in some simulations that comprise symmetry across countries. 
 
In spite of the complexity of the model, the use of simulations not only confirmed 
some of the patterns suggested in this subsection, but also allowed the 
identification of stable networks and the analysis of relevant implications for the 
issue of agricultural trade liberalisation. The study of these simulations is the topic 
of the following sections.  
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PART II: SIMULATIONS DEVELOPED IN THE RESEARCH 
 
As explained in the previous part, it is not possible to obtain general results from 
the proposed model as a consequence of its high level of endogeneity. It is for this 
reason that the model was solved using simulations. The objective of the second 
part of the current chapter is to explain and discuss the main results obtained from 
the simulations carried out in this dissertation. The calculations carried out in these 
simulations are presented in appendices A, B, C and D, and the numerical results 
are shown in the tables in Appendix E. Only the tables obtained from the first 
simulation (see Section 4.3.1.1) are also presented in this chapter with the purpose 
of illustrating how they have to be read.  
 
The material covered in this part is focussed on the cases of political unbiased 
governments, governments biased in favour of intermediaries, and governments 
biased in favour of the farming sector. The reason for this choice is because it is 
unlikely to find countries with governments biased in favour of consumers as they 
are more atomised implying that it is more difficult for them to influence 
policymakers. Nonetheless, a detailed analysis of governments biased in favour of 
consumers is provided in Appendix F. 
 
4.3 Simulations for bilateralism under symmetric countries 
 
As explained in the literature review, the original work by Goyal and Joshi (2006) 
adopted the traditional pairwise stability concept to determine the stability of 
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international trade networks when countries are involved in bilateral trade 
agreements. Using this concept these researchers found the following results. For 
the case of symmetric countries and exogenous tariffs, they found that when 
governments are biased in favour of consumers, the only pairwise stable network 
is global free trade; when governments are unbiased, the pairwise stable networks 
are global free trade and a network formed of a complete component and a 
singleton; and when governments are biased in favour of firms (i.e. intermediaries 
in the extended version of the model), the stable networks corresponds to global 
free trade, the empty network, and networks formed of one or more complete 
components of different size with or without singletons. For the case of symmetric 
countries and endogenous tariffs, Goyal and Joshi found that global free trade is 
pairwise stable. However, the stability of other networks was not explored by these 
researchers. Finally, they partially explored the issue of bilateral agreements under 
exogenous tariffs, asymmetry in market size, and different firms‟ cost structure. In 
this analysis, they found that smaller countries have greater incentives to form 
trade agreements than larger countries, and that low-cost countries have greater 
incentives to form trade agreements than high-cost countries. However, the 
stability of international networks under different policy biases was not studied by 
Goyal and Joshi. 
 
In order to determine deviations from these results, a number of simulations were 
carried out in this section. Note that in these simulations the values for the slopes 
and intercepts of the various functions that have been used and that the ordering of 
these results are unlikely to change with alternative values. The figure summarises 
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the set of possible networks that can be formed with countries i, j, k and l. These 
networks are shown in the following figure. 
Figure 4.3. Possible network architectures formed with countries i, j, k and l. 
 
Note in this figure that some networks are omitted. For example, country l in 
network g in this figure is a singleton. Similar network architectures could have 
been introduced in order to represent the cases when the other countries are 
singleton. However, information about these networks can be inferred from network 
g as a result of the assumption of symmetrical countries.  
 
4.3.1 Bilateralism under exogenous tariffs and symmetric countries 
 
In order to capture the effect of different levels of monopsonistic power on the 
international trade stability when countries are symmetric and when tariffs are 
established exogenously, three simulations were carried out using the networks 
presented in Figure 4.3. Each of these simulations corresponds to different levels 
of monopsonistic power associated with specific values of the parameter i in 
equation 4.1: i = 0; i = 0.5; and i = 1.5 for all i  N. In these simulations, non-
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monopsonistic power implies i = 0 which corresponds, by definition, to the original 
model by Goyal and Joshi (2006). The other values for i were selected in 
accordance to related empirical research that have found values for this parameter 
smaller than one (see, for example, McCorriston and MacLaren, 2013). In this 
context values of i equal to 0.5 and 1.5 are considered as representing large and 
very large degrees of monoponistic power, respectively.   
 
On the other hand, it was also assumed that market size (i.e. the parameter i in 
the inverse demand function in Equation 4.6) is equal to one in all countries of the 
world without losing generality given the assumption of symmetrical countries. The 
mathematical computations carried out in these simulations are presented in 
Appendix A. These simulations are reported below. 
 
4.3.1.1 Simulation 1: i = 0 and i = 1 for all i  N.    
 
As explained above, this simulation converges to the original model by Goyal and 
Joshi (2006) because in this case there is no monopsonistic power (i.e. i = 0). 
Consequently, the results obtained in this part will be used as a benchmark to 
evaluate deviations from the original international trade network model when there 
is a farming sector. 
 
The results of the simulation in terms of consumer surplus, profits made by the 
intermediary, and welfare are presented in the following tables (note that producer 
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surplus was omitted in this simulation because it is zero when i = 0 as can be 
inferred from Equation 4.16).  
 
Table 4.1. Consumer surplus 
 Countries 
Networks i j k l 
a 
b 
c 
d 
e 
f 
g 
h 
i 
j 
k 
0.1250 
0.2222 
0.2222 
0.2813 
0.2813 
0.2813 
0.2813 
0.3200 
0.2813 
0.2813 
0.3200 
0.1250 
0.1250 
0.2222 
0.2813 
0.2813 
0.2222 
0.2813 
0.2222 
0.2813 
0.3200 
0.3200 
0.1250 
0.2222 
0.2222 
0.2222 
0.2813 
0.2222 
0.2813 
0.2222 
0.3200 
0.3200 
0.3200 
0.1250 
0.1250 
0.2222 
0.2222 
0.2813 
0.1250 
0.1250 
0.2222 
0.2222 
0.2813 
0.3200 
 
Table 4.2. Profits made by the intermediary 
 Countries 
Networks i j k l 
a 
b 
c 
d 
e 
f 
g 
h 
i 
j 
k 
0.2500 
0.2222 
0.2222 
0.2361 
0.1875 
0.2847 
0.1875 
0.3733 
0.1650 
0.1425 
0.1600 
0.2500 
0.2500 
0.2222 
0.2361 
0.1875 
0.1736 
0.1875 
0.1511 
0.1650 
0.2050 
0.1600 
0.2500 
0.2222 
0.2222 
0.1736 
0.1875 
0.1736 
0.1875 
0.1511 
0.2761 
0.2050 
0.1600 
0.2500 
0.2500 
0.2222 
0.1736 
0.1875 
0.2500 
0.2500 
0.1511 
0.1511 
0.1425 
0.1600 
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Table 4.3. Welfare. 
 Countries 
Networks i j k l 
a 
b 
c 
d 
e 
f 
g 
h 
i 
j 
k 
0.3750 
0.4444 
0.4444 
0.5174 
0.4688 
0.5660 
0.4688 
0.6933 
0.4463 
0.4238 
0.4800 
0.3750 
0.3750 
0.4444 
0.5174 
0.4688 
0.3958 
0.4688 
0.3733 
0.4463 
0.5250 
0.4800 
0.3750 
0.4444 
0.4444 
0.3958 
0.4688 
0.3958 
0.4688 
0.3733 
0.5961 
0.5250 
0.4800 
0.3750 
0.3750 
0.4444 
0.3958 
0.4688 
0.3750 
0.3750 
0.3733 
0.3733 
0.4238 
0.4800 
 
The case of politically unbiased governments 
 
Let us start the analysis by considering the case of unbiased governments (i.e. 
governments care about maximising an unweighted welfare function). According to 
the information presented in Table 4.3, there are networks that are preferred for 
some countries but they are not pairwise stable and, therefore, cannot be reached 
permanently. For example, network j is the preferred network for country j because 
the highest level of welfare in this country (i.e. 0.5250) is reached in this network. 
The reason is because country j has already agreements with all countries of the 
world (see Figure 4.3) implying that the domestic market of this country has a high 
degree of competition as a consequence of these agreements. As a result, 
consumers in this country obtain high levels of consumer surplus.  
 
At the same time, the domestic firm of country j makes high profits in countries i 
and l because the degree of competition in these countries is lower as they are not 
fully integrated. However, this network is not pairwise stable because these 
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countries have an incentive to sign a bilateral agreement (i.e. passing from network 
j to k in Figure 4.3) as this increases the level of welfare in each country from 
0.4238 to 0.4800. Because this agreement only depends on the decisions made by 
the governments of countries i and l, country j cannot remains in its preferred 
network.  
 
In considering these unstable preferred networks and using the information 
presented in Table 4.3, it is inferred that network k is link deletion proof because no 
country in this network has an incentive to break an existing link. This can be seen 
from the fact that when countries i and l break their agreement, welfare in each 
country decreases from 0.4800 to 0.4238 (i.e. when passing from network k to 
network j). Following this reasoning, it is inferred that the set of link deletion proof 
networks is D = {a, b, c, d, e, f, g, j, k, Eq} where Eq denotes the networks that are 
equivalent to the networks included in this set6.  
 
On the other hand, Network a is not link addition proof because countries i and k 
have an incentive to sign an agreement (i.e. passing from network a to network b) 
because this agreement increases welfare in both countries from 0.3750 to 0.4444. 
Following this reasoning, it is concluded that the set of link addition proof networks 
is A = {g, k, Eq}.  
 
                                                          
6
 For example, the network in which countries i and j have a link and countries k and l are singletons 
is equivalent to network b in Figure 4.3 given the assumption of symmetrical countries. The former 
was not included in this figure because its stability is inferred from the analysis of network b. 
However, it has to be included in the set D because this set includes all networks in which countries 
are unwilling to break an existing link.  
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Now, remember that pairwise stability requires that: (1) no country has an incentive 
to break an existing agreement (i.e. the link deletion proof condition); and (2) a new 
agreement is not feasible because at least one country is unwilling to sign this 
agreement (i.e. the link addition proof condition). This implies that the set of 
pairwise stable networks is found in the intersection of the sets of link deletion and 
link addition proof networks.  In the case of unbiased governments this is given by: 
P = D  A = {g, k, Eq}. This result is not surprising because the international 
network model proposed in this dissertation converges to the original model 
developed by Goyal and Joshi (2006) when i = 0, and the result has already been 
reported by these researchers in Proposition 1 of their article (see Goyal and Joshi 
2006, 755).  
 
The case of politically biased governments 
 
Let us now determine the stable networks for the case of biased governments in 
favour of consumers. In considering Table 4.1 it is concluded that D = {a, b, c, d, e, 
f, g, h, i, j, k, Eq} and A = {k}. This means that the set of pairwise stable networks in 
this case is P = D  A = {k}. That is, global free trade. Likewise, in considering 
Table 4.2 it is inferred that D = {a, e, g, k, Eq} and A = {a, b, g, i, k, Eq}. This 
implies that the set of pairwise stable networks when governments are biased in 
favour of the intermediary is given by P = D  A = {a, g, k, Eq}. As in the unbiased 
case, these results are not surprising because they have already been reported by 
Goyal and Joshi (2006, 760-761) in Propositions 4 and 5 of their work. 
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The intuition behind these results is discussed as follows. 
 
Discussion 
 
In relation to the intermediaries, these firms always face a trade off when an 
agreement is either signed or broken. That is, when a country signs an agreement, 
they lose profits in the domestic market as a consequence of the higher level of 
competition and, at the same time, they make additional profits in the new partner 
country after the agreement (the opposite happens when an agreement is broken). 
Consequently, the intermediaries are better off only when the loss of domestic 
profit is smaller than the gain in profits in new partner countries. But this depends 
on the existing number of agreements in both partner countries. In other words, 
this depends on both the current architecture of the network and the relative 
position of countries in the network.  
 
This is why there are multiple equilibriums when governments are biased in favour 
of the intermediaries. Depending on the current architecture of the network, some 
intermediaries may be better off or worse off after an agreement. For example, the 
empty network is stable because there is a net loss of profits when two singletons 
sign an agreement. Likewise, network g is stable because breaking a link causes a 
net loss of profits in countries i, j and k (i.e. the gain in profits in the domestic 
market in these countries is smaller than the loss of profits in foreign countries after 
a link is broken). These countries would be willing to sign an agreement with 
country l because the additional profit that they can make in that country is larger 
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than the loss of domestic profits caused for the higher degree of competition. 
However, the opposite happens in country l. This country is in autarky in network g 
implying the intermediary in this country makes high profits in the domestic market 
because this firm is a monopolist. Consequently, signing an agreement with either 
i, j or k would cause a significant loss of profit in the domestic market that is not 
compensated by the additional profit in the new foreign country. Finally, global free 
trade is stable because the gain in profits in the domestic market is not 
compensated by the loss of profit in the ex-partner foreign country after an 
agreement is broken. 
 
In the case of unbiased governments, the set of pairwise stable networks is smaller 
than the set that is observed when governments are biased in favour of domestic 
firms. The reason is because consumers positively influence the formation of 
bilateral agreements as this increases consumer surplus (see Appendix F). For 
example, the empty network is only stable when governments are biased in favour 
of intermediaries because the loss of domestic profit is not compensated by the 
gain in profits in the foreign country when an agreement is signed. However, when 
consumer surplus is included in the welfare function, this net loss of profit is 
compensated by the gain in consumer surplus caused by the higher degree of 
competition after the agreement. This affects the link addition proof condition of the 
empty network that was valid for the case of biased governments in favour of the 
intermediaries. In the unbiased case, this condition does not hold because the 
countries in the empty networks have an incentive to form a bilateral agreement. 
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In summary, the main conclusions obtained from this simulation are: (i) when 
governments are biased in favour of consumers, only global free trade is pairwise 
stable; (ii) the number of pairwise stable networks increases as more weight is 
given to the intermediaries in the welfare function; (iii) global free trade is always 
stable independently of the weights given to the components of the welfare 
function7; and (iv) the empty network is pairwise stable when governments are 
biased in favour of intermediaries.  
 
4.3.1.2 Simulation 2: i = 0.5 and i = 1 for all i  N.    
 
This simulation includes the farming sector into the network approach which is 
captured by the monopsonistic power exercised by the intermediaries. That is, in 
this case it is assumed that the price paid by the intermediaries to the farming 
sector increases as the quantity supplied by the rural sector increases (see 
Equation 4.1). However, this increase is moderate because it is assumed in this 
simulation that the degree of market power is not very high (i.e. i = 0.5). The 
relevant information obtained from the simulations are summarised in Tables E.4, 
E.5, E.6 and E.7 in Appendix E. 
 
 
 
                                                          
7
 This is a consequence of the stability of global free trade in the extreme cases when governments 
are biased in favour of consumers and intermediaries. In the first case, it holds that CSi(g
c
)  CSi(g
c
 
 gik) for all i,k  N , and in the second case it holds that i(g
c
)  i(g
c
  gik) for all i,k  N . Let 
multiply the first inequality by a non-negative arbitrary constant a, and the second by an non-
negative arbitrary constant b. By adding the resulting inequalities, it is obtained aCSi(g
c
) + bi(g
c
)  
aCSi(g
c
  gik) + bi(g
c
  gik) for all i,k  N. But this means that global free trade is pairwise stable for 
any non-negative weight (a or b) put on the components of the welfare function.  
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The case of politically unbiased governments 
 
The sets of link deletion proof and link addition proof networks that are needed to 
identify the pairwise stable networks for the case of unbiased countries can be 
inferred from the information given in Table E.7. In considering this information, it 
was found that these sets correspond to D = {a, b, c, d, e, f, g, i, j, k, Eq} and A = 
{k}. Consequently, the set of pairwise stable networks in this case is given by P = D 
 A = {k}. This is an interesting result because this means that when governments 
are political unbiased, the inclusion of the farming sector has a positive effect on 
free trade. This is inferred from the fact that the stable networks in Goyal and 
Joshi‟s model are networks g (and equivalents) and k. But the stability of the 
former is broken when there is a farming sector and the only stable network in this 
case is k. That is, global free trade.  
 
The case of politically biased governments 
 
In this simulation there are three types of biases: bias in favour of consumers (see 
Appendix F); firms; and the farming sector. The information that is needed to 
identify the pairwise stable networks under these biases is presented in Tables 
E.4, E.5 and E.6 in Appendix E. 
 
When governments are biased in favour of the intermediaries, the sets of link 
deletion and link addition proof networks are given by D = {a} and A = { a, b, c, d, e, 
f, g, i, j, k, Eq}, respectively, a result that was inferred from the information 
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presented in Table E.5. This implies that the set of pairwise stable networks in this 
case is P = D  A = {a}. This is different from the results by Goyal and Joshi. As 
shown in subsection 4.3.1.1, the pairwise stable networks in their model are a, g 
(and equivalents) and k. This difference has two main implications. Firstly, because 
network a is the empty network, it is inferred that the addition of the farming sector 
plays against free trade when governments are biased in favour of intermediaries. 
Secondly, the claim made by Goyal and Joshi that global free trade (i.e. network k) 
is always pairwise stable independent of the governments‟ political biases does not 
hold when the farming sector is included because in this case the stability of 
network k is broken. 
 
On the other hand, in considering Table E.6, it was inferred that the sets of link 
deletion proof and link addition proof networks when governments are biased in 
favour of the farming sector are given by D = {a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j, k, Eq} and A 
= {k}. Consequently, the set of pairwise stable networks in this case is given by P = 
D  A = {k}. This result suggests that the inclusion of the farming sector into the 
network approach has a positive effect on the formation of bilateral agreements 
when governments are biased in favour of farmers as the only stable network in 
this case is global free trade.  
 
Discussion 
 
The results obtained in this simulation reveal that the international trade structure is 
strongly influenced by the presence of a farming sector in each country. The effect 
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of this sector on the stability of international trade networks is explained by the 
monopsonistic power exercised the intermediaries who, in contrast to the approach 
by Goyal and Joshi, have to pay a price for the agricultural good that increases in 
proportion to the output sold by the farmers (see Equation 4.1). The effect of this 
non-fixed marginal cost faced by the intermediaries on trade stability is explained 
as follows. 
 
Let us consider first the case of governments biased in favour of intermediaries. In 
comparing the results obtained in this simulation with the previous one, it is 
concluded that governments are more willing to break existing agreements when 
there is a farming sector and less willing to sign new ones (i.e. the number of 
networks in the set of link deletion proof decreases and the number of networks in 
the set of link addition proof networks increases when introducing the farming 
sector). The reason is because more trade increases the total output that is sold by 
the intermediaries in the domestic and foreign markets. Since the price paid to 
farmers increases in proportion to this output (i.e. increasing marginal cost), the 
total cost faced by these firms in more integrated networks is significantly higher 
and negatively affects the profit obtained by them in these networks. As a 
consequence, if governments are biased in favour of intermediaries, they will break 
links in order to help them to obtain higher profits in less integrated networks until 
network a is reached. That is, until the empty network is reached which is the 
network where the intermediaries make the highest level of profits as they pay 
lowest price to farmers. In contrast, when there is no monopsonistic power (i.e. in 
Goyal and Joshi‟s world), the intermediaries face a fixed-marginal cost implying 
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that these firms sell more output in more integrated networks with the same 
marginal cost making, therefore, higher profits. As a result, biased governments in 
favour of intermediaries are less inclined to break links which explains why the 
number of stable networks in the previous simulation is larger.  
 
On the other hand, when governments are biased in favour of the farming sector, 
only free trade is the pairwise stable network. This is also explained by the fact that 
the intermediaries face a non-fixed marginal cost that increases as the output 
purchased by these firms increases. This non-fixed marginal cost implies that 
farmers are paid higher prices when they sell higher output volumes positively 
affecting producer surplus. Thus, because free trade increases the output that is 
purchased by the intermediaries, the farmer sector will support additional 
agreements. The main implication of this finding is that the farming sector 
exercises a positive effect on free trade when governments are symmetric and 
biased in favour of this sector. 
 
In considering these extreme cases, it is clear that the pairwise stability of global 
free trade depends on whether the governments put more weight on the 
intermediaries in the welfare function. For example, the results revealed that when 
governments are unbiased, only global free trade is pairwise stable. The reason is 
because the positive influence that consumers and the farming sector exercise on 
free trade offsets the negative influence exercised by the intermediary (see 
Appendix F for the case of governments biased in favour of consumers). It is 
inferred, therefore, that deviations from global free trade can only be observed in a 
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world where governments put more weight on intermediaries under the assumption 
that the latter have monopsonistic power, a fact that does not hold in Goyal and 
Joshi‟s world. This confirms that the existence of a farming sector can strongly 
affect the stability of the international trade system and global free trade in 
particular.  
 
4.3.1.3 Simulation 3: i = 1.5 and i = 1 for all i  N.    
 
This is the last simulation of this section and was introduced to explore the effects 
of very high levels of monopsonistic power on the international trade system. The 
information that is needed for this analysis is presented in Tables E.8, E.9, E.10 
and E.11 is Appendix E.   
 
In considering these tables, it was found that the relevant sets of networks are the 
same as the ones identified for the case of moderate degree of monopsonistic 
power (i.e. when i = 0.5). That is, when governments are unbiased, the sets of link 
deletion proof, link addition proof and pairwise stable networks corresponds to D = 
{a, b, c, d, e, f, g, i, j, k, Eq}, A = {k} and P = D  A = {k}, respectively. When 
governments are biased in favour of consumers, these sets correspond to D = {a, 
b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j, k, Eq}, A = {k} and P = D  A = {k} (see Appendix F). When 
governments are biased in favour of the intermediaries, these sets are given by D 
= {a}, A = { a, b, c, d, e, f, g, i, j, k, Eq}, and  P = D  A = {a}. Finally, when 
governments are biased in favour of the farming sector, these sets correspond to D 
= {a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j, k, Eq}, A = {k} and P = D  A = {k}.  
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This result reinforces the conclusion that monopsonistic power can strongly affect 
the international trade system when there is a farming sector. The reason, as in the 
previous simulation, is due to the fact that intermediaries face higher marginal cost 
in more integrated networks because the higher output volume sold in these 
markets pushes the price paid to the farming sector up negatively affecting the 
profit made by the former.  
 
4.3.2 Bilateralism under endogenous tariffs and symmetric countries 
 
One of the most challenging aspects of the proposed international trade network 
model is the analysis of trade stability when tariffs are established endogenously. 
This is because endogenous tariffs into the model generate high degree of 
endogeneity across countries making it very difficult to solve the model even when 
having only four countries in the world. This endogeneity arises from the fact that 
tariffs affect the output in equilibrium in each market of the world and, therefore, the 
cost incurred by intermediaries when buying the output to the farming sector given 
the monopsonistic power exercised by the former. This cost, in turn, affects the 
optimal tariff in each country, and this, in turn, the output in equilibrium in each 
market, and so on. Under exogenous tariffs, the endogeneity problem of tariffs is 
not present and this is why it easier to analyse considerations concerning 
asymmetry and policy biases. For example, policy biases under exogenous tariffs 
can be explored by multiplying weights on the simulated values of consumer 
surplus, profits and producer surplus in the weighted welfare function. However, 
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this cannot be done when tariffs are endogenous because the simulated values of 
these variables depend on specific tariffs that are different for each bias assumed 
in the weighted welfare function.  
 
In recognising this problem, the current investigation is focused mainly on the 
simplest case of homogeneous and unbiased countries under endogenous tariffs 
given the complexity of the analysis (this is the same strategy adopted by Goyal 
and Joshi (2006) to study the issue of international trade networks under 
endogenous tariffs). However, partial extensions are explored to analyse the effect 
of policy biases on the pairwise stability of global free trade. The mathematical 
calculations carried out for the simulations under the assumption of endogenous 
tariffs are presented in Appendix B.   
 
4.3.2.1 Simulation 4: i = 0 and i = 1 for all i  N.    
 
Similar to the case of exogenous tariffs, this simulation converges to the original 
model by Goyal and Joshi (2006) because there is no monopsonistic power (i.e. i 
= 0). In this case, these researchers only studied the pairwise stability of global free 
trade but they did not investigate the stability of other networks given the 
complexity of the analysis. This is formally stated by Goyal and Joshi (2006) who 
point out: “Given the complexity of the computations involved, we have been 
unable to completely characterize the nature of stable networks in this setting. We 
do have some interesting partial results” (p.768).  
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The simulation developed with four countries was very useful to extend the original 
work by these researchers because it was possible to assess the pairwise stability 
of networks other than free trade when governments are unbiased. The results 
obtained from this exercise were used to assess the influence of monopsonistic 
power on the trade system when tariffs are placed endogenously. The information 
needed for this analysis is summarised in Tables E.12, E.13, E.14 and E.15 in 
Appendix E.  
 
According to the information presented in Table E.15, the set of link deletion proof 
and link addition proof networks when governments are unbiased correspond to D 
= {a, b, c, e, g, j, k, Eq} and A = {g, k}, respectively. This implies that the set of 
pairwise stable networks in this case is given by P = D  A = {g, k, Eq}. This result 
is the same as the one obtained for the case of unbiased countries, exogenous 
tariffs, and  = 0 suggesting that this finding remains robust through the 
assumptions of endogenous and exogenous tariffs.  
 
In order to understand this result, an analysis of the components of the welfare 
function based on the information presented in Tables E.12, E.13 and E.14 is 
carried out as follows. Before showing this analysis, however, it is important to 
highlight the fact that this exercise does not have to be interpreted as the 
incentives of different groups of firms when governments are biased in favour of 
them. The reason is because the information presented in these tables was 
obtained from tariffs that maximise an un-weighted welfare function. In relation to 
this point, the relevant information that is needed to analyse the incentives of 
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interest groups when governments are biased has to be obtained from optimal 
tariffs that maximise a weighted welfare function. This extension is explored in 
Section 4.3.2.4. 
 
According to the information presented in Table E.12, consumer surplus always 
increases when new agreements are signed, and always decreases when existing 
ones are broken. This is explained, as in the case of exogenous tariffs, by the fact 
that more trade increases competition in domestic markets (i.e. reduces the market 
power exercised by intermediaries) positively affecting consumer surplus. On the 
other hand, the information in Table E.13 reveals that in networks a, e, g, j, k and 
equivalents, the total profit made by at least one intermediary in the world 
decreases when its country breaks an existing agreement. Likewise, the profit 
made by at least one intermediary in the world in networks a, b, g, k and 
equivalents decreases when its country signs an additional agreement. This 
implies that, as in the case of exogenous tariffs, these firms would not support 
signing a new or breaking and existing agreement in networks a, g, k or 
equivalents. Again, as in the case of exogenous tariffs, this is a reflection of the 
trade-off faced by the intermediaries: new agreements increases the profit made by 
these firms in foreign countries but reduces the profit made in the domestic market 
as a consequence of higher competition, and the opposite happens when an 
agreement is broken. Thus, these firms would support signing or breaking an 
agreement depending on whether this implies a net gain in profits. Finally, it is 
inferred from the information presented in Table E.14 that tariff revenue decreases 
when governments sign an agreement and its maximum value in a country is 
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reached when this country does not have any international agreement. The reason 
is because according to the information presented in Appendix B, it is in this 
condition where countries place the highest tariff to imported processed food. 
 
In comparing these figures with the pairwise stable networks described above, it is 
concluded that the pairwise stability of networks g (and equivalents) and k are 
explained by the profits made by the intermediaries, and the pairwise stability of 
the latter network is reinforced by the high level of consumer surplus that is 
obtained in global free trade. This positive influence of consumer surplus on trade 
is large enough to offset the negative influence of tariff revenue.  
 
4.3.2.2 Simulation 5: i = 0.5 and i = 1 for all i  N.    
 
Let us now explore the pairwise stability of international trade networks when there 
is a farming sector in each country of the world. For this purpose, consider the 
information presented in Tables E.16, E.17, E.18, E.19 and E.20 in Appendix E. 
 
In considering the information presented in Table E.20, it is inferred that the set of 
link deletion and link deletion proof networks correspond to D = {a, b, c, d, e, f, g, j, 
k, Eq} and A = {g, k, Eq}, respectively. This implies that the set of parwise stable 
networks in this case is given by P = D  A = {g, k, Eq}. This result is interesting 
because, in contrast to the case of exogenous tariffs, it reveals that the farming 
sector does not affect the pairwise stability of network g (and equivalents) when  = 
0.5. To see this, note that the set of pairwise stable networks identified in the 
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current simulation is exactly the same as the one when  = 0 (see Section 4.3.2.1). 
This differs from the case of exogenous tariffs because, as discussed in 4.3.1, the 
stability of network g is broken when there is a farming sector. It is explained in that 
section that more trade implies higher levels of exported output and this pushes the 
price paid to farmers up reducing the profit made by the intermediaries. 
Consequently, the level of profits made by the latter increases when the country 
breaks and existing agreement, and this gain in profit is larger than the loss of 
consumer surplus which is why the pairwise stability of network g is broken. In the 
case of endogenous tariffs, in contrast, this stability is not broken because firms do 
not lose profits when an agreement is broken.  
 
The reason is due to the fact that breaking an agreement adds an additional cost to 
intermediaries which corresponds to the higher tariffs paid to non-partner countries 
as can be inferred in Equations 4.50 and 4.53. Thus, while the deviation from 
network g helps these firms to reduce total costs by paying lower prices to the 
farming sector, they have to incur in a higher cost which corresponds to higher 
tariff levels in non-partner countries. This trade off in cost is clearly identified in 
these equations which show the profit made by the intermediary in country k in the 
domestic market of a non-partner country i. This profit implicitly includes a total 
cost function given by TC(g) = )()(
2
1
)()( )()( gqgqgqgT k
k
i
k
ii  . Using Expression 4.1, 
this total cost function becomes TC(g) = )()()()( )( gqgpgqgT k
f
k
k
ii  .  
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As can be seen in this expression, the cost function has two components: one 
related to the tariff faced in country i (i.e. )()( )( gqgT kii ), and the other one related to 
the price paid to the farming sector (i.e. )()( gqgp k
f
k ). Thus, when a country in 
network g (and equivalents) breaks an existing agreement, the first component 
increases, but the second one decreases. The increase in the first component is 
large enough to prevent the pairwise stability of this network to be broken. In 
contrast, when tariffs are placed exogenously, only the second component is 
present in the cost function implying that when a country breaks an agreement, 
total cost decreases unambiguously positively affecting the profit made by the 
intermediary and, consequently, breaking the deletion proof property of the 
pairwise stability in this network. 
 
The information presented in Table E.18 reveals that producer surplus always 
decreases when an existing agreement is broken. This implies that the farming 
sector will not support the decision of deleting a trade link with another country 
when governments are unbiased. This is consistent with the finding obtained for 
the case of exogenous tariffs. However, there is a difference in relation to decisions 
concerning the signature of new agreements. It was shown in Section 4.3.1 that 
when tariffs are placed exogenously, the farming sector will always support new 
agreements. However, when tariffs are endogenous, this not always holds. In 
particular, Table E.18 shows that producer surplus in country l decreases when this 
country signs a new agreement. This implies that the farming sector in this country 
will not support such an agreement. The reason for this result is explained by the 
fact that the agreement causes a significant decrease in the output sold by the 
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intermediary of country l in the domestic market which is not compensated by the 
increase in output sold in foreign countries after the agreement. This is inferred 
from the information presented in Appendix B: the increase in output exported from 
country l after the signature of the agreement between country l and k (i.e. after 
passing from network g to network i) is equal to 0.0561, and a decrease in the 
output sold in the domestic market by the intermediary of country l is equal to 
0.0626. This implies that there is a net decrease in the output purchased to the 
farming sector of this country equal to 0.0626  0.0561 = 0.0065. This net 
decrease in output pushes the price paid to farmers down negatively affecting 
producer surplus.  
 
This result only happens when tariffs are endogenous because before the 
agreement country l is already exporting output to foreign countries having high 
levels of competition. Thus the increase in output that is exported after the 
agreement is not as large as the decrease in the output sold in the domestic 
market of this country. In contrast, when tariffs are exogenous, country l does not 
export any level of output to foreign countries before the agreement. Thus, when 
the agreement is signed, the increase in exported output is large enough to offsets 
the decrease in output sold in the domestic market. The main implication of this 
finding is that the parwise stability of network g and equivalents when tariffs are 
endogenous and when governments are unbiased is reinforced when there is a 
farming sector. In other works, the existence of inefficient stable pairwise stable 
networks is reinforced when there is a farming sector.  
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In relation to the other components of the welfare function, the information 
presented in Tables E.16, E.17 and E.19 reveals the same patterns than the ones 
identified in the previous simulation, namely: (i) consumer surplus always 
increases when new agreements are signed, and never decreases when existing 
ones are broken; (ii) the intermediaries would not support signing a new or 
breaking and existing agreement in networks a, g, k or equivalents; and (iii) tariff 
revenue decreases when governments sign an agreement and its maximum value 
in a country is reached when this country does not have any international 
agreement.  
 
In considering the results obtained in this simulation, it is concluded that the effect 
of the farming sector on trade liberalisation is not strong enough to break the 
inefficient pairwise stable networks identified in the case when there is no 
monopsonistic power, when governments are unbiased, and when tariffs are 
determined endogenously.   
 
4.3.2.3 Simulation 6: i = 1.5 and i = 1 for all i  N.    
 
This simulation was introduced to determine the effect of the farming sector on the 
trade system when intermediaries exercise very high levels of monopsonistic 
power. The information employed in this simulation is presented in Tables E.21, 
E.22, E.23, E.24 and E.25 in Appendix E. 
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The information presented in Table E.25 reveals that the sets of link deletion and 
link addition proof networks are D = {a, b, c, d, e, f, g, j, k, Eq} and A = {g, k, Eq}. 
This implies that the set of pairwise stable networks in this case is P = D  A = {g, 
k, Eq}. This is the same result as the ones obtained for the cases when  = 0 and  
= 0.5. It is concluded, therefore, that the influence of the farming sector is not 
strong enough to affect the pairwise stability of networks when governments are 
unbiased and when tariffs are placed endogenously for levels of monopsonistic 
power equal or smaller than 1.5.  
 
In spite of this result, it can be inferred from Tables E.22 and E.23 that high levels 
of monosonistic power influence the incentives of intermediaries and the farming 
sector in some networks. For example, it was shown in the simulations for the 
cases of  = 0 and  = 0.5 that in networks a and b, not all intermediaries support 
the signature of new agreements. However, this does not hold when  = 1.5 
because in this case all the intermediaries support an additional agreement 
suggesting that the farming sector exercise a positive influence towards free trade 
on intermediaries for very high levels of monopsonistic power. This result is 
explained by a combination of three interrelated effects in which some of them 
operate in opposite direction. They correspond to the market power effect (i.e. 
intermediaries lose profits in the domestic market in more integrated networks as a 
consequence of higher competition but at the same time make additional profit in 
foreign markets); the monopsonistic effect (i.e. the increase in the quantity of 
output exported to other countries in more integrated networks pushes the price 
paid to farmers up negatively affecting the profit made by the intermediaries); and 
202 
 
the tariff effect (more trade reduces the level of tariffs applied by non-partner 
countries positively affecting the profit made in these countries).  
 
In order to illustrate how the relevance of these three effects changes under 
different levels of monoponistic power, let us consider for illustrative purposes 
networks a and b. As explained above, when  = 0 and  = 0.5, not all 
intermediaries support the signature of new agreements in network a. However, 
this does not hold when  = 1.5 because in this case all the intermediaries support 
an additional agreement. To understand this result, consider Figure 4.4. This figure 
is based on the information presented in Appendix B and shows the changes in 
output, profits and tariffs when countries i and k signs an agreement (i.e. when 
passing from network a to b) for different values of the parameter . The symbols  
and  denote an increase and a decrease in a determined variable, respectively, 
and a bar over a variable means that this variable does not change after the 
agreement.  
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Figure 4.4. Effects of an agreement signed by countries i and k when the initial 
network is a. 
 
According to this figure, when there is no monopsonistic power (i.e.  = 0), the 
agreement between countries i and k causes a decrease in the output sold in the 
domestic market of these countries, and an increase in the output exported to the 
new partner countries. However, the output exported to non-partner counties (i.e. 
countries j and l) remains the same. The net change in output is, however, 
negative and this explains why the agreement causes a net loss of profits in each 
of the new partner counties. On the other hand, this agreement generates a 
positive externality in countries j and l. That is, the tariffs applied by countries i and 
k decrease after the agreement positively affecting the quantity of the output 
exported by countries j and l to the former. As a result, the intermediaries in 
countries j and l make higher profits after the agreement, even when the profits that 
these intermediaries make in the domestic market do not change (this is because 
the tariffs in these countries are not affected by the new agreement). In terms of 
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the incentives of the intermediaries of countries i and k, they will not support the 
agreement because this would cause a net loss of profits for them.  
 
Let us now consider the case when  = 0.5. According to Figure 4.4, in this case all 
the variables included in the analysis are affected by the new agreement proving 
the high degree of endogeneity of the model when there is monopsonistic power in 
a world with endogenous tariffs. In order to understand the implications of this 
endogeneity, the effects of the agreement on countries i and k is analysed first.  
 
Figure 4.4 shows that when these two countries sign an agreement, the output that 
is sold by the intermediaries of these countries in the domestic market decreases 
as a consequence of the higher competition. This negatively affects the profit 
obtained by these firms from these markets. The new agreement causes an 
increase in the output exported by the intermediaries of countries i and k to the 
new partner countries. In addition, the output exported to non-partner countries (i.e. 
j and l) also increases as a consequence of the tariff reduction in these countries 
after the signature of the new agreement (note that this decrease in tariffs in 
countries j and l is an externality effect cause by the agreement between countries 
l and k). This additional output implies that the intermediaries of countries i and k 
make additional profits in foreign countries (both the new partners and the existing 
non-partner countries) after the agreement because, as shown in Equations 4.52 
and 4.53, the profit that an intermediary makes in a determined market is a 
monotonic transformation of the output sold by these firms in that market.  
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According to the information presented in Appendix B, the decrease in the quantity 
of output sold by these firms in the domestic market is compensated by the 
increase in the quantity of exported output. This implies that the intermediaries pay 
higher prices to the farming sector after the agreement because this price is 
proportional to the total output sold by these firms. This additional cost and the loss 
of market power in the domestic market is reflected as a net loss of profit faced by 
the intermediaries in countries i and k.  
 
In relation to the non-partner countries j and l, on the other hand, the agreement is 
beneficial for them because the resulting tariff reduction in countries i and k allow 
the former to export more output to the latter countries. This higher output, 
however, pushes the price paid to the farming sector in countries j and l up 
negatively affecting the profit made by the intermediaries in these countries. In 
order to decrease the pressure on this price, these countries reduce the optimal 
tariff in order to increase the level of competition in their domestic markets. This 
higher level of competition negatively affects the profit made by the intermediaries 
in countries j and l in the domestic market, but increases the profit that they make 
in the rest of the countries as a consequence of the decrease in the pressure of the 
price paid to the farming sector. As a consequence, these intermediaries obtain 
higher net profits after the agreement between countries i and k.  Finally, because 
the intermediaries of the latter countries lose net profits after the agreement, they 
are unwilling to support this agreement implying that the incentives of these firms 
are the same as the ones in the case when  = 0. 
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The final case presented in Figure 4.4 corresponds to the one in which 
intermediaries exercise very high levels of monopsonistic power (i.e.  = 1.5). This 
case in interesting because it is here where it is possible to see how the existence 
of a farming sector may reverse the incentives of intermediaries to support of reject 
a new agreement. As shown in this figure, the same direct effects between 
countries i and k are verified when these two countries sign an agreement: the 
output sold in the domestic market decreases as a consequence of the higher level 
of competition after the agreement; and the output exported to the new partner 
countries increases as a consequence of the tariff reduction resulting from the 
agreement.  
 
What is different from the previous cases is that when monopsonistic power is very 
high, the agreement causes a net gain in the profit made by the intermediaries of 
the new partner countries i and j implying that under this degree of monopsonistic 
power, these firms support the new agreement. This result is explained by the 
externality caused by the agreement on countries j and l. These countries increase 
the optimal tariff in response to the agreement. As a result, the output that is sold 
by the intermediaries of these countries in the domestic market increases as a 
consequence of the lower degree of competition, and the output exported to 
countries i and k also increases as a consequence of the lower tariffs in these 
countries. This higher output pushes the price paid to the farming sector up 
negatively affecting the profit obtained by the intermediaries in country j and l. 
However, this higher price is cushioned by the lower output that is exported to the 
non-new partner countries (because the higher tariff in these countries). On the 
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other hand, the decrease in the output exported by the intermediaries of countries i 
and k to the non-partner countries pushes the price paid to the farming sector by 
these firms down positively affecting the profits that they make in the new partner 
country. This gain in profit is large enough to offset the loss of profit in the domestic 
market which is why the intermediaries in countries i and k make higher profits 
after the agreement.  
 
In relation to the farming sector, the information presented in table E.23 revealed 
another case of a change of incentives when monopsonistic power is very high. As 
shown in the previous case (i.e. when  = 0.5), producer surplus always decreases 
when an existing agreement is broken. However, when tariffs are endogenous, the 
farming sector does not always support the signature of a new agreement. In 
particular, it was shown that producer surplus in country l and network g decreases 
when this country signs a new agreement because the total output purchased to 
the farming sector in this country decreases pushing the price paid to farmers 
down. This, in turn, implies that the farming sector of this country will not support 
such an agreement.  
 
This incentive is reversed when there is very high level of monopsonistic power 
because, according to Table E.20, producer surplus always decreases when an 
agreement is broken and always increases when a new agreement is signed in any 
country and in any network. The reason of why the incentive of the farming sector 
in country l and network g is reversed is because the decrease in output in the 
domestic is not as large as the gain in output exported to foreign countries after the 
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agreement. This implying that more output is purchased to the farming sector after 
the agreement and this pushes the price paid to this sector up positively affecting 
producer surplus.  
 
Finally, the information presented in Tables E.21 and E.22 revealed that consumer 
surplus always increases (decreases) and tariffs revenue always decreases 
(increases) when an agreement is signed (broken). This is the same result 
obtained in the previous simulations suggesting that the response of these 
variables to different trade patterns remains robust through different degrees of 
monopsonistic power.  
 
In conclusion, it is proved in this section that, as in the cease of exogenous tariffs, 
the existence of a farming sector has the potential to influence the incentives of 
different groups of firms in favour free trade when governments are politically 
unbiased. However, in contrast to the case of exogenous tariffs, when tariffs are 
determined endogenously this positive influence is not strong enough to affect the 
pairwise stability of the networks identified in the case when there is no 
monopsonistic power.  
 
4.3.2.4 The case of biased governments 
 
A key result identified in the case of exogenous tariffs that revealed a clear 
deviation from the original model by Goyal and Joshi (2006) is that global free 
trade is not always stable when governments are biased in favour of intermediaries 
209 
 
and when there is a farming sector. The reason is because more trade implies 
more output sold in foreign countries and this, in turn, implies higher prices paid to 
the farming sector negatively affecting the profit made by the intermediaries. As a 
result, the pairwise stability of global free trade is broken because biased 
government will deviate with the purpose of helping the intermediaries to achieve 
higher profits in less integrated networks.  
 
The aim of this subsection is to show that the stability of global free trade can also 
be broken when governments are biased in favour of the intermediaries in a world 
where tariffs are placed endogenously. However, it was not possible to generalise 
the results for larger networks given the mathematical tractability problem. In spite 
of this, partial results were obtained to show that the finding concerning the 
destabilising effect of the farming sector on the pairwise stability of free trade is 
robust. In order to show this fact, the following simulations based on the 
information presented in Appendix B are considered.  
 
Table 4.4. Tariffs and profits 
  = 0  = 0.5  = 1.5 
Simulations for Policy 
bias 
Tariff 
Ti(j) 
Profit 
i(j) 
Profit 
i(k) 
Tariff 
Ti(j) 
Profit 
i(j) 
Profit 
i(k) 
Tariff 
Ti(j) 
Profit 
i(j) 
Profit 
i(k) 
 
(7) ai = ci = di = 0.40; and bi = 1 
(8) ai = ci = di = 0.30; and bi = 1 
(9) ai = ci = di = 0.20; and bi = 1 
(10) ai = ci = 0; di = 0.50; and bi = 1 
 
 
0.1765 
0.2371 
0.3793 
0.2500 
 
 
0.1388 
0.1413 
0.1561 
0.1425 
 
 
0.1600 
0.1600 
0.1600 
0.1600 
 
0.1360 
0.1764 
0.2837 
0.2180 
 
 
0.1209 
0.1224 
0.1344 
0.1257 
 
 
0.1280 
0.1280 
0.1280 
0.1280 
 
0.1153 
0.1393 
0.2031 
0.1927 
 
0.0887 
0.0893 
0.0930 
0.0922 
 
 
0.0914 
0.0914 
0.0914 
0.0914 
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Table 4.5. Welfare 
  = 0  = 0.5  = 1.5 
 
Simulations for Policy bias 
Weighted 
Welfare  
Wi(j) 
Weighted 
Welfare 
Wi(k) 
Weighted 
Welfare  
Wi(j) 
Weighted 
Welfare 
Wi(k) 
Weighted 
Welfare 
Wi(j) 
Weighted 
Welfare 
Wi(k) 
 
(7) ai = ci = di = 0.40 and bi = 1 
(8) ai = ci = di = 0.30 and bi = 1 
(9) ai = ci = di = 0.20 and bi = 1 
(10) ai = ci = 0; di = 0.50; and bi = 1 
 
0.2599 
0.2270 
0.2192 
0.1425  
 
0.2880 
0.2560 
0.2240 
0.1600 
 
0.2190 
0.1938 
0.1769 
0.1289 
 
 
0.2304 
0.2048 
0.1792 
0.1280 
 
0.1594 
0.1414 
0.1260 
0.0954 
 
 
0.1646 
0.1463 
0.1280 
0.0914 
 
The first columns in Tables 4.4 and 4.5 show different biases that were used to 
develop four simulations referred to as (7), (8), (9) and (10). For example, the first 
one assumes that governments place a weight equal to 1 to the intermediaries and 
a weight equal to 0.4 to the rest of the components of the welfare function. The 
other columns in Table 4.4 show the tariff in country i when this country deviates 
from global free trade by passing from network k to network j (i.e.Ti(j)), and the 
profit that the intermediary of this country makes in networks j and k (i.e. i(j) and 
i(k)) under different levels of monopsonistic power (i.e.  = 0;  = 0.5;  = 1.5) for 
each of the four simulations. Likewise, the columns in Table 4.5 show the values of 
the weighted welfare function of country i in networks j and k (i.e. Wi(j) and Wi(k)) 
under different levels of monopsonistic power for each of the four simulations.  
 
The introduction of these simulations has two objectives. The first one is to show 
that intermediaries may influence governments‟ incentives to deviate from global 
free trade. That is, these firms may influence the selection of tariffs that maximise a 
weighted welfare function that allow them to obtain higher profits in less integrated 
networks. The second objective is to show that this influence is stronger when the 
level of monopsonistic power is higher. This is shown as follows.  
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According to Simulations (7), (8) and (9) in Table 4.4, when the government in 
country i places less weight on the components of the welfare function other than 
the intermediary, the optimal tariff increases positively affecting the profit made by 
the latter. When there is no monopsonistic power, this increase in profit is not 
strong enough to reach the level of profit in global free trade. For example, when 
the weight placed on the components of the welfare function other than the 
intermediary is equal to 0.2 (i.e. Simulation (9)), the intermediary obtains a profit 
equal to 0.1561 which is smaller than the profit obtained in global free trade and 
equal to 0.1600. In contrast, when there is monopsonistic power, the increase in 
profit can actually offset the profit in global free trade with lower tariffs. For 
example, when  = 1.5, the intermediary in country i makes a profit equal to 0.0930 
which is larger than the profit that this firm makes in global free trade which 
corresponds to 0.0914. Moreover, this higher profit in network j is obtained with a 
tariff equal to 0.2031 which is smaller than the tariffs that maximises a similar 
weighted welfare function but with lower levels of monopsonistic power.  
 
The higher profit that the intermediary can make in network j in Simulation (9) when 
 = 0.5 and  = 1.5 is, however, not feasible because, as shown in Table 4.5, the 
value of welfare in this simulation is still larger in global free trade implying that the 
biased government in country i is not willing to deviate from the complete network 
k. This is explained by two facts. Firstly, the level of consumer surplus and 
producer surplus is higher in global free trade. Secondly, the weight that the 
government puts on these components of the welfare function is still large enough 
for welfare to be larger in global free trade. 
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Simulation (10) shows a case of a government that is strongly biased in favour of 
the intermediary and chooses an optimal tariff that causes a deviation from global 
free trade. In particular, Table 4.4 shows that the profit made by the intermediary in 
country i is larger in network j only when the monopsonitic power is given by  = 
1.5. Nonetheless, under this policy bias, the stability of global free trade is broken 
even when  = 0.5, but not when  = 0. This is shown in Table 4.5: welfare is larger 
in network j in simulation (4) when the intermediary exercises monoponistic power 
implying that under this market imperfection the pairwise stability of global free 
trade is broken.  
 
What is interesting about this result is that the pairwise stability of this network can 
be broken even when the intermediary obtains higher profits in global free trade. 
As shown in the case of  = 0.5, this happens when the gain in tariff revenue after 
the deviation from global free trade is larger than the loss of profits made by the 
intermediary implying that the government has in this case an incentive to break an 
existing agreement. However, when  = 1.5, the deviation causes both a gain in 
the profit made by the intermediary and a gain in tariff revenue. The reason that 
explains why the intermediary makes higher profits after the deviation is because 
under very high levels of monopsonistic power, the price paid to the farming sector 
is too high when the world is in global free trade, and this price is reduced when 
the country deviates from global free trade. 
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In summary, the main implication of the results presented in this part is that global 
free trade is not always stable when governments are biased in favour of 
intermediaries and this result also holds when tariffs are determined endogenously.  
 
4.4 Simulations on bilateralism under asymmetric countries 
 
In the previous section, the pairwise stability of international networks under the 
assumption of symmetric countries was studied. This analysis provided interesting 
insights about international trade patterns in agriculture and the stability of free 
trade. The objective of this section is to extend this analysis in order to explore the 
issue of agricultural trade liberalisation in a more realistic world characterised by 
asymmetric countries. Ttwo types of asymmetry are considered in this study: (1) 
asymmetry in market size: and (2) asymmetry in farmer‟s productivity. 
 
In order to determine the pairwise stable networks under these asymmetries, 
different simulations were carried out in this section. As in the previous section, 
they consider the set of possible networks that can be formed with countries i, j, k 
and l. These networks are shown in the following figure. 
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 Figure 4.5. Possible network architectures formed with countries i, j, k and l.   
  
This figure assumes two sets of countries. The first set contains countries i and k 
and are represented with a white circle each. The second set is formed of countries 
j and l and are represented with a black circle each. Countries i and k are assumed 
to be symmetric, and countries j and l are also assumed to be symmetric. 
However, countries that belong to different sets are assumed to be asymmetric.     
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In this figure the number of networks that have to be analysed is larger than in the 
case of symmetrical countries. This is because similar network architectures are 
not necessarily equivalent. For example networks g and l have the same 
architecture corresponding to the star network (i.e. a network with a central country 
connected to the rest of the countries, but the latter are only connected to the 
central country). While these networks have the same architecture, they are 
different because their central countries are asymmetric implying that numerical 
simulations in these networks have to be different.   
 
Note that as in the previous section, some networks were omitted. For example, 
country l in network j in this figure is a singleton. A similar network can be 
considered when country j is the singleton and the rest have agreements with each 
other. However, information about this network can be inferred from network j 
because countries j and l are symmetric in this simulation.  
 
4.4.1 Bilateralism under exogenous tariffs and asymmetry in market size 
 
Asymmetry in market size is introduced by assuming that countries i and k have 
the same market size denoted by , and countries j and l have the same market 
size denoted by  ~  (see Section 4.2.1.2). Using this assumption, six 
simulations were developed (i.e. simulations 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, and 16). The three 
first simulations considers the extreme case when ~ = 0. That is, they consider the 
case when countries j and l are extremely small in the sense that they don‟t have a 
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domestic market. This extreme case is used as a benchmark limiting behaviour or 
boundary to gain an understanding of the incentive of large countries to trade with 
very small countries under different levels of monopsonistic power. This 
assumption is relaxed in the next three simulations with the purpose of studying the 
incentive of large countries to trade with middle size countries under different levels 
of monoxonistic power. In these simulations it is assumed ~ = 0.5. That is, 
countries j and l are small but still have a significant domestic market.. The 
mathematical computations carried out in the simulations are show in Appendix C. 
The results of the simulations are presented as follows. 
 
4.4.1.1 Simulation 11:  = 1, = 0 and  = 0 for all i  N.    
 
In this simulation it is assumed that there is no monopsonistic power (i.e. i = 0). 
This implies that this simulation converges to the original model by Goyal and Joshi 
(2006) under asymmetry in market size. The results obtained in this part will, 
therefore, be used as a benchmark to evaluate deviations from the original 
international trade network model when there is a farming sector. 
 
The results of the simulation in terms of consumer surplus (see Appendix F), profits 
made by the intermediary, and welfare are presented in Tables E.26, E.27 and 
E.28. 
 
 
 
~
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The case of politically unbiased governments 
 
Let us consider first the information presented in Table E.28. From this table it is 
inferred that the set of link deletion proof networks is D = {a, c, d, e, h, i, j, m, n, p, 
q, s, t, u, v, w, x, z, c‟, Eq} where Eq, as before, denotes the networks that are 
equivalent to the networks included in this set8. On the other hand, the set of link 
addition proof networks is A = {m, t, x, z, Eq}. In considering these sets, it is 
concluded therefore that the set of pairwise stable networks in the case of 
unbiased governments is given by: P = D  A = {m, t, x, z, Eq}. This result was not 
explored by Goyal and Joshi (2006) because these researchers only focussed on 
the stability of global free trade when countries are asymmetric in market size. 
However, the results revealed that global free trade is not the only parwise stable 
network in their model.  
  
The case of politically biased governments 
 
Using the information presented in Table E.27 it is inferred that D = {a, d} and A = 
{a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j, m, n, o, p, q, r, s, t, u, x, y, z, c‟, Eq}. This implies that the 
set of pairwise stable networks when governments are biased in favour of 
intermediaries is given by P = D  A = {a, d}.  
 
 
                                                          
8
 For example, in network e country i is connected to countries j and k. A similar network is the one 
where country k is connected to countries i and l. This network has been omitted because 
information about this network can be inferred from network e as a consequence of symmetry 
between counties i and k, and countries j and l.  
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Discussion 
 
Let us first consider the case of unbiased governments. The stability of network m 
in this case is explained by the fact that the singleton (i.e. country k) is unwilling to 
sign an agreement with any of the other countries. This happens because this 
country is large and an agreement with a small country only causes a loss of profit 
in the domestic market as a consequence of higher competition. This loss of profit 
is not compensated by additional profit made in a small country because the latter 
does not have a relevant domestic market (i.e. it is very small). The gain in 
consumer surplus that the larger country obtains after the agreement with a small 
country as a consequence of higher competition does not compensate the loss of 
profit either, and this is why such an agreement causes a net loss of welfare in the 
large country. Country k is not willing to sign an agreement with the other large 
country i either because the latter has already high level of competition in the 
domestic market (i.e. country i is already connected to the small countries j and l). 
As a consequence, the gain in consumer surplus and profit in country i if they sign 
an agreement are not large enough to compensate the loss of profit in the 
domestic market of country k. The same facts discussed for network m explains 
the stability of network z.  
 
Another interesting observation in relation to network m is that this network is also 
stable when countries are symmetric (see Section 4.3.1.1). However, network j is 
not stable even when having the same architecture. The reason is because 
network j is not link addition proof implying that there are at least two countries 
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willing to sign an agreement. For example, countries k and l have an incentive to 
form the agreement. For country k the gain in consumer surplus offsets the loss of 
profits after the agreement. For country l, on the other hand, the agreement allows 
this country to obtain positive profits in country k without losing domestic profits 
and consumer supplies (because this country is very small and does not have 
domestic market). In conclusion, networks composed of a complete component 
and a singleton are all pairwise stable in the symmetric countries case. However, in 
the asymmetric case this only holds when the singleton is a large country. 
 
The stability of network t, on the other hand, is explained by the fact that the small 
countries j and l are indifferent about signing an agreement. This is because the 
agreement will not change consumer surplus or profits in these countries as a 
consequence of not having a relevant domestic market. 
 
Finally the stability of global free trade (i.e. network x) is explained by the fact that 
the small countries are indifferent about breaking an agreement, and large 
countries face a net decrease in welfare when deviating from global free trade (i.e. 
the gain in profit in the domestic market as a consequence of the lower level of 
competition after breaking an agreement is not large enough to compensate the 
loss in consumer surplus and the profit made in the ex-partner country). 
 
Let us now consider the case of countries biased in favour of intermediaries. In this 
case there are two pairwise stable networks: a and d. The stability of network a is 
explained by the fact that no large country in autarky is willing to sign an 
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agreement. If they did, then the gain in consumer surplus plus the additional profits 
made in the new partner country (this profit is cero if the new country is a small 
one) are not large enough to compensate the loss of profits made in the domestic 
market (i.e. the monopoly profit). On the other hand, small countries are indifferent 
about signing an agreement with one another because they don‟t have domestic 
market implying that they would obtain cero profits. These countries would be 
willing to sign an agreement with large countries in order to benefit from getting 
access to large markets. However, as explained above, countries would not sing 
this agreement.  
 
On the other hand, network d is stable because the small countries do not have an 
incentive to break the existing agreement as a consequence of not having a 
domestic market. They are willing to sign an agreement with large countries in 
order to make large profits in these countries. But the latter are not willing to sign 
an agreement with small countries because this agreement does not allow them to 
get profits in the small countries. On the contrary, the agreement would increase 
competition in the domestic market of the large countries negatively affecting the 
profit made by the intermediaries of these countries. Finally, large countries would 
be unwilling to sing an agreements with one another for the same reason given 
above for network a. 
 
Note that the results obtained in this simulation are the ones obtained from the 
original framework by Goyal and Joshi (2006). According to these researchers, 
global free trade is always pairwise stable and this claim is used by Goyal and 
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Joshi to suggest the use of bilateral agreements to reach global free trade. 
However, as seen in this simulation, this is not always the case. When 
governments are biased in favour of intermediaries, networks a and d are pairwise 
stable but not global free trade. Consequently, the claim made by Goyal and Joshi 
has to be considered with caution.  
 
4.4.1.2 Simulation 12:  = 1,  = 0 and  = 0.5 for all i  N.    
 
This simulation introduces the farming sector into the analysis. This is done by 
assuming moderate level of monopsonistic power (i.e.  = 0.5 for all i  N). The 
relevant information that is needed for this simulation is presented Tables E.29, 
E.30, E.31 and E.32 in Appendix E. 
 
The case of politically unbiased governments 
 
In considering Table E.32 it is inferred that the sets of link deletion proof and link 
addition proof networks are D = {a, c, d, e, h, i, j, m, n, p, q, s, t, u, v, w, x, z, c‟, Eq} 
and A = {m, t, x, z, Eq}, respectively. This implies that the set of pairwise stable 
networks in this case is given by P = D  A = {m, t, x, z, Eq}.  
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The case of politically biased governments 
 
The information that is needed to identify the pairwise stable networks under 
biased governments in favour of consumers, firms and the farming sector is 
presented in Tables E.29, E.30 and E.31, respectively. 
 
In considering Table E.30 it is inferred that the sets of link deletion and link addition 
proof networks when governments are biased in favour of the intermediaries are D 
= {a, d} and A = {a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j, l, m, n, o, p, q, r, s, t, u, x, y, z, a‟, c‟, Eq }, 
This implies that the set of pairwise stable networks in this case is P = D  A = {a, 
d}, respectively. This is the same result than the one obtained in the previous 
simulation. On the other hand, in considering Table E.31, it is inferred that the sets 
of link deletion proof and link addition proof networks when governments are 
biased in favour of the farming sector are given by D = {a, c, d, c‟, Eq} and A = {c, 
e, g, h, i, j, n, o, p, q, s, t, u, x, c‟, Eq}. Consequently, the set of pairwise stable 
networks in this case is given by P = D  A = {c, c‟}.  
 
Discussion 
 
The results revealed that the pairwise stability of international networks is not 
affected when there is a farming sector, when monopsonistic power is moderate 
and when governments are unbiased or biased in favour of intermediaries. This 
implies that the influence of the farming sector is not large enough to affects the 
network stability under these conditions.  
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When governments are biased in favour of the farming sector, the pairwise stable 
networks (i.e. c and c‟) reflect some forms of regionalism. For example network c‟ 
contains two blocks of countries. One of them is composed of large countries (i.e. 
countries i and k) and the other block is composed of small countries (i.e. countries 
j and l). As explained in the literature review, this type of regionalism exists in the 
real world. That is, large countries, referred to as countries of the north, have 
higher degree of international trade of agricultural products between them. The 
same happens with small countries which are referred to as countries of the south. 
However, international trade between countries of the north and the south is 
significantly lower. According to the results obtained in the current simulation, this 
regionalism is explained by the monopsonistic and oligopolistic power exercised by 
the intermediaries, and by asymmetry in market size. This is explained as follows 
by taking network c‟ as an example (note that this explanation also applies to 
network c).  
 
If the large countries broke their agreement, then the total output sold by the 
intermediaries in the domestic market would increase because this market would 
become less competitive. However, the intermediaries would stop exporting to the 
ex-partner country.  The increase in output sold in the domestic market is not large 
enough to offsets the decrease in the output exported to the ex-partner country 
implying that breaking the agreement would cause a net decrease in the total 
output sold by the intermediaries. This decrease in output implies that the farming 
sector would receive a lower price for their production negatively affecting producer 
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surplus. This explains why the large countries are unwilling to break their existing 
agreement when they are biased in favour of the farming sector.  
 
On the other hand, the large countries are unwilling to sign an agreement with 
small countries because this would increase the level of competition in the 
domestic markets of the former reducing the total output sold by the intermediaries. 
These firms would be unable to compensate this decrease by exporting new output 
to the small countries because the domestic market of these counties is very small. 
Thus, an agreement with a small country would cause a net decrease in the output 
sold by the intermediaries of the large countries. This, in turn, would decrease the 
price paid to the farming sector in these countries negatively affecting producer 
surplus. In relation to the small countries, they are indifferent between having or 
breaking their agreement because their domestic markets are very small and any 
change would not cause changes in producer surplus (note that this is what 
explains the stability of c as well). However, they would be willing to sign an 
agreement with a large country because this would cause a significant gain in 
produce. This is explained by the fact that the intermediaries of small countries 
would be able to access large markets. This would cause an increase in the output 
sold by these firms pushing the price paid to the farming sector up, and therefore, 
increasing producer surplus in small countries.  
 
In summary, it is predicted that bilateral agreements in a world formed of biased 
governments in favour of the farming sector leads to regionalism when countries 
are asymmetric in market size. In contrast, when countries are symmetric (see 
225 
 
Section 4.3.1.2), the only pairwise stable network is global free trade. It is 
concluded therefore that the existence of a farming sector that is supported by 
biased governments favours free trade when countries are symmetric, and 
prevents global free trade when the world of composed of large and very small 
countries.  
 
4.4.1.3 Simulation 13:  = 1,  = 0 and  = 1.5 for all i  N.    
 
The objective of this simulation is to determine whether the results obtained in the 
previous one are affected when intermediaries exercise larger levels of 
monopsonistic power (i.e. when  = 1.5)  The information used in this analysis is 
presented in Tables E.33, E.34, E.35 and E.36 in Appendix E.   
 
The case of politically unbiased governments 
 
In considering Table E.36 it is concluded that the sets of link deletion proof and link 
addition proof networks when governments are politically unbiased are D = {a, c, d, 
e, g, h, i, j, m, n, o, p, q, s, t, u, v, w, x, z, c‟, Eq} and A = {t, x}, respectively. 
Therefore the set of pairwise sable networks in this case is P = D  A = {t, x}. The 
number of networks in this set is smaller than the number of pairwise stable 
networks identified in the previous simulation (i.e. when  = 0.5). This implies that 
as monopsonistic power increases, the number of pairwise stable networks 
decreases in the case of unbiased governments and asymmetry in market size.  
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The case of politically biased governments 
 
The information presented in Table 4.34 revealed that the sets of link deletion proof 
and link addition proof networks when governments are biased in favour of the 
intermediaries are D = {a, d} and  A = {a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j, k, l, m, n, o, p, q, r, s, 
t, u, v, w, x, y, z, a‟, b‟, c‟, Eq}, respectively.  Therefore the set of pairwise stable 
networks in this case is P = D  A = {a, d}. The same set of pairwise stable 
networks was found in the previous simulation. However, the set of link addition 
proof networks is different. In the case of high level of monopsonitic power (i.e.  = 
1.5), this set is larger implying that the number of networks in which countries are 
unwilling to sigh new agreements increases as the level of monopsonistic power 
increases.  
 
On the other hand, in considering Table E.35, it is concluded that the sets of link 
deletion proof and link addition proof networks when governments are biased in 
favour of the farming sector are D = {a, c, d, c‟, Eq} and A = {c, e, g, h, i, j, n, o, p, 
q, s, t, u, x, c‟, Eq}, respectively. Therefore the set of pairwise stable networks in 
this case is P = D  A = {c, c‟}. This is the same result than the one obtained in the 
previous section. It is inferred therefore that the incentives of countries to break or 
sign bilateral agreements is not affected under moderate or large levels of 
monopsonitic power.  
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Discussion 
 
This discussion is focussed on the cases that revealed deviations from the 
previous simulation.  
 
The first deviation was found in the case of politically unbiased governments. In 
this case the pairwise stability of networks m and z is broken because these 
networks are not link addition proof any longer when the level of monopsonistic 
power is high. In both networks this is explained by the incentives of the singleton 
large country k. When monopsonistic power is moderated (i.e.  = 0.5) this country 
is not willing to sign any agreement with any other country, but this incentive is 
reversed when monopsonistic power is high. This is explained as follows. 
 
If country k signed an agreement with the other large country I, then the domestic 
market of the former would become more competitive positively affecting consumer 
surplus. However, this higher competition would negatively affect the profits made 
by the intermediary of country k in the domestic market. The additional profit that 
this firm would make in the new partner country is not large enough to compensate 
the loss of profit in the domestic market implying that the agreement would cause a 
net loss of profits. This loss is reinforced by the fact that the total output traded in 
the domestic market and the new partner country increases after the agreement as 
can be seen form the information presented in Appendix C. This higher quantity of 
output means that the intermediary has to pay a higher price to the farming sector 
after the agreement given the existing monopsonistic power. However, this higher 
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price and the higher quantity of traded output positively affect producer surplus. 
Thus, when monopsonistic power is moderate, the gain in consumer surplus and 
producer surplus is not large enough to offset the loss of profits faced by the 
intermediary and this explains why in this case country k is unwilling to sign the 
agreement. In contrast, when monopsonistic power is high, the gain in producer 
surplus is more significant implying that this gain plus the gain in consumer surplus 
offsets the net loss of profits. As a consequence, an agreement increases welfare 
which is what explains why country k is willing to sign an agreement with the other 
large country when monopsonistic power is high. It is concluded, therefore, that in 
the asymmetric case in terms of market size and unbiased countries, the existence 
of a farming sector in a world with high level of monopsonistic power positively 
affects free trade in networks having large singleton countries because this sector 
increase the incentives of these countries to sign bilateral agreements.     
 
The second deviation identified in this simulation corresponds to the case of 
governments biased in favour of intermediaries. While the same pairwise stable 
networks were found under different levels of monopsonistic power, the number of 
networks in the set of link addition proof networks changed. In particular, it was 
found that when the level of monopsonistic power increased from  = 0.5 to  = 
1.5, networks k, v, w and b‟ become link addition proof. This is because when  = 
0.5, the larger countries i and k in these networks are willing to sign an agreement. 
However, this incentive is reversed when  = 1.5.  
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To understand this change, note that an agreement between these countries 
increases the level of competition in their domestic market negatively affecting the 
profits made by the intermediaries in these markets. But at the same time these 
firms get access to the new partner country. Thus, the large countries will be willing 
to sign the agreement when the gain in profits in the new partner country is larger 
than the loss of profits in the domestic market. But this depends on the impact of 
the agreement on the price paid to the farming sector. In both cases (i.e. when 
from  = 0.5 and when  = 1.5) the agreement increases the total output sold by 
the intermediaries of the large countries. This pushes the price paid to the farming 
sector. When monopsonistic power is moderate, this additional marginal cost is not 
strong enough. As a consequence, the profit made in the new partner countries is 
larger than the loss of profits in the domestic market. This is why networks k, v, w 
and b‟ are not link addition proof in this case: the large countries have an incentive 
to sign the agreement. In contrast, when the level of monopsonistic power is large, 
the increase in marginal costs after the agreement is large enough to reverse this 
difference in profits. That is, when  = 1.5, the loss of profits in the domestic market 
offsets the gain of profits in the new partner given the high marginal cost faced by 
the intermediaries after the agreement. As a result, the large countries in networks 
k, v, w and b‟ do not have an incentive to sign an agreement. This explains why 
these networks are link addition proof for the case of high level of monpsonistic 
power.  
 
It is concluded therefore that the farming sector negatively affects the formation of 
bilateral agreements between large countries when intermediaries exercise high 
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levels of monopsonistic power, when governments are biased in favour of these 
firms, and when countries are asymmetric in market size. 
 
4.4.1.4 Simulation 14:  = 1,  = 0.5 and  = 0 for all i  N.    
 
The next three simulation were introduced with the purpose of identifying the 
pairwise stable networks when there are large and medium size countries (i.e.  = 
1 and  = 0.5, respectively) under different degrees of monopsonistic power. The 
current simulation in particular considers the case when there is no monopsonistic 
power. That is, Goyal and Joshi‟s world when there are large and medium size 
countries. The information used in this simulation is presented in Tables E.37, E.38 
and E.39 in Appendix E. 
 
The case of politically unbiased governments 
 
In considering Table E.39 it is concluded that when governments are politically 
unbiased the sets of link deletion proof and link addition proof are D = {a, c, d, e, h, 
i, j, m, n, p, s, t, u, v, w, x, z,  c‟, Eq} and A = {m, x, Eq}, respectively. This implies 
that the set of pairwise stable networks is P = D  A = {m, x, Eq}.  
 
The case of politically biased governments 
 
Using the information presented in Table E.38 it is inferred that the link deletion 
proof and link addition proof networks when governments are biased in favour of 
~
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the intermediaries are D = {a} and A = {a, b, c, d, f, i, m, n, o, p, q, r, s, u, x, y, c‟, 
Eq}, respectivelly. This implies that the set of pairwise stable networks in this case 
is P = D  A = {a}.  
 
Discussion 
 
The result obtained for the case of unbiased governments is different from the one 
obtained in the simulation assuming the existence of both large and very small 
countries without monopsonistic power (see Simulation 11 in Section 4.4.1.1). In 
that case, the stable networks are {m, t, x, z Eq}. This means that in Goyal and 
Joshi‟s world, the number of stable pairwise networks becomes smaller when small 
countries are replaced by medium size countries and the networks that become 
unstable are networks t and x.  
 
To understand this fact, remember that it was found in Simulation 11 that the small 
countries j and l in networks t and x are indifferent about having an agreement with 
each other because they don‟t have domestic markets. In contrast, when countries 
j and l are medium size, they have relevant domestic markets that origin a gain in 
consumer surplus and a net gain in profits when these countries sign an 
agreement. The gain in consumer surplus is explained by the higher level of 
competition in the domestic markets of these countries after the agreement. 
Likewise, the net gain in profits is explained by the fact that the additional profit that 
the intermediaries make in the new partner country offsets the loss of profits in the 
domestic market caused by the higher level of competition.   
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On the other hand, when governments are biased in favour of the intermediaries, 
the only stable network is the empty network. This also differs from the results 
obtained in Simulation 11. In that case network d is also pairwise stable and this is 
explained by the fact that the very small countries j and l are indifferent about 
having an agreement with each other as a result of not having domestic markets. 
In contrast, when these countries are medium size, they have an incentive to break 
their existing agreement because the gain in profits as a result of the decrease in 
market power offsets the loss of profit that the intermediaries made in the ex-
partner countries.  
 
In summary it is concluded that in Goyal and Joshi‟s world the governments of very 
small and medium size countries who trade with large countries have different 
incentives towards bilateral agreements and this is explained by the existence of 
domestic markets in these countries. In the case of unbiased governments of 
medium size countries, these governments have an incentive to sign an agreement 
in some key networks because this causes a net gain in social welfare. Likewise, 
governments of medium size countries that are biased in favour of consumers 
have an incentive to sign an agreement because this causes a gain in consumer 
surplus (see Appendix F). In contrast governments of medium size countries that 
are biased in favour of the intermediaries have an incentive to break an existing 
agreement because this causes a net gain in profits.  
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4.4.1.5 Simulation 15:  = 1,  = 0.5 and  = 0.5 for all i  N.    
 
The objective of this simulation is to introduce the farming sector into the model 
when networks are formed of large and medium size countries. This is reflected by 
the assumption that intermediaries exercise a moderate level of monopsonistic 
power. (i.e. i = 0.5). The relevant information that is needed to determine the 
pairwise stable networks in this case is presented in Tables E.40, E.41, E.42 and 
E.43 in Appendix E. 
 
The case of politically unbiased governments 
 
The sets of link deletion proof and link addition proof networks were inferred from 
the information given in Table E.43 and correspond to D = {a, c, d, e, g, h, i, j, m, n, 
o, p, q, r, s, t, u, v, w, x, z, c‟, Eq} and A = {x}. Consequently, the set of pairwise 
stable networks in this case is given by P = D  A = {x}.  
 
The case of politically biased governments 
 
In this simulation there are three types of biases: bias in favour of consumers (see 
Appendix F); firms; and the farming sector. The information that is needed to 
identify the pairwise stable networks under these biases is presented in Tables 
E.40, E.41 and E.42. 
 
~
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The information presented in Table E.41 revealed that when governments are 
biased in favour of the intermediaries, the sets of link deletion and link addition 
proof networks D = {a} and A = {a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j, k, l, m, n, o, p, q, r, s, t, u, x, 
y, z, a‟, c‟, Eq}, respectively. This implies that the set of pairwise stable networks in 
this case is P = D  A = {a}. On the other hand, in considering Table E.42, it is 
inferred that the sets of link deletion proof and link addition proof networks when 
governments are biased in favour of the farming sector are given by D = {a, b, c, d, 
e, g, h, j, m, n, o, p, q, s, t, u, v, w, x, z, b‟, c‟, Eq} and A = {x, c‟}. Consequently, the 
set of pairwise stable networks in this case is given by P = D  A = {x, c‟}.  
 
Discussion 
 
As in the case of symmetric counties, the result for the case of unbiased 
governments shows that the pairwise stability of networks other than global free 
trade is broken when there is a farming sector implying that this sector positively 
affects international trade. This is inferred from the fact that the stable networks in 
Goyal and Joshi‟s model (see the previous simulation) are networks m (and 
equivalents) and x (i.e. global free trade). This is explained by the incentive of 
country k in network m. When there is moderate monopsonistic power, producer 
surplus in this country increases after the agreement because the total output 
traded by the intermediary in this country increases pushing the price paid to 
farmers up. This positive effect on producer surplus and consumer surplus are 
together strong enough to offsets the net loss of profits made by the intermediary 
235 
 
and this explains why the government of country k is willing to sign an agreement 
and why network m is not pairwise stable in this case. 
 
This result also differs from the case of large and very small countries with 
moderate monopsonistic power (see Section 4.4.1.2). In that case there are 
several pairwise stable networks. But the stability of the networks other than global 
free trade is broken when replacing very small countries with medium size 
countries. For example, the pairwise stability of networks t and z is broken in the 
current simulation. This is explained by the fact that when countries j and l are 
medium size, they have a relevant domestic market that offers them a net gain in 
welfare after the agreement is signed. This is because the gain in consumer 
surplus plus the gain in producer surplus are together large enough to offsets the 
net loss of profits faced by the intermediary in these countries.  
 
In relation to the case of governments biased in favour of intermediaries, the 
results revealed that only the empty network is pairwise stable when there are 
large and medium size countries with moderate monopsonistic power. This result 
differs from the case of large and very small countries with moderate levels of 
monopsonistic power (see Section 4.4.1.2). In that simulation network d is also 
pairwise stable and this is explained by the fact that these countries are indifferent 
about signing an agreement with each other because they have irrelevant domestic 
markets. That is, an agreement between the very small countries j and l will not 
allow the intermediaries to export the food processed good to the new partner 
countries because their domestic markets are very small. In contrast, when 
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countries j and l are medium size, their domestic markets are large enough to allow 
the intermediaries to compensate the loss of profit in their domestic markets with 
the additional profits that they make in the new partner countries.  
 
Finally, when governments are biased in favour of the farming sector, global free 
trade and network c‟ are the pairwise stable network in current simulation. This 
result is interesting because it shows that regionalism arises when there is 
asymmetry in market size. To see this, remember that in the symmetrical case, 
only global free trade is pairwise stable when governments are biased in favour of 
the farming sector and when the level of monopsonistic power is moderate (see 
Section 4.3.1.2). However, when there are large and medium size countries, the 
large countries in network c‟ are unwilling to sign an agreement with the medium 
size countries. The reason is explained by the fact that the latter have smaller 
domestic markets. Thus the additional output that can be sold in the medium size 
countries is not large enough to compensate the decrease of output sold in the 
domestic market of the large countries. This net loss of output implies that the 
farming sector obtain a lower price for their production which explains why the 
agreement decreases the level of producer surplus in large countries and why 
network c’ is pairwise stable in the current simulation. 
 
The results obtained in the current simulation also differ from the case of large 
countries and very small countries with moderate monopsonistic power (see 
Section 4.4.1.2). In that case global free trade is not pairwise stable but network c 
is. In relation to global fee trade, when there are medium size countries rather than 
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very small ones, the intermediaries of the large countries can export a significant 
quantity of output to the medium size country that compensates the decrease of 
output in the domestic market as a consequence of the higher competition. Thus 
the gain in total output traded by the intermediaries in these countries pushes the 
price paid to farmers up positively affecting producer surplus in global free trade 
which is what explains the stability of this network in the current simulation.  
 
In relation to network c, on the other hand, this network is pairwise stable in the 
case of large and very small countries because the latter are indifferent about 
signing an agreement as a consequence of their very small domestic markets. 
These countries are willing to sign an agreement with large countries because it 
can help them to export the food processed output positively affecting producer 
surplus. However, large countries are unwilling because an agreement with very 
small countries causes a net decrease in producer surplus. In contrast, in the case 
of large and medium size countries, the latter have an incentive to sign an 
agreement with each other because they have relevant domestic markets that can 
be filled with exports that give the farmers higher levels of producer surplus. This is 
why network c is not pairwise stable in the current simulation.  
 
4.4.1.6 Simulation 16:  = 1,  = 0.5 and  = 1.5 for all i  N.    
 
This last simulation in the section of asymmetry in market size introduced to study 
the effects of very high levels of monopsonistic power on the international trade 
~
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system. The information that is needed for this analysis is presented in Tables 
E.44, E.45, E.46 and E.47 in Appendix E.   
 
The case of politically unbiased governments 
 
In considering Table E.47 it is concluded that the sets of link deletion proof, link 
addition proof and pairwise stable networks are D = {a, c, d, e, g, h, i, j, m, n, o, p, 
q, s, t, u, v, w, x, z, c‟, Eq} and A = {t, x}, respectively. This implies that the set of 
pairwise stable networks in this case is P = D  A = {t, x}.  
 
The case of politically biased governments 
 
It was found from Table E.45 that when governments are biased in favour of the 
intermediaries, the sets of link deletion proof, link addition proof and pairwise stable 
networks are D = {a}, A = {a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j, k, l, m, n, o, p, q, r, s, t, u, v, w, x, 
y, z, a‟, c‟, Eq}, and P = D  A = {a}, respectively.  
 
On the other hand, in considering Table E.46 it was found that when governments 
are biased in favour of the farming sector, the sets of link deletion proof, link 
addition proof and pairwise stable networks are D = {a, b, c, d, g, h, j, m, n, o, s, t, 
u, v, w, x, y, z, b‟, c‟, Eq}, A = {x, c‟}, and P = D  A = {x, c‟}, respectively.  
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Discussion 
 
A first deviation with respect to the previous simulation was identified in the case of 
unbiased governments. In this case it was found that when monopsonistic power is 
high, network t becomes pairwise stable. The reason is because in this network the 
medium size countries j and l are indifferent about signing an agreement with each 
other. In contrast, when the level of monopsonistic power is moderate, these 
counties are willing to sign the agreement. This difference is explained by the 
higher cost that intermediaries have to face when monopsonistic power is high. 
That is, an agreement between countries j and l causes a gain in consumer surplus 
in these countries as a result of the higher competition in their domestic markets. 
However, this higher competition negatively affects the profits made by the 
intermediaries of these countries in the domestic market. This decrease is 
compensated to some extent by the additional profits that they make in the new 
partner country. Nonetheless, because countries j and l are medium size, the gain 
in profits from exports is not large enough to fully compensate the loss of profits in 
the domestic market implying that the agreement causes a net loss of profits.  
 
This is also explained by the higher price that the intermediaries have to pay to the 
farming sector because the agreement causes a net increase in the total output 
that is traded. The farming sector, on the other hand, is better off because the 
higher price and the higher level of output that is traded by the intermediary implies 
that they obtain higher levels of producer surplus after the agreement. Thus, when 
monopsonistic power is high, the net loss of profits faced by the intermediaries is 
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more severe because this means that they have to face a much larger marginal 
cost. This loss is just equal to the gain in consumer surplus and producer surplus, 
and this is why the governments of the medium size countries are indifferent about 
signing the agreement. It is concluded therefore that high levels of monopsonistic 
power have a negative effect on the trade system when governments are unbiased 
and when the world is formed of large and medium size countries because this 
creates multiple pairwise equilibriums.  
 
Regarding the case of governments biased in favour of intermediaries, it was found 
that networks v and w become link addition proof in the current simulation. This 
happens because the large countries i and k in these networks are unwilling to sign 
an agreement with each other when monopsonistic power is high. In this case the 
agreement increases the level of competition in the domestic market of the large 
countries causing a decrease in the output sold by the intermediaries of these 
countries in the domestic market. However, they increase the export output to the 
new partner large country and this increase is larger than the decrease in the 
domestic output. This net increase pushes the price paid to the farming sector up 
negatively affecting the profits made by the intermediaries after the agreement. 
This suggests therefore that countries‟ unwillingness to sign new bilateral 
agreements is reinforced under this level of monopsonistic power.   
 
Finally, in relation to the case of governments biased in favour of the farming 
sector, two deviations were identified with respect to the previous simulation. The 
first one corresponds to the fact that networks e, p and q are not link deletion proof 
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when monopsonistic power is high. This is because large countries in these 
networks have an incentive to break their existing agreements with a medium size 
country. To understand this result, note that the large countries in these networks 
are already connected to other large countries meaning that their domestic markets 
are relatively competitive. This implies that the gain in output in the domestic 
market of a large country after an agreement with a medium size country is broken 
is not significantly large given the existing level of competition. This gain in output 
in the domestic market can be either larger or smaller than the decrease in the 
export output after the agreement is broken depending on the effect of this action 
on the cost faced by the intermediary of the large country. That is, when 
monopsonistic power is high, breaking this agreement lowers the cost faced by the 
intermediary in the large country and this reinforces the increase in output sold in 
the domestic market as a consequence of lower competition. This gain in output is 
large enough to compensate the decrease in the output that was exported in the 
ex-partner medium size country. Now, because producer surplus is a monotonic 
transformation of the total output that is traded by the intermediary, breaking the 
agreement with the medium size country positively affects producer surplus in the 
large country. However, when monopsonistic power is moderate, breaking the 
agreement does not contribute significantly in the reduction of the cost faced by the 
intermediary of the large country. As a result, the increase in the output in the 
domestic market is not large enough to compensate the decrease in the output that 
was exported before the agreement was broken. It is concluded, therefore, that 
high levels of monopsonistic power have a negative effect on trade because it 
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increases the incentives of large countries to break existing agreements with 
medium size countries.  
 
The second deviation with respect to the previous simulation corresponds to the 
fact that network y becomes link deletion proof when monopsonistic power if high. 
This is the opposite of the deviation described above for networks e, p and q and 
this is explained by the fact that the large country i is not willing to break the 
existing agreement with the medium size country j. To understand this result, note 
that this country is only connected to country j. As a consequence, the level of 
competition in the domestic market of country i is low. In contrast, the medium size 
country j is already connected to all the large countries in the network implying that 
the level of competition in the domestic market of this country is high. Thus, when 
the agreement between countries i and j is broken, the gain in output in the large 
country i is larger than the decrease in the export output in the medium size 
country j. Thus, from the point of view of the large country, when monopsonistic 
power is moderate, the gain in output in the domestic market offsets the loss of 
export output. This means that breaking the agreement causes a net increase in 
output sold by the intermediary of the large country positively affecting producer 
surplus. This is why network y is not deletion proof in the previous simulation. 
However, when monopsonistic power is high, the large increase in the output sold 
in the domestic market of the large country significantly increases the price paid to 
the farming sector in this country. This higher cost mitigates the increase of this 
output to the extent that it is not large enough to compensate the decrease in the 
export output. This implies that when monopsonistic power is high, there is a net 
243 
 
decrease in the output sold by the intermediary of the large country when the 
agreement is broken and, therefore, a decrease in producer surplus. This is why 
network y is link deletion proof in the current simulation. This result suggests, 
consequently, that high levels of monopsonistic power may prevent large countries 
from breaking existing links with medium size countries when they have low degree 
of international integration.  
 
In summary, it was found in this simulation that while high monopsonistic power 
does not always affect the pairwise stability of the networks identified in the 
previous simulation, it affects the incentives of countries in non-stable networks. In 
particular it was found that high degree of monopsonistic power plays against free 
trade in the cases of unbiased and biased governments.  
 
4.4.2 Bilateralism under exogenous tariffs and asymmetry in farmers’ 
productivity 
 
A key result obtained in the previous simulations is that monopsonistic power has 
an important effect on the architecture and stability of international networks of 
food processed goods. The reason is because this power makes free trade more 
expensive to intermediaries as they have to pay higher prices to farmers as a 
consequence of the higher total quantity of the good that is traded domestically and 
internationally. This finding was developed assuming that all the intermediaries in 
the world exercise the same monopsonistic power. Given the relevance of this 
result, the current simulation extends the analysis with the purpose of exploring the 
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pairwise stability of international networks when intermediaries exercise different 
monopsonistic power. That is, when there are intermediaries in some countries 
who buy the output from more efficient farmers, and there are intermediaries in 
other countries who buy the output from less efficient farmers. 
 
As explained in Section 4.2.1.3, asymmetry in farmers‟ productivity is captured by 
the parameter  in Equation 4.19. Using this parameter, two sets of countries are 
defined. The set  = {i, j} contains the countries in the networks having the same 
productivity coefficient   1. On the other hand, the set  = {j, l} contains the 
countries having the same productivity coefficient  = 1. Using this definition, all 
networks were partitioned into two groups of counties: the efficient countries (i.e. 
countries j, l); and the inefficient countries (i.e. i, k). The networks considered in 
this simulation are presented in Figure 4.5 and the calculations are presented in 
Appendix D. 
 
4.4.2.1 Simulation 17:  = 3 for  = {i, k};  = 1 for  = {j, l};  = 0.5; and  = 1.   
 
The information that was used in this simulation is presented Tables E.48, E.49, 
E.50 and E.51 in Appendix E.  
 
The case of politically unbiased governments 
 
In considering Table E.51 it is inferred that the sets of link deletion proof and link 
addition proof networks are D = {a, b, c, d, h, i, j, m, n, p, q, s, t, u, v, w, x, y, z, 
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a‟,b‟, c‟, Eq} and A = {m, x}, respectively. Consequently, the set of pairwise stable 
networks in this case is given by P = D  A = {m, x}.  
 
The case of politically biased governments 
 
It was inferred from Table E.49 that when governments are biased in favour of the 
intermediaries, the sets of link deletion and link addition proof networks are given 
by D = {a} and A = {a, b, c, d, e, f, h, i, j, k, l, m, n, o, p, q, r, s, t, u, v, w, x, y, z, a‟, 
b‟, c‟, Eq}, respectively. Consequently the set of pairwise stable networks in this 
case is P = D  A = {a}. On the other hand, in considering Table E.50, it was 
inferred that the sets of link deletion proof and link addition proof networks when 
governments are biased in favour of the farming sector are given by D = {a, b, c, d, 
e, f, g, h, i, j, k, l, m, n, o, p, q, r, s, t, u, v, w, x, y, z, a‟, b‟, c‟, Eq} and A = {x}. 
Consequently, the set of pairwise stable networks in this case is given by P = D  
A = {x}.  
 
Discussion 
 
The results of the current simulation when governments are biased in favour of 
either consumers, intermediaries or the farming sector are the same as the ones 
obtained for the cases of symmetric countries with different levels of monosonistic 
power (see Sections 4.3.1.1, 4.3.1.2, 4.3.1.3 and Appendix F). This means that the 
same conclusions discussed in these simulations applies to the case of asymmetry 
in farmers‟ productivity when governments are politically biased. 
246 
 
 
On the other hand, the result obtained for the case of politically unbiased 
governments is different from the one obtained in the case of symmetrical 
governments without monopsonistic power (i.e. Goyal and Joshi‟s world with 
symmetrical countries presented in Section 4.3.1.1).  
 
In that simulation it was found that the pairwise stable networks are global free 
trade and a network composed of a complete component and a singleton. The 
current simulation revealed that global free trade is also pairwise stable when there 
is asymmetry in farmers‟ productivity. However, the other stable network is a 
network formed of a complete component and a singleton having a less efficient 
farming sector. This means that Goyal and Joshi‟s is only consistent with the 
current simulation when the singleton has an intermediary that exercise higher 
levels of monopsonistic power. This is explained as follows. In Goyal and Joshi‟s 
world the network with the complete component and the singleton is stable 
because the latter country is unwilling to sign an agreement. That is, the gain in 
consumer surplus as a consequence of the higher competition after an agreement 
plus the additional profits made in the new partner country are not large enough to 
compensate the loss of profits in the domestic market of the singleton.  
 
In the current simulation this is reversed when the singleton is efficient because in 
addition to the gain in consumer surplus and the additional profit made in the new 
partner country there is also a gain in producer surplus that reflects the higher level 
of output that is traded after the agreement. This three positive sources of welfare 
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are large enough to offsets the loss of profits in the domestic market. In contrast, 
when the singleton is inefficient, the additional gain in welfare from producer 
surplus is not large enough to contribute in compensate the loss of profit in the 
domestic market.  This reflects the fact that the intermediary in this country faces a 
higher marginal cost than intermediaries in more efficient countries.  It is concluded 
therefore that the existence of a farming sector contributes to free trade in 
countries that have a more efficient farming sector.  
 
This result also differs from the cases of symmetrical countries with different 
monopsonistic power (see Sections 4.3.1.1, 4.3.1.2 and 4.3.1.3). In these cases 
only global free trade is pairwise stable. In considering this result it was concluded 
in these simulations that the farming sector have a positive effect on global free 
trade because producer surplus has a significant contribution in the welfare 
function. But as explained above, the result obtained in the current simulation 
revealed that this conclusion only holds for countries that have an efficient farming 
sector. In considering these differences, it is predicted that in the real world higher 
levels of international trade of food processed goods can be found in more efficient 
countries with politically unbiased governments. That is, in countries where 
intermediaries exercise lower levels of monopsonistic power.  
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PART III: Summary, Discussion and Conclusions 
 
4.5 Summary and conclusions 
 
This chapter introduces the proposed international trade network and explains the 
fact that the introduction of the farming sector into the original framework by Goyal 
and Joshi (2006) creates high level of endogeneity. This happens because this 
sector translates as non-fixed marginal cost from the point of view of 
intermediaries. That is, increasing the demand for agricultural goods by these firms 
pushes the price paid to the farming sector up. There are two main implications of 
this effect. Firstly, more free trade increases agricultural prices but reduces the 
price of food processed good given by higher competition negatively affecting the 
gross margin made by the intermediaries in more integrated networks. Secondly, 
the high level of endogeneity caused by the farming sector makes the theoretical 
model intractable in mathematical terms. This means that it is difficult to obtain 
generalisations from the model as it cannot be solved for a generic number of 
countries.  
 
In considering the endogeneity problem, the proposed model was solved by means 
of simulations that assume the existence of a world composed of four countries 
under different assumptions (i.e. exogenous and endogenous tariffs, asymmetry in 
market size, and asymmetry in farmers‟ productivity). The aim of these simulations 
is to identify deviations from the original work by Goyal and Joshi that are attributed 
to the existence of a farming sector. That is, the aim is to assess how the 
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international trade architecture is affected when intermediaries face a non-fixed 
marginal cost. In this context, three types of deviations were explored: cases when 
global free trade becomes unstable; cases when other networks become unstable; 
and cases when multiple stable networks emerge. 
 
In relation to the fist type of deviations, it was found that global free trade becomes 
unstable mainly when governments are biased in favour of intermediaries. This 
happens, as noted above, because more trade increases agricultural prices but 
reduces the price of food processed goods negatively affecting the profits made by 
these firms. This result was found in all the simulations developed in this chapter. 
In considering this result, it is concluded therefore that the farming sector exercise 
a negative effect on free trade when governments are biased in favour of 
intermediaries. 
 
In order to understand the economic mechanism behind this finding, let us consider 
the impact of trade liberalisation upstream and downstream in the supply chain in, 
say, country i. In relation to the upstream segment, when this country signs new 
agreements, the domestic market becomes more competitive implying that the 
intermediary obtains a lower price in this market after the new agreements are in 
force. At the same, this firm gets access to the domestic market of the new partner 
countries but the price obtained in these markets decreases as trade liberalisation 
progress because countries become more competitive. As a result, the total output 
that is exported by the intermediary in country i increases but the price that this 
firms obtains in foreign markets decreases resulting in a net loss of profits as a 
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result of trade liberalisation. Consumers in country i are better off as a result of the 
increase in competition in this country. In relation to the downstream segment, on 
the other hand, the increase in the total output that is traded by the intermediary as 
international trade progresses increases the demand for the agricultural good 
pushing the price paid to the farming sector up positively affecting the return 
obtained by this sector. In summary, the impact of trade liberalisation upstream 
and downstream is reflected as an increase in total output that is traded by the 
intermediary, a decrease in net profits, and increase in consumer surplus, and an 
increase in producer surplus.  
 
In order to illustrate the upstream and downstream effects of trade liberalisation 
described above, consider as an example the Simulation 2 (i.e. symmetrical 
countries; moderate level of monopsonistic power given by ϕ = 1 in Equation 4.1; 
and market size given by  = 1 in Expression 4.6 in all countries). Let us assume 
that all countries are in autarky and suppose that countries i and k decide to sign a 
bilateral agreement which each other (i.e. passing from network a to network b in 
Figure 4.3). According to the information presented in Appendix A, the intermediary 
of country i sells a total output of 0.4000 in the domestic market in autarky and, 
according to equation 4.6, the price that this firm obtains in this market is 0.6000. 
At that price the intermediary makes a total profit of 0.2000. Now, when country i 
signs the agreement with country k, the output that is sold in the domestic market 
decreases from 0.4000 to 0.2667 as a consequence of the higher competition, but 
at the same time, this firm exports an output of 0.2667 to the new partner country. 
This means that the total output that is traded by the intermediary of country i 
251 
 
increases from 0.4000 to 0.5334 (i.e. 2x0.2667) after the agreement. According to 
the Equation 4.6, the price that the intermediary receives in each market after the 
agreement is equal to 0.4666. As a result of this price, this firm makes a profit of 
0.0889 in each market. This means that after the agreement, the total profit made 
by the intermediary of country i decreases from 0.2000 to 0.1778 (i.e. 2x0.0889). 
Let us consider now the downstream segment in this example. As explained 
above, the total output traded by the intermediary of country i increases from 
0.4000 to 0.5334. Because of the Leontief production function of this firm, this 
implies that the demand for the agricultural good increases by the same amount. 
Using the Equation 4.1, this means that the price paid to the farming sector 
increases from 0.1000 to 0.1333 after the agreement resulting in an increase of 
producer surplus from 0.0200 to 0.0356.   
 
Regarding the cases when other networks become unstable, it was found that the 
farming sector positively affects free trade when governments are politically 
unbiased because the presence of this sector breaks pairwise stable networks 
other than global free trade. This is explained by the fact that more trade increases 
the demand for agricultural goods pushing the price paid to the farming sector up. 
This gain in producer surplus plus the gain in consumer surplus due to higher 
competition are both large enough to offsets the net loss of profits made by the 
intermediaries. Nonetheless, two exceptions were found.  
 
Firstly, it was found in the simulation that assumes a world composed of large and 
very small countries that the farming sector positively affects the incentives of large 
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countries to sign more agreements. However, this does not happen in very small 
countries because they markets are too small to obtain significant gains from trade. 
Consequently, this result suggests that more trade would be expected in large 
countries in a world composed of large and very small countries with politically 
unbiased governments.  
 
Secondly, it was found that when countries are asymmetric in farmers‟ productivity, 
pairwise stable networks that contain a singleton becomes unstable under the 
presence of a farming sector when the singleton is an efficient country. The reason 
is because these countries obtain a net gain in welfare when signing a bilateral 
agreement that is reinforced by the gain in producer surplus resulting from higher 
agricultural prices. In contrast, this increase in price is too high in inefficient 
singletons in terms of the negative effect on the profits made by the intermediary of 
these countries. This causes a net loss in welfare when an agreement is signed. It 
is concluded therefore that in this case the farming sector has a positive effect on 
trade in countries having a more efficient farming sector.  
 
Finally, in relation to deviations that consider the emerging of new stable networks 
with respect to Goyal and Joshi‟s world, the following results were found. Firstly, 
when governments are biased in favour of the farming sector and when countries 
are symmetric, only global free trade is stable. The reason is because, as 
explained above, more free trade implies that farmers obtain higher agricultural 
prices and, therefore, higher levels of producer surplus. In this context, the farming 
sector positively affects free trade. However, when countries are asymmetric in 
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market size, regionalism of the south-north emerges. That is, large countries are 
willing to sign bilateral agreements with each other but are unwilling to sign 
agreements with smaller countries.  
 
The reason is because signing an agreement with a smaller country increases the 
level of competition in the domestic market of the large country. This causes a 
decrease in the output that is sold by the intermediary of this country in the 
domestic market that is not compensated by the additional export output that is 
exported to the new smaller country partner. This net decrease in output pushes 
the price paid to the farming sector in the large county down negatively affecting 
producer surplus in this country. It is concluded therefore that in this case the 
farming sector only favour free trade in blocks of countries of similar size leading to 
regionalism.  
 
It was also found that several networks emerged in the case of unbiased 
governments when the world is composed of large countries and very small 
countries. In this case there are several stable networks where large countries are 
unwilling to sign agreements with very small countries because the gain in profits in 
these countries is irrelevant. As a result, there is not significant gain in export 
profits to compensate the loss in consumer surplus and producer surplus in the 
large countries given by the resulting higher competition after an agreement is 
signed.  
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On the other hand, note this chapter is focussed on the cases of unbiased 
governments or governments biased in favour of either intermediaries or the 
farming sector. The reason is because it is less likely to find in the real world 
governments biased in favour of consumers. Nonetheless, this analysis was 
developed in Appendix F and some interesting theoretical results were obtained.  
 
It was found in all the simulations that global free trade is pairwise stable when 
governments are biased in favour of consumers. The reason is because more 
trade increases competition and this positively affects consumer surplus.  
 
However, global free trade is not the only stable network when there are 
asymmetries across countries. For example, in the simulation that assumes a 
world composed of large and very small countries, networks in which all countries 
have agreements with each other except the very small countries is also pairwise 
stable. This is because the latter countries are indifferent about signing an 
agreement with each other because this does not offer significant gains in 
consumer surplus as a consequence of their small domestic markets.  
 
Likewise, when countries are asymmetric in farmers‟ productivity, less efficient 
countries are unwilling to sign an agreement with large countries because the 
additional export output in the large country pushes the agricultural price in the less 
efficient country up. In order to mitigate this increase, the intermediary of the latter 
country decreases the output sold in the domestic market depressing in this way 
the level of competition and, therefore, negatively affecting consumer surplus. This 
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suggests therefore that regionalism of the south-north type can also emerge when 
governments are biased in favour of consumers and when there is asymmetry in 
farmers‟ productivity.  
 
A summary of the main results obtained in this chapter is presented in the Table 
4.6. On the other hand, Table 4.7 shows the cases where global free trade is not 
pairwise stable and when regionalism arises.  
 
 
Table 4.6. Summary of the results found in the simulations 
Simulation Unbiased Biased in favour 
of consumers 
Biased in favour 
of intermediaries 
Biased in favour 
of farming sector 
1: Symmetric 
without farming 
sector 
Two pairwise stable 
networks. One of 
the is global free 
trade 
Global free trade is 
the only pairwise 
stable network 
Multiple equilibria 
including global 
free trade 
NA 
2: Symmetric with 
moderate 
monopsonistic 
power 
Farming sector 
positively affects 
trade: it breaks the 
inefficient stable 
network 
Idem Farming sector 
negatively affects 
trade: Countries are 
unwilling to keep 
their agreements  
Farming sector 
positively affects 
trade: Only global 
free trade is stable. 
3: Symmetric with 
high monopsonistic 
power 
Idem Idem Idem Idem 
4: Symmetric 
without farming 
sector and 
endogenous tariffs 
The same as in 
simulation 1 
NA NA NA 
5: Symmetric with 
moderate 
monopsonistic 
power and 
endogenous tariffs 
Farming sector 
does not affect the 
pairwise stability of 
the networks in 
simulation 4 
NA NA NA 
6: Symmetric with 
high monopsonistic 
power and 
endogenous tariffs 
Idem NA GFT can be broken NA 
11: Large and very 
small countries 
without farming 
sector 
Multiple equilibria 
including global 
free trade  
Two pairwise stable 
networks. Network t 
in Figure 4.5 and  
global free trade 
Empty network and 
Regionalism 
emerges: single 
block formed of 
very small countries 
NA 
12: Large and very 
small countries with 
moderate 
monopsonistic 
power  
Idem. Farming 
sector does not 
affect pairwise 
stability 
Idem Idem Regionalism 
emerges: Blocks 
composed of same 
size countries 
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13: Large and very 
small countries with 
high monopsonistic 
power 
Farming sector 
favours free in large 
singleton countries. 
The number of 
stable networks 
decreases  
Idem Idem. Farming 
sector prevents 
bilateralism 
between large 
countries in non-
stable networks 
Idem 
14: Large and 
medium size 
countries without 
farming sector 
Number of stable 
networks 
decreases with 
respect to 
simulation 11. 
Medium size 
countries willing to 
sign agreements 
with each other 
Global free trade is 
the only pairwise 
stable network 
Regionalism is lost: 
medium size 
countries unwilling 
to keep their 
agreements. Only 
empty network is 
stable 
NA 
15: Large and 
medium size 
countries with 
moderate 
monopsonistic 
power 
 
Farming sector 
favours free trade. 
Only global free 
trade is stable 
Global free trade is 
the only pairwise 
stable network 
Idem Regionalism 
emerges. Global 
free trade is stable 
16: Large and 
medium size 
countries with high 
monopsonistic 
power 
Farming sector 
negatively affects 
free trade. More 
pairwise stable 
networks emerge 
Two pairwise stable 
network: global free 
trade and network c 
in Figure 4.5 
Idem 
Unwillingness to 
sign bilateral 
agreements is 
reinforced 
Large countries 
with several 
connections are 
more willing to 
break agreements 
with medium size 
countries. The 
opposite happens 
with large countries 
having few 
connections 
17: Asymmetry in 
farmers‟ 
productivity 
Farming sector 
favour trade only in 
more efficient 
countries 
Global free trade is 
the only pairwise 
stable network 
The same as in the 
symmetric case 
with different 
degree of 
monopsonistic 
power 
The same as in the 
symmetric case 
with different 
degree of 
monopsonistic 
power 
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Table 4.7. Simulations where regionalism can emerge. Cells in red are the cases 
where global free trade is not paiwise treaty stable  
Simulation Unbiased Biased in favour 
of consumers 
Biased in favour 
of intermediaries 
Biased in favour 
of farming sector 
1: Symmetric without 
farming sector 
   NA 
2: Symmetric with 
moderate 
monopsonistic power 
    
3: Symmetric with high 
monopsonistic power 
    
4: Symmetric without 
farming sector and 
endogenous tariffs 
 NA NA  
5: Symmetric with 
moderate 
monopsonistic power 
and endogenous tariffs 
 NA NA NA 
6: Symmetric with high 
monopsonistic power 
and endogenous tariffs 
 NA  NA 
11: Large and very 
small countries without 
farming sector 
  Regionalism  
12: Large and very 
small countries with 
moderate 
monopsonistic power  
  Regionalism Regionalism 
13: Large and very 
small countries with 
high monopsonistic 
power 
  Regionalism Regionalism 
14: Large and medium 
size countries without 
farming sector 
   NA 
15: Large and medium 
size countries with 
moderate 
monopsonistic power 
   Regionalism 
16: Large and medium 
size countries with high 
monopsonistic power 
 Regionalism  Regionalism 
17: Asymmetry in 
farmers‟ productivity 
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CHAPTER FIVE: Stable Trade Networks under Alternative Stability Concepts 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter, the stability of international trade networks was studied 
using the pairwise stability concept. The main results obtained in that chapter are 
that when there is a farming sector global free trade is not always stable, and free 
trade may be prevented depending on the political biases of governments, the 
position of countries in the networks and the existence of asymmetries across 
countries. 
 
Pairwise stability is a useful concept to predict as a first approximation the possible 
stable international trade architecture when countries sign bilateral agreements. 
This is why pairwise stability has been used as a benchmark in the current 
investigation. However, this concept has two main disadvantages. Firstly, it does 
not consider cases when countries break two or more agreements simultaneously. 
This implies that the set of pairwise stable networks might be overestimated by the 
traditional pairwise stability concept and this may affect predictions on international 
trade patterns in the real world. Secondly, the pairwise stability concept can only 
identify stable networks when countries are involved in bilateral agreements. 
However, it cannot inform about the possible stable networks when countries are 
involved in global agreements which is actually one of the approaches promoted by 
the World Trade Organisation in what is referred as the Doha Round.  
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In considering these disadvantages, the objective of this chapter is to extend the 
analysis by introducing two alternative stability concepts and to use them in the 
study of agricultural trade liberalisation. One of them is the strongly pairwise 
stability concept that allows countries to break two or more agreements 
simultaneously. The other concept is a novel stability concept developed in this 
dissertation referred to as global treaty stability and has the potential to identify 
stable networks when countries are involved in global agreements.  
 
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.2 formally introduced the proposed 
alternative stability concepts. It also explains how these concepts provide some 
insights to the issue of agricultural trade liberalisation. Section 5.3 studies 
bilateralism under strongly pairwise stability. Section 5.4 studies global agreements 
under global treaty stability. As in the previous chapter, the focus is placed on the 
cases of politically unbiased governments and governments biased in favour of 
either intermediaries or the farming sector. This is because it is less likely to find in 
the real world cases of governments biased in favour of consumers. Nonetheless, 
a detailed analysis of this type of biases is provided in Appendix F. Finally, section 
5.5 concludes the chapter. 
 
5.2 Introducing Alternative Stability Concepts 
 
Researchers in the area of International Trade Networks have adopted the 
pairwise stability concept developed by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) to identify 
the set of stable international networks (see for instance Goyal and Joshi, 2006; 
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Furusawa and Konishi, 2007; Zu et al. 2011). Pairwise stability establishes that an 
international trade network is stable when no country has an incentive to break an 
existing international agreement between them, and, if two countries are not 
involved in an international agreement, then at least one of them does not have an 
incentive to form one. Formally, let Si(g) be the objective function of the 
government of country i in network g. A network g is pairwise stable if and only if: 
(i) Si(g) > Si(g – gik) for all i  N  (i.e. no country is willing to break an existing 
agreement); and (ii) if Si(g + gij) > Si(g), then Sj(g + gij) < Sj(g) (i.e. if country i has 
an incentive to sign an agreement with country j, then the latter does not have an 
incentive to sign an agreement with country i). Note that bilateral deals often have 
exclusions that apply to agricultural trade and here there may be a deal covering 
other sectors but not agriculture. This aspect of bilateral agreements is not 
considered by the original model by Goyal and Joshi (2006) because their model 
assumes trade of a single commodity. The same strategy is considered in the 
current chapter as this allows focusing on key aspects of food processed goods 
trade without complicating the model in excess. Nonetheless, a more complex 
investigation of bilateral agreements is left for future research. 
 
The reason of why pairwise stability has been adopted to identify stable networks 
is because the traditional Nash equilibrium concept in a network framework 
produces unrealistic equilibria. This is formally explained by Bloch and Jackson 
(2006): “It is easy to see that the concept of Nash stability is too weak as a concept 
for modelling network formation when links are bilateral, as it allows for too many 
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equilibrium networks. For instance, the empty network is always a Nash network, 
regardless of the payoff structure (p. 309)”. 
 
While the pairwise stability has the ability to identify different stable international 
networks when countries are involved in bilateral agreements, there is potential for 
refinements that can be used to reduce the set of stable international networks. To 
see this, note that pairwise stability assumes that countries cannot break or sign 
more than one agreement simultaneously. This constitutes a strong assumption for 
the analysis of international trade liberalisation.  
 
Firstly, it is reasonable to assume that signing and putting in force several bilateral 
agreements simultaneously is unrealistic given the large amount of resources that 
each bilateral negotiation demands. Nonetheless, breaking two or more 
agreements simultaneously is not unrealistic as this depends only on decisions 
made by single countries (i.e. governments cannot be forced to maintain several 
agreements if they don‟t want to). This suggests that an appropriate stability 
concept to study bilateral trade agreements is the one that allows countries to: (i) 
break two or more agreements simultaneously; and (ii) sign one agreement at time.  
 
Secondly, a global agreement involves a commitment made by all the countries in 
the world. This is equivalent to sign all possible bilateral agreements by all the 
countries of the world simultaneously, a fact that is not captured by pairwise 
stability. In addition, a global agreement can only be sustained if no country has an 
incentive to deviate from the agreement by breaking one or more agreements 
262 
 
simultaneously. This suggests, therefore, that an appropriate stability concept to 
study the issue of global agreements in agriculture is the one that allows countries 
to: (i) sign all the possible bilateral agreements simultaneously (i.e. to sign a global 
agreement); and (ii) break one or more agreements simultaneously. These 
considerations were introduced into the original model of Goyal and Joshi (2006) 
as stability concept extensions. They are described as follows. 
 
5.2.1. A Stability Concept to Study Bilateral Agreements   
 
Given the disadvantages of using the pairwise stability to study the issue of 
bilateral agreements from an international trade network point of view, it was 
considered that a more suitable equilibrium concept would be that of strongly 
pairwise stability. This concept was formally studied by Gilles et al. (2006), Gilles 
and Sarangi (2010), and Gilles et al. (2012). It was first proposed as an extension 
by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) and referred to as pairwise Nash equilibrium by 
Bloch and Jackson (2006). Strongly pairwise stability has the property that 
countries are allowed to break multiple links at the same time. Moreover, the set of 
strongly pairwise stable networks is equal to the intersection of the sets of Nash 
stable networks and pairwise stable networks (Bloch and Jackson, 2006). That is, 
 = P  NE, where , P, and NE are the sets of strongly pairwise stable networks, 
pairwise stable networks, and Nash equilibrium networks, respectively. The main 
implication of this property is that the set of strongly pairwise stable networks is a 
subset of the set of pairwise stable networks. This is a useful property that is 
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considered in this thesis to determine the stability of international trade networks 
under strongly pairwise stability.  
 
In order to define strongly pairwise stability in the terms of the International Trade 
Network model, let us consider some concepts adapted from Gilles et al. (2006), 
Gilles and Sarangi (2010), and Gilles et al. (2012): (i) The marginal benefit of 
country i when breaking an international agreement with country j is: Di(g,gij) = Si(g) 
− Si(g − gij)  R; and (ii) the marginal benefit in country i when deleting 
(simultaneously) hi  Li(g) international agreements is  Di(g,hi) = Si(g) − Si(g − hi)  
R.  
 
Using these concepts, Gilles et al. (2006), Gilles and Sarangi (2010), and Gilles et 
al. (2012) define: 
 
(a) A network g  G is link deletion proof if for every player i  N and every 
neighbour j  Ni(g) it holds that Di(g,gij) ≥ 0. Let D  G be the set of link deletion 
proof networks. 
 
(b) A network g  G is strong link deletion proof if for every player i  N and every 
hi  Li(g) it holds that Di(g,hi) ≥ 0. Let DS  G be the set of strong link deletion proof 
networks. 
 
(c) A network g  G is link addition proof if Si(g + gij) > Si(g) implies that Sj(g + gij) < 
Sj(g) for all i,j  N. Let A  G be the set of link addition proof networks. 
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The researchers used these definitions to establish the following equilibrium 
concepts: 
 
(1) A network g  G is pairwise stable if g is link deletion proof as well as link 
addition proof. Let P = D  A  G be the set of pairwise stable networks. This is 
the stability concept used originally by Goyal and Joshi (2006). 
 
(2) A network g  G is strongly pairwise stable if g is strong link deletion proof as 
well as link addition proof. Let  = DS  A  G be the set of strongly pairwise 
stable networks. This is the stability concept adopted in this chapter.  
 
Pairwise stability and strongly pairwise stability have in common that both of them 
are link addition proof. That is, both stability concepts allow countries to form only 
one agreement at time. However, they differ in that the former is link deletion proof 
and the latter is strong deletion proof meaning that strongly pairwise stability allows 
countries to break several agreements simultaneously.  
 
5.2.2. A Stability Concept to Study Global Trade Agreements     
 
No concept that is suitable to study global trade agreements in agriculture using a 
network approach was found in the literature. It is for this reason that the concept 
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described in this section is an additional novel contribution of the current chapter. 
This concept was named in this thesis Global Treaty Stability9. 
 
The global treaty stability proposed in this dissertation is an extension of strongly 
pairwise stability that replaces the link addition proof condition by an alternative 
condition that has been named global treaty proof. This is explained as follows. Let 
the marginal benefit of country i when forming a global agreement be i(g
c) = 
Wi(g
c) – Wi(g). A network g  G is global treaty proof if for at least one country i  
N it holds that i(g
c)  0. In words, a network g  G is global treaty proof if at least 
one country i  N does not have an incentive to form a global agreement. Let  be 
the set of global treaty proof networks and GT be the set of global treaty stable 
networks. Using this definition, a network g is said to be global treaty stable if g is 
strong link deletion proof as well as global treaty proof (i.e. g  GT = Ds). That 
is, network g is global treaty stable if: (i) no country has an incentive to break one 
or more international agreements; and (ii) at least one country is not willing to form 
a global trade agreement. 
 
It is important to highlight the fact that in contrast to strongly pairwise stability, the 
set of global treaty stable networks is not a subset of pairwise stable network. This 
is because the global treaty proof condition of this stability concept is not a subset 
of the link addition proof condition that characterises the pairwise stability concept. 
This means that it may be possible to identify global treaty stable networks that are 
not pairwise stable. That is, it may be possible to find different results from those 
                                                          
9
 This contribution was published in the Bulleting of Economic Research. See May (2016). See Appendix G. 
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obtained by Goyal and Joshi (2006). This possibility is explored in the simulations 
considered in the current chapter. 
 
5.2.3 New insights of the proposed stability concepts 
 
The proposed stability concepts have the potential to inform about new results in 
relation to the original theoretical work by Goyal and Joshi as well as the extension 
introduced in the previous chapter to study the issue of agricultural trade 
liberalisation. This is explained as follows. 
 
Regarding the strongly pairwise stability concept, remember that it differs from 
pairwise stability in that the latter cannot capture cases when countries break two 
or more agreements simultaneously. This is because pairwise stability assumes 
that countries can only break a single agreement at time. To illustrate how the 
results from Goyal and Joshi may be affected when relaxing this assumption, 
consider the following analysis.  
 
Suppose that an arbitrary network g is pairwise stable. When a country in this 
network breaks a single agreement in Goyal and Joshis‟ world, its domestic market 
becomes less competitive. Now, because network g is pairwise stable, the gain in 
the profit made by the intermediary of this country in the domestic market after the 
agreement is broken is not large enough to offsets the loss in consumer surplus, 
and the profit made in the ex-partner country. However, this balance on the welfare 
function may be reversed when countries are allowed to break two or more 
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agreements simultaneously. That is, it may be the case that if a country in network 
g breaks several agreements simultaneously, the gain in profits in the domestic 
market is much larger because the level of competition is reduced significantly. The 
resulting increase in the domestic profit can potentially be large enough to offset 
the loss in consumer surplus and the profit made in the ex-partner countries. If this 
was the case, then network g would not be strongly pairwise stable even when 
being pairwise stable.  
 
In the extended version of the model this possibility is more likely when 
governments have a tendency to be biased in favour of intermediaries. This is 
because more trade increases agricultural prices implying that intermediaries face 
higher costs and get paid a lower price for the finished food good given the higher 
competition. Consequently, breaking several links simultaneously can significantly 
increase the profits made by these individuals in the domestic market to the extent 
of offsetting any loss in welfare from consumer surplus, export profits and producer 
surplus. In contrast, it is more likely that breaking several links simultaneously will 
not affect the stability of networks when governments are biased in favour of the 
farming sector because, as explained above, farmers get paid higher agricultural 
prices in more liberalised networks and breaking one or more agreements will 
cause a decrease in producer surplus. 
 
This, of course, can be reinforced in some cases when countries are asymmetric in 
Goyal and Joshis‟ world. For example, a large country may have an incentive to 
break simultaneously its existing agreements with small countries in order reduce 
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the level of competition in its domestic market in order to favour their 
intermediaries. The increase in domestic output can be large enough to offset the 
loss of export profits obtained from the small countries. However, this is not so 
clear when there is a farming sector because breaking several links with small 
countries can also increase the cost faced by the intermediaries. These examples 
illustrate some possible implications of replacing the pairwise stability with the 
strongly pairwise stability. This is explored in detail in Section 5.3.  
 
Regarding the global treaty stability concept, on the other hand, it has the ability to 
identify what countries in the world are willing or unwilling to sign a global 
agreement. In this context, centrality becomes a key feature of the analysis under 
this stability. Centrality is referred to a country that is highly connected to other 
countries that have a small number of connections. The former is said to have a 
central position in the network. To illustrate why centrality is important in the 
analysis of global free trade agreements, consider as an example the star network. 
That is, a network where the central country is connected to all countries of the 
world (i.e. the non-central countries) and the non-central countries are only 
connected to the central one.  
 
It is not difficult to infer in this example that the central country is unwilling to sign a 
global agreement in Goyal and Joshis‟ world. This is because this country has 
already an agreement with all countries implying that it has reached the highest 
level of competition in the domestic market and, therefore, the highest level of 
consumer surplus. In addition, the central country makes high levels of export 
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profits because non-central countries have low levels of competition as they are 
only connected to the former country. Thus, a global agreement does not offer the 
central country gains in consumer surplus. However, the agreement increases 
competition in non-central countries negatively affecting the export profits made by 
the central country.  
 
In the extended version of the model, the unwillingness to sign an agreement by a 
central country may be weakened or reinforced when there is a farming sector 
depending on several factors such as policy biases and the level of monopsonistic 
power, among others. For example, a central government that has a tendency to 
be biased in favour of the farming sector may be less willing to sign an agreement. 
This is because a global agreement increases the level of competition in non-
central countries negatively affecting the output that is exported by the central 
country. Now, because producer surplus depends on the total output that is traded 
by the intermediary, this means that a global agreement decreases producer 
surplus reinforcing the unwillingness of the central country to sign the global 
agreement. However, the situation is not so clear when governments have a 
tendency to be biased in favour of intermediaries because a global agreement also 
lowers the agricultural price and, therefore, the cost faced by the intermediaries.  
 
This example illustrates the role of centrality when studying the issue of global 
agreements. This centrality and other relevant considerations are formally studied 
in Section 5.4. 
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Having discussed some possible implications of adopting alternative stability 
concepts, a detailed analysis of how these concepts affect the international 
network stability is presented in the following sections. 
 
5.3 Bilateralism under strongly pairwise stability 
 
In order to identify the strongly pairwise stable networks in the simulations 
presented in the previous chapter, the following sets defined in Section 5.2.1 will 
be used: (i) strong link deletion proof networks (i.e. DS); link addition proof 
networks (i.e. A); and strongly pairwise stable networks (i.e.  = DS  A). 
 
Because the set of strongly pairwise stable networks is a subset of pairwise stable 
networks (Gilles et al., 2006; Gilles and Sarangi, 2010; Gilles et al., 2012), this 
section only reports the cases when these sets are different. That is, only the 
simulations that revealed deviations from the analysis developed in the previous 
chapter.  
 
5.3.1 Simulation 1: i = 0 and i = 1 for all i  N.    
 
In the previous chapter it was found in the case of exogenous tariffs, symmetric 
countries with governments biased in favour of intermediaries, and not 
monopsonistic power (i.e. the original model Goyal and Joshi with exogenous 
tariffs) that the set of pairwise stable networks is P = {a, g, k, Eq} (see Figure 4.3). 
However, this differs from the set of strongly pairwise stable networks. To see this, 
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consider Table 4.2. From this table it is inferred that the sets of strong link deletion 
proof and link addition proof are DS = {a} and A = {a, b, g, i, k, Eq}, respectively. 
This implies that the set of strongly pairwise networks in this case is  = DS  A = 
{a}, that is, the empty network. This result revealed that biased governments in 
favour of intermediaries without monoponistic power can favour these individuals 
by breaking multiple links simultaneously. This is because the resulting higher 
competition in the domestic market is strong enough to cause a net gain in total 
profit. That is, the gain in the profit made in the domestic market is large enough to 
offsets the loss of profits made in the ex-partner countries.  
 
It can also be inferred from the results obtained in the previous chapter that the 
incentives of governments to break one or more agreements simultaneously are 
reinforced when there is a farming sector. This is because this sector makes free 
trade more expensive to intermediaries as these individuals have to face higher 
marginal costs in more integrated networks. This can be seen for example when 
considering Simulations 2 and 3 in the previous chapter (see Sections 4.3.1.2 and 
4.3.1.3). In these simulations the sets of pairwise stable networks and strongly 
pairwise stable networks are the same and correspond to the empty network. This 
means that no network other than the empty network can be sustained because 
free trade is expensive from the point of view of the intermediaries. This is due to 
the fact that more output is traded by the intermediaries in more integrated 
networks as can be seen in the calculations developed for networks a, g and k in 
Appendix A. This higher total output pushed the price to the farmers up which is 
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why the intermediaries face higher costs when there is more free trade in these 
simulations.  
 
5.3.2 Simulations 4 and 5: i = 0 and i = 1 for all i  N; and i = 0.5 and i = 1 for 
all i  N.      
 
A similar deviation was found in the cases of endogenous tariffs, symmetric 
countries with governments biased in favour of intermediaries, no monopsonistic 
power (i.e. the original model Goyal and Joshi with exogenous tariffs), and 
moderate levels of monopsonistic power (see Sections 4.3.2.1 and 4.3.2.2). It was 
found in the previous chapter that the set of pairwise stable networks in these 
simulations is P = {a, g, k, Eq} (see Figure 4.3). However, this differs from the set 
of strongly pairwise stable networks which, according to Tables E.13 and E.17 in 
Appendix E, correspond to  = DS  A = {a}, that is, the empty network. In relation 
to Simulation 4, this difference is explained by the fact that breaking all the existing 
agreements by a determined country increase market power in the domestic 
market helping the intermediary to make higher profits in this market that offsets 
the loss in export profits. Nonetheless, this gain is mitigated to some extent by the 
optimal endogenous tariffs. That is, in contrast to the deviation explained in the 
previous subsection, the existence of optimal tariffs implies that a country that 
breaks all its agreements still imports a reduced level of food processed good 
causing a certain degree of competition in the domestic market. In spite of this 
mitigating factor, the gain in domestic profit after breaking the agreements offsets 
the loss of export profits. 
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Regarding simulation 5, on the other hand, the same factors discussed above 
explain why the only strongly pairwise stable network is the empty network. 
However, as explained in the previous subsection, the existence of a farming 
sector reinforces the gain in profits in the domestic market because less trade 
lowers the cost faced by the intermediaries.  
 
5.3.3 Simulations 11 and 12:  = 1, = 0 and  = 0 for all i  N; and  = 1, = 0 
and  = 0.5 for all i  N.    
 
Other deviations were found in the case of unbiased governments in networks 
formed of large and very small countries without monopsonistic power (i.e. Goyal 
and Joshis‟ world) and the case of unbiased governments in networks formed of 
large and very small countries with moderate level of monopsonistic power. In both 
cased it was found in Sections 4.4.1.1 and 4.4.1.2 of Chapter Four that the set of 
pairwise stable networks is P = {m, t, x, z, Eq} (see Figure 4.5). In contrast, as can 
be inferred from Tables E.28 and E.32, the set of strongly pairwise stable networks 
is  = {t, x}.   
 
In both cases it can be seen that networks m and z are pairwise stable but not 
strongly pairwise stable. The reason is related to the incentives of the unbiased 
government of the large country i in these networks. Welfare in this country 
decreases when the agreement with one of the very small countries is broken. In 
~ ~
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contrast, welfare increases when the large country i breaks simultaneously the 
existing agreements with the very small.  
 
To understand this finding, note that breaking an agreement increases the level of 
market power in the domestic market of the large country i. In the first case, this 
higher level of market power causes an increase in the profit made by the 
intermediary in this market but at the same time a decrease in consumer welfare. 
In the second, in addition to this gain in profits and loss in consumer surplus, there 
is also an increase in producer surplus because the higher level of market power in 
the large country translates into a higher level of output sold in this market that 
pushes the price paid to the farming sector up. In both cases the intermediary does 
not face a loss of profits made in the ex-partner country because the domestic 
market of this country is very small (i.e. the level of profits obtained in this market is 
irrelevant from the point of view of the intermediary of the large country). 
Consequently, the trade-off faced by the unbiased government in the first case 
consists of the gain in profits in the domestic market vs. the loss of consumer 
surplus after an agreement is broken, and the trade off in the second case consists 
of the gains in profits in the domestic market and producer surplus vs. the loss in 
consumer surplus.  
 
According to the results, when the government breaks a single agreement, the loss 
of consumer surplus is larger than the gains implying a net loss of welfare. This 
explains why networks m and z are both pairwise stable in both simulations. In 
contrast, when the government breaks all the existing agreements with the very 
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small countries simultaneously, the gains offset the loss in consumer surplus 
implying a net gain in welfare. This is why in this case networks m and z are not 
strongly pairwise stable in both cases.  
 
It is concluded therefore that when there is no monopsonistic power or when the 
level of monopsonistic power is moderate, unbiased government of large countries 
that are connected only with small countries have an incentive to break all their 
agreements with these countries. Note however that as long as large countries 
have some agreements with other large countries, their incentives to break their 
agreements with the very small countries are reversed. This is why networks t and 
x are also strongly pairwise stable in the simulations considered in this subsection. 
This happens because the level of competition in the domestic markets of the large 
countries is relatively high when they have an agreement with each other. This 
implies that the gain in market power when deleting simultaneously the 
agreements with the very small countries is not large enough to cause a net gain in 
welfare.  
 
Finally, it can be inferred from Simulation 13 (see Section 4.4.1.3 in Chapter Four) 
that when the level of monopsonistic power is high in networks composed of large 
and very small countries, the sets of pairwise stable and strongly pairwise stable 
networks are the same and corresponds to P = DS = {t, x}. This means that under 
high levels of monopsonistic power, the existence of a farming sector plays against 
free trade in networks where large countries are only connected to very small 
countries (i.e. networks m and z in Figure 4.5). The reason is because the gain in 
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producer surplus when breaking one or more agreements simultaneously is 
significantly high under these levels of monoponistic power. This gain plus the gain 
in profits in the domestic market are both large enough to offset the loss in 
consumer surplus caused by the lower level of competition after one or more 
agreements are broken.   
 
5.4 Global agreements under global treaty stability 
 
The analysis of a global agreement is based on the following sets of networks 
defined in Section 5.2.2: (i) strong link deletion proof networks (i.e. DS); global 
treaty proof networks (i.e. ); and global treaty stable network, (i.e. GT = DS  ). 
 
Note as pointed out in Section 5.2.2 that the set of global treaty networks is not a 
subset of pairwise stable networks. This is because the link addition proof condition 
of pairwise stability does not include cases where countries are willing to sign 
several links simultaneously which is what characterises a global international 
agreement. As a consequence, the stable global treaty networks that are studied in 
this section do not have to be the same as the ones identified in the previous 
chapter. This is shown as follows.  
 
5.4.1 Global agreements under exogenous tariffs and symmetric countries 
 
This section studies the network stability when countries are involve in global 
agreements under the assumption that tariffs are placed exogenously and that 
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countries are symmetric in terms of market size and farmers‟ productivity. The 
analysis considers the same three simulations that were carried out using the 
networks presented in Figure 4.3 (see Section 4.3). Each of these simulations 
corresponds to different levels of monopsonistic power associated with specific 
values of the parameter i in equation 4.1: i = 0; i = 0.5; and i = 1.5 for all i  N. 
These simulations are explained as follows. 
 
5.4.1.1 Simulation 1: i = 0 and i = 1 for all i  N.    
 
As explained in 4.3.1.1, this simulation converges to the original model by Goyal 
and Joshi (2006) because in this case there is no monopsonistic power (i.e. i = 0). 
The results obtained in this part will be used as a benchmark to evaluate deviations 
when the farming sector is introduced into the analysis. 
 
The case of politically unbiased governments 
 
In considering the information presented in Table 4.3 it was found that the sets of 
strong link deletion proof networks and global treaty proof networks are DS = {a, b, 
c, d, e, f, g, j, k, Eq} and  = {d, f, h, i, j, k, Eq}, respectively. This implies that the 
set of global treaty stable networks is GT = DS   = {d, f, j, k, Eq}. 
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The case of politically biased governments 
 
Using Table 4.2 it is concluded that when governments are biased in favour of 
intermediaries, the sets of strong link deletion proof networks and global treaty 
proof networks are DS = {a} and  = {a, b, c, d, e,  f, g, h, i, j, k, Eq}, respectively. 
This implies that the set of global treaty stable networks is GT = DS   = {a}. 
 
Discussion 
 
Let us first consider the case of politically unbiased governments. According to the 
results, there are four global treaty stable networks: d, f, j and k. The stability of 
networks d, f and j is explained by the fact that they contain at least one country 
that is not willing to sign a global agreement. The stability of network k, on the 
other hand, is explained by the fact that no country in this network is willing to 
break one or more agreements simultaneously. These networks are shown in 
Figure 5.1. The countries that are not willing to sign a global agreement are 
depicted as nodes with an eccentric circle.   
 
 
 
 
 
            (d)                                  (f)                                   (j)                                (k)          
Figure 5.1. Global treaty stable networks when governments are unbiased  
 
i i i i  j   j  j   j 
 k  k  k  k  l  l  l  l 
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According to this figure, the countries that are unwilling to sign a global agreement 
in networks d, f and j are those who have a central position in the network. That is, 
countries having on average a larger number of agreements. To illustrate why 
these countries are unwilling to sign a global agreement, consider network f. In this 
network the domestic market of country i is more competitive than the domestic 
market of the other countries. This is because country i has bilateral agreements 
with countries j and k implying that these three countries compete in the domestic 
market of the former. This high level of competition offers the consumers in country 
i high levels of consumer surplus. On the other hand, the intermediary in this 
country obtains a low level of profits in the domestic market as a consequence of 
competition. However, this low profit is compensated by the profits that this 
individual makes in countries j and k as domestic market of these countries are 
less competitive because there are less players competing in these markets. Thus 
the ability of country i to obtain large levels of consumer surplus and profits is due 
to its privileged position in the network.  
 
Now, if this country signed a global agreement, then there would be a gain in 
consumer surplus because its domestic market would become even more 
competitive. However, this would also cause a loss of profit in the domestic market 
of countries i, j and k because all these markets would become more competitive 
after the agreement. According to the results, this loss in profits offsets the gain in 
profits that the intermediary would make in the new partner-countries implying that 
the global agreement would cause a net loss of profits that cannot be compensated 
by the gain in consumer surplus. This is why country i is unwilling to sign such an 
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agreement. In contrast, countries who are located more far away from the centre of 
the network (i.e. networks that have less agreements than country i) are willing to 
sign the global agreement because this would cause a net gain in welfare. That is, 
the gain in consumer surplus as a consequence of higher competition offsets the 
net loss of profits.  
 
The same explanation applies to networks d and j. That is, the privileged position 
of countries i and j in network d, and the privileged position of countries j and k in 
network j is what explains why these countries are unwilling to sign a global 
agreement in these networks.  
 
In relation to network k, on the other hand, its global treaty stability is explained by 
the fact that this network is strong link deletion proof. That is, no country in this 
network is willing to break one or more agreements simultaneously. If they did, 
then gain in profit in their domestic market as a consequence of lower competition 
would not be large enough to compensate for the loss in consumer surplus and the 
loss of profits that the intermediaries made in the ex-partner countries. 
 
Let us now consider the case of governments biased in favour of intermediaries. 
According to the results, the only global treaty stable network in this case is 
network a, that is, the empty network. This is because a global agreement 
increases the level of competition in the domestic markets of the countries in the 
network. This causes a loss of profits in these markets that is not compensated by 
the additional profits that the intermediaries make in the new partner-countries.  
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In considering the results presented in this simulation, it is concluded that in Goyal 
and Joshis‟ world global free trade is a possible outcome when countries are 
involved in a global agreement and when governments are politically unbiased or 
biased in favour of consumers (see Appendix F). However, this possible outcome 
is not unique. There are other global treaty stable networks that contain countries 
who are unwilling or indifferent about signing a global agreement in agriculture. 
This is a consequence of their central position in the network. Finally, biased 
governments in favour of intermediaries are unwilling to sign a global agreement in 
agriculture because the associated high level of competition causes a net loss in 
profits.  
 
5.4.1.2 Simulation 2: i = 0.5 and i = 1 for all i  N.    
 
This simulation introduces the farming sector in order to assess how moderate 
levels of monopsonistic power (i.e. i = 0.5) affects the global treaty stable 
networks identified in the previous case.  
 
The case of politically unbiased governments 
 
The information presented in Table E.7 in Appendix E revealed that the sets of 
strong link deletion proof networks and global treaty proof networks are DS = {a, b, 
c, d, e, f, g, i, j, k, Eq} and  = {d, f, h, i, j, k, Eq}, respectively. This implies that the 
set of global treaty stable networks is GT = DS   = {d, f, i, j, k, Eq}.  
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The case of politically biased governments 
 
When governments are biased in favour of intermediaries (see Table E.5 in 
Appendix E), the sets of strong link deletion proof networks and global treaty proof 
networks are DS = {a} and  = {a, b, c, d, e,  f, g, h, i, j, k, Eq}, respectively. This 
implies that the set of global treaty stable networks is GT = DS   = {a}. On the 
other hand, using Table E.6 it is inferred that when governments are biased in 
favour of the farming sector, the sets of strong link deletion proof networks and 
global treaty proof networks are DS = {a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j, k, Eq} and  = {f, h, i, 
j, k, Eq}, respectively. Therefore the set of global treaty stable networks in this case 
is GT = DS   = {f, h, i, j, k, Eq}. 
 
Discussion 
 
According to the results, the global treaty stability of the networks identified in the 
previous simulation in the case of biased governments in favour of intermediaries 
is not affected when there is a farming sector. This means that Goyal and Joshis‟ 
model generates results that are robust under this bias and when countries are 
involved in global agreements.  
 
A deviation was found in the case of unbiased governments. That is, when the 
agricultural sector is introduced into the model, the network i in Figure 4.3 becomes 
global treaty stable. This is explained by the incentives of the government in 
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country l in this network. In the previous simulation, this country is unwilling to keep 
the agreement with country k because breaking this agreement causes a net gain 
in welfare. In contrast, when the farming sector is introduced, producer surplus in 
country l decreases when this country breaks the agreement with country k. This 
happens because the total output that is traded by the intermediary of the former 
decreases after the agreement is broken. This lower level of output implies that the 
farming receives a lower price negatively affecting producer surplus. This loss in 
producer surplus and the loss of consumer surplus are both large enough to offset 
the net gain in profits and this explains why the unbiased government of country l is 
unwilling to break the agreement when there is a farming sector. It is concluded 
therefore that the presence of this sector has a positive effect on international trade 
because it positively affects the incentives of governments of low integrated 
countries to maintain their existing agreements.  
 
In spite of the positive effect of the farming sector, this effect is not large enough to 
break the global treaty stability of network i in favour of a global agreement. This is 
because the central country of this network, country k, obtains a higher level of 
welfare in this network than in global free trade, even when there is a farming 
sector. This is explained by the fact that this country is already connected to all 
countries of the world. As a consequence, a global agreement will not offer this 
country access to new markets. Nonetheless, a global agreement increases the 
level of competition in these markets negatively affecting the profits made by the 
intermediary of the central country. This country also faces a loss in producer 
surplus that is caused by the decrease in the output that is traded by this country 
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when all the markets in the world become more competitive after the agreement. 
This lower output translates into a lower price that is paid to the farming sector in 
the central country that explains the loss in producer surplus.  
 
Finally, the global agreement causes a loss in consumer surplus in the central 
country as a consequence of the decrease in the output that is sold in the domestic 
market of this country after the agreement. This happens because the total output 
that is traded by non-central countries increases when these countries get access 
to new markets after the agreement. This higher output pushes the price paid to 
the farming sector in these countries up. In response to this higher marginal cost, 
the intermediaries of the non-central countries adjust by reducing the output that is 
sold in the domestic market of the central country negatively affecting consumer 
surplus. Thus, because the central country faces a loss in welfare after the 
agreement, it is concluded that the presence of a farming sector reinforces the 
incentives of central countries to prevent a global agreement in agriculture.  
 
In summary, the results for the case of unbiased governments revealed that the 
existence of a farming sector has a positive effect on international trade in non-
central countries and a negative effect on central countries. This again proves the 
advantage of studying agricultural trade liberalisation using an international 
network approach as it allow to identify heterogeneous behaviour in the network.  
 
Let us now analyse the case of biased governments in favour of farmers. The 
stable networks are presented in Figure 5.2. 
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Figure 5.2. Global treaty networks when governments are biased in favour of the 
farming sector 
 
In this figure the countries that are unwilling to sign a global agreement are 
identified as nodes with the highlighted circle. In networks f, h, i and j these 
countries occupy a central position in the network. The reason of why these 
countries are unwilling to sign a global agreement is because this position allows 
them to obtain higher levels of producer surplus than in global free trade. This is a 
consequence of the decrease in the quantity of output that is traded by the central 
countries after a global agreement is signed. That is, central countries have 
already access to all markets in the world implying that a global agreement does 
not offer them access to new markets. However, this agreement increases the 
level of competition in non-central countries and this, in turn, causes a decrease in 
the output that is exported to these countries. As a result of this lower output, the 
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farming sector in the central countries receives a lower price negatively affecting 
producer surplus.  
 
Network f is an exception because the central country is not fully connected. 
However, the same explanations apply here because the additional output that is 
exported by the central country to the new partner country l is not large enough to 
offsets the decrease in the output traded in other markets as a consequence of the 
higher competition after the global agreement. It is concluded therefore that the 
existence of a farming sector negatively affects the outcome of a global agreement 
negotiation because this causes a negative effect on producer surplus in countries 
that occupy a central position in the network.  
 
In relation to network k (i.e. global free trade), on the other hand, the global stability 
of this network is explained by the fact that no country is willing to break one or 
more agreements simultaneously. If they did, then the increase in the output sold in 
the domestic market would not be enough to compensate the decrease in the 
output that was exported in the ex-partner countries. This net decrease would 
reduce the price paid to the farming sector negatively affecting producer surplus. 
 
5.4.1.3 Simulation 3: i = 1.5 and i = 1 for all i  N.    
 
This simulation was introduced with the purpose of investigating whether the 
results obtained under moderate levels of monopsonistic power remains robust 
when this power is high.  
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The same results were obtained with only one exception. This corresponds to the 
stability of network f in the case of governments biased in favour of the farming 
sector. When monopsonistic power is moderate, this network is global treaty 
stable. However, when monopsonistic power is high, this network becomes 
unstable. The reason is because when monopsonistic power is high, the additional 
output that is exported to the new partner country l offsets the decrease in output 
caused by the higher competition positively affecting producer surplus. This 
happens because the intermediary of the singleton country reduces the output sold 
in the domestic market in a greater magnitude in order to compensate for the 
higher marginal cost that the intermediary faces when exporting to the new partner 
countries. This implies that the level of competition in this market is lower when 
monopsonistic power is higher. This lower competition is what explains why the 
output that is exported by the central country to country l is more significant and 
large enough to compensate for the decrease in output sold in the other markets. It 
is concluded therefore that when monopsonistic power is high, the existence of a 
farming sector have a positive effect on trade on central countries that are not fully 
connected in the network.  
 
5.4.2 Global agreements under endogenous tariffs and symmetric countries 
 
This section extends the analysis with the purpose of determining whether the 
global treaty stable networks identified in the previous simulations are affected 
when tariffs are placed endogenously. As in the previous chapter, the analysis only 
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considers the case of symmetrical countries with unbiased governments given the 
complexity of the mathematical computations involved. However, some partial 
analyses of the components of the welfare function are provided. 
 
5.4.2.1 Simulation 4: i = 0 and i = 1 for all i  N.    
 
This simulation assumes that there is not monopsonistic power in the model (i.e. i 
= 0) implying that it converges to the original model by Goyal and Joshi (2006). 
The results will be used to explore how the introduction of the farming sector 
affects the international trade structure of processed goods. 
 
According to the information presented in Table E.15 in Appendix E, the sets of 
strong link deletion proof networks and global treaty proof networks are DS = {a, b, 
c, e, g, k, Eq} and  = {d, f, h, i, j, k, Eq}, respectively. This implies that the set of 
global treaty stable networks when governments are unbiased is GT = DS   = 
{k}. 
 
This result is different from the one obtained under exogenous tariffs and non-
monopsonistic power (see Section 5.4.1.1). In that simulation, networks d, f, j and k 
are all global treaty stable. However, when tariffs are placed endogenously, 
networks d, f and j become unstable. The reason that explains this change is 
because there is at least one country in these networks that is willing to break one 
or more agreements simultaneously.  
 
289 
 
Using the information presented in Table E.15, it was found that these countries 
correspond to non-central countries (see Figure 4.3). In particular, it was found that 
country k has an incentive to break the agreement with country i and country l has 
an incentive to break the agreement with country j in network d; countries j and k 
are willing to break their existing agreements with country i in network f; and 
countries i and l have an incentive to break all their agreements simultaneously in 
network j.  
 
To understand why the non-central countries have an incentive to break one or 
more agreement, consider as an example network d. If country k in this network 
deleted its existing link with the central country i, then the following changes in the 
components of the welfare function would be observed. Firstly, this would cause a 
decrease in consumer surplus because the domestic market of country k would 
become less competitive. Secondly, for the same reason, the profit made by the 
intermediary of country k in this market would increase. Thirdly, this intermediary 
would face a loss in profits in the ex-partner country after the agreement was 
broken. Finally, there is an additional gain when an agreement is broken and 
corresponds to the additional tariff revenue obtained by the government. This 
additional tariff revenue plus the gain of profits in the domestic market are both 
large enough to offset the losses in consumer surplus and the profit made in the 
ex-partner country. This net gain in welfare after an agreement is broken explains 
why the non-central countries are not willing to maintain their existing agreements.  
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On the other hand, the instability of networks d, f and j and the global treaty 
stability of global free trade (i.e. network k) suggest that when governments are 
unbiased and when tariffs are placed endogenously, countries in different networks 
will either break or sign some agreements until they reach a network in which all 
countries of the world will be willing to sign a global agreement. In Figure 4.3, these 
networks correspond to a, b, c, e and g. This optimistic view, however, only holds 
under the assumption of politically unbiased governments. To see this, remember 
that it is shown in Chapter Four in the context of pairwise stability that 
intermediaries can potentially make additional profits by influencing biased 
policymakers to place tariffs that destabilises global free trade. This possible 
deviation by biased governments is discussed in more detail in the next 
simulations. 
 
5.4.2.2 Simulation 5 and 6: i = 0.5 and i = 1 for all i  N; and i = 1.5 and i = 1 
for all i  N.    
 
In considering Tables E.20 and E.25 in Appendix E, it was found the sets of strong 
link deletion proof networks and global treaty proof networks in the simulations that 
assume moderate (i.e. i = 0.5) and high levels of moopsonistic power (i.e. i = 1.5) 
are the same. They correspond to DS = {a, b, c, d, e, f, g, j, k, Eq} and  = {d, f, h, i, 
j, k, Eq}, respectively. This implies that the set of global treaty stable networks in 
both simulations is GT = DS   = {d, f, j, k, Eq}. 
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This result has three main implications. Firstly, when there is a farming sector, 
several networks become global treaty stable. To understand this result, remember 
that we saw in the previous simulation that in Goyal and Joshis‟ world under 
endogenous tariffs only global free trade is global treaty stable. The reason is 
explained as follows. 
 
When there is a farming sector, networks d, f and j become global treaty stable 
because an additional loss arises when the agreement with a central country is 
broken: producer surplus in the non-central country decreases because the 
farming sector obtains a lower price after the agreement is broken. Now, because 
the loss in consumer surplus plus the loss of profits made in the ex-partner country 
plus the loss in producer surplus are together larger than the gain in profits in the 
domestic market plus the gain in tariffs revenue, the non-central countries are 
unwilling to break the agreement with the central country which is what explains 
why d, f and j become global treaty stable. It is concluded therefore that the 
farming sector has a positive effect on trade because it prevents non-central 
countries from breaking their existing agreement with central countries.  
 
The second implication is that the analysis developed under exogenous tariffs 
offers a reasonable approximation to analysis under endogenous tariffs because 
both of them concluded the same: the farming sector has a positive effect on trade 
because it prevents non-central countries from breaking existing agreement with 
central countries. Given the complexity of the study of networks under endogenous 
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tariffs, adopting exogenous tariffs as a first approximation seems to be a good 
strategy.   
 
Finally, the global treaty stability of global free trade suggests that this network 
could potentially be reached. However, as stated in the previous simulation, this 
only holds in the case of politically unbiased governments. As shown in Chapter 
Four in the context of pairwise stability, intermediaries can influence biased 
policymakers to place tariffs that can destabilise global free trade and this deviation 
is more likely when monopsonistic power if high. This also applies to the case of 
global treaty stability because if global free trade is not link deletion proof (which is 
what happens when the intermediary influences the biased government), then it is 
not strong link deletion proof either. And if it is not strong link deletion proof, it 
cannot be global treaty stable. It is concluded therefore that a global agreement in 
agriculture is unlikely when there is a farming sector and when governments are 
biased in favour of intermediaries.   
 
5.4.3 Global agreements under exogenous tariffs and asymmetry in market 
size 
 
A key characteristic in the real world is that countries are heterogeneous in terms 
of market size. According to the results obtained in the previous chapter, this type 
of asymmetry can affect the international network stability in the context of pairwise 
stability. The objective of this section is to extend the analysis to determine 
whether asymmetry in market size can also affect the global treaty stability when 
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countries are involved in global agreements. As in Chapter Four, the strategy 
adopted in this section consists of analysing first the interaction between large 
countries and very small countries. The attention is then placed to the case of large 
and medium size countries. 
 
5.4.3.1 Simulation 11:  = 1, = 0 and  = 0 for all i  N.    
 
This simulation considers a world composed of large and very small countries 
without monopsonistic power. That is, it corresponds to Goyal and Joshis‟ world 
under this type of asymmetry. 
 
The case of politically unbiased governments 
 
In considering the information presented in Table E.28 in Appendix E, it is inferred 
that the sets of strong link deletion proof networks and global treaty proof networks 
are DS = {a, c, d, e, h, i, j, n, p, q, s, t, u, x, c’, Eq} and  = {c, e, f, g, h, i, j, k, n, o, 
p, q, r, s, t, u, v, w, x, y, a’, b’, c’, Eq}, respectively. This implies that the set of 
global treaty stable networks is GT = DS   = {c, e, h, i, j, n, p, q, s, t, u, x, c’, Eq} 
(see Figure 4.5). 
 
The case of politically biased governments 
 
According to the information presented in Table E.27 in Appendix E, the sets of 
strong link deletion proof networks and global treaty proof networks when 
~
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governments are biased in favour of intermediaries are DS = {a, d} and  = {a, b, c, 
d, e, f, g, h, i, j, k, l, m, n, o, p, q, r, s, t, u, v, w, x, y, z, a’, b’, c’, Eq}, respectively. 
Therefore the set of global treaty stable networks in this case is GT = DS   = {a, 
d}. 
 
Discussion 
 
Let us consider first the results obtained when governments are unbiased. The 
global treaty stable networks in this case are presented in Figure 5.3. In this figure 
large countries are represented as white nodes, very small countries as black 
nodes, and countries that are unwilling to sign a global agreement are represented 
as nodes with highlighted circles. 
 
In comparing this figure with Figure 5.1 above, it is possible to identify several 
differences from the results obtained in the symmetrical countries case in Goyal 
and Joshis‟ world (see Section 5.4.1.1). Firstly, while central countries in several 
global treaty stable networks are still the ones who are unwilling to sign a global 
agreement, in most of the cases these central countries are large ones. For 
example, consider network e in Figure 5.3. In this network country i is unwilling to 
sign a global agreement because it has a privileged position in this architecture. 
That is, this large central country makes high export profits in the other large 
country k because the domestic market of the latter is less competitive (i.e. it 
contains only two competitor countries: i and k). This high profit offsets the loss in 
profits that is made in the domestic market of the central country as a consequence 
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of the higher competition (i.e. it contains three competitor countries: i, j and k). 
Consequently, having the agreement with the large country k allows the large 
central country i to obtain a net gain in profits.  
 
 
 
 
 
           (c)                              (e)                               (h)                             (i)  
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          (c‟)  
Figure 5.3. Global treaty networks when governments are unbiased  
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On the other hand, the agreements with countries k and j makes the domestic 
market of country i more competitive positively affecting consumer surplus. Finally, 
the large central country i does not make profits in the very small country j because 
the domestic market of the latter is very small. However, the central country is 
willing to keep the agreement with the small country because the latter increases 
the level of competition in the latter positively affecting consumer surplus.  Thus, if 
country i signed a global agreement, then the loss of profits in the domestic and 
foreign markets as a consequence the higher competition would be large enough 
to offsets the gain in consumer surplus.  
 
Now, consider network f in figure 4.5. This network has the same architecture as 
network e. However they differ in that the central country in network f is the very 
small country j. This country is also unwilling to sign a global agreement. This 
global agreement would affect neither the profit made in the domestic market in 
country l nor consumer surplus because the domestic markets of these countries 
are very small. However, the additional profit that the very small country j would 
make in the new partner country k is not large enough to compensate the loss of 
profit in the large country i as a consequence of the higher level of competition 
after the agreement.  
 
This network, however, is not global treaty stable because the non-central large 
country is willing to break the agreement with the very small central country j. 
Breaking this agreement would make the domestic market of the large country less 
competitive positively affecting the profit made by the intermediary in this market. 
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This would also decrease consumer surplus. But the gain in profits is larger than 
the loss in consumer surplus which explains why the large country i is unwilling to 
keep the link with the central country j. It is concluded therefore that while central 
countries do not have an incentive to sign a global agreement, networks with large 
central countries are in general global treaty stable.  
 
Secondly, there exist some exceptions to the conclusion given in the previous 
paragraph. That is, there are some global treaty stable networks that contain a very 
small central country. In Figure 5.3, these networks correspond to networks q, s 
and u. The stability of these networks is explained by the political motivations of 
large countries.  
 
To illustrate this fact, consider as an example network q. In this network, the very 
small central country j is connected to the non-central very small country l and the 
non-central large countries i and k. The very small countries are indifferent about 
keeping or breaking their agreement because this will not affect their level of 
welfare as a result of the very small size of their domestic markets. However, the 
very small central country is willing to maintain the agreements with the large 
countries because this offers the former to obtain high profits in these countries. 
The central country is not willing to sign a global agreement because this would 
increase the level of competition in the large non-central countries negatively 
affecting the level of profits made in these countries. On the other hand, the large 
non-central countries are willing to keep the agreement with the very small central 
country because this helps the former to increase competition in their domestic 
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markets and, therefore, to increase the level of consumer surplus. It is concluded 
therefore that the global treaty stability of networks that contains a very small 
central country depends on the incentives of large countries to maintain their 
agreements with the central country. 
 
Third, it was found in the symmetric countries case that only central countries in 
global treaty stable networks are unwilling to sign a global agreement in 
agriculture. A key difference with respect to this case is that when countries are 
asymmetric in market size, there are global treaty stable networks with non-central 
countries that are also unwilling to sign an agreement. Examples of these networks 
are networks c, j, n, q, s, t, u, and c‟. In these networks the unwillingness of non-
central large countries is explained by the fact that they do not obtain additional 
significant profits when trading with very small countries. On the contrary, opening 
access to these countries makes the domestic markets of the large countries more 
competitive negatively affecting the profits made by the latter. This loss in profits is 
large enough to offsets the gain in consumer surplus caused by the higher 
competition.  
 
On the other hand, non-central very small countries unwilling to sign a global 
agreement are always connected to large countries. This is the reason why they 
are against the agreement: a global agreement makes the domestic markets of 
large countries more competitive negatively affecting the profit made by non-
central very small countries. This finding implies that occupying a central position in 
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a network is a sufficient but not a necessary condition for a country to be against a 
global agreement.  
 
Fourthly, a last difference with respect to the symmetrical case is that regionalism 
of the south-north type can arise when there is asymmetry in market size in the 
context of global treaty stability. This is reflected in networks c and c‟ in Figure 5.3. 
In these networks, the very small countries are indifferent about maintaining or 
breaking their existing agreement because this does not affect their levels of 
welfare as a consequence of the small size of their domestic markets. However, 
they are willing to sign a global agreement because this would offer them open 
access to the large countries.  
 
The large countries, on the other hand, are willing to maintain their agreement with 
each other because it allows them to increase the level of competition in their 
domestic markets positively affecting consumer surplus and also to obtain 
additional profits in the partner country. However, these countries are against a 
global agreement because this would increase competition in their domestic 
markets causing a net loss in welfare after given access to the small countries.  
 
 Let us now consider the case of biased governments in favour of intermediaries. 
The results revealed that in this case the global stable networks are networks a 
and d. The stability of these networks is explained by the incentives of the large 
countries. These countries are unwilling to have any agreement with very small 
countries because they do not obtain significant profits in the latter. On the 
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contrary, very small countries increase the level of competition in very large 
countries negatively affecting the profits made by the intermediaries of these 
countries. In addition, larger countries are unwilling to keep an agreement with 
each other because the additional profits that the make in the new partner country 
is not large enough to compensate for the loss of profits in the domestic market as 
a result of the higher competition. This is why the large countries in the global 
stable networks a and d are singletons.  
 
In summary, it is concluded that when governments are unbiased and when there 
are large and very small countries in Goyal and Joshis‟ world, several networks 
become global treaty stable implying that global free trade is unlikely under this 
asymmetry. In these networks, central countries (normally large countries) are 
always against a global agreement because this causes a net loss in welfare. Non-
central countries can also be against a global agreement depending on the 
structure of the network. Finally, if a network contains a block composed of large 
countries (i.e. regionalism of the south-north type), then these countries would not 
sign a global agreement because offering access to small countries would 
negatively affect their levels of welfare.  
 
On the other hand, when governments are biased in favour of intermediaries, only 
networks where large countries are singletons can be global treaty stable. This is 
because they are unwilling to increase the level of competition in their domestic 
market from a global agreement as this negatively affect the profits made by the 
intermediaries in these countries.   
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5.4.3.2 Simulation 12:  = 1,  = 0 and  = 0.5 for all i  N.    
 
Having identified the stable networks when there is not a farming sector in a world 
composed of large and very small countries, this simulation investigates how this 
stability is affected when this sector is introducing into the analysis. This is done by 
assuming that intermediaries exercise moderate levels of monopsonistic power 
(i.e.  = 0.5 in all i  N) 
 
The case of politically unbiased governments 
 
In considering the information presented in Table E.32 in Appendix E it is 
concluded that the sets of strong link deletion proof networks and global treaty 
proof networks are DS = {a, c, d, e, h, i, j, n, p, q, s, t, u, x, c’} and  = {b, c, e, f, g, i, 
j, k, l, n, o, q, r, s, t, u, v, w, x, y, a’, b’, c’, Eq}, respectively. This implies that the set 
of global treaty stable networks is GT = DS   = {c, e, i, j, n, q, s, t, u, x, c’, Eq}. 
 
The case of politically biased governments 
 
It is inferred from Table E.30 in Appendix E that when governments are biased in 
favour of intermediaries, the sets of strong link deletion proof networks and global 
treaty proof networks are DS = {a, d} and  = {a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j, k, l, m, n, o, p, 
q, r, s, t, u, v, w, x, y, z, a’, b’, c’, Eq}, respectively. This implies that the set of 
global treaty stable networks is GT = DS   = {a, d}. On the other hand, using the 
~
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information presented in Table E.33, it is concluded that when governments are 
biased in favour of the farming sector, the sets of strong link deletion proof 
networks and global treaty proof networks are DS = {a, c, d, c’} and  = {a, b, c, d, 
e, f, g, h, i, j, l, m, n, o, p, q, r, s, t, u, v, w, x, y, z, a’, c’, Eq}, respectively. Therefore 
the set of global treaty stable networks in this case is GT = DS   = {a, c, d, c’}. 
 
Discussion 
 
The results for the case of unbiased governments revealed deviations from the 
results obtained in the previous simulation. In particular, the results revealed that 
when the farming sector is introduced into the analysis, networks h and p become 
unstable. This is explained by the fact that the large countries in these networks 
are unwilling to sign a global agreement when there is not a farming sector, but this 
incentive is reversed when intermediaries exercise a moderate level of 
monopsonistic power. This happens because a global agreement also decreases 
the level of producer surplus in the large countries. While this loss implies an 
additional negative effect of a global agreement from the point of view of the large 
countries, this also implies that the intermediaries of large countries pay a lower 
price to the farming sector in global free trade. This mitigates the decrease in 
profits which is what explains why in this case the gain in consumer surplus offsets 
the net decrease in profits and producer surplus.    
 
Let us now consider the case of politically biased governments in favour of the 
farming sector, networks a, c, d and c‟ are global treaty stable. This is different 
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from the case of symmetrical countries with moderate monopsonistic power (see 
Section 5.4.1.2 and Figure 5.2) in that centrality becomes irrelevant because large 
central countries are better off by breaking their agreements with the very small 
countries. This is because breaking these links decreases the level of competition 
in large countries positively affecting the profits made by intermediaries. This 
increase is accompanied by an increase in the output sold by these individuals in 
this market pushing the price paid to the farming sector up. This, in turn, increases 
producer surplus in the large countries. It is for this reason that under this type of 
asymmetry, it is regionalism rather than centrality what explains the difference with 
respect to the symmetrical case. This also explains why in the asymmetric case 
global free trade is not stable. That is, biased large countries in favour of the 
farming sector have an incentive to deviate from global free trade by breaking their 
links with very small countries in order to increase producer surplus.  
 
In summary, the current simulation revealed that some of the results obtained in 
Goyal and Joshis‟ world under asymmetry in market size remain robust when the 
farming sector is introduced into the analysis and when monopsonistic power is 
moderate. However, there are some deviations that prove the fact that the 
presence of a farming sector can affect the international pattern of food processed 
goods.  
 
Firstly, it was found that larger unbiased countries that are connected to each other 
may have an incentive to form a global agreement that includes very small 
countries. This is because the latter increases competition in the large countries 
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reducing pressure on the price paid to farming sector mitigating the loss of profits 
that the intermediaries face in global free trade.  
 
Secondly, the results revealed that when the world is composed of large and very 
small countries, it is regionalism rather than centrality what explains the 
unwillingness of large countries to sign a global agreement in agriculture. This also 
explains why in the asymmetric case global free trade is not stable. In this case 
biased governments in favour of the farming sector can increase producer surplus 
by breaking their links with very small countries.  
 
5.4.3.3 Simulation 13:  = 1,  = 0 and  = 1.5 for all i  N.    
 
This last simulation in the case of a world composed of large and very small 
countries is introduced to determine how the international trade structure of 
processed agricultural goods is affected when the level of monopsonistic power is 
high (i.e. when  = 1.5 for all i  N).    
 
It was found that increasing the level of monopsonistic power does not cause 
deviations when governments are biased in favour of either consumers (see 
Appendix F), intermediaries or the farming sector. However, when governments 
are unbiased, the number of networks that are included in the sets of strong link 
deletion proof and global treaty stable networks increases. In the case of the set of 
strong link deletion proof networks, the new networks are g, m, o and z and, in the 
case of global treaty networks, the new networks are g and o. 
~
305 
 
 
In relation to networks are g, m, o and z, they are strong link deletion proof 
networks when monopsonistic power is high because the incentives of some large 
countries in these networks (i.e. country i in networks m and z, and country k in 
networks g and o) are reversed. In relation to networks m and z, the large country i 
is only connected to the very small countries j and l in these networks. Thus, when 
the former country breaks these agreements, market power increases in the 
domestic market positively affecting the output that is sold by the intermediary in 
this market. This does not cause a decrease in export output because the domestic 
market of the very small countries is irrelevant from the point of view of the very 
large country i. As a consequence, there is a net increase in output in the latter 
country that pushes the agricultural price up. While this implies a gain in producer 
surplus, it also implies that the gain in domestic profit is mitigated by the higher 
cost faced by the intermediary. Thus, when monopsonistic power is high, this 
mitigating effect is strong enough to make the gains in domestic profit and 
producer surplus not large enough to compensate the loss in consumer surplus. 
This is why in these networks the large country i is willing to maintain its 
agreements with the very small countries. That is, this is why networks m and z are 
strong link deletion proof when monopsonistic power is high.  
 
In relation to networks g and o, on the other hand, the incentive of the large country 
k is reversed when there is high level of monopsonistic power. To understand this 
fact, note that this country is only connected to the other large country i. Thus when 
country k breaks the link with country i, there is an increase in domestic output and 
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a decrease in export profit from the point of view of the large country K. According 
to the results obtained in Appendix C, the decrease in export output dominates 
implying that breaking the agreement causes a net decrease in output in country k. 
As a result of this decrease, the farming sector in this country gets paid a lower 
price that reinforces the gain in domestic profits by the intermediary but reduces 
producer surplus. Consequently, when monopsonistic power is high, the loss in 
producer surplus is significantly high to the extent that the gain in domestic profit is 
not large enough to compensate for the losses in producer surplus, consumer 
surplus and export profits. This is why under this level of monopsonistic power two 
networks g and o are strong link deletion proof.   
 
Regarding the set of global treaty networks, the reason of why networks g and o 
belong to this set when monopsonistic power is high is a consequence of the fact 
that they become strong link deletion proof as explained above.  
 
In considering the results obtained in the current simulations, the following 
implications are highlighted. Firstly, a high level of monopsonistic power has a 
positive effect on free trade because it prevents some countries from breaking their 
existing agreements with other countries. That is, the number of networks that 
belong to the set of strong link deletion proof network increases. However, it also 
plays against a global agreement because it increases the number of stable global 
treaty stable networks. Secondly, it is interesting to notice that centrality is not so 
relevant when the world is composed of large and very small countries and when 
the level of monopsonistic power is moderate (see the previous simulation). This is 
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because large countries are in general unwilling to sign agreements with very small 
countries. However, when monopsonistic power is high, centrality becomes 
relevant again as proved by the stability of networks g and o. In these networks, a 
central large country is willing to keep its agreements with very small countries 
because this increases the level of competition in the domestic market of the 
former. This not only increase consumer surplus in the central country, but also 
reduces pressure on the price paid to the farming sector mitigating the high cost 
paid by the intermediary of this country which offers them a better competitive 
position in the network.  
 
5.4.3.4 Simulation 14:  = 1,  = 0.5 and  = 0 for all i  N.    
 
The next three simulations are introduced to study global agreements when the 
world is composed of large and medium size countries (i.e.  = 1 and  = 0.5, 
respectively) under different degrees of monopsonistic power. The current 
simulation in particular considers the case when there is not monopsonistic power 
(i.e. Goyal and Joshi‟s world). 
 
The case of politically unbiased governments 
 
In considering the information presented in Table E.39 in Appendix E, it was found 
that the sets of strong link deletion proof networks and global treaty proof networks 
are DS = {a, c, d, e, h, i, j, m, n, p, s, t, u, w, x, z, c’, Eq} and  = { b, c, e, f, g, h, i, j, 
~
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k, l, n, o, p, q, r, s, t, u, v, w, x, y, a’, c’, Eq}, respectively. Therefore the set of 
global treaty stable networks is GT = DS   = {c, e, h, i, j, n, p, s, t, u, w, x, c’, Eq}. 
 
The case of politically biased governments 
 
When governments are biased in favour of intermediaries (see Table E.38 in 
Appendix E), the sets of strong link deletion proof networks and global treaty proof 
networks are DS = {a} and  = {a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j, k, l, m, n, o, p, q, r, s, t, u, v, 
w, x, y, z, a’, b’, c’, Eq}, respectively. This implies that the set of global treaty stable 
networks is GT = DS   = {a}. 
 
Discussion 
 
The results found in this simulation for the case of unbiased governments are in 
general the same as the ones identified for the case of large countries and very 
small countries (see Section 5.4.3.1). This suggests that these results remain 
robust when the world is composed of large countries and either medium size or 
very small countries. However, three deviations were identified.  
 
The first one is related to network t. In Section 5.4.3.1, it was found that this 
network is global treaty stable because all countries in this network are indifferent 
about signing a global agreement. However, when countries j and l are medium 
size, their domestic markets are relevant. If a link is formed between these 
countries, then they increase welfare because they obtain additional export profits 
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and a gain in consumer surplus due to higher competition that offsets the loss of 
domestic profits. In contrast, the large countries are against this agreement 
because this makes the domestic markets of the medium size countries more 
competitive negatively affecting their export profits. It is interesting to notice then 
that in both cases network t is global treaty stable. However, what changes are the 
incentives of the countries that belong to this network.  
 
The second deviation corresponds to network q. It was found in section 5.4.3.1 that 
this network is global treaty stable. However, it is not stable when the world is 
composed of large and medium size governments. This is explained by the 
incentive of country l which is only connected to network j. Thus, when these 
countries are medium size, country l is better off by breaking the link with country j 
because the gain in domestic profit as a consequence of the resulting lower 
competition offsets the losses of consumer surplus and export profits. This explains 
why in the current simulation network q is not global treaty stable.  
 
The last deviation identified for the case of unbiased governments is related to 
network w. That is, when the world is composed of large and very small countries, 
this network is not global treaty stable. In contrast, when the world is composed of 
large and medium size countries, this network becomes stable. This is explained 
by the incentives of the large country k which is only connected to countries j and l 
in this network. When the latter countries are very small, country k is willing to 
break simultaneously the agreements with these countries j and l because in 
autarky the gain in domestic profits offsets the loss in consumer surplus. In 
310 
 
contrast, when countries j and l are medium size, breaking these agreements also 
causes a loss of export profits. This loss and the loss of consumer surplus cannot 
be compensated by the gain in domestic profits and this is why network w 
becomes global treaty stable in the current simulation.  
 
Let us now consider the case of biased governments in favour of intermediaries, it 
was found in Section 5.4.3.1 that when the world is composed of large and very 
small countries, networks a and d in Figure 4.5 are both global treaty stable. 
However in the current simulation only network a is stable. This difference is 
explained by the incentives of countries j and l. That is, when these countries are 
medium size, they have large enough domestic markets to obtain a net gain in 
profits (i.e. gain in domestic profits offsets the loss in export profits) by breaking 
their agreement. This is why this network is not global treaty stable in a world 
composed of large and medium size countries.  
 
In summary, it is concluded from the results obtained in this simulation that, while 
several results remains robust, there are some deviations that are explained by the 
more active role of medium size countries. In contrast to very small countries, 
medium size countries are not indifferent about certain trade decisions and this is 
what causes these deviations. 
 
Having discussed the case of large and medium size countries in Goyal and 
Joshis‟ world, the attention is placed now on how the international trade structure is 
affected when there is a farming sector. This is explored in the next simulations.  
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5.4.3.5 Simulation 15:  = 1,  = 0.5 and  = 0.5 for all i  N.    
 
In this simulation, it is assumed a world composed of large and medium size 
countries with intermediaries that exercise moderate levels of monopsonistic power 
(i.e. i = 0.5).  
 
The case of politically unbiased governments 
 
In considering the information presented in Table E.43 in Appendix E, it is 
concluded that the sets of strong link deletion proof, global treaty proof, and global 
treaty networks are DS = {a, c, d, e, g, h, i, j, m, n, o, p, q, s, t, u, x, z, c’, Eq},  = 
{b, c, e, f, g, h, i, j, k, l, n, o, q, r, s, t, u, v, w, x, y, a’, b’, c’, Eq}, and GT = DS   = 
{c, e, g, h, i, j, n, o, q, s, t, u, x, c’, Eq}, respectively.  
 
The case of politically biased governments 
 
Using the information presented in Table E.41 in Appendix E, it is inferred that  
when governments are biased in favour of intermediaries, the sets of strong link 
deletion proof, global treaty proof, and global treaty networks are DS = {a},  = {a, 
b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j, k, l, m, n, o, p, q, r, s, t, u, v, w, x, y, z, a’, b’, c’, Eq}, and GT = 
DS   = {a}, respectively. On the other hand, using the information presented in 
Table E.42 it is concluded that  when governments are biased in favour of the 
farming sector, the sets of strong link deletion proof, global treaty proof, and global 
~
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treaty networks are DS = {a, b, c, d, e, g, h, j, m, n, o, p, q, s, t, u, w, x, z, b’, c’, Eq}, 
 = {c, e, g, h, i, j, l, n, o, p, q, r, s, t, u, v, w, x, y, a’, c’, Eq}, and GT = DS   = {c, 
e, g, h, j, n, o, p, q, s, t, u, w, x, c’, Eq}, respectively. 
 
Discussion 
 
Let us start the discussion with the case of unbiased governments. According to 
the results, the sets of strong link deletion proof, global treaty proof, and global 
treaty networks are all affected when the farming sector is introduced into the 
international network model.  
 
In relation to the first set, networks g, o and q become strong link deletion proof 
and network w does not belong to this set any longer when monopsonistic power is 
moderate (i.e. ϕ = 0.5). Regarding networks g and o, this change is explained by 
the incentive of the large country k, and for network q this is explained by the 
incentive of the medium size country l.  That is, when there is not a farming sector, 
these countries are better off in autarky because the gain in domestic profit as a 
consequence of lower competition offsets the loss of consumer surplus and the 
loss of export profits. However, when there is a farming sector, this gain in 
domestic profits is mitigated to some extent by the higher cost faced by the 
intermediary of these countries. In addition, when country k breaks its agreements 
in networks g or o and when country l breaks its agreement in network q, there is a 
net decrease in the total output that is traded by the intermediary of these countries 
and this translates as a lower level of producer surplus. As a result of these 
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changes, the gain in domestic profits is not large enough to compensate the losses 
in consumer surplus, export profits and producer surplus.  
 
On the other hand, network w is not strong link deletion proof when there is 
moderate monopsonistic power because country k has an incentive to break its 
existing agreements with the medium size countries j and l. The reason is because 
this country is only linked to medium size countries implying that it obtains 
relatively low levels of export profits. Thus, when the large country k breaks its 
entire links, there is a net increase in the output that is traded by the intermediary 
pushing the price paid to the farming sector up. While this mitigates to some extent 
the gain in domestic output, it also increases the level of producer surplus. As a 
result, being in autarky is an optimal choice for country k because the gains in 
domestic profits and producer surplus offset the losses in consumer surplus and 
export profits. To finish this analysis, it is interesting to notice that the behaviour of 
a country depends on its position in the network and the current architecture of the 
network. For example, as discussed above, country k is better off in autarky when 
the network is w, and is better off when keeping its agreements when the networks 
are g and o. This illustrates the advantage of working with the network approach. 
That is, it is possible to identify individual behaviour that depends on the nature of 
the current network. 
 
In relation to the set of global treaty proof networks for the case of unbiased 
governments, the results revealed that network p does not belong to this set when 
there is a moderate level of monopsonistic power. However, network b’ becomes 
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global treaty proof. Regarding network p this change is explained by the incentives 
of the large countries i and k. These countries are already connected in this 
network which implies that a global agreement only allows them to form a link with 
an additional medium size country. This means that the resulting additional export 
profit plus the gain in consumer surplus is not large enough to offset the loss in 
export profits in existing partner countries and the loss of domestic profits. This is 
why that when there is no farming sector, these countries are unwilling to sign a 
global agreement.  
 
On the other hand, when monopsonistic power is moderate, the same effects in 
profits and consumer surplus are caused by a global agreement. However, this 
agreement also causes a decrease in the total output that is traded by the 
intermediaries of the large countries as a consequence of the resulting higher 
competition which implies that these firms pay lower agricultural prices after the 
agreement. This negatively affects producer surplus, but also mitigates the net loss 
in profits because the intermediaries face lower costs. These effects of agricultural 
prices make the gain in consumer surplus and the gain in export profits in the new 
partner country large enough to offset the losses in domestic profits, export profits 
in existing partner-countries and producer surplus. Thus, because in the current 
simulation the large countries are better off in global free trade, they have an 
incentive to support a global agreement and this is why network p is not global 
treaty proof in this case.  
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In relation to network b’, on the other hand, it becomes global treaty proof because 
the incentives of the medium size countries j and l are reversed. To understand this 
change, note that these countries are only connected to a large country. Thus, 
when there is a moderate level of monopsonistic power, the export expansion after 
the global agreement causes a net increase in the total output that is traded by the 
intermediaries of the medium size countries j and l. This pushes the price paid to 
the farming sector up positively affecting producer surplus but negatively affecting 
the profits made by these intermediaries as they face a higher cost. As a result, the 
gains in consumer surplus, export profits in new partner countries and producer 
surplus after the global agreement are not large enough to compensate the losses 
in domestic profits and the export profits in existing partner countries. This is why in 
the current simulation the medium size countries are unwilling to sign a global 
agreement (i.e. why they are global treaty proof).  
 
Finally, the results revealed that set of global treaty stable networks in the case of 
unbiased governments in the current simulation includes three new networks 
(networks g, o and q), but it does not includes networks p and w. This is a 
consequence of the changes described above for the sets of strong link deletion 
proof and global treaty proof networks.  
 
Let us now consider the case of politically biased governments in favour of 
intermediaries. The results revealed no differences with respect to the previous 
simulation suggesting that the introduction of a farming sector does not affect the 
international trade structure when governments have this bias. 
316 
 
 
Finally, in relation to the case of governments biased in favour of the farming 
sector, deviations were identified with respect to the simulation assuming 
symmetrical countries with moderate monopsonistic power (see Section 5.4.1.2). 
Firstly, in the symmetrical countries case, it was found that all networks are strong 
link deletion proof. That is, no country has an incentive to break one or more 
agreements simultaneously. However, when the world is composed of large and 
medium size countries and when monopsonistic power is moderate, networks that 
contains medium size countries with high degree of centrality (e.g. networks f, i, h, 
l, r, v, y, and a’) are not strong link deletion proof.  
 
The reason is because non-central large countries have an incentive to break their 
agreement with the medium size country because the domestic market of the latter 
is not large enough to make significant profits and also because the degree of 
competition in this market is high given by the centrality of the country. Thus, if a 
large country breaks an existing agreement, the increase in output traded by the 
intermediary of this country in the domestic market will be larger than the decrease 
in export output. This net increase in output pushes the agricultural price up 
positively affecting producer surplus in the large country. This is why, in the 
asymmetrical case networks with medium size countries occupying a central 
position in the networks are not strong link deletion proof. However, this does not 
happen when central countries are large countries (e.g. network g). It is inferred 
therefore that in the real world it is more likely to find large countries occupying a 
central position in the network. 
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Secondly, it was found in the symmetrical case that when monopsonistic power is 
moderate and when governments are biased in favour of the farming sector, 
networks containing countries that occupy a central position are global treaty stable 
because they are unwilling to sign a global agreement (see the discussion provided 
in Section 5.4.1.2). However, when the world is composed of large and medium 
size countries, only networks with central large countries and networks composed 
of blocks of countries of the north-south type can be global treaty stable. As 
explained in the previous paragraph, this is because networks containing central 
medium size countries cannot be global treaty stable as large countries are 
unwilling to keep their agreements with them. It is concluded therefore that when 
the world is composed of large and medium size countries and when 
monopsonistic power is moderate, it is expected to be found global treaty stable 
networks having large central countries as well as networks characterised by 
regionalism of the north-south type.  
 
5.4.3.6 Simulation 16:  = 1,  = 0.5 and  = 1.5 for all i  N.    
 
To finish with the issue of asymmetry in market size, this last simulation in this 
section studies the global treaty stability of the international trade system when the 
world is composed of large countries and medium size countries and when 
monopsonistic power is high (i.e. ϕ = 1.5). The results are shown as follows. 
 
 
~
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The case of politically unbiased governments 
 
In considering the information presented in Table E.47 in Appendix E it is 
concluded that the sets of strong link deletion proof, global treaty proof, and global 
treaty networks are DS = {a, c, d, e, g, h, i, j, m, n, o, p, q, s, t, u, x, z, c’, Eq},  = 
{b, c, e, f, g, h, i, j, k, l, n, o, q, r, s, t, u, v, w, x, y, a’, b’, c’, Eq}, and GT = DS   = 
{c, e, g, h, i, j, n, o, q, s, t, u, x, c’, Eq}, respectively.  
 
The case of politically biased governments 
 
Using the information presented in Table E.45 in Appendix E it is inferred that  
when governments are biased in favour of intermediaries, the sets of strong link 
deletion proof, global treaty proof, and global treaty networks are DS = {a},  = {a, 
b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j, k, l, m, n, o, p, q, r, s, t, u, v, w, x, y, z, a’, b’, c’, Eq}, and GT = 
DS   = {a}, respectively. On the other hand, using the information presented in 
Table E.46 it is concluded that  when governments are biased in favour of the 
farming sector, the sets of strong link deletion proof, global treaty proof, and global 
treaty networks are DS = {a, b, c, d, h, j, m, n, s, t, u, v, w, x, y, z, b’, c’, Eq},  = {c, 
e, g, h, i, j, l, n, o, p, q, r, s, t, u, v, w, x, y, a’, c’, Eq}, and GT = DS   = {c, h, j, n, 
s, t, u, v, w, x, y, c’, Eq}, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
319 
 
Discussion 
 
According to the results obtained in the current and previous simulations, 
increasing monopsonistic power does not affect the international trade system 
when governments are unbiased or when governments are biased in favour of 
intermediaries. However, deviations were found in the cases of governments 
biased in favour of consumers and in favour of the farming sector. This is explained 
as follows (see Appendix F for the case of governments biased in favour of 
consumers). 
 
In the case of governments biased in favour of intermediaries, the increase in 
monopsonistic power affected the sets of strong link deletion proof and global 
treaty stable networks. In the first set, networks v and y become strong link deletion 
proof. However, networks e, g, o, p and q are not included in this set. The reason is 
explained by the incentives of the large countries contained in these networks. 
That is, when monopsonistic power is high, trading the processed food is costly for 
the intermediary of the large country. In this case an agreement with a medium 
size country that is highly integrated does not help the intermediary to export a 
relevant quantity of the processed good. But it increases competition in the 
domestic market of the large country releasing in this way pressure on the 
agricultural price. This lower cost allows the intermediary of this country to increase 
the output that is sold in the domestic market, and this additional output is what 
increases producer surplus when the agreement is maintained. In other words, 
breaking the agreement is not beneficial for the large country because it negatively 
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affects producer surplus when monopsonistic power is high, and this is why 
network v is strong link deletion proof in this case. 
 
In relation to networks e, g, o, p and q, on the other hand, they are not strong link 
deletion proof for the opposite reason. That is, in this case when monopsonistic 
power is high, large countries are unwilling to keep their agreements with medium 
size countries that have few links. The reason relies on the fact that the domestic 
markets of these medium size countries are less competitive as a consequence of 
the small number of agreements. This lower competition implies that the output 
that is exported by the intermediary of a large country is relevant and contributes in 
increasing the price paid to the farming sector. This higher cost negatively affects 
the output that is sold by the intermediary of the large country in the domestic 
market. As a result, the agreement causes a net decrease in the output that is 
traded by the intermediary of the large country negatively affecting producer 
surplus. This is why this country is better off when breaking the agreement. 
 
In relation to the set of global treaty stable networks, the results revealed that high 
levels of monopsonistic power influence the number and composition of the 
networks that are included in this set. This is explained by the changes described 
above for the case of governments biased in favour of the farming sector.  
 
In summary, the results obtained in this simulation revealed that increasing 
monopsonistic power can affect the international trade structure when 
governments are biased in favour of either consumers or the farming sector. In the 
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case of consumers, high levels of monopsonistic power negatively affect free trade 
because it becomes costlier from the point of view of medium size countries that 
can increase consumer surplus in less integrated networks. In the case of 
governments biased in favour of the farming sector, high levels of monopsonistic 
power affects the incentives of large countries in different ways depending on 
whether they are connected to medium size countries with high or low degree of 
trade integration. If a large country is connected to medium size countries that are 
highly integrated, then this country will keep the agreements in order to lower the 
cost faced by intermediaries. In contrast, if the large country is connected to 
medium size countries with low degree of integration, then the agreement will be 
broken because this will allow the large country to lower cost, increase domestic 
output and producer surplus. Finally, the scope of a global agreement is reduced 
when there is a high degree of monopsonistic power and when governments are 
biased in favour of consumers or the farming sector.  
 
5.4.4 Global agreements under exogenous tariffs and asymmetry in farmers’ 
productivity 
 
The simulations developed in this chapter have revealed that the existence of a 
farming sector strongly influences the international trade architecture and the 
incentives of countries to sign a global agreement. This is because monopsonistic 
power exercised by the intermediaries directly affects the cost faced by them and 
producer surplus, and indirectly consumer surplus throughout the externalities 
caused by this type of imperfection. 
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Given the relevance of monopsonistic power in the extended version of the 
international trade model offered in this dissertation, the objective of this section is 
to extend the analysis to determine whether asymmetry in farmers‟ productivity (i.e. 
different levels of monopsonistic power across countries) affects countries‟ 
incentives to sign a global agreement. For this purpose, the same simulation 
developed in Section 4.4.2 is considered in this analysis. This is presented as 
follows. 
 
5.4.4.1 Simulation 17:  = 3 for  = {i, k};  = 1 for  = {j, l};  = 0.5; and  = 1.   
 
The information that was used in this simulation is presented in Tables E.48, E.49, 
E.50 and E.51 (see Appendix E). From these tables, the following relevant sets of 
networks were obtained. 
 
The case of politically unbiased governments 
 
In considering Table E.51 it is inferred that the sets of strong link deletion proof and 
global treaty proof networks are DS = {a, b, c, d, h, i, j, m, n, p, q, s, t, u, v, w, x, y, 
z, a’, b’, c’, Eq} and  = {c, e, f, g, h, i, j, k, l, n, o, q, r, s, t, u, v, w, x, y, z, a’, c’, Eq}, 
respectively. Consequently, the set of global treaty stable networks in this case is 
given by GT = DS   = {c, h, i, j, n, q, s, t, u, v, w, x, y, z, a’, c’, Eq}.  
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The case of politically biased governments 
 
It is inferred from Table E.49 in Appendix E that when governments are biased in 
favour of the intermediaries, the sets of strong link deletion and global treaty proof 
networks are DS = {a} and  = {a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j, k, l, m, n, o, p, q, r, s, t, u, v, 
w, x, y, z, a‟, b‟, c‟, Eq}, respectively. Consequently the set of global treaty stable 
networks in this case is GT = DS   = {a}. On the other hand, it was inferred from 
Table E.50 that the sets of strong link deletion proof and global treaty proof 
networks when governments are biased in favour of the farming sector are DS = {a, 
b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j, k, l, m, n, o, p, q, r, s, t, u, v, w, x, y, z, a‟, b‟, c‟, Eq} and  = {c, 
e, g, h, i, j, l, n, o, q, r, s, t, u, v, x, y, z, a‟, c‟, Eq}, respectively. Consequently, the 
set of global treaty stable networks in this case is GT = DS   = {c, e, g, h, i, j, l, n, 
o, q, r, s, t, u, v, x, y, z, a‟, c‟, Eq}. 
 
Discussion 
 
Let us first consider the case of politically unbiased governments. In this case, 
deviations were found in the sets of strong link deletion proof, global treaty proof 
and global treaty stable networks with respect to the simulations that consider 
monopsonistic power with symmetrical countries (see Sections 5.4.1.2 and 
5.4.1.3). In relation to the first set, the configuration captured by network f in Figure 
4.3 when countries are symmetric is not strong link deletion proof in the current 
simulation (see networks e and f in Figure 4.5). This happens because the non-
central inefficient country in networks e and f in Figure 4.5 has an incentive to 
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break the existing agreement with the central country. This happens because when 
the agreement is broken, there is a net decrease in the total output that is traded 
by the intermediary of country the inefficient country pushing the agricultural price 
down. As a result of this lower cost, the gain in domestic profit due to lower 
competition is reinforced to the extent that this gain offsets the losses in producer 
surplus, consumer surplus and export profits.  
 
On the other hand, when governments are symmetric, the configuration 
represented by network i in Figure 4.3 is strong link deletion proof. When countries 
are asymmetric, this only happens when the less connected country is an efficient 
one (i.e. networks n and q in Figure 4.5). However, when the less connected 
country is inefficient, this country has an incentive to break its existing agreement 
for the same reason explained above. 
 
In relation to the set of global treaty proof networks under the assumption of 
unbiased governments, it was found in the symmetrical case that the configuration 
represented by network g in Figure 4.3 is not global treaty proof meaning that all 
countries in this configuration are willing to sign a global agreement. However, in 
the asymmetric case this configuration is global treaty proof when the singleton is 
an efficient country (i.e. network j in Figure 4.5) but not when the singleton is an 
inefficient one (i.e. network m in Figure 4.5). This is explained by the incentive of 
the efficient country j in these networks. In network l this country is only connected 
to the inefficient countries i and k. Thus because this country has a better 
competitive position than the inefficient countries, it makes high profits in these 
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countries. A global agreement is therefore not a good option for country j because 
the other efficient country l will compete in the same markets reducing the profits 
that it makes in the inefficient countries causing a net loss in welfare.  
 
In contrast, in network m the efficient country j is connected to the efficient country l 
and the inefficient country i. Thus, because country j is already competing with the 
efficient country l, a global agreement does not cause a significant loss of export 
profits in the existing partner countries. On the contrary, it allows the efficient 
country j to access the inefficient country k that implies a significant increase of 
export profits in the later as well as a gain in consumer surplus given by higher 
competition. This is why network j is global treaty proof, but network m is not.  
 
On the other hand, it was found that network w in the asymmetric case (see Figure 
4.5) is global treaty proof. However, the equivalent network when countries are 
symmetric (i.e. network e in Figure 4.3) is not global treaty proof. This is explained 
by the incentives of the inefficient countries i and k. These countries are unwilling 
to sign a global agreement because it causes a significant increase in the output 
that is traded by the intermediaries of these countries. Now, because 
monopsonistic power in these countries is high with respect to the efficient 
countries, this increase in output causes a significant increase in the agricultural 
price in countries i and k negatively affecting the profits made by the intermediaries 
of these countries. This loss in profits is too large to be compensated by the gains 
in producer surplus and consumer surplus.  
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Let us now consider the case of politically biased governments. According to the 
results obtained in the current simulation, there are no differences between the 
symmetric (see Sections 5.4.1.2 and 5.4.1.3) and the asymmetric cases when 
governments are biased in favour of either consumers (see Appendix F) or firms. 
However, deviations were found when governments are biased in favour of the 
farming sector. Firstly, in the symmetrical case, the configuration represented by 
network f in figure 4.3 is global treaty stable when there is moderate level of 
monopsonistic power (see Section 5.4.1.2), but it is not global stable when 
monopsonistic power is high (see Section 5.4.1.2).  
 
In contrast, when countries are asymmetric in farmers‟ productivity, this 
configuration is stable in most of the cases (see networks e, z and a’ in Figure 4.5), 
except network f in Figure 4.5. The reason is because in this network all countries 
have an incentive to sign a global agreement because this causes an expansion of 
export output that increases producer surplus. However, in the other related 
configurations the country that occupies a central position in the network faces a 
decrease in producer surplus when a global agreement is signed. What these 
configurations have in common is that the efficient countries are not connected, 
and this is the key feature that explains why a central country is unwilling to sign 
the global agreement. That is, when an agreement is signed, there is a significant 
increase in competition in the efficient countries that depress the output that is 
traded by the intermediaries of these countries in the domestic market.  
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This also negatively affects the export output of the central country in the existing 
partner efficient country reducing in this way pressure on the agricultural price in 
the former country. This lower cost causes an increase in the output that is traded 
by the intermediary of the central country in the domestic market. However, this 
gain and the additional export output in the new partner countries after the 
agreement are not large enough to compensate the loss of export output in the 
existing partner countries. This implies that the agreement causes a net decrease 
in output in the central country and this, in turn, decreases producer surplus in this 
country which is why it is unwilling to sign the global agreement. In contrast, this 
does not happen in network f in Figure 4.5 because the efficient countries are 
already connected and, as a result, a global agreement does cause the competitive 
externality on the central country that was described above. 
 
Other network configurations that become global treaty stable in the asymmetric 
case are the ones represented by networks h, I and y in Figure 4.5 (which are 
equivalent to network d in Figure 4.3 in the symmetrical case), and the one 
represented by network j in Figure 4.5 (which is equivalent to network g in Figure 
4.3 in the symmetrical case). In all these networks, there are inefficient countries 
that are unwilling to sign a global agreement because this causes a significant 
increase in competition when efficient countries are fully incorporated. This 
competition effect causes a net decrease in the output that is traded by the 
intermediary of the inefficient country negatively affecting producer surplus. A final 
network structure that becomes global treaty stable in the case of asymmetric 
countries is network c’. This case is interesting because this is a form of 
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regionalism of the south-north type and is explained by the unwillingness of 
inefficient countries to sign a global agreement for the same reason described 
above: this agreement strongly increases competition by fully incorporating the 
efficient countries which negatively affect producer surplus in the inefficient 
countries. Thus, asymmetry in farmers‟ productivity can also lead to regionalism 
when governments are biased in favour of the farming sector. 
 
In summary, it is concluded from the results obtained in the current simulation that 
asymmetry in farmers productivity plays in general against free trade when 
governments are unbiased because inefficient countries have less incentives to 
keep their agreements. The only exception is the star network with an efficient 
central country. Only this configuration becomes strong link deletion proof implying 
that under this type of asymmetry, efficient countries that occupy a central position 
in the network prevents countries from breaking their existing agreements. 
 
It is also inferred that when governments are unbiased and when countries are 
asymmetric in farmers‟ productivity, there are more network structures having 
countries unwilling to sign a global agreement. This explains why the number of 
networks in the set of global treaty stable networks increases when countries are 
asymmetric in farmers‟ productivity.  
 
Finally, asymmetry in farmers‟ productivity also influences the international trade 
structure when governments are biased in favour of the farming sector. In this 
case, new network configurations become global treaty stable and this is explained 
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mainly by the unwillingness of inefficient countries to sign a global agreement. That 
is, a global agreement causes a significant impact on competition when fully 
integrating more efficient countries. This higher competition negatively affects the 
output that is traded by the intermediaries of the inefficient countries and this, in 
turn, decreases producer surplus in these countries. One example of these 
networks is a networks composed of two blocks, one formed of efficient countries 
and the other of inefficient countries. This network is interesting because it shows 
that asymmetry in farmers‟ productivity can also lead to regionalism of the south-
north type.   
 
5.5 Summary and conclusions 
 
The objective of this chapter is to extend the analysis of international trade 
networks by adopting two alternative stability concepts to the traditional pairwise 
stability. The first one, referred to as strongly pairwise stability, allows countries to 
break one or more agreements simultaneously and it was adopted to determine the 
stability of international networks when countries are involved in bilateral 
agreements. The second stability concept, referred to as global treaty stability, was 
introduced to identify stable networks when countries sign global agreements. The 
results obtained in the current chapter and Appendix F for the case of governments 
biased in favour of consumers are described as follows. 
 
In relation to the strongly pairwise stability, the results revealed few deviations with 
respect to the traditional pairwise stability proving that the latter can be considered 
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as a reasonable stability concept to study bilateral agreements. However, key 
deviations corresponds to the following cases: (1) biased governments in favour of 
intermediaries with symmetrical governments; and (2) unbiased governments in 
networks formed of large and very small countries.  
 
In the first case, it was found that governments have an incentive to break all their 
agreements simultaneously in order to increase the profits made by the 
intermediaries, and this deviation is reinforced when there is a farming sector 
because breaking these links reduces the cost faced by these firms.  
 
In the second case, it was found that the number of stable networks decreases 
because large unbiased governments that are not connected to other large 
countries have an incentive to break their existing agreements with very small 
countries and this happens when there is no monopsonistic power or when this 
type of imperfection is moderate. Note however that this incentive is reversed when 
large countries are connected to other large countries. The reason is because 
having agreements with very small countries increases the level of competition in 
the domestic markets of large countries releasing pressure on the price paid to the 
farming sector. This, in turn, allows the intermediaries of large countries to improve 
their competitive position as they face lower costs. 
 
In relation to global treaty stability, several new results were identified. Firstly, 
when countries are symmetrical and when tariffs are placed exogenously, centrality 
(i.e. a country that have a significant number of agreements with countries that 
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have few agreements) plays a key role in explaining the unwillingness of some 
countries to sign a global agreement, and this is in general reinforced when there is 
a farming sector. This is explained by the fact that a country benefits when 
occupying a central position in the network. On the one hand, its domestic market 
is highly competitive given the large number of agreements which implies that 
consumer surplus is high in the central country. On the other hand, a central 
country exports a significant amount of output to third countries because they have 
less competitive domestic markets as a consequence of their few agreements. This 
allows a central country to obtain high levels of profits and producer surplus.  
 
This country is unwilling to support a global agreement because it increases 
competition in third countries negatively affecting producer surplus and profits, and 
also because this competition increases the level of trade in third countries. As a 
result, the intermediaries of these countries pay higher agricultural prices that 
cause a decrease in the output that is exported to the central country negatively 
affecting consumer surplus.  
 
Secondly, when countries are symmetric, when tariffs are placed endogenous, and 
when there is no monopsonistic power (i.e. in Goyal and Joshis‟ world), the only 
global treaty stable network is global free trade. However, when there is a farming 
sector, centrality becomes an important factor in explaining the unwillingness of 
countries to sign a global agreement. This difference relies on the fact that non-
central countries have an incentive to break their agreements with the central 
country when there is not a farming sector. However, when this sector is present, 
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this incentive is reversed given the contribution of the agreement in increasing 
producer surplus in the non-central countries. 
 
Thirdly, when the world is composed of large and very small countries under the 
assumption of exogenous tariffs, unbiased governments and non-monopsonistic 
power, centrality becomes relevant mainly in large countries because they are 
unwilling to sign a global agreement that includes very small countries. This is 
because the latter increases the level of competition in large countries negatively 
affecting profits made in these countries. However, there are some structures 
where very small countries are also unwilling to sign a global agreement and this 
happens when these countries are already connected to large countries. Finally, 
regionalism of the south-north type is also a possible outcome and this happens 
because welfare in large countries in a trading block is reduced when very small 
countries are included as they increase the level of competition without offering 
significant export profits.  
 
On the other hand, when there is a farming sector, the number of stable networks 
that include countries that are unwilling to sign a global agreement increases and 
this is more evident when monopsonistic power is high. This is due to the effect of 
the agreement in increasing the cost faced by the intermediaries in the player 
countries. However, when monopsonistic power is moderate, the farming sector 
can impact in favour of a global agreement in some networks structures where 
large countries are already connected with each other and when they have an 
agreement with a very small country. In these structures, a global agreement does 
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not cause a significant expansion of exports in the large countries. But it increases 
the level of competition in their domestic markets that lowers the prices paid to the 
farming sector. This lower cost mitigates the loss of profits caused by higher 
competition to the extent that the gain in consumer surplus offsets the losses in 
profits and producer surplus. 
 
Fourthly, when the world is composed of large and very small countries under the 
assumption of exogenous tariffs and politically biased governments, the following 
results were found. When governments are biased in favour of consumers, all 
networks are global treaty stable independently of the existence of a farming 
sector. This is because very small countries are indifferent about signing a global 
agreement because this does not offer them significant gains in consumer surplus.  
 
Alternatively, when governments are biased in favour of the intermediaries, both 
the empty network and a network in which only the very small countries are 
connected are global treaty stable. This is explained by the fact that the very small 
countries are indifferent about keeping or breaking their agreement with each other 
because this does not offer them significant gains in profits. Finally, when 
governments are biased in favour of the farming sector, regionalism becomes a 
likely outcome for two reasons.  
 
On the one hand, large countries are unwilling to include very small countries in a 
global agreement because of the decrease in producer surplus that results from 
the agreement. On the other hand, very small countries are indifferent about 
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breaking their agreements with each other because there is no significant change 
in producer surplus.   
 
Fifthly, when the world is composed of large and medium size countries under the 
assumption of exogenous tariffs, unbiased governments and non-monopsonistic 
power, the same general patterns than the ones identified in the case of a world 
composed of large and very small countries were identified. The only difference is 
that in contrast to the very small countries, medium size countries are not 
indifferent about certain decisions because their domestic markets have a relevant 
size that allow these countries to obtains certain gains in profits and consumer 
surplus. This is more evident when there is monopsonistic power because in this 
case the composition of the networks in the set of global treaty stable networks 
changes. New existence of networks in this set is explained by the incentives of 
medium size countries to keep their agreements as this allow them to obtain net 
gains in welfare. However, other networks become unstable because the 
unwillingness of central countries to sign a global agreement is reversed as they 
can make relevant export profits in medium size countries. In any case, centrality 
and regionalism are still key factors that explain in general the unwillingness of 
countries to sign a global agreement.  
 
Sixthly, when the world is composed of large and medium size countries under the 
assumption of exogenous tariffs and politically biased governments, the following 
results were found. When governments are biased in favour of consumers, 
centrality becomes the main factor in explaining countries‟ unwillingness to sign a 
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global agreement when there is no monopsonistic power or when this power is 
moderate. In this case, global treaty stable networks are unwilling to sign a global 
agreement because the resulting increase in trade in non-central countries 
increase agricultural prices in these countries reducing the export to the central 
country and negatively affecting consumer surplus. However, when monopsonistic 
power is high, several networks become global treaty stable suggesting that the 
high cost faced by intermediaries in global free trade has a detrimental effect on 
welfare on large countries and countries that occupy a central position.  
 
Under this level of monopsonistic power, regionalism is also a possible outcome. 
However, in this case the medium size countries are the ones that are against a 
global agreement because this agreement causes a significant export expansion to 
the large countries pushing the price paid to the farming sector down. This lowers 
the total output that is traded by the intermediary in the domestic market negatively 
affecting consumer surplus. On the other hand, when governments are biased in 
favour of intermediaries, the same results were obtained for all levels of 
monopsonistic power: the only global treaty stable network in this case is the 
empty networks. This happens in general because higher competition decreases 
the output made by the intermediary and this is reinforced by the higher costs that 
they face when there is more free trade. Finally, when governments are biased in 
favour of the farming sector, centrality (mainly in large countries) and regionalism 
become relevant in explaining countries‟ unwillingness to sign a global agreement. 
However, when monopsonitic power is high, the number of networks in the set of 
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global treaty stable networks decreases because large countries are unwilling to 
keep their agreements with medium size countries. 
 
Finally, when there is asymmetry in farmers‟ productivity, it was found that this type 
of asymmetry plays in general against free trade when governments are unbiased 
because inefficient countries have fewer incentives to keep their agreements. The 
only exception is the star network with an efficient central country. It was also 
found that the number of stable networks containing countries that are unwilling to 
sign a global agreement increases with respect to the symmetrical case. This 
explains why the number of networks in the set of global treaty stable networks 
increases when countries are asymmetric in farmers‟ productivity.  
 
Asymmetry in farmers‟ productivity also influences the international trade structure 
when governments are biased in favour of the farming sector. In this case new 
network configurations become global treaty stable and this is explained mainly by 
the unwillingness of inefficient central countries to sign a global agreement. On the 
other hand, regionalism is also a possible outcome and this is explained by the 
unwillingness of inefficient countries to sign a global agreement. This is because 
this agreement incorporates the efficient countries that have a significant impact on 
competition that negatively affect producer surplus in inefficient countries.   
 
A summary of the main results found in the simulations for the case of global treaty 
stable networks is presented in Table 5.1. On the other hand, Table 5.2 shows the 
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cases where centrality and regionalism become relevant. It also shows in what 
cases global free trade is not global treaty stable.  
 
Having described some of the most relevant stable networks under strongly 
pairwise stability and global treaty stability, the attention is placed now on how to 
break inefficient stable networks by means of lump sum transfers. This is the topic 
of the next section.  
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Table 5.1. Summary of the results found in the simulations 
Simulation Unbiased Biased in favour 
of consumers 
Biased in favour 
of intermediaries 
Biased in favour 
of farming sector 
1: Symmetric 
without farming 
sector 
Global treaty stable 
networks related to 
centrality 
Global treaty stable 
networks related to 
centrality: 
indifferent central 
countries 
Only the empty 
network (autarky) 
NA 
2: Symmetric with 
moderate 
monopsonistic 
power 
Farming sector 
positively affects 
trade on non-
central countries 
but negatively on 
central 
Idem. However 
central countries 
are unwilling rather 
than indifferent 
Idem Negative effect of 
the farming sector 
on trade in central 
countries 
3: Symmetric with 
high monopsonistic 
power 
Idem Idem Idem Reverse incentives 
of central countries 
in some networks  
4: Symmetric 
without farming 
sector and 
endogenous tariffs 
Some networks 
become unstable 
as central countries 
are willing to break 
agreements 
NA NA NA 
5: Symmetric with 
moderate 
monopsonistic 
power and 
endogenous tariffs 
More global treaty 
networks become 
stable. Farming 
sector prevents 
breaking 
agreements of non-
central countries. 
NA NA NA 
6: Symmetric with 
high monopsonistic 
power and 
endogenous tariffs 
Idem NA NA NA 
11: Large and very 
small countries 
without farming 
sector 
Mainly large 
countries unwilling 
to sign a global 
agreement. 
Regionalism 
emerges.  
All networks are 
global treaty stable. 
Very small 
countries indifferent 
about this 
agreement 
Empty network and 
Regionalism 
emerges: blocks of 
large and very 
small countries 
NA 
12: Large and very 
small countries with 
moderate 
monopsonistic 
power  
Idem. However 
there are networks 
where large 
countries are willing 
to sign with very 
small. Centrality 
less important. 
Idem Idem In contrast to the 
symmetrical case, 
centrality is not 
relevant. 
Regionalism 
emerges.  
13: Large and very 
small countries with 
high monopsonistic 
power 
Farming sector 
prevents links to be 
broken. Number of 
global treaty stable 
networks increases. 
Centrality becomes 
relevant for large 
countries. 
Idem Idem Idem 
14: Large and 
medium size 
countries without 
farming sector 
Mainly large 
countries unwilling 
to sign a global 
agreement. 
Regionalism 
emerges. 
 
 
Centrality becomes 
relevant 
Regionalism is lost: 
small countries 
unwilling to keep 
their agreements 
NA 
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15: Large and 
medium size 
countries with 
moderate 
monopsonistic 
power 
Change in the 
composition of the 
set of global treaty 
stable networks 
Incentives to sign a 
global agreement 
increase: more 
competition in non-
central countries 
increases 
consumer surplus 
in central. However, 
there are more 
incentives to break 
links unilaterally  
Idem Blocks become 
stable (regionalism) 
and networks with 
central countries 
16: Large and 
medium size 
countries with high 
monopsonistic 
power 
Idem Farming sector 
negatively affects 
free trade: 
consumer surplus 
increases in less 
integrate networks 
Idem Large countries 
have incentives to 
break agreements 
with medium size 
countries that have 
low degree of 
integration 
17: Asymmetry in 
farmers‟ 
productivity 
Inefficient countries 
less incentives to 
keep their 
agreements, except 
the star network 
with efficient 
networks in the 
centre. 
The same as in the 
symmetric case 
The same as in the 
symmetric case 
Regionalism 
emerges: less 
efficient countries 
unwilling to sign 
global agreements 
that include efficient 
countries 
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Table 5.2. Simulations where centrality and regionalism can emerge. Cells in red 
are the cases where global free trade is not global treaty stable 
Simulation Unbiased Biased in favour 
of consumers 
Biased in favour 
of intermediaries 
Biased in favour 
of farming sector 
1: Symmetric without 
farming sector 
Centrality Centrality  NA 
2: Symmetric with 
moderate 
monopsonistic power 
Centrality Centrality  Centrality 
3: Symmetric with high 
monopsonistic power 
Centrality Centrality  Centrality 
4: Symmetric without 
farming sector and 
endogenous tariffs 
 NA NA  
5: Symmetric with 
moderate 
monopsonistic power 
and endogenous tariffs 
Centrality NA NA NA 
6: Symmetric with high 
monopsonistic power 
and endogenous tariffs 
Centrality NA NA NA 
11: Large and very 
small countries without 
farming sector 
Centrality 
Regionalism 
Centrality 
Regionalism 
Regionalism  
12: Large and very 
small countries with 
moderate 
monopsonistic power  
Centrality 
Regionalism 
Centrality 
Regionalism 
Regionalism Regionalism 
13: Large and very 
small countries with 
high monopsonistic 
power 
Centrality 
Regionalism 
Centrality 
Regionalism 
Regionalism Regionalism 
14: Large and medium 
size countries without 
farming sector 
Centrality 
Regionalism 
Centrality   
15: Large and medium 
size countries with 
moderate 
monopsonistic power 
Centrality 
Regionalism 
Centrality  Centrality 
Regionalism 
16: Large and medium 
size countries with high 
monopsonistic power 
Centrality 
Regionalism 
Centrality 
Regionalism 
 Centrality 
Regionalism 
17: Asymmetry in 
farmers‟ productivity 
Centrality 
Regionalism 
Centrality  Centrality 
Regionalism 
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CHAPTER SIX: Compensatory Payments 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
A key result that was obtained by Goyal and Joshi (2006) in the original network 
model is that global free trade is the efficient network because it is in this network 
where global welfare (i.e. the sum of welfare in each country of the world) is 
maximised. Since in this framework, global free trade is always pairwise stable, 
these researchers used this result to support the claim that bilateralism is a 
reasonable strategy to reach this network (ie. bilateralism is a path towards global 
free trade). In line with this research, Furusawa and Konishi (2005) developed a 
closely related model and found that while global free trade is the efficient network, 
it is not pairwise stable when countries have different levels of industrialization. 
However, this network can be stabilised by means of international compensatory 
payments across countries. The reason is because gains from trade are Pareto 
improving in this model implying that as long as the gainers could compensate the 
losers and still be better off, there are (potential) gains from trade. Consequently, if 
payments across countries are adopted to compensate losers, then governments 
would be willing to sign bilateral agreements until global free trade is reached.  
 
The use of this type of payments has been considered before in the literature of 
networks in general. The aim is to use transfers between nodes (i.e. inter-node 
transfers) with the purpose of reaching the efficient network defined as the one that 
maximises the aggregate level of countries‟ payoffs. In this research, the tension 
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between efficiency and stability can eventually be addressed by using side-
payments. That is, the efficient network can be stabilised when nodes have the 
facility to make these payments. However, this strategy only works in some cases 
that depend on the network model under consideration and the assumptions that 
are included in these models (see Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996; Bloch and 
Jackson, 2007).   
 
In relation to the current research, the use of compensatory payments (i.e. inter-
node transfers) is a reasonable strategy to facilitate agricultural trade liberalisation 
for several reasons.  
 
Firstly, it is also the case that bilateral agreements do have transfers. For example, 
the CAP is actually a type of wealth re-distribution among member states and, in 
the agreement allowing a country (e.g. Norway) access to the European Single 
Market, this country has to pay a contribution to the EU budget which is then 
distributed across EU member states (Shucksmith et al. 2005). Likewise, the aid 
for trade introduced by the World Trade Organisation is a type of transfer from 
developed to less developed countries to help the latter to engage in international 
trade (Silva and Nelson, 2012; Huhne et al. 2014). These examples illustrate the 
fact that the introduction of side-payments to favour agricultural trade liberalisation 
may be feasible.  
 
Secondly, the results obtained in Chapters Four and Five revealed that global free 
trade is not always stable when there is a farming sector. This suggests therefore 
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that the use of compensatory payments could potentially be adopted to stabilise 
global free trade in order to take advantage of gains from trade of food processed 
goods. While a similar approach was adopted by Furusawa and Konishi (2005), the 
current research differs in the type of problem that is considered. That is, in 
Furusawa and Konishis‟ framework, the instability of global free trade is explained 
only by differences in the level of industrialisation between countries. In contrast, in 
the current research, as revealed in the previous chapters, the instability of global 
free trade is explained by the existence of a farming sector that affects the 
marginal cost faced by intermediaries, existence of asymmetry in market size 
across countries, existence of asymmetry in farmers‟ productivity across countries, 
and governments‟ political biases. These sources of instability are the focus of the 
current chapter. 
 
Thirdly, the stability of global free trade does not mean that this network can be 
reached when there are multiple equilibriums because countries can eventually be 
trapped in an inefficient equilibrium. The existence of multiple equilibria not only 
was identified by Goyal and Joshi, but also in the extended model in the 
simulations developed in the previous chapters. In this context, the adoption of 
compensatory payments may eventually be used to break inefficient equilibriums in 
favour of free trade.  
 
Fourthly, while in Goyal and Joshi (2006) and Furusawa and Konishi (2005) global 
free trade is the efficient network, it was found in the current investigation that there 
are cases where other networks are efficient (e.g. when there is asymmetry in 
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market size and when there is a farming sector). The use of compensatory 
payments can also be considered as an alternative to reach these networks.  
 
Fifthly, the adoption of side-payments to stabilise the efficient network have only 
been considered in the context of pairwise stability. This chapter extends this 
approach in order to explore also how free trade can be favoured in the context of 
strongly pairwise stability and global treaty stability. In relation to the latter stability 
concept, this extension implies that compensatory payments not only have the 
potential to favour bilateral agreements, but also global agreements which is one of 
the aims of the WTO in relation to agricultural goods.  
 
Finally, this chapter also explores the use of intra-node payments (i.e. 
compensatory payments within a country e.g. from consumers to farmers in the 
same country) as an alternative tool to either break inefficient networks or reach 
global free trade. The main advantage of this alternative is that it can be used to 
complement inter-node payments particularly when their applicability is limited. For 
example, it is reasonable to adopt an inter-node payment from a developed country 
to a less developed one in order to favour trade. However, payments across rich 
countries or from poor countries to developed countries may be politically 
unfeasible. In this respect, intra-node payments can potentially be used in these 
cases as they do not involve transfers across countries.  
 
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 6.2 discusses the issue of efficiency 
and stability in international networks and explains what networks in the 
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simulations developed in the previous chapters are efficient. Section 6.3 formally 
introduces and defines the inter-node and intra-node payments. Section 6.4 
studies the impact of these payments on the international trade system when 
countries are involved in bilateral and global agreements. The analysis is focussed 
only on the simulations that consider the farming sector because the aim of 
introducing these payments in the context of the current investigation is to provide 
insights of how to facilitate agricultural trade liberalisation. Finally, Section 6.5 
summarises and concludes.   
 
6.2 Efficiency vs. stability 
 
In the network literature, a network is said to be efficient when the aggregate level 
of nodes‟ payoff is maximised in this network (Bloch and Jackson, 2007). Formally, 
let N = {1, 2, …, N} be the set of nodes, G = { a , b , …, G} the set of networks that 
can be formed with the nodes in N, and )(gSi  the payoff obtained by node i in 
network g . Using these notations, network g  is said to be efficient when 
 
N
i
i
N
i
i hSgS )()(  for all network gh   in N. 
 
This definition in the context of international trade implies that the efficient network 
is the one that maximises global welfare. In the simulations developed in the 
previous chapters for the case of symmetrical countries, the efficient networks are 
presented in the following table. 
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Table 6.1. Global welfare and efficient networks for symmetrical countries 
 Simulation 
Network 1 2 3 4 5 6 
a 
b 
c 
d 
e 
f 
g 
h 
i 
j 
k 
1.5000 
1.6388 
1.7776 
1.8264 
1.8752 
1.7326 
1.7814 
1.8132 
1.8620 
1.8976 
1.9200 
1.2000 
1.3112 
1.4224 
1.4572 
1.5000 
1.3811 
1.4250 
1.3480 
1.4817 
1.5148 
1.5360 
0.8568 
0.9364 
1.0160 
1.0400 
1.0712 
0.9855 
1.0176 
0.9005 
1.0570 
1.0810 
1.0980 
1.7356 
1.8054 
1.8756 
1.8910 
1.9068 
1.8482 
1.8640 
1.8867 
1.9022 
1.9134 
1.9200 
1.4124 
1.4592 
1.5040 
1.5146 
1.5264 
1.4867 
1.4993 
1.5083 
1.5219 
1.5306 
1.5360 
1.0288 
1.0480 
1.0748 
1.0818 
1.0900 
1.0647 
1.0735 
1.0771 
1.0869 
1.0932 
1.0972 
 
 
In this table, the first column shows the networks that were considered in the six 
simulations assuming symmetric countries (see Figure 4.3). The other columns 
show global welfare in each network used in simulations 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6. These 
numbers were obtained by adding each line in Tables E.3, E.7, E.11, E.15, E.20, 
and E.25 in Appendix E. Finally, the numbers in red correspond to the highest 
global welfare in each simulation. 
 
According to this table, network k (i.e. global free trade) is the efficient network in 
all simulations. This is not surprising for simulations 1 and 4 because they 
correspond to the original model of Goyal and Joshi under exogenous and 
endogenous tariffs, respectively. In the rest of the simulations, the introduction of 
the farming sector does not affect the efficiency of global free trade in the sense 
that it is still the most efficient network. This is explained by the fact that countries 
obtain in global free trade, high levels of consumer surplus as a consequence of 
high competition and high levels of producer surplus as a consequence of the large 
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quantity of output that is exported. These gains are large enough to offsets the 
lower level of profits made by the intermediaries.  
 
In Goyal and Joshi global free trade is pairwise stable independently of any political 
bias of governments. This means that in this paradigm compensatory payments 
are not needed to stabilise global free trade. However, when governments are 
biased in favour of intermediaries, when there is a farming sector, and when tariffs 
are placed exogenously, only the empty network is pairwise stable (see 
Simulations 2 and 3 in Chapter Four). Likewise, in the context of strongly pairwise 
stability and global treaty stability, global free trade is not stable in Simulations 1, 2, 
3, 4 and 5 when governments are biased in favour of intermediaries. Thus, 
because global free trade offers a higher level of global welfare, it is reasonable to 
use in these cases compensatory payments to direct the world towards this 
network. This may be done by means of inter-node payments as well as intra-node 
payments because consumers and the farming sector would be willing to 
compensate the intermediaries for the loss in profits when passing from inefficient 
networks to global free trade as long as the gainers and losers are all better off 
after the payment. In the particular case of intra-node payments, this would be an 
option to deal with cases involving politically biased governments in favour of trade 
losers. That is, because these governments care about the payoffs obtained by 
trade losers rather than aggregate welfare, a redistribution of wealth from trade 
gainers to losers within a country can lead to a Pareto improving change when 
reaching a more integrated network. 
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On the other hand, there are several cases where global free trade is stable (i.e. 
pairwise, strongly pairwise or global treaty stable) but not unique. For example, 
when governments are unbiased, network g is also pairwise stable in simulations 
1, 4, 5 and 6, and when governments are biased in favour of the farming sector, 
networks h, i, j and k are all global treaty stable in Simulations 5 and 6. The 
problem in cases of multiple stable networks is that the world could eventually 
reach an inefficient stable network and remains trapped in this network. Under this 
circumstance, a compensatory may be used to break the stability of the inefficient 
network in order to reach global free trade.  
 
Let us now consider the efficient networks in the simulations developed under the 
assumption of asymmetric countries. This is shown in the following table. 
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Table 6.2. Global welfare and efficient networks for asymmetrical countries 
 Simulation 
Network 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
a 
b 
c 
d 
e 
f 
g 
h 
i 
j 
k 
l 
m 
n 
o 
p 
q 
r 
s 
t 
u 
v 
w 
x 
y 
z 
a‟ 
b‟ 
c‟ 
0.7500 
0.8194 
0.8888 
0.7500 
0.9132 
0.8194 
0.9244 
0.9376 
0.9132 
0.9376 
0.8888 
0.8888 
0.8438 
0.9488 
0.9244 
0.9376 
0.9376 
0.9132 
0.9488 
0.9600 
0.9488 
0.9376 
0.9386 
0.9600 
0.9132 
0.8438 
0.8888 
0.8888 
0.8888 
0.6000 
0.6876 
0.7114 
0.6000 
0.7668 
0.6876 
0.7985 
0.8178 
0.7668 
0.7978 
0.7752 
0.7456 
0.7259 
0.8304 
0.7985 
0.8178 
0.7978 
0.7919 
0.8304 
0.8466 
0.8360 
0.8178 
0.8178 
0.8466 
0.7919 
0.7259 
0.7453 
0.7752 
0.7114 
0.4284 
0.5227 
0.5080 
0.4284 
0.5847 
0.5228 
0.6339 
0.6548 
0.5847 
0.6144 
0.6172 
0.6809 
0.5735 
0.6667 
0.6339 
0.6548 
0.6144 
0.6297 
0.6667 
0.6846 
0.6731 
0.6548 
0.6548 
0.6846 
0.6297 
0.5735 
0.5673 
0.6172 
0.5080 
0.9376 
1.0244 
1.0764 
0.9724 
1.1182 
1.0477 
1.1468 
1.1600 
1.1415 
1.1485 
1.1230 
1.1200 
1.0780 
1.1771 
1.1586 
1.1718 
1.1688 
1.1503 
1.1859 
1.1942 
1.1859 
1.1776 
1.1718 
1.2000 
1.1415 
1.0662 
1.0997 
1.0112 
1.1112 
0.7500 
0.8280 
0.8612 
0.7776 
0.9034 
0.8573 
0.9278 
0.9486 
0.9227 
0.9326 
0.9402 
0.8846 
0.8761 
0.9597 
0.9417 
0.9564 
0.9460 
0.9321 
0.9670 
0.9850 
0.9670 
0.9582 
0.9564 
0.9820 
0.9283 
0.8670 
0.8844 
0.9060 
0.8888 
0.5356 
0.6024 
0.6152 
0.5554 
0.6602 
0.6139 
0.6874 
0.7030 
0.6748 
0.6841 
0.7028 
0.6427 
0.6432 
0.7136 
0.6952 
0.7090 
0.6964 
0.6867 
0.7175 
0.7336 
0.7175 
0.7074 
0.7090 
0.7308 
0.6853 
0.6388 
0.6356 
0.6692 
0.6350 
1.1102 
1.2123 
1.1804 
1.2214 
1.2067 
1.2889 
1.2889 
1.3212 
1.3554 
1.2961 
1.3638 
1.3410 
1.3246 
1.3496 
1.4578 
1.3792 
1.3632 
1.3480 
1.3919 
1.3754 
1.3919 
1.4084 
1.3792 
1.4106 
1.3425 
1.2658 
1.2820 
1.3144 
1.2916 
 
 
In these simulations, global free trade corresponds to network x (see Figure 4.5). 
As shown in Table 6.2, this network is the unique efficient network only in 
simulation 14. That is, in a world composed of large countries and medium size 
countries without a farming sector (i.e. Goyal and Joshis‟ world under this type of 
asymmetry). However, when the world is composed of large and very small 
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countries (i.e. Simulations 11, 12 and 13), network t and global free trade are both 
efficient networks and this holds independently of the existence of a farming sector.  
 
The reason of why network t is also efficient is related to the fact that in this 
network only the very small countries j and l are not connected (see Figure 4.5). 
Thus, if they signed an agreement, then the impact on global welfare would be 
irrelevant given their very small domestic markets. On the other hand, when the 
world is composed of large and medium size countries with a farming sector (i.e. 
Simulations 15 and 16), only network t is the efficient network. This is explained by 
the fact that the farming sector increases the cost faced by the intermediaries in 
more integrated networks. Thus, if the medium size countries j and l broke their 
agreement, they would stop exporting the processed food good to each other 
negatively impacting the price paid to the farming sector in these countries. In 
response to this lower cost, the intermediaries in countries j and l would increase 
the level of exports to the existing partner large countries increasing the level of 
competition in these countries. This would cause a significant increase in 
consumer surplus in the large countries. At the same time, the domestic markets of 
countries j and l would become less competitive positively affecting the output that 
is exported by the large countries to the former. This would cause and increase in 
profits and producer surplus in the large countries. These positive gains in large 
countries when the agreement between the medium size countries is broken are 
large enough to offset the losses faced by the latter and this is why network t is the 
efficient under this type of asymmetry.  
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Finally, according to the information presented in Table 6.2, network o is the 
unique efficient network when there is asymmetry in farmers‟ productivity (i.e. 
Simulation 17). The reason of why this network is the efficient network is explained 
by the large contribution of the inefficient country i to global welfare. This country 
occupies a central position in the network implying that the domestic market in this 
country has a high level of competition. As a consequence, consumer surplus in 
this country is large. The high level of competition in the central country also 
significantly decreases the price paid to the farming sector. This lower cost allows 
the intermediary of country i to be more competitive and to obtain higher export 
profits. These gains obtained by the inefficient country for occupying a central 
position are large enough to offset the losses in other countries causing a positive 
net contribution to global welfare. This is why network o is the efficient network 
when countries are asymmetric in farmers‟ productivity.   
 
The existence of efficient networks other than global free trade suggests that 
reaching less integrated networks may not necessarily be a bad outcome when 
there are asymmetries across countries. However, putting the effort on these 
networks is against the spirit of the WTO. In spite of this, the current chapter 
investigates how compensatory payments can be used to reach both global free 
trade and also the other efficient networks in the simulations presented in Table 
6.2. It is also explored how inefficient stable networks can be broken. How inter 
and intra-node payments can be used for these purposes is the topic of the next 
section.  
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6.3 Inter-node and intra-node payments 
 
Inter-node and intra-node payments are lump sum transfers that are given by 
gainers from free trade (i.e. either bilateral or global free trade) to losers in order to 
achieve a Pareto improvement outcome reflected as a more efficient stable 
network (note however that it may be the case that a third country that is not 
involved in transfer activities may be worse off after more free trade is created as a 
consequence of transfers because this may cause an externality in this country. In 
other words, transfers may only be Pareto improving for countries that are involved 
in transfer activities depending on the nature of the current network. This is 
explained in more detail in the next sections).  
 
Inter-node payments in particular correspond to lump sum transfers that are given 
by gainer countries to loser countries. That is, they are transfers across countries. 
In contrast, intra-node payments correspond to lump sum transfers given by gainer 
groups within a country to loser groups within the same country. That is, they are 
transfers across groups of people that belong to the same country. How these 
payments can be used to stabilise the efficient network or break inefficient ones is 
explained next. 
 
6.3.1 Inter-node payments 
 
The description and formal definition of an inter-node payment given in this 
subsection was obtained from Furusawa and Konishi (2005, 153). Following these 
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researchers, a transfer from country i to country j is defined as the amount Tij(g) ∈ 
R given from i to j in network g such that Tij(g) = −Tji(g). A transfer system of the 
network g is T(g) = (Tij(g))(i,j)∈g such that Tij(g) = −Tji(g) for any link gij ∈ g. A network 
with transfers (g, T(g)) is a pair of a network and an associated transfer system. 
Country i‟s payoff under (g, T(g)) is given by Si(g, T(g)) = Si(g) + 
Nj
ji gT )( .  
 
As explained above, an inter-node payment can be used for two purposes: to 
stabilise global free trade; and to break inefficient stable networks in favour of free 
trade. This is formally explained as follows. 
 
6.3.1.1 Inter-node transfers to stabilise global free trade 
 
As in Furusawa and Konishi (2005), to stabilise global free trade requires a 
redefinition of pairwise stability that includes the inter-node transfers across 
countries. This approach is extended to include also the strongly pairwise stability 
and the global treaty stability concepts. For this purpose, the definitions for the sets 
of link addition proof, link deletion proof, and strong link deletion proof proposed by 
Gilles et al. (2006), Gilles and Sarangi (2010), and Gilles et al. (2012) described in 
Section 3.4.1 are considered in this sub-section to define the concepts of pairwise 
and strongly pairwise stability with transfers. The definition of the set of strong link 
deletion proof proposed by these researchers and the definition of the set of global 
treaty proof proposed in this dissertation (see Section 5.2.2) are also employed to 
re-define the global treaty stability concept.   
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Formally, let Di(g, T(g), gij) = Si(g, T(g)) − Si(g − gij)  R be the marginal benefit of 
country i when breaking an international agreement with country j and when 
cancelling the inter-node transfers between these countries. On the other hand, let 
Di(g, T(g), hi) = Si(g, T(g)) − Si(g − hi)  R be the marginal benefit in country i when 
deleting (simultaneously) hi  Li(g) international agreements and when cancelling 
all the inter-node transfers between the ex-partner countries. Finally, let i(g
c, 
T(gc)) = Si(g
c, T(gc)) – Si(g) be the marginal benefit of country i when forming a 
global agreement with inter-node transfers.  Using these concepts, the following 
definitions are considered: 
 
(a) A network g  G is link deletion proof with inter-node transfers if for every 
player i  N and every neighbour j  Ni(g) it holds that Di(g, T(g), gij) ≥ 0. That is, 
no country has an incentive to cut a link and thereby eliminate the transfer from (or 
to) that partner. Let DT  G be the set of link deletion proof networks with inter-
node transfers.  
 
(b) A network g  G is strong link deletion proof with inter-node transfers if for 
every player i  N and every hi  Li(g) it holds that Di(g, T(g), hi) ≥ 0. That is, no 
country has an incentive to cut one or more links simultaneously and thereby 
eliminate the transfer(s) from (or to) the ex-partner(s). Let DST  G be the set of 
strong link deletion proof networks with inter-node transfers.  
 
(c) A network g  G is link addition proof with inter-node transfers if Si(g + gij) > 
Si(g, T(g)) implies that Sj(g + gij) < Sj(g, T(g)) for all i,j  N. That is, for any pair of 
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unlinked countries, at least one of them has no incentive to form the link with any 
feasible inter-node transfer. Let AT  G be the set of link addition proof networks 
with inter-node transfers. 
 
(d) A network g  G is global treaty proof with inter-node transfers if for at least one 
country i  N it holds that i(g
c, T(gc))  0. In words, a network g  G is global 
treaty proof with inter-node transfers if at least one country i  N does not have an 
incentive to form a global agreement with any feasible inter-node transfer. Let T 
be the set of global treaty proof networks with inter-node transfers. 
 
Used these definitions, following equilibrium concepts are defined: 
 
(1) A network g  G is pairwise stable with inter-node transfers if g is link deletion 
proof with inter-node transfers as well as link addition proof with inter-node 
transfers. Let PT = DT  AT  G be the set of pairwise stable networks with inter-
node transfers.  
 
(2) A network g  G is strongly pairwise stable with inter-node transfers if g is 
strong link deletion proof with inter-node transfers as well as link addition proof with 
inter-node transfers. Let T = DST  AT  G be the set of strongly pairwise stable 
networks with inter-node transfers.  
 
(3) A network g is said to be global treaty stable with inter-node transfers if g is 
strong link deletion proof with inter-node transfers as well as global treaty proof 
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with inter-node transfers. Let GTT = DST  T  G be the set of global treaty stable 
networks with inter-node transfers.  
 
6.3.1.2 Inter-node transfers to break inefficient stable networks in favour of free 
trade 
 
An inefficient network g is either pairwise or strongly pairwise stable when two 
conditions are satisfied: no country in this network is willing to break an existing 
agreement (or several agreements simultaneously for the case of strongly pairwise 
stability); and if a country is willing to sign an agreement with another country, then 
the latter is not willing to sign this agreement. In considering these conditions, it is 
inferred that the stability of this network can be broken in favour of free trade when 
the second condition (i.e. proof link addition) is altered by an inter-node transfer. 
Because the pairwise stability and strongly pairwise stability share the same 
condition, this strategy can be adopted to break both types of stability.  
 
Formally, assume that the inefficient network g is either pairwise or strongly 
pairwise stable. In addition, assume that it holds for countries i,j that Si(g + gij) > 
Si(g) and Sj(g + gij) < Sj(g) (i.e. country i has an incentive to sign an agreement with 
country j but the latter is not willing to sign the agreement). An inter-node transfer 
system Tij(g + gij) given in network g + gij is said to be able to break the stability of 
the inefficient network g in favour of free trade when Si(g + gij, T(g + gij)) > Si(g) and 
Sj(g + gij, T(g + gij)) > Sj(g). That is, this transfer system can break network g when 
country j is compensated by the loss after free trade and when country i is still 
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willing to sign the agreement after the agreement. Note that this condition implicitly 
states that countries i and j are both better off after the agreement. But it does not 
consider the welfare effect of the agreement on third countries. It is for this reason 
that this transfer is not considered as a Pareto improving tool. It is considered a 
tool that can potentially lead the world to the efficient network.  
 
Now, suppose that the inefficient network g is global treaty stable. As before, this 
stability requires two conditions: no country has an incentive to break one or more 
agreements simultaneously; and at least one country is not willing to sign a global 
agreement. This stability can be broken in favour of global free trade when the 
second condition is altered by an inter-node transfer. Formally, assume that Si(g
c) 
< Si(g) in country i. An inter-node transfer system T(g
c) given in network gc can 
break the global treaty stability of g when Si(g
c, T(gc)) > Si(g). That is, when country 
i is compensated by the loss from trade by means of the transfer system.  
 
Having described the concepts that are needed to explore the role of inter-node 
payments as free trade facilitators, the attention is placed now on the intra-node 
transfers. This is discussed in the next subsection.  
 
6.3.2 Intra-node payments 
 
Intra-node payments correspond to lump sum transfers that are given by a 
particular sector in a country to another sector in the same country (e.g. from 
consumers to the farming sector in a determined country). They correspond to a 
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welfare redistribution strategy that compensates a loser sector from free trade by a 
gainer sector in a way that all the sectors in the country are better off. That is, it is a 
Pareto improving strategy from the point of view of the country (note however that 
a third country may negatively be affected by this transfer through the resulting free 
trade implying that it may not be Pareto improving from the point of view of the 
world). The advantage of this type of transfer is that it only depends on the decision 
made by a single country because it involves domestic welfare redistribution. As a 
consequence, it is easier to implement because it does not requires the consent of 
several countries. However, as it is demonstrated in Corollary 6.2 and Proposition 
6.3 below, the disadvantage of this transfer is that it only works in cases of 
politically biased governments. 
 
Let us now offer a formal definition for intra-node transfers. Let‟s assume the 
existence of two sets of sectors in country following generic welfare function in 
country j: )()()( )()( gSgSgS vj
u
jj   
where )()( gS uj  and )(
)( gS vj  are the payoffs 
obtained by sectors u and v in country j and network g, respectively. An intra-node 
transfer is defined as the amount Truv(g) ∈ R given from sector u to sector v in 
country j and network g such that Truv(g) = −Trvu(g). That is, this is a compensatory 
payment that benefits sector v. This definition can also be extended to more 
sectors as follows. Let U = {u1,…, un} be the sectors in country j that pay intra-node 
transfers in network g, and let V = {v1,…, vm} be the sectors that receive these 
transfers. An intra-node transfer system is defined in this case as Tr(g) such as 



Vk
uv
Ui
vu gTrgTr ki )()( .  
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As in the case of inter-node transfers, an intra-node payment can also be used to 
stabilise global free trade and to break inefficient stable networks in favour of free 
trade. This is discussed as follows. 
 
6.3.2.1 Intra-node transfers to stabilise global free trade 
 
The same approach considered to stabilise global free trade in the case of inter-
node transfers is adopted in the case of intra-node transfers. That is, the stability 
concepts are redefined in order to account for these transfers. This is done as 
follows.  
 
Let Di(g, Tr(g), gij, Tr(g − gij)) = Si(g, Tr(g)) − Si(g − gij, Tr(g − gij))  R be the 
marginal benefit of country i when breaking an international agreement with 
country j and when Tr(g) ≠ Tr(g − gij). On the other hand, let Di(g, Tr(g), hi, Tr(g − 
hi)) = Si(g, Tr(g)) − Si(g − hi, Tr(g − hi))  R be the marginal benefit in country i 
when deleting (simultaneously) hi  Li(g) international agreements and when Tr(g) 
≠ Tr(g − hi). Finally, let i(g
c, Tr(gc)) = Si(g
c, Tr(gc)) – Si(g) be the marginal benefit of 
country i when forming a global agreement with intra-node transfers.  Using these 
concepts, the following definitions are considered: 
 
(a) A network g  G is link deletion proof with intra-node transfers if for every 
player i  N and every neighbour j  Ni(g) it holds that Di(g, Tr(g), gij, Tr(g − gij)) ≥ 
0. That is, no country has an incentive to cut a link and thereby modify the transfers 
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from (or to) different sectors within the country. Let DTr  G be the set of link 
deletion proof networks with intra-node transfers.  
 
(b) A network g  G is strong link deletion proof with intra-node transfers if for 
every player i  N and every hi  Li(g) it holds that Di(g, Tr(g), hi, Tr(g − hi)) ≥ 0. 
That is, no country has an incentive to cut one or more links simultaneously and 
thereby modify the transfers from (or to) different sectors within the country. Let 
DSTr  G be the set of strong link deletion proof networks with intra-node transfers.  
 
(c) A network g  G is link addition proof with intra-node transfers if Si(g + gij, Tr(g 
+ gij)) > Si(g) implies that Sj(g + gij) < Sj(g) for all i,j  N. That is, if country i is willing 
to sign an agreement with country j after adopting a intra-node transfer system, 
then country j is unwilling to sign this agreement. Let ATr  G be the set of link 
addition proof networks with intra-node transfers. 
 
(d) A network g  G is global treaty proof with intra-node transfers if for at least one 
country i  N it holds that i(g
c, Tr(gc))  0. In words, a network g  G is global 
treaty proof with intra-node transfers if at least one country i  N does not have an 
incentive to form a global agreement with any feasible intra-node transfer. Let Tr 
be the set of global treaty proof networks. 
 
Used these definitions, following equilibrium concepts are defined: 
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(1) A network g  G is pairwise stable with intra-node transfers if g is link deletion 
proof with intra-node transfers as well as link addition proof with intra-node 
transfers. Let PTr = DTr  ATr  G be the set of pairwise stable networks with intra-
node transfers.  
 
(2) A network g  G is strongly pairwise stable with intra-node transfers if g is 
strong link deletion proof with intra-node transfers as well as link addition proof with 
intra-node transfers. Let Tr = DSTr  ATr  G be the set of strongly pairwise stable 
networks with intra-node transfers.  
 
(3) A network g is said to be global treaty stable with intra-node transfers if g is 
strong link deletion proof with intra-node transfers as well as global treaty proof 
with intra-node transfers. Let GTTr = DSTr  Tr  G be the set of global treaty 
stable networks with intra-node transfers.  
 
6.3.2.2 Intra-node transfers to break inefficient stable networks in favour of free 
trade 
 
As in the case of inter-node transfers, an inefficient pairwise or strongly pairwise 
stable network can be broken by intra-node payments in favour of free trade by 
altering the link addition proof condition of countries that are unwilling to sign 
additional agreements. Before explaining how this can be done, it is important to 
describe first a desirable property that an intra-node payment has to complete. This 
property corresponds to the idea that an intra-node transfer system has to be 
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Pareto improving from the point of view of the country that adopts this payment. 
This is explained in detail as follows. Let us consider the following generic welfare 
function in country j that is composed of U = {u1,…, un} sectors that pay intra-node 
transfers 


Vk
uv
Ui
vu gTrgTr ki )()(  and V = {v1,…, vm} sectors that receive these 
transfers: 

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v
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Ui
u
jj gSgSgS
ki )()()(
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)( . That is, suppose that all 
the sectors in U are better off after an agreement between countries i and j is 
signed and all sectors V are worse off. We say that an intra-node transfer system 
given in network g + gij is Pareto improving from the point of view of country j when 
the following conditions are satisfied:  
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Condition (i) states the all the sectors that pay transfers in network g + gij are better 
off in this network than in network g, and condition (ii) states that all the the sectors 
that receives the transfers in network g + gij are better off in this network than in 
network g. 
 
The two conditions outlined above is a desirable property of any transfer from the 
point of view of the society. However, it has an important disadvantage: intra-node 
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transfers can only work in cases of biased governments. To see this, let us 
consider the following propositions. 
 
Proposition 6.1. Intra-node transfers used in network g + gij can only be Pareto 
improving from the point of view of the country that uses these transfers when 
unweighted welfare in this country in network g + gij is larger than unweighted 
welfare in network g. 
 
Proof. Suppose that the two conditions in (i) and (ii) are satisfied. By adding these 
conditions, it is obtained the following expression:  


Ui
ij
u
j ggS
i )(
)(  + 


Vk
ij
v
j ggS
k )(
)(
> 
Ui
u
j gS
i )(
)( + 
Vk
v
j gS
k )(
)( . But for definition, this implies that )( ijj ggS   > )(gS j , 
and the proof is complete.  
 
According to this proposition, a Pareto improving intra-node transfer can only exist 
when welfare in the country that uses this transfer increases after this country 
signs an agreement. This result implies the use of this tool is restricted to cases 
where there is a gain in welfare, but governments are concerned about the payoffs 
obtained from trade losers rather than welfare. This is shown in the following 
corollary and proposition.    
 
Corollary 6.2. Intra-node transfers cannot be used to break inefficient pairwise or 
strongly pairwise stable networks when the government that adopt this tool is 
politically unbiased. 
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Proof. This corollary is a consequence of Proposition 6.1. To see this, assume that 
the inefficient network g is either pairwise or strongly pairwise stable and assume 
that governments are politically unbiased. Given this stability, it holds for at least 
one country j  N that )( ijj ggS   < )(gS j  (i.e. the link addition proof condition). 
That is, there is at least one country j in the network that is unwilling to sign an 
additional agreement. But because welfare in country j in network g + gij is smaller 
than in network g, it is concluded that this country cannot use a Pareto improving 
intra-node transfer to reverse the inequality above as revealed in Proposition 6.1.   
 
The idea behind this result is when )( ijj ggS   < )(gS j , country j does not have 
enough resources to compensate the losers when passing from network g to 
network g + gij. As a consequence, this inequality cannot be reversed and, 
therefore, the inefficient network cannot be broken in favour of free trade when 
governments are unbiased. However, this strategy can work when governments 
are biased in favour of the loser sectors. This is shown in the following proposition.  
 
Proposition 6.3. Consider the following generic welfare function in country j: )(gS j  
= 
Ui
u
j gS
i )(
)( + 
Vk
v
j gS
k )(
)( . Suppose that the government of this country is biased in 
favour of the sectors in V = {v1,…, vm} and that 


Vk
ij
v
j ggS
k )(
)(  < 
Vk
v
j gS
k )(
)( (i.e. this 
government is unwilling to sign an agreement with country i because this causes a 
decrease in welfare in these sectors). This inequality can be reversed by an intra-
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node transfer as long as )( ijj ggS  > )(gS j  (i.e. as long as total welfare in this 
country in network g + gij is larger than in network g).  
 
Proof. By using the generic welfare function, the inequality )( ijj ggS  > )(gS j  can 
be expressed as 


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u
j ggS
i )(
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rearranging terms, this can be expressed as 
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indifferent the sectors in V = {v1,…, vm} from networks g and g + gij. That is,  = 
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)( . By replacing this term in the previous inequality, it is 
obtained 
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)(  > . This expression indicates that there are 
sufficient resources in country j from the sectors in U = {u1,…, un} to compensate 
the sectors in V = {v1,…, vm} when passing from network g to network g + gij and 
when )( ijj ggS  > )(gS j . 
 
This result indicates that an intra-node transfer can be used to break inefficient 
pairwise and strongly pairwise stable networks when there are sufficient resources 
to compensate the loser sectors from free trade. That is, when )( ijj ggS  > )(gS j . 
In this case the inequality 


Vk
ij
v
j ggS
k )(
)(  < 
Vk
v
j gS
k )(
)(
 of the link addition proof 
condition can be reversed.  
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Formally, assume that g is an inefficient pairwise or strongly pairwise stable 
network in which country i is willing to sign an agreement with country j, but the 
latter is not willing to sign the agreement. In addition, suppose that the government 
of country j is biased in favour of the sectors in V = {v1,…, vm}. Network g can be 
broken in favour of free trade when the following condition holds: if 


Vk
ij
v
j ggS
k )(
)(  
< 
Vk
v
j gS
k )(
)( , then 
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j gS
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In relation to global treaty stability, on the other hand, the same considerations 
hold. That is, an intra-node transfer can be used to break an inefficient global treaty 
stable network only when the government of the country that uses this payment is 
politically biased and when welfare in this country in global free trade is larger than 
in the inefficient network.  This can easily be proven by replacing in the previous 
analysis network g + gij by g
c. Thus, for the case of an inefficient global treaty 
stable network g, this network can be broken in favour of global free trade under 
the assumption of government biased in favour of the sectors in V = {v1,…, vm} the 
following condition holds: if 
Vk
cv
j gS
k )(
)(  < 
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v
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)(  in some countries j  N,  then 
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6.3.3 Final remarks 
 
It is important to clarify that inter-node and intra-node transfers should not be seen 
as competitor tools. They can assist on free trade in different contexts. For 
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example, in a world where governments are politically unbiased, only inter-node 
transfers can be used. In contrast, there are cases with biased governments in 
which intra-node transfers offer better results. Moreover, there are cases when 
both types of transfers are needed to reach global free trade. These possibilities 
are discussed in the next sections taking as a reference the simulations carried out 
in the previous chapters. 
 
 6.4 Trade effects of transfers on the international trade stability 
 
It is argued in this dissertation that the adoption of inter-node and intra-node side 
payments can potentially facilitate agricultural trade liberalisation because they can 
be used to compensate losers from trade from the gainers. In order to show this 
possibility, this section explores how these payments can both stabilise the efficient 
network or break inefficient stable ones in favour of free trade. For this purpose, 
the simulations that include the farming sector and that were analysed in the 
previous chapters are considered in this section. This is explored as follows.    
 
6.4.1 Simulations under the assumption of exogenous tariffs and symmetric 
countries 
 
There are two simulations under the assumptions of exogenous tariffs and 
symmetric countries that include the farming sector. One of them (i.e. Simulation 2 
in Chapters Four and Five) considers the case of moderate levels of monopsonistic 
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power (i.e. ϕi = 0.5), and the other simulation (i.e. Simulation 2 in Chapters Four 
and Five) considers the case of high levels of monopsonistic power (i.e. ϕi = 1.5).  
 
6.4.1.1Simulation 2: i = 0.5 and i = 1 for all i  N.    
 
The case of politically unbiased governments 
 
According to the results obtained in Sections 4.3.1.2 and 5.3, the pairwise and 
strongly pairwise stable network in this simulation when governments are politically 
unbiased is network k in Figure 4.3. Since this corresponds to global free trade and 
is also the efficient network, a transfer in this case is not needed.  
 
On the other hand, the results obtained in Section 5.4.1.2 revealed that the global 
treaty stable networks are d, f, i, j, k in Figure 4.3. Because global free trade is 
global treaty stable, a transfer is only needed to break the inefficient networks d, f, i 
and j in order to facilitate the signature of a global agreement. Now, as shown in 
Corollary 6.2 and Proposition 6.3, when governments are unbiased, only inter-node 
transfers can be used to break the stability of these networks. To show that these 
transfers can indeed be used to facilitate a global agreement in the current 
simulation, consider the following table. 
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Table 6.3. Inter-node transfer to break inefficient networks under unbiased 
governments 
  
Country 
Difference of welfare between 
global free trade and the 
inefficient stable network 
 
i 
 
j 
 
k 
 
l 
Net global 
welfare gain 
k  d 
k  f 
k  i 
k  j 
-0.0177 
-0.0479 
0.0231 
0.0372 
-0.0177 
0.0594 
0.0231 
-0.0266 
0.0571 
0.0594 
-0.065 
-0.0266 
0.0571 
0.084 
0.0731 
0.0372 
0.0788 
0.1549 
0.0543 
0.0212 
 
The first column in this table shows the difference in welfare between global free 
trade (i.e. network k) and a determined stable inefficient network. For example, k  
d is the difference in welfare between global free trade and the inefficient network 
d. The second, third, fourth and fifth columns correspond to this difference in 
numerical terms in each country (these figures were obtained from Table E.7 in 
Appendix E). For example, welfare in country i when passing from network d to 
network k decreases by 0.0177. Finally, the last column is the sum of the numbers 
in each row and represents the net gain in global welfare when passing from the 
inefficient network to global free trade.  
 
Table 6.3 reveals that there are always enough resources in the world to finance 
inter-node transfers in order to break inefficient networks. For example, suppose 
that the world is trapped in network d. If countries signed a global agreement, then 
welfare in countries i and j would decrease by 0.0177 and welfare in countries k 
and l would increase by 0.0571. Now, because the total gain in welfare is larger 
than the total loss, there is a net gain in welfare (i.e. net gain in global welfare) of 
0.0788. This suggests, consequently, that the gainer countries k and l would be 
willing to pay inter-node transfers to the loser countries i and j in order to sign a 
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global agreement. In considering the global treaty stability concept with transfers 
(see Section 6.3.1.1), this agreement would be stable. Moreover, these transfers 
do not need to be paid for ever to sustain global free trade because, as 
demonstrated in Section 5.4.1.2, this network is also stable without transfers. This 
is explained by the fact that once in global free trade, no country has an incentive 
to deviate unilaterally by breaking on or more links simultaneously. In other works, 
the intra-node payment can be used to break an inefficient network in order to 
induce countries to sign a global agreement. But when the agreement is signed, 
the payments can be cancelled. The same holds for the other inefficient networks 
considered in Table 6.3. This result illustrates, therefore, that a tool of this nature 
can be used to facilitate a global agreement by compensating loser countries from 
trade. 
 
The case of politically biased governments 
 
Let us now consider the case of governments biased in favour of consumers. 
According to the results obtained in in Sections 4.3.1.2 and 5.3, global free trade is 
the only pairwise and strongly pairwise stable network in this simulation implying 
that transfers are not needed in this case. On the other hand, the results obtained 
in Section 5.4.1.2 revealed that networks h, i, j and k are global treaty stable. Using 
the same analysis as the one conducted for the case of unbiased governments, it 
is concluded that there are enough resources to finance inter-node transfers to 
break the inefficient networks h, i and j. This is inferred from the information 
presented in Table 6.4. 
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Table 6.4. Inter-node transfers to break inefficient networks when governments are 
biased in favour of consumers 
  
Country 
Difference of consumer surplus 
between global free trade and 
the inefficient stable network 
 
i 
 
j 
 
k 
 
l 
Net global 
consumer  
surplus gain 
k  h 
k  i 
k  j 
-0.0127 
0.0279 
0.0289 
0.0816 
0.0279 
-0.0027 
0.0816 
-0.0059 
-0.0027 
0.0816 
0.068 
0.0289 
0.2321 
0.1179 
0.0524 
 
This table shows the change in consumer surplus when passing from the inefficient 
network to global free trade. For example, if the world is trapped in network h, 
passing from this network to global free trade causes a loss in consumer surplus in 
country i by 0.0127 and a gain in countries j, k and l by 0.0816. Because there is a 
net global consumer surplus when passing to global free trade, the gainer 
countries j, k and l have an incentive to pay inter-node transfers to the loser 
countries, and the same holds for the other inefficient networks. As before, this 
strategy can be adopted to induce the signature of a global agreement and this 
payment can be cancelled when global free trade is reached. In intra-node 
payment, however, cannot work in this case. To see this, consider the following 
table. 
 
Table 6.5. Intra-node transfers to break inefficient networks when governments are 
biased in favour of consumers 
  
Country 
Difference between welfare (W) and consumer 
surplus (CS) in the same loser country in a 
determined network 
 
i 
 
j 
 
k 
 
l 
W  CS in network h 
W  CS in network i 
W  CS in network j 
0.2881 
 
 
 
 
0.2031 
 
0.1840 
0.2031 
 
 
 
W  CS in network k 0.1792 0.1792 0.1792  
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The first column of this table represents the available welfare resources other than 
consumer surplus that there are in a loser country in a determined network, and 
the other columns show the numerical value of this difference (these figures were 
obtained by subtracting from welfare in Table E.7 the corresponding values of 
consumer surplus in Table E.4 in Appendix E). This difference corresponds 
therefore to the available resources that belong to the intermediary and the farming 
sector in the loser country. For example, country i is a loser country when passing 
from network h to global free trade as shown in Table 6.5. In the inefficient network 
h, the available resources in the hands of the intermediary and the farming sector 
is the amount of 0.2881.  
 
Now, if countries signed an agreement (i.e. passing from network h to network k), 
the available resources that belong to the intermediary and the farming sector 
would decrease from 0.2881 to 0.1792 as can be seen in the last row of Table 6.5. 
This means that the global agreement would cause a net decrease in the 
resources available in these sectors implying that at least one of these sectors 
would be worse off after the agreement and, consequently, would be unwilling to 
pay the intra-node transfer to compensate consumers contradicting the desirable 
property of Pareto improving from the point of view of the loser country. The same 
situation holds in loser countries in other inefficient networks. This is why intra-
node payments that are Pareto improving cannot be used in this case.  
 
In relation to the case of governments biased in favour of intermediaries, the 
results   obtained in in Sections 4.3.1.2 and 5.3 revealed that the empty network is 
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the only pairwise and strongly pairwise stable network in this simulation implying 
that transfers are need in this case to favour free trade. A suitable strategy to 
achieve global free trade in the current simulation when countries are involved in 
bilateral agreements is the use of intra-node transfers. The idea is to use these 
transfers sequentially from the empty network (i.e. network a in Figure 4.3) in order 
to follow a path of networks that leads to global free trade. There are different 
feasible paths and the one that has been selected for illustrative purposes is the 
following: a  b  c  d  e  j  k, where the arrows represents the path from 
an initial network to the next one (e.g. a  b means the path starting from network 
a to network b). The information that is needed to determine the feasibility of this 
path is presented in Tables 6.6 and 6.7. 
 
Table 6.6. Welfare minus profits made by the intermediary with intra-node transfers 
 Countries 
Networks i j k l 
a 
b 
c 
d 
e 
j 
k 
0.1000 
0.1778 – 0.0223 = 0.1555 
0.1778 – 0.0223 = 0.1555 
0.2315 – 0.0300 = 0.2015 
0.2250 – 0.0502 = 0.1748 
0.2150 – 0.0684 = 0.1466 
0.2560 – 0.0723 = 0.1837 
0.1000 
0.1000 
0.1778 – 0.0223 = 0.1555 
0.2315 – 0.0300 = 0.2015 
0.2250 – 0.0502 = 0.1748 
0.2650 – 0.0547 = 0.2103 
0.2560 = 0.0723 = 0.1837 
0.1000 
0.1778 – 0.0223 = 0.1555 
0.1778 – 0.0223 = 0.1555 
0.1705 - 0.0437 = 0.1268 
0.2250 – 0.0502 = 0.1748 
0.2650 – 0.0547 = 0.2103 
0.2560 – 0.0723 = 0.1837 
0.1000 
0.1000 
0.1778 – 0.0223 = 0.1555 
0.1705 – 0.0437 = 0.1268 
0.2250 – 0.0502 = 0.1748 
0.2150 – 0.0684 = 0.1466 
0.2560 – 0.0723 = 0.1837 
 
Table 6.7. Profits made by the intermediary with intra-node transfers 
 Countries 
Networks i j k l 
a 
b 
c 
d 
e 
j 
k 
0.2000 
0.1778 + 0.0223 = 0.2001 
0.1778 + 0.0223 = 0.2001 
0.1702 + 0.0300 = 0.2002 
0.1500 + 0.0502 = 0.2002 
0.1318 + 0.0684 = 0.2002 
0.1280 + 0.0723 = 0.2003 
0.2000 
0.2000 
0.1778 + 0.0223 = 0.2001 
0.1702 + 0.0300 = 0.2002 
0.1500 + 0.0502 = 0.2002 
0.1456 + 0.0547 = 0.2003 
0.1280 + 0.0723 = 0.2003 
0.2000 
0.1778 + 0.0223 = 0.2001 
0.1778 + 0.0223 = 0.2001 
0.1564 + 0.0437 = 0.2001 
0.1500 + 0.0502 = 0.2002 
0.1456 + 0.0547 = 0.2003 
0.1280 + 0.0723 = 0.2003 
0.2000 
0.2000 
0.1778 + 0.0223 = 0.2001 
0.1564 + 0.0437 = 0.2001 
0.1500 + 0.0502 = 0.2002 
0.1318 + 0.0684 = 0.2002 
0.1280 + 0.0723 = 0.2003 
 
 
Table 6.6 shows the available resources that belong to consumer surplus and the 
farming sector (i.e. welfare in Table E.7 minus profits in Table E.6 in a determined 
country. See Appendix E) minus the intra-node transfer that is paid by these 
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sectors to the intermediary. Table 6.7, on the other hand, is the profit made by the 
intermediary plus the intra-node transfer paid by consumers and the farming 
sector. For example, in network a in Table 6.6, the resources that belong to 
consumers and the farming sector in country i have a value of 0.1778. From this 
amount, an intra-node payment of 0.0223 is subtracted and the resulting resources 
in the hands of consumers and the farming sector have a value of 0.1555. In Table 
6.7, this transfer is paid to the intermediary in country i. As a result, the resources 
in hands of this firm increases from 0.1778 to 0.2001.   
 
Having described the information contained in Tables 6.6 and 6.7, let us know 
explain how the intra-node transfers in these tables can help the world to reach 
global free trade in the suggested path of networks. According to Figure 4.3, 
passing from network a to network b requires countries i and k to sign a bilateral 
agreement. However, this causes a decrease in the profit made by the 
intermediaries of these countries from 0.2000 to 0.1778 (see Table E.5 in Appendix 
E). Thus, since governments are biased in favour of these firms, they are not 
willing to sign the agreement. However, if the intermediaries of countries i and k 
were compensated by an intra-node transfer of 0.0223 paid by consumers and the 
farming sector (see the row for network b in Table 6.6), then they would obtain the 
amount of 0.2001 which is larger than the profits in network a. (see the row for 
network b in Table 6.7). As a result, countries i and k would be willing to sign the 
agreement. If this agreement is signed, the intermediaries of these countries would 
be better off as can be seen in Table 6.7. Consumers and the farming sector in 
these countries would also be better off because they would obtain the amount of 
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0.1555 which is larger than the amount of 0.1000 obtained in network a as can be 
seen in Table 6.6. In other words, the transfer is a Pareto improving payment from 
the point of view of countries i and k as required.  
 
Now, suppose that the agreement is signed. In order to reach network c from 
network b requires countries j and l to sign an agreement. As revealed in Tables 
6.6 and 6.7, the same results hold. That is, intra-node transfers paid consumers 
and the farming sector in countries j and l would make all the sectors in these 
countries better of implying that this agreement would be signed. By following the 
same reasoning for the suggested path of networks, it is inferred that global free 
trade can be reached with intra-node transfers. Moreover, global free trade would 
be both pairwise and strongly pairwise stable as it is concluded from the definition 
of pairwise and strongly pairwise stability with intra-node transfers defined in 
Section 6.3.2.1. 
 
In the relation to global treaty stability for the case of governments biased in favour 
of intermediaries, the results obtained in Section 5.4.1.2 revealed that network a 
(i.e. the empty network) is the only global treaty stable network. It is difficult to 
justify the use inter-node transfers to reach global free trade from the empty 
network in this case because a global agreement causes a loss of profits in all 
countries of the world. This can be seen in Table E.5. In this table, all countries 
obtain a profit of 0.1280 in global free trade (i.e. network k) which is smaller than 
the profit of 0.2000 that is made in the inefficient network a. In other words, all 
countries of the world should be compensated to be willing to sign the agreement. 
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Nonetheless, an intra-node transfer can potentially solve this conflict. To see this, 
note that according to Table E.5 the intermediaries in each country of the world 
(i.e. countries i, j, k and l) should be compensated by at least the amount of 0.072 
to be willing to support a global agreement (i.e. 0.2000 – 0.1280). Now, note by 
subtracting profits from welfare (i.e. subtracting the figures in Table E.5 from Table 
E.7) that consumers and the farming sector in each country can increase the value 
of their resources from 0.1000 to 0.2560. That is, a global agreement would offer 
them a gain of 0.156. But this amount is larger than the compensation required by 
the intermediaries. This means that in global free trade there are enough resources 
from consumers and the farming sector to compensate the intermediaries. This 
suggests, therefore, that intra-node transfers can be used to achieve a global 
agreement when governments are biased in favour of intermediaries. Moreover, 
this finding illustrates the fact that these payments can constitute a possible 
alternative tool when inter-node transfers are not feasible.    
 
Finally, let us consider the case of governments biased in favour of the farming 
sector. In this case it was found in Sections 4.3.1.2 and 5.3 that global free trade is 
the only pairwise and strongly pairwise stable network implying that a transfer is 
not needed to favour free trade. On the other hand, the results obtained in Section 
5.4.1.2 revealed that networks h, i, j and k are global treaty stable. In this case, 
only inter-node transfers can be used to break the global treaty stability of networks 
h, i, and j in favour of a global agreement. To see that this is the case, consider the 
following table (the figures in this table were obtained from Table E.6 in Appendix 
F).   
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Table 6.8. Inter-node transfers to break inefficient networks when governments are 
biased in favour of the farming sector 
  
Country 
Difference of producer surplus 
between global free trade and 
the inefficient stable network 
 
i 
 
j 
 
k 
 
l 
Net global 
producer  
surplus gain 
k  f 
k  h 
k  i 
k  j 
-0.0049 
-0.0276 
0.0091 
0.0121 
0.0206 
0.0257 
0.0091 
-0.0063 
0.0206 
0.0257 
-0.015 
-0.0063 
0.0312 
0.0257 
0.0233 
0.0121 
0.0675 
0.0495 
0.0265 
0.0116 
 
According to this table, loser countries in terms of producer surplus can be 
compensated by gainers by transferring payments from the farming sector of the 
latter to the former. This is because a global agreement causes a net gain in 
producer surplus (see the last column in the table).  
 
Now, consider Table 6.9 to show that intra-node transfers cannot work in this case 
(the figures in this table were obtained by subtracting producer surplus in Table E.6 
from welfare in Table E.7 in Appendix E).   
 
Table 6.9. Welfare minus producer surplus in countries that are unwilling to sign a 
global agreement 
  
Country 
Difference between welfare and 
producer surplus in inefficient 
stable network and global free 
trade 
 
i 
 
j 
 
k 
 
l 
Net global 
producer  
surplus gain 
f 
h 
i 
j 
0.3758 
0.4268 
 
 
 
 
0.3531 
 
 
0.3828 
0.3531 
 0.0675 
0.0495 
0.0265 
0.0116 
k 0.3328 0.3328 0.3328   
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This table shows the available resources in the hands of consumers and 
intermediaries in countries that are unwilling to sign a global agreement (these 
countries can be identified in Table 6.8 and corresponds to the ones that face a net 
decrease in producer surplus when passing from the inefficient network to global 
free trade). According to Table 6.9, the resources that belong to consumers and 
intermediaries decrease when passing from an inefficient global treaty stable 
network to network k. This implies that there are not enough resources in global 
free trade to compensate the farming sector from the other sectors because this 
would not cause a Pareto improvement from the point of view of the loser 
countries. This illustrates again the claim that intra-node and inter-node payments 
are not substitutes and they can work in different contexts. 
 
Final comments 
 
In considering the analysis developed in this simulation it is concluded therefore 
that inefficient pairwise, strongly pairwise and global treaty stable networks can be 
broken in favour of free trade by means of transfers in the current simulation. The 
reason is because there are sufficient resources either across countries or within a 
country to compensate losers from trade by using these transfers. However, the 
type of transfer (i.e. intra-node or inter-node) that can be used for this purpose 
depends on the context and also on the type of policy bias.  
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6.4.1.2 Simulation 3: i = 1.5 and i = 1 for all i  N.    
 
The same results obtained in the previous case are in verified when i = 1.5 as can 
be inferred from the information presented in Tables E.8, E.9, E.10 and E.11 in 
Appendix E. This implies that inter-node and intra-node transfers can also be used 
to break inefficient networks in favour of free trade when countries are symmetric, 
tariffs are placed exogenously, and when monopsonistic power is high.  
 
6.4.2 Simulations under the assumption of endogenous tariffs and symmetric 
countries 
 
Simulations that assume endogenous tariffs were carried out for the case of 
symmetrical countries with unbiased governments and farming sectors (i.e. 
Simulations 5 and 6). As shown in Table 6.1, in these simulations global free trade 
(i.e. network k) is the efficient network and therefore the target of compensatory 
payments is to help the world to reach this network. 
 
Unfortunately, it was not possible to fully study cases of biased governments 
because the model becomes untractable in mathematical terms. However, some 
partial results were obtained in Section 4.3.2.4. They are considered in the current 
section in the context of compensatory payments. 
 
 
 
380 
 
The case of politically unbiased governments 
 
There are two simulations that include the farming sector in a world with 
endogenous tariffs and unbiased governments. They are studied as follows. 
 
6.4.2.1 Simulation 5: i = 0.5 and i = 1 for all i  N. 
 
This simulation assumes moderate levels of monopsonistic power, symmetrical 
countries and unbiased governments. It was found in Sections 4.3.2.2 and 5.3.2 
that the pairwise and strongly pairwise stable networks in this case correspond to 
networks g and k in Figure 4.3. It was also found in Section 5.4.2.2 that the global 
treaty stable networks in this simulation are d, f, j and k in the same figure. This 
result revealed therefore the existence of inefficient stable networks: the pairwise 
and strongly pairwise stable network g; and the global treaty stable networks d, f 
and j. Because governments are unbiased in this case, only inter-node transfers 
can be used to break these inefficient stable networks as proven in Corollary 6.2. 
However, this instrument is not needed to stabilise global free trade because this 
network is already pairwise, strongly pairwise and global treaty stable.  
 
Let us first consider the inefficient pairwise and strongly pairwise stable network g. 
A path of networks that can be followed from bilateral agreements that lead to 
global free trade is g  i  j  k. The information that is needed to determine 
whether this path can be facilitated is presented in Table 6.10 (this information was 
obtained from Table E.20 in Appendix E).  
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Table 6.10. Welfare with inter-node transfers 
 Countries 
Networks i j k l 
g 
i 
j 
k 
0.3756 
0.3764 
0.3741 
0.3840 
0.3756 
0.3764 
0.3912 
0.3840 
0.3756 
0.4027 – 0.0062 = 0.3965 
0.3912 
0.3840 
0.3725 
0.3664 + 0.0062 = 0.3726 
0.3741 
0.3840 
 
 
According to Figure 4.3, passing from network g to network i requires countries k 
and l to sign a bilateral agreement. According to Table E.20, country k is willing to 
sign this agreement because this would increase welfare in this country from 
0.3756 to 0.4027. However, country i does not support this agreement because 
this would cause a decrease in welfare in this country from 0.3725 to 0.3664. Now, 
if country k paid to country i an inter-node payment to compensate this loss, then 
this agreement would be signed. This is shown in Table 6.10. In this table, country 
k pays a transfer of 0.0062 to country i. As a result, both countries are better off 
after the agreement because welfare in both countries increases. As can be seen 
in this table, this is the only inter-node transfer that is needed in this path because 
once network i reached, countries j and l have an incentive to form an agreement 
which is required to pass from network i to network j. Likewise, once network j is 
reached, countries i and l have an incentive to sign a bilateral agreement which is 
what is required to reach network k, that is, global free trade. 
 
Let us now explore whether the inefficient global treaty stable networks d, f and j 
can be broken by means of inter-node transfers. This is shown in Table 6.11 (the 
information in this table was obtained from Table E.20 in Appendix E). 
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Table 6.11. Inter-node transfer to break inefficient networks under unbiased 
governments 
  
Country 
Difference of welfare between 
global free trade and the 
inefficient stable network 
 
i 
 
j 
 
k 
 
l 
Net global 
welfare gain 
k  d 
k  f 
k  j 
-0.0042 
-0.009 
0.0099 
-0.0042 
0.0213 
-0.0072 
0.0149 
0.0213 
-0.0072 
0.0149 
0.0157 
0.0099 
0.0214 
0.0493 
0.0054 
 
This table shows the welfare gains/losses when passing from the inefficient 
network to global free trade (i.e. network k). For example, welfare in countries i and 
j decreases by 0.0042 when passing from network d to network k, and welfare in 
countries k and l increases by 0.0149. The last column in Table 6.11 shows that 
the aggregate gain in welfare when passing from network d to k is positive implying 
that the gainer countries k and l have enough resources in global free trade to 
compensate the loser countries i and j is a global agreement is signed. The same 
holds for the other inefficient networks as can be seen in this table. 
 
In considering the results obtained in this simulation, it is concluded therefore that 
inter-node transfers have the potential to assist countries to reach global free trade 
in a world where tariffs are placed endogenously and when countries have a 
farming sector. 
 
6.4.2.2 Simulation 6: i = 1.5 and i = 1 for all i  N.    
 
This simulation also assumes endogenous tariffs and politically biased 
governments. However, it assumes high level of monopsonistic power (i.e. ϕi = 
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1.5). According to the results obtained in Sections 4.3.2.3 and 5.3, the pairwise and 
strongly pairwise stable networks in this case are g and k. On the other hand, it 
was found in Section 5.4.2.2 that the global treaty stable networks are d, f, j and k.  
 
The same stable networks were found in the previous case (see Section 6.4.2.1) 
and the same results concerning the use of inter-node transfers hold in the current 
simulation. It is concluded therefore that inter-node transfers can also facilitate free 
trade when tariffs are placed endogenously in a world with high levels of 
monopsonistic power. 
  
The case of politically biased governments 
  
As explained above, it was not possible to fully study the case of endogenous 
tariffs when governments are biased. However, partial simulations based on the 
information presented in Appendix B were developed 4.3.2.4 (see Simulations 7, 8, 
9 and 10 in Tables 4.4 and 4.5). The aim of these simulations was to show that it is 
possible to identify cases where biased governments have an incentive to deviate 
from global free trade. An example is found in Simulation 10. In this case, when 
governments are biased in favour of intermediaries and take into account tariff 
revenue (i.e. the government puts cero weight to consumer surplus and producer 
surplus, a weight equal to one to the profits made by the intermediary, and a 
weight equal 0.5 to tariff revenue) and when monopsonistic power is high (i.e. ϕi = 
1.5), global free trade becomes unstable because a government obtains a higher 
level of weighted welfare in network j by breaking an existing agreement.  
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Based on the same information obtained from Appendix B, it is possible to show 
that an intra-node network can be used to stabilise global free trade in Simulation 
10. To see this, note that consumer surplus and producer surplus in a determine 
country in global free trade sum together the amount of 0.1829. If this country 
breaks an existing agreement, this amount decreases to 0.1602 implying a net loss 
of 0.0227 for these sectors. On the other hand, according to Table 4.5 the 
weighted welfare in this country is 0.0914, and 0.0954 when deviating by breaking 
an existing link. This means that the deviation causes a gain in weighted welfare of 
0.0040. In considering these figures, it is concluded that consumers and the 
farming sector have enough resources compensate for the 0.0040 in case the 
government decides to stay in global free trade. This illustrates that in the context 
of endogenous tariffs and biased governments, intra-node transfers have the 
potential to facilitate free trade. 
 
6.4.3 Simulations under the assumptions of exogenous tariffs and 
asymmetry in market size 
 
Four simulations that include the farming sector were developed under the 
assumption of asymmetric countries in terms of market size. Two of them 
(Simulations 12 and 13) consider the case of large and very small countries under 
different levels of monopsonistic power. The other two simulations (Simulations 15 
and 16) consider the case of large and medium size countries, also under different 
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levels of monopsonistic power. The way in which compensatory transfers can be 
used in these simulations is explained as follows.   
 
6.4.3.1 Simulation 12:  = 1,  = 0 and  = 0.5 for all i  N.    
 
This simulation assumes the existence of large countries and very small country 
with low degree of monosonistic power. According to Table 6.2, in this simulation 
there are two efficient networks: network t in which all countries have an 
agreement with each other except the very small countries j and l; and network x 
that corresponds to global free trade (see Figure 4.5). In the following analysis it is 
studied how to reach these efficient networks by means of compensatory 
payments. 
 
The case of politically unbiased governments 
 
It was found in Sections 4.4.1.2 and 5.3 that when governments are politically 
unbiased in the current simulation, networks m, t, x, z are pairwise stable networks, 
and networks t and x (i.e. the efficient networks) are also strongly pairwise stable. 
This finding suggests that compensatory payments may be used to break the 
inefficient pairwise stable networks m and z. Because governments are unbiased, 
only inter-node payments can be used in this case as proved in Corollary 6.2 and 
proposition 6.3. 
 
~
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Note before proposing a suitable path to reach one of the efficient networks that 
there are sub-paths that are not feasible because there is no change in welfare in 
any of the countries. For example, a logical path to break the two inefficient 
pairwise stable networks is to pass from z to m which requires the very small 
countries j and l to sign an agreement. However, according to Table E.32 in 
Appendix E all countries obtain the same level of welfare in both networks implying 
that there is no incentive for compensation. This happens in any sub-path that 
requires an agreement between the very small countries j and l. The reason is 
because the domestic markets of these countries are very small to make any 
significant change in the network system in terms of welfare when signing an 
agreement.  
 
It is inferred from this limitation that only the efficient network t can be reached from 
the inefficient network z. In contrast, the efficient network x (i.e. global free trade) 
can be reached from the inefficient network m because in this network the very 
small countries j and l have already an agreement with each other. Having clarified 
why two different paths are needed for the inefficient networks, the following paths 
to reach the efficient networks for networks z and m are proposed, respectively: z 
 g  n  t; and m  o  s  x (note that there are other possibilities as well). 
The information that is needed to determine whether these paths are feasible is 
presented in the following tables (the figures in these table were obtained from the 
information presented in Table E.32).  
 
 
387 
 
Table 6.12. Feasible path to reach the efficient network t from network z by means 
of inter-node transfers 
 Countries 
Networks i j k l 
z 
g 
n 
t 
0.2901 
0.3928 - 0.0028 = 0.3900 
0.3527 
0.3326 
0.0679 
0.0542 
0.0557 
0.0907 
0.3000 
0.2973 + 0.0028 = 0.3001 
0.3131 
0.3326 
0.0679 
0.0542 
0.1089 
0.0907 
 
Table 6.13. Feasible path to reach the efficient network x from network m by 
means of inter-node transfers 
 Countries 
Networks i j k l 
m 
o 
s 
x 
0.2901 
0.3928 - 0.0028 = 0.3900 
0.3527 
0.3326 
0.0679 
0.0542 
0.0557 
0.0907 
0.3000 
0.2973 + 0.0028 = 0.3001 
0.3131 
0.3326 
0.0679 
0.0542 
0.1089 
0.0907 
 
Table 6.12 shows how the inefficient network z can be broken in order to reach the 
efficient network t through the path z  g  n  t. In this case, passing from 
network z to network g requires the large countries i and k to sign a bilateral 
agreement (see Figure 4.5). According to table E.32, welfare in country i increases 
from 0.2901 to 0.3928 after the agreement is signed, and welfare in country k 
decreases from 0.3000 to 0.2973. This suggests that network z can be broken in 
favour of the agreement by means of an inter-node payment paid by country i to 
country k to compensate for the welfare loss. In Table 6.12, it is considered as an 
example an inter-node transfer of 0.0028. If this transfer is paid, then both 
countries obtain a higher level of welfare after the agreement (i.e. country i obtains 
0.3900 and country k obtains 0.3001). This means that both countries have the 
incentive to sign the agreement with the transfer. Now, suppose that the 
agreement is signed. Passing from network g to network n requires countries k to l 
to sign an agreement. However, according to Table 6.12, welfare in these two 
countries increases after the agreement even without any transfer implying that this 
agreement will be signed. The same holds for the sub-path between network n and 
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t. In this case passing from network n to network t requires an agreement between 
countries k and j and this is feasible because this agreement increase welfare in 
these countries. In conclusion, it is possible to reach the efficient network t from the 
inefficient network z when the latter is broken by means of an inter-node transfers. 
What it is not possible, however, is to reach the other efficient network x (i.e. global 
free trade) because an agreement between the very small countries does not 
favour any country in terms of welfare gains. That is, there are no available 
beneficiaries to pay compensatory payments.  
 
Let us now consider the second path from the inefficient network m to global free 
trade. According to the information presented in Table 6.13, the same conclusions 
obtained for the first path applies in this case. That is, an inter-node payment paid 
by country i to compensate the welfare loss in country k can be used to break the 
inefficient network m. This, once network o is reached from network m, there are 
always a pair of countries willing to sign an agreement until global free trade is 
reached. The only difference with respect to the previous case is that the efficient 
network that is reached is global free trade. The reason is because the very small 
countries j and l have already an agreement with each other implying that the lack 
of gainers to promote this agreement is not an issue in this case. 
 
On the other hand, it was found in Section 5.4.3.2 that the global treaty stable 
networks in this case are networks c, e, i, j, n, q, s, t, u, x, and c’. The following 
table shows whether inter-node transfers can be used to break the inefficient global 
treaty stable networks c, e, i, j, n, q, s, u, and c’.   
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Table 6.14. Inter-node transfer to break inefficient networks under unbiased 
governments 
  
Country 
Difference of welfare between 
the efficient network (t or x) and 
the inefficient stable network 
 
i 
 
j 
 
k 
 
l 
Net global 
welfare gain 
Efficient network  c 
Efficient network  e 
Efficient network  i 
Efficient network  j 
Efficient network  n 
Efficient network  q 
Efficient network  s 
Efficient network  u 
Efficient network  c’ 
-0.0231 
-0.0379 
-0.0379 
0.0002 
-0.0201 
0.0002 
-0.0201 
-0.0236 
-0.0231 
0.0907 
0.0100 
0.0100 
-0.0423 
0.0350 
-0.0423 
0.0350 
-0.0183 
0.0907 
-0.0231 
0.0170 
0.0170 
0.0002 
0.0195 
0.0002 
0.0195 
0.0175 
-0.0231 
0.0907 
0.0907 
0.0907 
0.0907 
-0.0182 
0.0907 
-0.0182 
0.0350 
0.0907 
0.1352 
0.0798 
0.0798 
0.0488 
0.0162 
0.0488 
0.0162 
0.0106 
0.1352 
 
According to this table, the gainers when passing from any inefficient network to an 
efficient one have enough resources to compensate the losers as can be inferred 
from the last column of this table. As a result, inter-node transfers can be used to 
facilitate the signature of a global agreement.   
 
The case of politically biased governments 
 
According to the results obtained in Sections 4.4.1.2 and 5.3, the pairwise and 
strongly pairwise stable networks when governments are biased in favour of 
consumers are networks t and x. Since these networks are efficient in the current 
simulation, compensatory transfers are not needed in this case.  
 
On the other hand, the results obtained in Section 5.4.3.2 revealed that all the 
networks are global treaty stable when governments are biased in favour of 
consumers. As explained in that section, one of the reasons is because the very 
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small countries are indifferent about signing a global agreement because this does 
not significantly affect the level of consumer surplus as a consequence of having 
very small domestic markets. The other reason is because large countries obtain 
high levels of consumer surplus in some inefficient networks when they occupy a 
privileged position in the network.  
 
A possible strategy to break inefficient global treaty stable networks in this case is 
the adoption of inter-node transfers by gainer countries in order to either 
compensate loser countries from free trade or motivate very small countries to sign 
a global agreement. It is inferred from the information presented in Table E.29 in 
Appendix E that this strategy would work for all the inefficient networks. For 
example, consider network j. Passing from this network to global free trade 
increases consumer surplus in the large countries i and k by 0.0425. However, 
consumer surplus in the very small countries j and l remains the same. This 
suggests therefore that the larger countries can pay a transfer to the very small 
countries to motivate them to sign a global agreement.  
 
The other possibility is to use intra-node payments. However this alternative can 
work in some networks only. For example, consider network p. This network is 
global treaty stable because the very small countries j and l are indifferent about 
signing a global agreement as the agreement would not increase the level of 
consumer surplus in these countries. However, the intermediaries and the farming 
sector would be better off as can be inferred from Tables E.29 and E.32. By 
subtracting consumer surplus from welfare, it is inferred that these sectors would 
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increase their available resources by 0.0133 if a global agreement is signed. This 
suggests therefore that a joint intra-node transfer paid by the intermediary and the 
farming sector to consumers can be used to break the inefficient network p in 
favour of a global agreement. Now, consider network j. This network is also global 
treaty stable because the very small countries are indifferent about signing a global 
agreement. However in this case an intra-node transfer cannot be used to break 
this network. To see why, note from the information presented in Tables E.29 and 
E.32 that a global agreement would increase the resources of the intermediary and 
the farming sector in country l by 0.0907. However, it would decrease the 
resources of the intermediary and the farming sector in country j by 0.0423. This 
implies that these sectors would not be willing to pay a transfer to consumers and, 
as a consequence, the global agreement would not be signed.  
 
In relation to the case of governments biased in favour of intermediaries, on the 
other hand, it was found in Sections 4.4.1.2 and 5.3 that the pairwise and strongly 
pairwise stable networks are a and d. Unfortunately inter-node transfers cannot 
always be used to break these networks and lead to the efficient network. The 
reason is because in many paths there are only loser countries or indifferent 
countries implying that there are not available gainers to compensate losers. For 
example, according to Table E.30 in Appendix E, passing from network a to c does 
not create profit gainers. Intra-node transfers have the ability to break the inefficient 
networks a and d and to lead the world towards the efficient network. As in the 
case of governments biased in favour of consumers, two different paths are 
needed for these inefficient networks and each of these paths can only lead to one 
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of the efficient networks (i.e. network t or x). The following paths are proposed for 
these networks corresponds to: a  c  e  h  n  t; and d  c  i  p  s 
 x. The following Tables shows how intra-node payments used in the first path 
can be used to reach the efficient network t (the information in these tables was 
obtained from Tables E.30 and E.32). 
 
Table 6.15. Welfare minus profits made by the intermediary with intra-node 
transfers 
 Countries 
Networks i j k l 
a 
c 
e 
h 
n 
t 
0.1000 
0.1779 - 0.0223 = 0.1556 
0.2298 - 0.0595 = 0.1703 
0.2281 
0.2617 - 0.0125 = 0.2492 
0.2570 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0073 
0.0070 
0.0051 
0.0151 
0.1000 
0.1779 - 0.0223 = 0.1556 
0.1749 
0.2281 - 0.0374 = 0.1907 
0.2221 
0.2507 - 0.0155 = 0.2415 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0070 
0.0179 
0.0151 
 
Table 6.16. Profits made by the intermediary with intra-node transfers 
 Countries 
Networks i j k l 
a 
c 
e 
h 
n 
t 
0.2000 
0.1778 + 0.0223 = 0.2001 
0.1407 + 0.0595 = 0.2002 
0.1034 
0.091 + 0.0125 = 0.1035 
0.0756 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0734 
0.0704 
0.0506 
0.0756 
0.2000 
0.1778 + 0.0223 = 0.2001 
0.1407 
0.1034 + 0.0374 = 0.1408 
0.0910 
0.0756 + 0.0155 = 0.0911 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0704 
0.0910 
0.0756 
 
 
 
Table 6.15 shows the resources that belong to consumers and the farming sector 
(i.e. welfare minus profits) and the intra-node transfers paid to the intermediaries in 
the selected path of networks, and Table 6.16 shows the profit made by the 
intermediaries of countries i, j, k and l in these networks and the transfers that have 
been paid to them. To see how these transfer lead to the efficient network t, 
consider for example the pass from network a to network c which requires a 
bilateral agreement signed by countries i and k (see Figure 4.5).  According to 
Table E.30, these countries are unwilling to sign the agreement because it causes 
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a decrease in profits from 0.2000 to 0.1778. However, the joint resources of 
consumers and the farming sector (i.e. consumer surplus plus producer surplus) 
increases from 0.1000 to 0.1779 as can be inferred from Tables E.30 and E.32. 
This means that these sectors have an incentive to compensate the intermediaries 
of countries i and k if the agreement between these countries is signed. This is 
shown in Table 6.15: consumers and the farming sector pay an intra-node transfer 
of 0.0223 in network c. Table 6.16, on the other hand, shows the resulting payoff 
that farmers obtain when they are given the transfers. According to this table, the 
resulting payoff in countries i and k is 0.2001 which is larger than the profits in 
network a. This implies according to the link addition proof condition of the pairwise 
and strongly pairwise stability concepts with transfer that the agreement will be 
signed and, therefore, the stability of network a will be broken. Following the same 
line of reasoning, it can be seen in Tables 6.15 and 6.16 that intra-node transfers 
lead to the efficient network t.  
 
Now consider the other path for the inefficient network d. According to Tables 6.17 
and 6.18, the same figures as in the previous case were obtained from Tables E.30 
and E.32 implying that intra-nodes in this path can also break the inefficient 
network d and lead to global free trade. 
 
Table 6.17. Welfare minus profits made by the intermediary with intra-node 
transfers 
 Countries 
Networks i j k l 
d 
c’ 
i 
p 
s 
x 
0.1000 
0.1779 - 0.0223 = 0.1556 
0.2298 - 0.0595 = 0.1703 
0.2281 
0.2617 - 0.0125 = 0.2492 
0.2570 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0073 
0.0070 
0.0051 
0.0151 
0.1000 
0.1779 - 0.0223 = 0.1556 
0.1749 
0.2281 - 0.0374 = 0.1907 
0.2221 
0.257 - 0.0155 = 0.2415 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0070 
0.0179 
0.0151 
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Table 6.18. Profits made by the intermediary with intra-node transfers 
 Countries 
Networks i j k l 
d 
c’ 
i 
p 
s 
x 
0.2000 
0.1778 + 0.0223 = 0.2001 
0.1407 + 0.0595 = 0.2002 
0.1034 
0.091 + 0.0125 = 0.1035 
0.0756 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0734 
0.0704 
0.0506 
0.0756 
0.2000 
0.1778 + 0.0223 = 0.2001 
0.1407 
0.1034 + 0.0374 = 0.1408 
0.0910 
0.0756 + 0.0155 = 0.0911 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0704 
0.0910 
0.0756 
 
 
 
In considering this result, it is interesting to note that intra-node payments do not 
require very small countries to compensate large countries for trade losses. 
However, this can be required in some networks when using inter-node transfers. 
That is, while inter-node networks cannot lead to the efficient network as explained 
above, they can eventually break specific networks. For example, passing from 
network a to b is feasible with an inter-node transfer paid by the very small country 
j to the large country i. This is an ethical issue (e.g. it is difficult to support a 
compensatory transfer paid by a poor African country to the United States) that is 
beyond the scope of this dissertation. Nonetheless, the ability to break inefficient 
networks without requiring transfers across countries can be considered as an 
advantage of intra-node transfers within this context.    
 
Let us now analyse the case of global treaty stable networks when governments 
are biased in favour of intermediaries. According to Section 5.4.3.2, the global 
treaty stable networks in this case are networks a and d (see Figure 4.5) and they 
are stable because the large countries i and k are unwilling to sign a global 
agreement as this agreement decrease the profits made by the intermediaries of 
these countries (this is shown in Table E.30). According to the information 
presented in Tables E.30 and E.32, these networks cannot be broken in favour of a 
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global agreement. To see this, note that according to Table E.30, when passing 
from network a or d to network x (i.e. global free trade in Figure 4.5), profits in the 
large countries i and k decrease by 0.1244 and profits in the very small countries j 
and l increase by 0.0756. This means that gain in profit in the latter countries are 
not large enough to compensate the large countries.  
 
On the other hand, intra-node networks can broke these networks in favour of a 
global agreement. This can be inferred from the same tables. That is, consumer 
surplus plus producer surplus in the large countries i and k increase by 0.1570 
which is enough to compensate the decrease in profits of 0.1244 when passing 
from network a or d to global free trade. Again, this result reveals that intra-node 
transfers are more effective than inter-node transfers when governments are 
biased in favour of intermediaries.  
 
Finally, consider the case of governments biased in favour of the farming sector. 
According to the results obtained in Sections 4.4.1.2 and 5.3, the pairwise and 
strongly pairwise stable networks in this case are c and c’ (i.e. regionalism). In this 
case, an inter-node transfer cannot be used to break these networks. To see this, 
consider the inefficient network c. This network can be broken following two 
possible sub-paths (see Figure 4.5): c  c’; and c  e. According to Table E.31, 
there is no change in producer surplus in any country when passing from this 
network to network c’. This implies that this path does not generate gainers able to 
compensate losers. On the other hand, passing from network c to network e 
causes a loss in producer surplus in each large country by 0.0082 and a gain in 
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producer surplus in the very small country j by 0.0073. This implies that the farming 
sector in the very small country does not have enough resources to compensate 
the farming sectors in the large countries for trade losses. The same holds for the 
other inefficient network c’. In this case, the possible sub-path is from this network 
to network i. However the conclusion is obtained from the information presented in 
Table E.31: producer surplus in the very small country is not large enough to 
compensate the farming sectors in the large countries. 
 
The alternative intra-node transfers tool, however, can assist in this case. As 
before, two different alternative paths are needed for each inefficient stable 
network to reach any of the efficient networks. That is, because the very small 
countries j and l are not linked (see Figure 4.5) in network c, any suitable path can 
only lead to the efficient network t as forming a link between these countries does 
not affect the level of producer surplus as a consequence of the very small 
domestic markets in these countries. Likewise, because these countries have 
already an agreement with each other in network c’, any suitable path from this 
network can only lead to network x (i.e. global free trade). The following path are 
proposed to show that intra-node transfers can break inefficient networks and lead 
to an efficient one: c  e  h  n  t; and c’  i  p  s  x. 
 
In relation to the first path, consider the information presented in Tables 6.19 and 
6.20. 
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Table 6.19. Welfare minus producer surplus with intra-node transfers 
 Countries 
Networks i j k l 
c 
e 
h 
n 
t 
0.3201 
0.3431 - 0.0083 = 0.3348 
0.3108 
0.3348 - 0.0029 = 0.3319 
0.3175 
0.0000 
0.0734 
0.0703 
0.0506 
0.0756 
0.3201 
0.2882 
0.3108 - 0.0068 = 0.3040 
0.2952 
0.3175 - 0.0029 = 0.3146 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0703 
0.0910 
0.0756 
 
Table 6.20. Producer surplus with intra-node transfers 
 Countries 
Networks i j k l 
c 
e 
h 
n 
t 
0.0356 
0.0274 + 0.0083 = 0.0357 
0.0207 
0.0179 + 0.0029 = 0.0208 
0.0151 
0.0000 
0.0073 
0.0071 
0.0051 
0.0151 
0.0356 
0.0274 
0.0207 + 0.0068 = 0.0275 
0.0179 
0.0151 + 0.0029 = 0.0180 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0071 
0.0179 
0.0151 
 
 
Table 6.19 shows the resources of consumers and the intermediaries and the intra-
node payments given to the farming sector. Table 6.20, on the other hand, shows 
producer surplus and the transfers received from consumers and the 
intermediaries. By analysing this table, it is concluded that in all these networks 
there are at least two countries willing to sign an agreement implying that the 
efficient network t can be reached from the inefficient network c by means of intra-
node payments. The same conclusion is obtained for the second proposed path. 
That is, global free trade can be reached from network c’ by means of these 
payments as inferred from Tables 6.21 and 6.22. 
 
Table 6.21. Welfare minus producer surplus with intra-node transfers 
 Countries 
Networks i j k l 
c’ 
i 
p 
s 
x 
0.3201 
0.3431 - 0.0083 = 0.3348 
0.3108 
0.3348 - 0.0029 = 0.3319 
0.3175 
0.0000 
0.0734 
0.0704 
0.0506 
0.0756 
0.3201 
0.2882 
0.3108 - 0.0068 = 0.3040 
0.2952 
0.3175 - 0.0029 = 0.3146 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0704 
0.0910 
0.0756 
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Table 6.22. Producer surplus with intra-node transfers 
 Countries 
Networks i j k l 
c’ 
i 
p 
s 
x 
0.0356 
0.0274 + 0.0083 = 0.0357 
0.0207 
0.0179 + 0.0029 = 0.0208 
0.0151 
0.0000 
0.0073 
0.0070 
0.0051 
0.0151 
0.0356 
0.0274 
0.0207 + 0.0068 = 0.0725 
0.0179 
0.0151 + 0.0029 = 0.0180 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0070 
0.0179 
0.0151 
 
 
Regarding global treaty stability for the case of governments biased in favour of the 
farming sectors, it was found in Section 5.4.3.2 that the global treaty stable 
networks in this case are a, c, d, c’ (see Figure 4.5). In this case, inter-node 
transfers can only be used to break the inefficient networks a and d in favour of a 
global agreement. This is inferred from the information presented in Table 6.23. 
 
Table 6.23. Inter-node transfer to break inefficient networks for the case of biased 
governments in favour of the farming sector 
  
Country 
Difference of producer surplus 
between the efficient network (t 
or x) and the inefficient stable 
network 
 
i 
 
j 
 
k 
 
l 
Net global 
producer 
surplus gain 
Efficient network  a 
Efficient network  c 
Efficient network  d 
Efficient network  c’ 
-0.0049 
-0.0205 
-0.0049 
-0.0205 
0.0151 
0.0151 
0.0151 
0.0151 
-0.0049 
-0.0205 
-0.0049 
-0.0205 
0.0151 
0.0151 
0.0151 
0.0151 
0.0204 
-0.0108 
0.0204 
-0.0108 
 
As can be seen in this table, only in networks a and d it holds that a change from 
these networks to an efficient one generates a net positive gain in producer 
surplus. That is, only in these networks the very small countries j and l have 
sufficient resources in terms of producer surplus to compensate the farming 
sectors in the large countries. However, this does not hold in the other inefficient 
networks c and c’.  
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This finding has two main implications. Firstly, inter-node transfers cannot be used 
in all cases; and when it can be used, very small countries have to compensate 
large countries which is difficult to support.  
 
The same results hold for the alternative intra-node transfers. That is, this tool can 
only break the inefficient networks a and d. To see this, note that when passing 
from these networks to global free trade producer surplus decreases in the large 
countries by 0.0049. However, as it inferred from Tables E.31 and E.32, consumer 
surplus plus profits (i.e. welfare minus producer surplus) in each large country 
increase by 0.0375 which is large enough to compensate the loss of 0.0049 faced 
by the farming sector. In relation to the other inefficient networks c and c’, on the 
other hand, the loss in producer surplus in each large country is 0.0205. But in this 
case, the sum of consumer surplus and producer surplus also decreases by 
0.0026 implying that there are insufficient resources available in the large countries 
to compensate the farming sector suggesting that regionalism is difficult to break. 
In spite of this disappointing result, there is still a possibility. That is, consumer 
surplus plus profits in the very small countries increase by 0.0756 when passing 
from either network c or network c’ to global free trade. This suggests that if these 
sectors have enough resources to compensate the farming sectors in the very 
large countries in order to break regionalism. However, as explained above, it is 
difficult to support payments given by very small countries to large countries. 
Nonetheless, this possibility exists in theoretical terms.  
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6.4.3.2 Simulation 13:  = 1,  = 0 and  = 1.5 for all i  N.    
 
This simulation assumes the existence of large countries with very small countries 
with high level of monopsonistic power (i.e. ϕi = 1.5) and the efficient networks 
correspond to networks t and x (see Table 6.2).  
 
The results obtained in Sections 4.4.1.3, 5.3, and 5.4.3.3 revealed that the 
pairwise, strongly pairwise, and global treaty stable networks are the same as 
those identified in the previous simulation. The only exception is the case of 
unbiased governments. In the current simulation the pairwise and strongly pairwise 
stable networks when governments are unbiased are network t and x. Since these 
networks are efficient, no transfer is needed in this case. On the other hand, the 
global treaty stable networks in this case are networks c, e, g, i, j, n, o, q, s, t, u, x, 
c’. This set differs from the previous case in that networks g and o are also global 
treaty stable when monopsonistic power is high. Apart from these differences, all 
the results obtained in the previous simulation also holds in the current simulation. 
This suggests therefore that these results remain robust through different levels of 
monopsonistic power. 
 
6.4.3.3 Simulation 15:  = 1,  = 0.5 and  = 0.5 for all i  N.    
 
This simulation assumes a world composed of large and medium size countries 
with intermediaries that exercise moderate levels of monopsonistic power (i.e. i = 
0.5). In contrast to the two previous simulations, only network t is the efficient 
~
~
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network. In spite of this, this section explores how to reach this network and also 
global free trade by means of transfers as reaching the latter is one of the aims of 
the WTO and also because it is the second best network in terms of the level of 
global welfare that can be obtained in any network.  
 
The case of politically unbiased governments 
 
The results obtained in Sections 4.4.1.5 and 5.3 revealed that network x (i.e. global 
free trade) is the only pairwise and strongly pairwise stable network when 
governments are unbiased.  As explained above, this a desirable network and also 
the second best in terms of efficiency. However, the efficient network t can still be 
reached and stabilised from global free trade by paying the medium size countries j 
and l inter-node compensatory payments in order to break their existing network 
(i.e. passing from global free trade to network t requires these countries to break 
their agreement). This can be inferred from Table E.43 in Appendix E. That is, 
when passing from network x to t, welfare in each large country increases by 
0.0048 and welfare in the medium size countries decreases by 0.0033. This proves 
that a transfer can be used in this case to break the agreement. However, it is 
difficult to support this particular transfer because breaking agreements is against 
the spirit of the WTO. 
 
On the other hand, it was found in Section 5.4.3.5 that the global treaty stable 
networks when governments are unbiased are c, e, g, h, i, j, n, o, q, s, t, u, x and c’. 
While global free trade is a second best option in this simulation, it can be reached 
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by means of a global agreement with inter-node transfers. This is inferred from the 
following table.  
 
Table 6.24. Inter-node transfer to break inefficient networks under unbiased 
governments 
  
Country 
Difference of welfare between 
global free trade and the 
inefficient stable network 
 
i 
 
j 
 
k 
 
l 
Net global 
welfare gain 
X  c 
X  e  
X  g  
X  h  
X  i  
X  j  
X  n  
X  o  
X  q 
X  s 
X  u 
X  c’ 
-0.0187 
-0.0386 
-0.0644 
-0.0046 
-0.0327 
-0.0009 
-0.0258 
-0.0542 
0.0020 
-0.0190 
-0.0190 
-0.0187 
0.0791 
0.0207 
0.0419 
0.0213 
0.0068 
-0.0279 
0.0401 
0.0304 
-0.0395 
0.0323 
-0.0177 
0.0653 
-0.0187 
0.0174 
0.0348 
-0.0046 
0.0165 
-0.0009 
0.0173 
0.0337 
0.0020 
0.0194 
0.0194 
-0.0187 
0.0791 
0.0791 
0.0419 
0.0213 
0.0687 
0.0791 
-0.0093 
0.0304 
0.0715 
-0.0177 
0.0323 
0.0653 
0.1208 
0.0786 
0.0542 
0.0334 
0.0593 
0.0494 
0.0223 
0.0403 
0.0360 
0.0150 
0.0150 
0.0932 
 
The last column of this table shows that there are always enough resources when 
passing from an inefficient network to global free trade to compensate loser 
countries from a global agreement.  
 
The case of politically biased governments 
 
As shown in Sections 4.4.1.5 and 5.3, the pairwise and strongly pairwise stable 
networks when governments are biased in favour of consumers is global free 
trade. As explained above, this is a second best and desirable network. On the 
other hand, the global treaty stable networks in this case are g, n, o, q, r, s, t, u, v 
and x (see Section 5.4.3.5). They cannot in general be broken by intra-node 
transfers. For example, consider network g. This network is global treaty stable 
403 
 
because country i is unwilling to sign a global agreement. It is concluded from 
Tables E.40 and E.43 that passing from network g to network x decreases the level 
of profits plus producer surplus in this country by 0.571 implying that the 
intermediary and the farming sector do not have enough resources to compensate 
consumers when signing a global agreement. In contrast, inter-node payments are 
effective in this case. This is inferred from the fact that passing from an inefficient 
network to global free trade always generates a net gain in global welfare as 
shown in Table 6.25. 
 
Table 6.25. Inter-node transfer to break inefficient networks under biased 
governments in favour of consumers 
  
Country 
Difference of welfare between 
global free trade and the 
inefficient stable network 
 
i 
 
j 
 
k 
 
l 
Net global 
welfare gain 
X  g 
X  n  
X  o  
X  q  
X  r  
X  s  
X  u  
X  v 
-0.0073 
-0.0037 
-0.0049 
0.0344 
0.0290 
-0.0021 
-0.0021 
0.0316 
0.0137 
0.0128 
0.0040 
-0.0020 
0.0047 
0.0053 
-0.0008 
-0.0013 
0.0809 
0.0330 
0.0795 
0.0344 
0.0771 
0.0330 
0.0330 
0.0316 
0.0137 
0.0064 
0.0040 
0.0117 
-0.0025 
-0.0008 
0.0053 
-0.0013 
0.1010 
0.0485 
0.0826 
0.0785 
0.1083 
0.0354 
0.0354 
0.0606 
 
Let us now consider the case of governments biased in favour of intermediaries. 
According to Sections 4.4.1.5 and 5.3, network a (see Figure 4.5) is the only 
pairwise and strongly pairwise in this case. According to the information presented 
in Table E.41, this network cannot be broken with an inter-node transfer financed 
by gainer intermediaries. For example, profits in country j increases by 0.0647 
when passing from network a to network b. But this gain in profits is not large 
enough to compensate the loss in profits of 0.0853 faced by the intermediary of 
country i. Likewise, passing from network a to either network c or d only generates 
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losers in terms of profits. In contrast, a suitable alternative to break network a in 
favour of either the efficient network t or global free trade is the adoption of intra-
node transfers. To illustrate that this is possible, the following paths are proposed, 
one to reach the efficient network t and the other to reach global free trade: a  c 
 e  h  n  t; and a  c  e  h  p  s  x. The following tables were 
developed with the information presented in Tables E.41 and E.43 and show how 
these paths can be led by intra-node transfers. 
 
Table 6.26. Welfare minus profits with intra-node transfers 
 Countries 
Networks i j k l 
a 
c 
e 
h 
n 
t 
0.1000 
0.1778 - 0.0223 = 0.1555 
0.2324 - 0.0571 = 0.1753 
0.2274 
0.2638 - 0.0153 = 0.2485 
0.2567 
0.0250 
0.0250 
0.0449 
0.0455 
0.0430 
0.0629 
0.1000 
0.1778 - 0.0223 = 0.1555 
0.1724 
0.2274 - 0.0331 = 0.1943 
0.2192 
0.2567 - 0.0155 = 0.2412 
0.0250 
0.0250 
0.0250 
0.0455 
0.0630 
0.0629 
 
Table 6.27. Profits with intra-node transfers 
 Countries 
Networks i j k l 
a 
c 
e 
h 
n 
t 
0.2000 
0.1778 + 0.0223 = 0.2001 
0.1431 + 0.0571 = 0.2002 
0.1141 
0.0989 + 0.0153 = 0.1142 
0.0850 
0.0500 
0.0500 
0.0885 
0.0873 
0.0710 
0.0879 
0.2000 
0.1778 + 0.0223 =0.2001 
0.1471 
0.1141 + 0.0331 = 0.1472 
0.1004 
0.085 + 0.0155 = 0.1005 
0.0500 
0.0500 
0.0500 
0.0873 
0.1004 
0.0879 
 
Table 6.28. Welfare minus profits with intra-node transfers 
 Countries 
Networks i j k l 
a 
c 
e 
h 
p 
s 
x 
0.1000 
0.1778 - 0.0223 = 0.1555 
0.2324 - 0.0571 = 0.1753 
0.2274 
0.2245 
0.2591 - 0.0147 = 0.2444 
0.2535 
0.0250 
0.0250 
0.0449 
0.0455 
0.0592 - 0.0043 = 0.0549 
0.0548 
0.0707 
0.1000 
0.1778 - 0.0223 = 0.1555 
0.1724 
0.2274 - 0.0331 = 0.1943 
0.2245 
0.2178 
0.2535 - 0.0164 = 0.2371 
0.0250 
0.0250 
0.0250 
0.0455 
0.0592 - 0.0043 = 0.0549 
0.0750 
0.0707 
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Table 6.29. Profits with intra-node transfers 
 Countries 
Networks i j k l 
a 
c 
e 
h 
p 
s 
x 
0.2000 
0.1778 + 0.0223 = 0.2001 
0.1431 + 0.0571 = 0.2002 
0.1141 
0.1114 
0.0968 + 0.0147 = 0.1115 
0.0834 
0.0500 
0.0500 
0.0885 
0.0873 
0.0831 + 0.0043 = 0.0874 
0.0670 
0.0834 
0.2000 
0.1778 + 0.0223 = 0.2001 
0.1471 
0.1141 + 0.0331 = 0.1472 
0.1114 
0.0997 
0.0834 + 0.0164 = 0.0998 
0.0500 
0.0500 
0.0500 
0.0873 
0.0831 + 0.0043 = 0.0874 
0.0968 
0.0834 
 
 
Tables 6.26 and 6.27 show that in any sub-path of the path that lead to the efficient 
network there are available resources in the loser country from consumers and the 
farming sector to compensate the intermediaries. Likewise, Tables 6.28 and 6.29 
shows the same but for the path that leads to global free trade. 
 
In relation to global treaty stability for the case of biased governments in favour of 
intermediaries, it was found in Section 5.4.3.5 that the global treaty stable network 
is network a (see Figure 4.5). In this case, inter-node transfers financed by gainer 
intermediaries cannot be used to break network a in favour of a global agreement. 
This can be inferred from the information presented in Table E.41. That is, profits in 
each of the large countries i and k decreases by 0.1166, and profits in each 
medium size county increase by 0.0334. This means that the intermediaries of the 
latter have not enough resources to compensate the intermediaries of the latter if a 
global agreement is signed. Nonetheless, intra-node transfers can be used for this 
purpose. This is inferred from the information presented in Tables E.31 and E.33. 
According to this information, consumer surplus plus producer surplus in each 
large countries i and k increase by 0.1535 which is large enough to compensate 
the loss in profits of 0.1166 faced by the intermediaries of these countries. 
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Finally, consider the case of governments biased in favour of the farming sector. 
According to the results obtained in Sections 4.4.1.5 and 5.3, the pairwise and 
strongly pairwise stable networks in this case are networks c’ and x. Because the 
latter is global free trade and is the second best in this simulation in terms of 
efficiency, the focus is placed on how to break network c’. This network is a form of 
regionalism of the south-north type (see Figure 4.5) and can be broken towards 
global free trade by means of inter-node transfers. To see this, consider the 
following path of networks: c’  i  p  s  x. In considering the information 
presented in Table E.42, the following results concerning this path was obtained. 
 
Table 6.30. Producer surplus with inter-node transfers 
 Countries 
Networks i j k l 
c’ 
i 
p 
s 
x 
0.0356 
0.0350 + 0.0007 = 0.0357 
0.0297 
0.0323 
0.0288 
0.0089 
0.0221 - 0.0007 = 0.0214 
0.0212 
0.0182 
0.0288 
0.0356 
0.0288 
0.0297 
0.0261 
0.0288 
0.0089 
0.0088 
0.0212 
0.0323 
0.0288 
 
 
According to this table, an inter-node payment is only needed to break the stability 
of network c‟. That is, it is inferred from Figure 4.5 that passing from network c’ to 
network i requires an agreement between the large country i and the medium size 
country j. If this agreement is signed, producer surplus in the former country 
decreases from 0.0356 to 0.0350, and producer surplus in the latter increases from 
0.0089 to 0.0221. This means that the gain in producer surplus in the medium size 
country is large enough to compensate the large country by paying, for example, a 
transfer of 0.0007. Thus once network a is broken, there are always at least two 
countries willing to sign bilateral agreement in any network in the path. For 
example, passing from network p to network s requires an agreement between 
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countries i and l (see Figure 4.5). As shown in Table 6.30, these countries have an 
incentive to sign this agreement because producer surplus increases in both 
countries.  
 
Intra-node transfers can also be used to break network a and to lead to global free 
trade. To see this, consider the same path and the following results obtained from 
Tables E.42 and E.43 in Appendix E. 
 
Table 6.31. Welfare minus producer surplus with intra-node transfers 
 Countries 
Networks i j k l 
c’ 
i 
p 
s 
x 
0.3200 
0.3346 - 0.0007 = 0.3339 
0.3062 
0.3236 
0.3081 
0.0799 
0.1252 
0.1211 
0.1036 
0.1253 
0.3200 
0.2916 
0.3062 
0.2914 
0.3081 
0.0799 
0.0766 
0.1211 
0.1395 
0.1253 
 
Table 6.32. Producer surplus with intra-node transfers 
 Countries 
Networks i j k l 
c’ 
i 
p 
s 
x 
0.0356 
0.0350 + 0.0007 = 0.0357 
0.0297 
0.0323 
0.0288 
0.0089 
0.0221 
0.0212 
0.0182 
0.0288 
0.0356 
0.0288 
0.0297 
0.0261 
0.0288 
0.0089 
0.0088 
0.0212 
0.0323 
0.0288 
 
 
According to Tables 6.31 to 6.32, a joint intra-node transfer of 0.0007 paid by 
consumers and the intermediary of the large country i to the farming sector in this 
country can break network a. The same as in the case of the inter-node transfer 
discussed in Table 6.30, once network a is broken, there are always at least two 
countries willing to sign an agreement in any network in the path.  
 
In relation to the results obtained for the case of governments biased in favour of 
the farming sector, there are two aspects that are interesting to discuss. Firstly, 
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while both types of transfers can lead to global free trade, intra-node transfers may 
be preferred form an ethical point of view. The reason is because it is difficult to 
support the use of payments given by medium size countries to compensate large 
countries. This ethical issue is beyond the scope of this dissertation. Nonetheless, 
this argument may be used in future normative research to support the use of intra-
node transfers in this case.  
 
Secondly, reaching the efficient network t in this simulation requires the medium 
size countries j and l to break their existing agreement in any feasible path. This is 
against the aim of the WTO and as such, this corresponds to an ethical issue that 
is beyond the scope of this dissertation. However, the possibility to lead to this 
network exists in theory. For example, breaking this agreement in global free trade 
(i.e. passing from network x to network t) decreases producer surplus in each 
medium size country by 0.0036, but increases total welfare in each large country 
by 0.0048. This implies that a joint inter-node transfer paid by consumers, the 
intermediary and the farming sector of the large country has the potential to lead to 
the efficient network. 
 
On the other hand, it was found in Section 5.4.3.5 that the global treaty stable 
networks when governments are biased in favour of the farming sector are c, e, g, 
h, j, n, o, p, q, s, t, u, w, x and c’. In this case, inter-node transfers can be used to 
break inefficient global treaty networks in order to sign a global agreement. This is 
inferred from the following table (the information presented in this table was 
obtained from Table E.42).  
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Table 6.33. Inter-node transfer to break inefficient in favour of a global agreement 
  
Country 
Difference of producer surplus 
between global free trade and 
the inefficient stable network 
 
i 
 
j 
 
k 
 
l 
Net producer 
surplus gain 
X  c 
X  e  
X  g  
X  h  
X  j  
X  n  
X  o  
X  p 
X  q 
X  s 
X  u 
X  w 
X  c’ 
-0.0068 
-0.0092 
-0.0134 
-0.0030 
-0.0025 
-0.0066 
-0.0087 
-0.0009 
-0.0006 
-0.0035 
-0.0035 
0.0076 
-0.0068 
0.0238 
0.0121 
0.0150 
0.0124 
-0.0025 
0.0149 
0.0102 
0.0076 
-0.0082 
0.0106 
-0.0035 
-0.0009 
0.0199 
-0.0068 
0.0000 
0.0038 
-0.0030 
-0.0025 
0.0013 
0.0038 
-0.0009 
-0.0006 
0.0027 
0.0027 
0.0076 
-0.0068 
0.0238 
0.0238 
0.0150 
0.0124 
0.0238 
0.0013 
0.0102 
0.0076 
0.0202 
-0.0035 
0.0106 
-0.0009 
0.0199 
0.0340 
0.0267 
0.0204 
0.0188 
0.0163 
0.0109 
0.0155 
0.0134 
0.0108 
0.0063 
0.0063 
0.0134 
0.0262 
 
The last column in this table shows that passing from an inefficient global treaty 
stable network to global free trade generates a net world gain in producer surplus 
implying that there are enough resources from the farming sector in the gainer 
countries to compensate the loser countries.   
 
6.4.3.4 Simulation 16:  = 1,  = 0.5 and  = 1.5 for all i  N.    
 
This is the last simulation that considers asymmetry in market size and assumes a 
world composed of large and medium size countries with high levels of 
monoponistic power. 
 
The results obtained in Sections 4.4.1.6, 5.3 and 5.4.3.6 are in general the same 
as the ones obtained in the previous simulation. As a consequence, the same 
general conclusions for the use of compensatory payments hold in the current 
~
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simulation as can be inferred from Tables E.44, E.45, E.46 and E.47 (See 
Appendix E). However there are some differences that are explored as follows.  
 
Firstly, the pairwise and strongly pairwise stable networks when governments are 
politically unbiased are networks t and x (see Figure 4.5). In contrast, in the 
previous simulation only the latter is stable. This suggests that the efficient network 
t and the second best network x (i.e. global free trade) are both possible outcomes 
when governments are unbiased. As a result, no compensatory payments are 
needed in this case.  
 
Secondly, the pairwise and strongly pairwise stable networks when governments 
are biased in favour of consumers is network x and network c’. The latter is only 
presented in this simulation under this bias suggesting that regionalism is a 
possible outcome when governments are biased in favour of consumers. 
According to the information presented in Table E.44, this network can be broken 
and lead to either global free trade or the efficient network t by either inter-node or 
intra-node transfers. To see this, consider the following path that lead to global free 
trade: c’  i  p  s  x. The ability of inter-node and intra-node transfers to 
facilitate this path is inferred from the following tables.  
 
Table 6.34. Consumer surplus with inter-node transfers 
 Countries 
Networks i j k l 
c’ 
i 
p 
s 
x 
0.0726 
0.1114 - 0.0020 = 0.1094 
0.1131 
0.1367 
0.1335 
0.0181 
0.0162 + 0.0020 = 0.0182 
0.014 
0.0127 
0.0143 
0.0726 
0.0762 
0.1131 - 0.0001 = 0.1130 
0.1092 
0.1335 
0.0181 
0.014 
0.0140 + 0.0001 = 0.0141 
0.0153 
0.0143 
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Table 6.35. Welfare minus consumer surplus with intra-node transfers 
 Countries 
Networks i j k l 
c’ 
i 
p 
s 
x 
0.1814 
0.1526 
0.1285 
0.1188 
0.1088 
0.0454 
0.0991 - 0.0020 = 0.0971 
0.0989 
0.0862 
0.1088 
0.1814 
0.1549 
0.1285 
0.1198 
0.1088 
0.0454 
0.0504 
0.0989 - 0.0001 = 0.0988 
0.1188 
0.1088 
 
Table 6.36. Consumer surplus with intra-node transfers 
 Countries 
Networks i j k l 
c’ 
i 
p 
s 
x 
0.0726 
0.1114 
0.1131 
0.1367 
0.1335 
0.0181 
0.0162 + 0.0020 = 0.0181 
0.014 
0.0127 
0.0143 
0.0726 
0.0762 
0.1131 
0.1092 
0.1335 
0.0181 
0.0140 
0.0140 + 0.0001 = 0.0141 
0.0153 
0.0143 
 
 
According to Figure 4.5, breaking network c’ requires an agreement between the 
large country i and the medium size country j (i.e. passing from network c’ to 
network i). According to Table 6.34, this agreement decreases consumer surplus in 
country j from 0.0181 to 0.0162 and increases consumer surplus in country i from 
0.0726 to 0.1114. Thus, an inter-node transfer of 0.0020 by the latter to the former 
can break this network. Following this reasoning, it can be inferred from this table 
that this path is feasible with this type of transfers. 
 
Tables 6.35 and 6.36, on the other hand, show a similar result when using a join 
intra-node transfer paid to consumers by the intermediary and the farming sector. 
For example, a transfer of 0.0020 paid to consumers is large enough to break 
network c’. 
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6.4.4 Simulations under the assumptions of exogenous tariffs and 
asymmetry in farmers’ productivity 
 
This section considers the simulation that was developed to identify possible 
international trade structures when countries are asymmetric in terms of farmers‟ 
productivity. In this case it is assumed that countries i and k have a less productive 
farming sector, and countries j and l have more efficient farming sectors.  
 
According to Table 6.2, network o in Figure 4.5 is the efficient network and network 
x (i.e. global free trade) is a second best network in terms of efficiency. The 
efficiency of network o is explained by the fact that the high cost faced by the 
intermediary in a less productive country is reduced when this country occupies a 
central position in the network because this increases the level of competition in 
the market. This lower cost has positive effects on global welfare. The problem is 
that network o has a relatively low degree of integration implying that reaching this 
network is not in the spirit of the WTO. In spite of this problem, this section 
explores how to reach the efficient as well as global free trade. The use of 
compensatory payments to reach these networks is explained as follows. 
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6.4.4.1 Simulation 17:  = 3 for  = {i, k};  = 1 for  = {j, l};  = 0.5; and  = 1.   
 
The case of politically unbiased governments 
 
The results obtained in Sections 4.4.2.1 and 5.3 revealed that the pairwise and 
strongly pairwise stable networks in this simulation are networks m and x. Because 
network x is the desirable network and second best in terms of efficiency, the focus 
is placed on how to break network m.  
 
As explained in Corollary 6.2 and proposition 6.3, only inter-node transfers can be 
used when governments are unbiased. This tool in the current simulation has the 
potential to break network m and lead the world to both network o and global free 
trade. To see this, consider the following proposed path: m  o  s  x. The way 
by which this path is facilitated by an inter-node transfer is inferred from the 
following table.  
 
Table 6.37. Welfare with inter-node transfers 
 Countries 
Networks i j k l 
m 
o 
s 
x 
0.2793 
0.3927 - 0.0149 = 0.3778 
0.3030 
0.2854 
0.3951 
0.4124 
0.3810 
0.4199 
0.2551 
0.2403 + 0.0149 = 0.2552 
0.2569 
0.2854 
0.3951 
0.4124 
0.4510 
0.4199 
 
According to Figure 4.5, passing from network m to network o requires the 
inefficient countries i and k to sign a bilateral agreement. As shown in Table 6.37, 
this can be achieved by means of a transfer of 0.0149 paid by the gainer country i 
to the loser country k. This allows the world to reach the efficient network o. From 
this network, there are always at least two countries willing to sign an agreement in 
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the path until global free trade is reached. This means that the transfer can assist 
the world to reach the first and second best networks in this simulation. Note, 
however, that to remain in the efficient network o would require an additional 
transfer to prevent countries k and l to form an agreement (see Figure 4.5). This is 
against of the spirit of the WTO. However, this possibility exists in theoretical 
terms. To see this, note from Table 6.37 that passing from network o to network s 
increase welfare in countries k and l by 0.017 and 0.0386, respectively. In contrast, 
welfare in countries i and j decreases by 0.0748 and 0.0314, respectively. This 
means that the latter countries have enough resources to prevent the agreement 
by paying a joint inter-node payment of at least 0.0403. On the other hand, 
countries j and k have an incentive to sign an agreement with each other in 
network o (i.e. passing from network o to network u in Figure 4.5). This agreement 
also has to be prevented in order to stabilise the efficient network o. Using a similar 
approach, it is inferred from Table E.51 that this agreement can indeed be 
prevented.  
 
On the other hand, it was found in Section 5.4.4.1 that the global treaty stable 
networks when governments are unbiased in the current simulation are c, h, i, j, n, 
q, s, t, u, v, w, x, y, z, a’, and c’. The following table shows that inter-node transfers 
can be used to break these networks in favour of global free trade. 
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Table 6.38. Inter-node transfer to break inefficient in favour of a global agreement 
  
Country 
Difference of welfare between 
global free trade and the 
inefficient stable network 
 
i 
 
j 
 
k 
 
l 
Net global 
welfare gain 
X  c 
X  h  
X  i  
X  j  
X  n  
X  q 
X  s 
X  t 
X  u 
X  v 
X  w  
X  y  
X  z  
X  a’ 
X  c’ 
-0.0048 
-0.0083 
-0.0325 
0.0022 
-0.0493 
0.0153 
-0.0176 
-0.0246 
-0.0176 
0.0175 
-0.0105 
0.0282 
-0.0387 
0.0298 
-0.0048 
0.1199 
0.0530 
-0.0075 
-0.0098 
0.0725 
-0.0675 
0.0389 
0.0422 
-0.0311 
-0.0164 
0.0262 
-0.0097 
0.0766 
-0.0509 
0.0643 
-0.0048 
-0.0083 
0.0210 
0.0022 
0.0151 
0.0153 
0.0285 
-0.0246 
0.0285 
0.0175 
-0.0105 
-0.0228 
0.0303 
0.0298 
-0.0048 
0.1199 
0.0530 
0.0742 
0.1199 
0.0227 
0.0843 
-0.0311 
0.0422 
0.0389 
-0.0164 
0.0262 
0.0724 
0.0766 
0.1199 
0.0643 
0.2302 
0.0894 
0.0552 
0.1145 
0.0610 
0.0474 
0.0187 
0.0352 
0.0187 
0.0022 
0.0314 
0.0681 
0.1448 
0.1286 
0.1190 
 
The last column of this table shows that there is always a global gain in welfare 
when passing from an inefficient global treaty stable network to global free trade. 
This means that there are always enough resources in the world to compensate 
loser countries when signing a global agreement from any inefficient global treaty 
stable network. 
 
The case of politically biased governments 
 
When governments are biased in favour of consumers, only global free trade is 
pairwise and strongly pairwise stable (see Sections 4.4.2.1 and 5.3). Because this 
is a desirable and second best network, the use of transfers is not considered in 
this case. On the other hand, the global treaty stable networks under this political 
bias correspond to g, l, n, o, q, r, s, t, u, v and x (see Section 5.4.4.1). In this case, 
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intra-node transfers cannot be used to break these networks in favour of a global 
agreement. This is inferred from the information presented in Table E.48. For 
example, this agreement decreases consumer surplus in country i when passing 
from network g to global free trade by 0.0110. This cannot be compensated by a 
joint transfer paid by the intermediary and the farming sector of this country 
because the agreement also decreases their joint resources by 0.0685. In contrast, 
inter-node transfers are effective in this case as can be seen in the following table.  
 
Table 6.39. Inter-node transfer to break inefficient in favour of a global agreement 
  
Country 
Difference of consumer surplus 
between global free trade and 
the inefficient stable network 
 
i 
 
j 
 
k 
 
l 
Net global 
consumer 
surplus gain 
X  g 
X  l  
X  n  
X  o  
X  q  
X  r  
X s  
X  t 
X  u 
X  v 
-0.0110 
0.0596 
-0.0077 
-0.0577 
0.0365 
0.0111 
-0.0028 
-0.0020 
-0.0028 
0.0144 
0.0592 
-0.0133 
0.0569 
0.0146 
-0.0062 
0.0111 
0.0146 
0.0358 
-0.0028 
-0.0037 
0.0886 
0.0596 
0.0356 
0.0857 
0.0365 
0.0713 
0.0356 
-0.0020 
0.0356 
0.0144 
0.0592 
0.0322 
0.0356 
0.0146 
0.0308 
-0.0087 
-0.0028 
0.0358 
0.0146 
-0.0037 
0.1960 
0.1381 
0.1204 
0.0572 
0.0976 
0.0848 
0.0446 
0.0676 
0.0446 
0.0214 
 
This table shows in the last column that the gain in global consumer surplus is 
large enough to compensate loser countries from a global agreement. 
 
Let us now consider the case of governments biased in favour of the 
intermediaries. In this case, only network a is both pairwise and strongly pairwise 
stable (see Sections 4.4.2.1 and 5.3). In this case inter-node transfers paid by 
gainer intermediaries cannot be used to break this network. For example, it is 
inferred from Table E.49 that passing from this network to network b decreases the 
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profit made by the intermediary of country i by 0.0630 and increases the profit 
made by the intermediary of country j by 0.0312. This gain is not large enough to 
compensate the intermediary of the former country. From the same table, it is 
inferred that passing from network a to either network c or network d does not 
generate gainers in terms of profits implying that there are no intermediaries willing 
to pay compensatory inter-node transfers. In contrast, intra-node transfers have the 
potential to break this network and to lead the world to either the efficient network o 
or global free trade. To see this, consider the following proposed path: a  c  e 
 g  o  s  x. The following tables show that this path can be facilitated by 
means of intra-node transfers. 
 
Table 6.40. Welfare minus profits with intra-node transfers 
 Countries 
Networks i j k l 
a 
c 
e 
g 
o 
s 
x 
0.0714 
0.1269 - 0.0205 = 0.1064 
0.1960 - 0.0497 = 0.1463 
0.2473 - 0.0542 = 0.1931 
0.2818 
0.2183 
0.2106 
0.1000 
0.1000 
0.1466 
0.1395 
0.2076 
0.2003 
0.2348 
0.0714 
0.1269 - 0.0205 = 0.1064 
0.0983 - 0.0710 = 0.0273 
0.1101 
0.1131 
0.1683 - 0.0387 = 0.1296 
0.2106 - 0.0526 = 0.1580 
0.1000 
0.1000 
0.1000 
0.1395 - 0.0035 = 0.1360 
0.2076 
0.2449 
0.2348 
 
Table 6.41. Profits with intra-node transfers 
 Countries 
Networks i j k l 
a 
c 
e 
g 
o 
s 
x 
0.1837 
0.1633 + 0.0205 = 0.1838 
0.1342 + 0.0497 = 0.1839 
0.1298 + 0.0542 = 0.1840 
0.1109 
0.0847 
0.0748 
0.2000 
0.2000 
0.2187 
0.1966 
0.2048 
0.1807 
0.1851 
0.1837 
0.1633+ 0.0205 = 0.1838 
0.1129 + 0.0710 = 0.1839 
0.1295 
0.1272 
0.0886 + 0.0387 = 0.1273 
0.0748 + 0.0526 = 0.1274 
0.2000 
0.2000 
0.2000 
0.1966 + 0.0035 = 0.2001 
0.2048 
0.2061 
0.1851 
 
 
Table 6.40 shows the networks where join transfers have to be paid by consumers 
and the farming sector, and Table 6.41 shows the networks where these payments 
are received by the intermediaries. The payoffs in the latter table show that in any 
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network in the path there are at least two countries willing to sign a bilateral 
agreement. For example, passing from network o to network s requires countries k 
and l to sign an agreement (see Figure 4.5). This is feasible because the payoffs 
with transfers increase in both countries when the agreement is signed. This table 
also shows that the efficient network o and global free trade can both be reached 
by adopting intra-node transfers. 
 
On the other hand, it was found in Section 5.4.4.1 that network a is also the only 
global treaty stable network when governments are biased in favour of the 
intermediaries. In this case, inter-node transfers cannot be used to facilitate a 
global agreement because passing from network a to global free trade decreases 
the profits made by the intermediaries of all countries in the network as is inferred 
from Table E.49. This means that all countries need to be compensated implying 
that there are not incentives to pay transfers across countries. In contrast, intra-
node transfers can assist the world to sign a global agreement. To see this, note 
that according to the information presented in Table E.49, the profits made by the 
intermediary of each inefficient country i and k decreases by 0.1089 when passing 
from network a to global free trade. In contrast, consumer surplus plus producer 
surplus increase by 0.1392. This implies that consumers and the farming sector in 
these countries have enough resources to compensate the intermediaries. The 
same holds for the efficient countries j and l (i.e. profits in these countries decrease 
by 0.0149 and consumer surplus plus producer surplus increase by 0.1348). This 
finding suggests therefore that a suitable tool to facilitate a global agreement when 
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governments are biased in favour of the intermediaries corresponds to intra-node 
transfers. 
 
Finally, let us consider the case of governments biased in favour of the farming 
sector. According to Sections 4.4.2.1 and 5.3, in this case only global free trade is 
both pairwise and strongly pairwise stable. Again, because this is a desirable 
network and is also the second best option in terms of efficiency, no transfer is 
needed to deal with the issue of pairwise and strongly pairwise stability. On the 
other hand, according to the results obtained in Section 5.4.4.1, the global treaty 
stable network when governments are biased in favour of the farming sector are c, 
e, g, h, i, j, l, n, o, q, r, s, t, u, v, x, y, z, a’ and c’. The use of Intra-node transfers is 
not the most suitable tool to break these networks in favour of a global agreement 
because they only work in some of them. For example, passing from network c to 
global free trade decreases producer surplus in countries i and k by 0.0046, but it 
increases profits plus consumer surplus by 0.0194 as can be inferred from tables 
E.50 and E.51 in Appendix E. This means that, in this particular case, consumers 
and the intermediaries have together enough resources to pay a transfer to the 
farming sector. Conversely, passing from network e to global free trade decreases 
producer surplus in country i by 0.0140 and consumer surplus plus profits by 
0.0176. This implies that in this case consumers and the intermediary in this 
country do not have enough resources to compensate the farming sector.  
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A suitable strategy that can effectively be used in this case corresponds to the 
adoption of inter-node transfers. This is inferred from the following table (this table 
was obtained from the information contained in Table E.50). 
 
Table 6.42. Inter-node transfer to break inefficient in favour of a global agreement 
  
Country 
Difference of producer surplus 
between global free trade and 
the inefficient stable network 
 
i 
 
j 
 
k 
 
l 
Net global 
producer 
surplus gain 
X  c 
X  e  
X  g  
X  h  
X  i  
X  j  
X l  
X  n 
X  o 
X  q 
X  r  
X  s 
 X  t  
X  u  
X  v  
X  y  
X  z  
X  a’ 
X  c’ 
-0.0046 
-0.0140 
-0.0258 
-0.0044 
-0.0069 
-0.0029 
0.0171 
-0.0145 
-0.0135 
0.0022 
0.0088 
-0.0049 
-0.0076 
-0.0049 
0.0095 
0.0120 
-0.0036 
0.0120 
-0.0046 
0.0540 
0.0305 
0.0361 
0.0306 
0.0110 
0.0037 
-0.0251 
0.0341 
0.0126 
-0.0166 
0.0193 
0.0199 
0.0163 
-0.0073 
-0.0034 
0.0057 
0.0353 
-0.0037 
0.0384 
-0.0046 
0.0125 
0.0118 
-0.0044 
0.0028 
-0.0029 
0.0171 
0.0024 
0.0119 
0.0022 
0.0168 
0.0067 
-0.0076 
0.0067 
0.0095 
-0.0010 
0.0192 
0.0120 
-0.0046 
0.0540 
0.0540 
0.0361 
0.0306 
0.0390 
0.0540 
0.0407 
0.0123 
0.0126 
0.0400 
-0.0081 
-0.0073 
0.0163 
0.0199 
-0.0034 
0.0346 
0.0353 
0.0540 
0.0384 
0.0988 
0.0830 
0.0582 
0.0524 
0.0459 
0.0519 
0.0498 
0.0343 
0.0236 
0.0278 
0.0368 
0.0144 
0.0174 
0.0144 
0.0122 
0.0513 
0.0862 
0.0743 
0.0676 
 
 
This table shows that there is always a gain in global producer surplus when 
passing from an inefficient network to global free trade (see the last column in this 
table). This confirms the claim that inter-node transfers can assists the world to 
reach a global agreement in a world composed of asymmetric countries in terms of 
farmers‟ productivity and when governments are biased in favour of the farming 
sector.  
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6.5 Summary and conclusions 
 
It was found in the previous chapters that different networks can be either pairwise, 
strongly pairwise or global treaty stable depending on the existence of 
asymmetries across countries and governments‟ policy biases. This chapter 
extends the analysis with the purpose of exploring how to break inefficient stable 
networks and to reach efficient ones by means of compensatory payments that are 
given by gainers from free trade to losers.  
 
The chapter starts defining the concept of efficiency as those networks that offer 
the highest possible global welfare among all possible international trade 
configurations. It also explains the fact that, in many cases, efficient networks are 
not stable and this is one of the arguments that have been used to propose the use 
of compensatory side-payments to stabilize these networks.   
 
In the current investigation, global free trade is the efficient network in all the 
simulations that assume symmetrical countries. However, when asymmetry is 
introduced into the model, other networks becomes efficient. In particular, two 
networks become efficient when the world is composed of large and very small 
countries: global free trade; and a network in which all countries have an 
agreement with each other except the very small countries. The latter network is 
efficient because an agreement between the very small countries does not 
significantly affect global welfare as a consequence of the very small domestic 
markets in these countries. When the world is composed of large and medium size 
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countries, only the network in which all countries have an agreement with each 
other except the medium size countries is efficient. The reason is because when 
these countries sign the agreement (i.e. global free trade), the increase in the 
output that is exported to each other significantly increases the price paid to the 
farming sector in these countries. In order to offsets this higher cost, the 
intermediaries of these countries reduce the level of export to the existing large 
country partners causing a net decrease in global welfare. This is why global free 
trade is not efficient in this case. However, it is the second most efficient network 
and, as such, it is considered in these simulations as a second best.  
 
Finally, when there is asymmetry in terms of farmers‟ productivity, a network with 
centre a less productive country that is connected to another less productive 
country and to productive countries having an agreement with each other is the 
efficient network. This is explained by the fact that the central position of the less 
efficient country increases the level of competition in this country cushioning the 
high price that is paid to the farming sector. This allows the intermediary of this 
country to be more competitive and this positively affects the level of global 
welfare. In spite of the fact that global free trade is not the efficient network in this 
case, it is the second best one. 
 
The chapter continues by defining and describing two different types of 
compensatory transfers that have the potential to lead to free trade. One of them is 
referred to as inter-node transfers and has normally been proposed in the literature 
to deal with the problem of efficiency and stability. That is, this is a tool that can be 
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used to stabilise the efficient network when it is unstable by allowing payments 
across nodes (or countries in the presented study). In a related article by Furusawa 
and Konishi (2005), this transfer was explored as a potential tool to stabilise global 
free trade when countries have different levels of industrialisation. However, the 
adoption of this type of payment in the current investigation differs from the work by 
these researchers in that the instability of the efficient network is explained by the 
existence of a farming sector that affects the marginal cost faced by intermediaries, 
the existence of asymmetry in market size across countries, the existence of 
asymmetry in farmers‟ productivity across countries, and governments‟ political 
biases. It also differs in terms of the use because inter-node payments in the 
current dissertation not only are used as a tool that is able to stabilise the efficient 
network, but also to break inefficient stable ones in favour of free trade.  
 
The other type of compensatory transfers referred to in this investigation as intra-
node transfers is a novel contribution of this dissertation. The reason is because 
the transfers considered in the literature of networks used to reach the efficient 
network correspond to payments across nodes, but not transfers within a node 
itself. In the current investigation they correspond to payments given by gainers 
from free trade within a country to losers that belong to the same country (e.g. from 
consumers to the farming sector). It is proved in this chapter that intra-node 
payments to be Pareto improving can only be used in cases when governments 
are politically biased.  
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The ability of inter-node and intra-node transfers to stabilise the efficient network or 
to break existing ones is also explored in this study by using them in the 
simulations developed in the previous chapters. It was found that in some 
simulations, these transfers are not needed because the stable network is the 
efficient one (or the desirable global free trade when it is the second best) implying 
that the world would reach this network without payments. However, in cases 
where this network is not stable or when the world is trapped in a stable inefficient 
stable network, the following general trends were found. Firstly, inter-node 
transfers are more suitable to favour either bilateral or global agreements when 
governments are unbiased. Secondly, when governments are biased in favour of 
consumers, inter-node transfers are normally more effective than intra-node 
transfers, although the latter can work in some simulations that involve asymmetry 
in market size. Thirdly, intra-node transfers are more effective to lead to global free 
trade when governments are biased in favour of intermediaries. Finally, when 
governments are biased in favour of the farming sectors, inter-node or intra-node 
transfers are more effective depending on the simulation.  
 
It is important to highlight the fact that inter-node and intra-node payments are 
abstract concepts. However, there exist some transfers that are consistent with 
these payments such as the aid for trade. While existing transfers have normally 
been used in different contexts (e.g. intra-node or inter-node transfers can be 
adopted with the purpose of breaking inefficient networks in favour of free trade 
rather than facilitating trade in developing countries), their current adoption 
suggests that the proposed payments can indeed be considered as suitable 
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compensatory strategies to reach more integrated networks. This possibility is 
discussed in more detail in the next chapter.  
 
In relation to the work by Furusawa and Konishi (2005), the results obtained in this 
chapter offer new insights that were not explored by these researchers. Firstly, it 
was also found that asymmetry affects the stability of global free trade. However, 
the type of asymmetry explored in the current investigation is different suggesting 
that transfers can be adopted to stabilise global free trade under a wider range of 
asymmetry across countries. Secondly, the current investigation extends the work 
by Furusawa and Konishi by exploring how to break inefficient networks. In 
contrast, these researchers only explored how to stabilise global free trade. This 
difference has important implications in terms of political strategies that can 
potentially be adopted to deal with real situations such us facilitating trade between 
existing blocks of countries, among others. Thirdly, the results obtained in this 
chapter shows that transfers not only have the potential to favour bilateral 
agreements as in the case by Furusawa and Konishi, but also global agreements. 
This offers new alternatives for current global negotiations that have been 
unsuccessful. Finally, these researchers only consider the use of inter-node 
transfers. However, as shown in the current investigation, intra-node transfers can 
become important complementary tools particularly in cases where inter-node 
payments are less effective.  
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Based on these results, a summary of the types of transfers that are more effective 
to facilitate free trade in different simulations and policy biases is presented in the 
following table.  
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Table 6.43. Types of transfers that are more effective to facilitate free trade in 
different simulations and policy biases 
Simulations 
considered in 
the chapter 
Unbiased 
governments 
Biased in favour of 
consumers 
Biased in favour of 
intermediaries 
Biased in favour of 
the farming sector 
2. Symmetric 
countries and 
exogenous 
tariffs. Low 
monopsonistic 
power 
a) Bilateral 
agreements: Not 
needed 
b) Global agreements: 
Inter-node 
a) Bilateral agreements: 
Not needed 
b) Global agreements: 
Inter-node 
a) Bilateral 
agreements: Intra-node 
b) Global agreements: 
Intra-node 
a) Bilateral agreements: 
Not needed. 
b) Global agreements: 
Inter-node 
3. Symmetric 
countries and 
exogenous 
tariffs. High 
monopsonistic 
power 
a) Bilateral 
agreements: Not 
needed 
b) Global agreements: 
Inter-node 
a) Bilateral agreements: 
Not needed 
b) Global agreements: 
Inter-node 
a) Bilateral 
agreements: Intra-node 
b) Global agreements: 
Intra-node 
a) Bilateral agreements: 
Not needed. 
b) Global agreements: 
Inter-node 
5. Symmetric 
countries and 
endogenous 
tariffs. Low 
monopsonistic 
power 
a) Bilateral 
agreements: Inter-node 
b) Global agreements: 
Inter-node 
Not solved because of 
endogeneity compexity 
Not solved because of 
endogeneity compexity 
Not solved because of 
endogeneity compexity 
6. Symmetric 
countries and 
endogenous 
tariffs. High 
monopsonistic 
power 
a) Bilateral 
agreements: Inter-node 
b) Global agreements: 
Inter-node 
Not solved because of 
endogeneity compexity 
Not solved because of 
endogeneity compexity 
Not solved because of 
endogeneity compexity 
12. Large and 
very small 
countries. 
Endogenous 
tariffs. Low 
monopsonistic 
power 
a) Bilateral 
agreements: Inter-node 
b) Global agreements: 
Inter-node 
a) Bilateral agreements: 
Not needed 
b) Global agreements: 
Inter-node and intra-
node in some networks 
a) Bilateral 
agreements: Intra-node 
b) Global agreements: 
Intra-node 
a) Bilateral agreements: 
Intra-node 
b) Global agreements: 
Inter-node and intra-
node but none of them 
fully effective 
13. Large and 
very small 
countries. 
Endogenous 
tariffs. High 
monopsonistic 
power 
 
 
a) Bilateral 
agreements: Not 
needed 
b) Global agreements: 
Inter-node 
a) Bilateral agreements: 
Not needed 
b) Global agreements: 
Inter-node and intra-
node in some networks 
a) Bilateral 
agreements: Intra-node 
b) Global agreements: 
Intra-node 
a) Bilateral agreements: 
Intra-node 
b) Global agreements: 
Inter-node and intra-
node but none of them 
fully effective 
15. Large and 
medium size 
countries. 
Endogenous 
tariffs. Low 
monopsonistic 
power 
a) Bilateral 
agreements: Not 
needed 
b) Global agreements: 
Inter-node 
a) Bilateral agreements: 
Not needed 
b) Global agreements: 
Inter-node 
a) Bilateral 
agreements: Intra-node 
b) Global agreements: 
Intra-node 
a) Bilateral agreements:  
Inter-node and intra-
node 
b) Global agreements: 
Inter-node 
16. Large and 
medium size 
countries. 
Endogenous 
tariffs. High 
monopsonistic 
power 
a) Bilateral 
agreements: Not 
needed 
b) Global agreements: 
Inter-node 
a) Bilateral agreements:  
Inter-node and intra-
node 
b) Global agreements: 
Inter-node 
a) Bilateral 
agreements: Intra-node 
b) Global agreements: 
Intra-node 
a) Bilateral agreements:  
Inter-node and intra-
node 
b) Global agreements: 
Inter-node 
17. Asymmetry 
in farmers‟ 
productivity. 
Endogenous 
tariffs 
a) Bilateral 
agreements: Inter-node 
b) Global agreements: 
Inter-node 
a) Bilateral agreements: 
Not needed 
b) Global agreements: 
Inter-node 
a) Bilateral 
agreements: Intra-node 
b) Global agreements: 
Intra-node 
a) Bilateral agreements: 
Not needed 
b) Global agreements: 
Inter-node and in some 
networks intra-node 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: Discussion and Conclusions 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
The aim of this dissertation is to offer an international trade network model that is 
able to address key aspects related to international trade of food processed goods: 
global agreements in agriculture have been unsuccessful; trade of agricultural and 
food processed goods are concentrated in geographical regions; the lack of 
agricultural trade liberalisation seems to be explained by policy biases; there is 
imperfect competition in the supply chain of food processed goods that are traded 
internationally that is associated with the existence of intermediaries with potential 
market power; and there is evidence of intra-industry trade of food processed 
goods. The reason for developing the international trade network is because these 
well-known key ideas are not considered explicitly in quantitative assessments of 
trade liberalisation making this the research gap that this thesis aims to 
contributing to fill.  
 
Based on the simulations developed in the previous sections, a number of new 
insights were found from the international trade network proving that this 
framework has the potential to inform about trade outcomes that cannot fully be 
identified from alternative models that deal with the issue of international trade of 
agricultural and food processed goods. The objective of this chapter is to conclude 
the current study by highlighting some key results that can be used to provide 
alternative explanations to current trends observed in the real world. It also outlines 
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limitations of the international trade network approach and potential avenues for 
future investigation. 
 
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 7.2 explains the mechanism by which 
oligopoly/oligopsony affects the outcome of trade policies from the international 
network approach point of view and contrasts with related research. Section 7.3 
discusses how this mechanism can explain the observed lack of agricultural trade 
liberalisation in the real world. In particular, the discussion is focussed on three key 
aspects explored in the previous chapters: the stability of global free trade; 
regionalism; and centrality. Section 7.4 extends the previous section by discussing 
how the inter-node and intra-node transfers might be adopted to facilitate trade in 
the real world. Finally, Section 7.5 shows some limitations of the international 
network approach adopted in this thesis and potential avenues for future research.   
 
7.2 Effect of market power on trade policy 
 
As explained in the previous chapters, the mechanism by which market power 
affects the outcome of trade policies is related to oligopoly and oligopsony power 
exercised by the intermediaries in each country. In relation to oligopoly, more trade 
increases the level of competition in domestic markets thereby reducing profits 
made by intermediaries in these markets and increasing consumer surplus. The 
former effect will lead to rejection of additional trade agreements unless the loss of 
domestic profits is compensated by the additional profits made in the new partner 
countries. This, in turn, depends on the current network structure. For example, if a 
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country initially had a low degree of trade integration (i.e. oligopoly is strong in the 
domestic market of this country) with respect to a potential partner (i.e. oligopolistic 
power is less strong), then the intermediary of the former would reject a trade 
agreement because the gain in export profits would not be large enough to offset 
the loss of domestic profits. On the other hand, consumers have in general an 
incentive to support additional agreements because of the positive effect on 
consumer surplus. As demonstrated by Goyal and Joshi (2006), in this paradigm 
the outcome of a trade policy depends on whether policymakers are politically 
biased in favour of either consumers or firms. In the first case, only global free 
trade is the outcome. However, in the second case, the world can reach different 
potential stable network structures but where global free trade is only one potential 
outcome. 
 
In relation to oligopsony, on the other hand, this type of market power increases 
the marginal cost faced by the intermediaries as the world becomes more 
integrated. The reason is because more export of food processed goods increases 
the demand for agricultural goods pushing the price paid to the farming sector up. 
As a consequence, the presence of the farming sector reinforces the 
intermediaries‟ unwillingness to support more trade. The effect of oligopsony on the 
outcome of a trade policy depends, therefore, on whether policymakers are biased 
in favour of consumers, the farming sector, or the intermediaries. If governments 
are biased in favour of consumers, the likely outcome is global free trade because 
more trade increases consumer surplus as a consequence of more competition, 
and increases producer surplus as farmers receive higher agricultural prices. 
431 
 
However, when governments are biased in favour of intermediaries, less integrated 
networks are the possible outcome of trade policies. 
 
There are some deviations to these general possible trade policy outcomes when 
there is asymmetry across countries. For example, the farming sector in a large 
country may not support an agreement with a small country because this can 
cause a net decrease in the output sold by the intermediary of the former pushing 
the price paid to the farming sector down. In spite of these deviations, the 
underlying mechanism is the same: the farming sector affects the marginal cost 
faced by intermediaries and this has important implications in terms of welfare 
redistribution across sectors.  
 
As explained in the literature review, this mechanism has largely be ignored in 
quantitative assessment of agricultural trade because in standard models, it is 
normally assumed that international markets of agricultural and food processed 
goods operate under perfect competition (and indeed that the links between 
agriculture and downstream intermediaries are ignored). However, as 
demonstrated in this thesis, welfare redistribution arising from this mechanism 
provides new insights in terms of agricultural trade policy suggesting that the issue 
of agricultural trade liberalisation should be analysed from alternative angles that 
include imperfect competition.  
 
Efforts to accommodate market power have indeed been made in previous 
research. For example, Sexton et al. (2007) developed a model to explore the 
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issue of oligopoly/oligosony in the context of agricultural trade when developed 
country food markets are vertically-linked to developing countries. In their model, a 
primary agricultural product is produced in a developing country and is processed 
and sold in a developed economy. However, it is important to highlight the fact that 
the issue addressed by these researchers is different from the one considering in 
this thesis. Firstly, they analyse export of a primary agricultural good from a 
developing to a developed country via an intermediary and not directly traded on 
world markets.. In contrast, the network model developed in the previous chapters 
considers the case of intra-industry trade of agricultural and food processed goods 
across countries in an industry with intermediaries with market power. Secondly, 
Sexton et al. (2007) focus the analysis on two countries rather than the set of 
countries that form part of the network. Finally, they analyse the potential impact of 
reducing the tariff of a primary good produced in a developing country when the 
food sector in developed countries are highly concentrated rather than the case 
where all agri-food sectors in the network may be characterised by imperfect 
competition.  
 
In contrast, the current investigation analyses the effects of market power on the 
incentives of policymakers to sign trade agreements and the resulting possible 
stable networks. In spite of these differences, what it is common in both research 
strands is the fact that introducing intermediaries with market power into the 
analysis has important welfare redistribution implications in terms of agricultural 
trade policy that cannot be identified under the assumption of perfect competition. 
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Some of these implications in the context of the international trade network 
framework are discussed as follows.    
 
7.3 Assessing the lack of agricultural trade liberalisation in the real world 
 
The main ideas related to agricultural trade liberalisation discussed in the literature 
review are that global agreements in agriculture have been unsuccessful, 
agricultural trade is concentrated in geographic areas, and this apparently reflects 
the fact that preferential agreements have been signed mainly by countries located 
in the proximity. The common explanation for this lack of agricultural trade 
liberalisation is that this reflects the existence of biased policymakers that place 
policies in order to favour some sectors in the economy (see for example Anderson 
et al., 2013; Cho, 2010; Regmi et al. 2005; Khor, 2003).  
 
The objective of this section is to explore this argument and to summarise the new 
insights that may explain the lack of trade liberalisation in the agri-food sector. The 
new insights are not by any means substitutes of the traditional arguments. On the 
contrary, they should be considered as complementary factors that may contribute 
in explaining this lack of trade. According to the international trade network 
approach, these factors not only include policy biases, but also the stability of 
global free trade, the central position of some countries in the network, and the 
possibility of being trapped in an stable network other than global free trade. These 
possibilities are discussed as follows.  
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7.3.1 The stability of global free trade 
 
One possibility that can explain lack of trade liberalisation of agricultural and food 
processed goods is that global free trade cannot be reached because it is not 
stable (i.e. neither pairwise nor globally treaty stable). This means that no matter 
what efforts are made to sign a global agreement or to encourage the formation of 
bilateral and RTAs, if global free trade is not stable, then the world will eventually 
reach a stable network different from free trade.   
 
According to the simulations developed in the previous chapters, this possibility 
can only arise when there are governments in the network that are politically 
biased. This reinforces the view of other researchers who argue that policy bias is 
a key factor in explaining the lack of agricultural trade liberalisation. However, what 
is new in the current research is that it was possible to infer from the network 
approach the type of biases and the circumstances that prevent global free trade. 
That is, as shown in the summaries in Tables 4.7 for the case of pairwise stability 
and 5.2, for the case of global treaty stability, in most of the simulations global free 
trade is not stable when governments are biased in favour of intermediaries. The 
only exception is the original work by Goyal and Joshi (2006) for the case of 
symmetrical countries suggesting that this is only a particular case when 
considering a broader picture of the problem. The main force in place is the effect 
of the farming sector on the marginal cost faced by the intermediaries. As 
explained in the previous section, more trade increases the price paid to 
intermediaries negatively affecting the profits made by these firms. As a result, 
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biased policymakers have an incentive to break existing agreements in order to 
protect the interests of intermediaries.  
 
There are other cases where global free trade is not stable and correspond to the 
ones when governments of large countries are biased in favour of the farming 
sector. In these cases, large countries have an incentive to break existing 
agreements with very small countries because the latter have irrelevant domestic 
markets. By breaking one of these agreements, the increase in domestic output as 
a consequence of lower competition offsets the decrease in output that was 
exported to the very small country. This higher net output traded by the 
intermediary of the large country pushes the price to the farming sector up 
positively affecting producer surplus.  
 
In summary, if lack of trade reflects the instability of global free trade, then there 
are either biased governments in favour intermediaries or there are large countries 
with governments biased in favour of the farming sector. 
 
7.3.2 Regionalism   
 
Another possible explanation for the lack of agricultural trade liberalisation is that 
the world is either trapped or is reaching a stable network different from global free 
trade. This is consistent with evidence of the growing trend towards preferential 
agreements in the global economy. This is explained as follows. 
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It has been noted a slowdown in the world trade growth that may indicate that 
global trade has peaked and what is observed today is a new normal with weaker 
levels of trade (Hoekman, 2015). This is consistent with the current trend of RTAs: 
as shown in the following figure, there is a slowdown in the number of RTAs in 
force per year.  
 
 
Figure 7.1. RTAs currently in force (by year of entry into force), 1948-2917. Source: 
WTO Secretariat. Available at http://rtais.wto.org/UI/charts.aspx#  
 
Based on this evidence, suppose that the infrastructure of trade of agricultural and 
food processed goods is indeed reaching a stable network different from global 
free trade. What is it the nature of this network? Before answering this question, it 
is important to clarify that the network model is silence in relation to geographical 
areas. However, using the facts that the trade flow of agricultural and food 
processed goods is concentrated in geographical areas, the type of regionalism 
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that characterise this sector consists of blocks of countries having agreements with 
each other. According to the results obtained in the previous chapters (see Tables 
4.7 and 5.2), these agreements  correspond to free trade areas as each country in 
the network model can choose its own trade policy. In these agreements, 
regionalism can emerge under different circumstances (see network c’ in Figure 
4.5). The ones that are considered in this section are only related to cases that do 
not include governments biased in favour of consumers because, as inferred from 
the discussion developed in the literature review (see Section 2.3.3), this type of 
bias is unlikely to be found in the real world.  These cases are described as 
follows.      
 
Under pairwise and strongly pairwise stability,  regionalism emerges when the 
world is composed of large and very small countries or medium size countries, 
when there exists either moderate or high levels of monopsonistic power, and 
when governments are biased in favour of the farming sector (i.e. Simulations 12 
and 13). In this case, large countries are only willing to sign agreements with each 
other. This is because signing an agreement with a small country or with a medium 
size country increases the level of competition in the domestic market of a large 
country causing a net decrease in the total output traded by the intermediary of this 
country (i.e. the decrease in the output that is traded by this firm in the domestic 
market of the large country as a consequence of the higher competition after an 
agreement is not compensated by the additional output that is exported to a 
smaller size country). This decrease in output pushes the price paid to the farming 
sector of the large country down negatively affecting producer surplus.  
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Regionalism that consists of blocks of countries having agreements with each 
other can also emerge under global treaty stability. In particular, when the world is 
composed of large countries and very small or medium size countries and under 
different levels of monopsonistic power (i.e. Simulations 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 and 16), 
this regionalism can emerge when governments are unbiased or biased in favour 
of the farming sector. In the first case, unbiased governments of large countries are 
unwilling to sign a global agreement because this implies having trade connections 
with smaller size countries. These connections increase the level of competition in 
the domestic market of the large countries positively affecting consumer surplus. 
But this gain is not large enough to compensate the net loss of profits faced by the 
intermediaries (i.e. the decrease in domestic profit is not compensate by the 
additional profits made in the smaller size countries) and the net loss of producer 
surplus faced by the farming sector (i.e. the decrease in output in the domestic 
market is not compensated by the additional output that is exported to the smaller 
size implying a net decrease in output that pushes the agricultural price down). On 
the other hand, when governments are biased in favour of the farming sector, 
regionalism emerges because large countries are unwilling to sign a global 
agreement. As explained above, this happens because the farming sector of large 
countries face a decrease in produce surplus when forming links with very small 
countries.  
 
Regionalism under global treaty stability can also emerge when there is asymmetry 
in terms of farmers‟ productivity and when governments are either politically 
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unbiased or biased in favour of the farming sector (i.e. Simulations 17). In the first 
case, inefficient countries in a block are unwilling to sign a global agreement 
because this causes a significant increase in competition when efficient countries 
are fully integrated in the network. That is, while this competition increases 
consumer surplus in all countries, it also causes a net decrease in the profits made 
by the intermediaries of the inefficient countries and a net decrease in the output 
that is traded by these firms negatively affecting producer surplus. The gain in 
consumer surplus is not large enough to offset the losses in profits and producer 
surplus which is why inefficient countries are unwilling to sign a global agreement. 
In the second case, inefficient countries in a block having biased governments in 
favour of the farming sector are not willing to sign a global agreement for the same 
reason: this agreement reduces producer surplus in these countries. 
 
In summary, the possibility that lack of trade liberalisation in the agri-food sector 
reflects that the world is reaching a stable network composed of blocks is only 
possible when there are asymmetries across countries. In the context of 
bilateralism, this can only happen when governments are biased in favour of the 
farming sector and when countries are asymmetric in terms of market size. In the 
context of global agreements, on the other hand, this type of regionalism can only 
arise when there is asymmetry in either market size or farmers‟ productivity and 
when governments are politically unbiased or biased in favour of the farming 
sector.   
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7.3.3 Centrality  
 
Another possible explanation for the lack of trade liberalisation in the agri-food 
sector is centrality, that is, the existence of countries that occupy a central position 
in the network (i.e. countries having a significant number of links with countries with 
few links). These countries have an incentive to block trade initiatives because 
centrality offers them higher levels of welfare compared with global free trade. This 
is because having a significant number of agreements increases the level of 
competition in the domestic market of a central country positively affecting 
consumer surplus. At the same time, having agreements with less integrated 
countries allows the intermediary of a central country to make high export profits 
that are large enough to compensate the low profits in the domestic market 
resulting from competition. Farmers also benefit because the output that is 
exported to peripheral countries offsets the low output that is traded domestically 
as a consequence of competition. This higher net output implies that farmers 
receive higher prices and, therefore, higher producer surplus when the country is in 
a central position. This is why, in general, a central country is unwilling to support 
additional trade independently of any policy bias (there are some exceptions when 
countries are asymmetric).  
 
The main implication of the privileged position of a central country in a network is 
that this country has an incentive to prevent both the formation of bilateral 
agreements by non-central countries and the signature of global free trade. This is 
because these agreements cause negative externalities on consumer surplus, 
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profits and producer surplus in a central country. In relation to consumer surplus, 
when non-central countries become more integrated after a bilateral or global 
agreement is signed, the level of trade in these countries increases implying that 
the marginal cost faced by the intermediaries increases as a consequence of 
monopsonistic power. In order to mitigate to some extent this higher cost, the 
intermediaries of the non-central countries reduce the level of export to the central 
country reducing the level of competition in the latter and, therefore, negatively 
affecting consumer surplus. In relation to profits, on the other hand, more trade in 
non-central countries increases the level of competition in these countries 
negatively affecting the profits made by the intermediary of the central country. 
Finally, producer surplus is also affected because more competition in non-central 
countries reduces the amount of output that is traded by the intermediary of the 
central country negatively affecting the price paid to the farming sector.  
 
Regarding the formation of bilateral agreements by non-central countries, it is 
unlikely that these agreements are prevented by a central country because this is a 
decision that depends on third countries. However, this country has the power to 
block the formation of global agreements because it is directly involved in this 
collective decision. Moreover, it was found in all the simulations developed in this 
thesis that there are always networks with central countries unwilling to sign a 
global agreement (i.e. there are always global treaty proof networks) implying that 
the incentives to block a global agreement is present in both stable and unstable 
networks. This means that even if the world is not reaching a stable network, the 
signature of a global agreement is unlikely.  
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To finish this section, note that the traditional argument that lack of free trade in the 
agri-food industry is explained by policy biases does not necessarily hold when 
there are central countries. As shown in Table 5.2, in all the simulations developed 
in this thesis, it was found for the unbiased governments case that centrality is a 
possible stable outcome. The main implication of this result is that the elimination 
of policy biases is not a sufficient condition to facilitate agricultural trade 
liberalisation.  
 
7.3.4 Final comments 
 
According to the discussion summarised above, the main factors identified by the 
international network framework that can explain the current lack of trade in the 
agri-food sector are policy biases, instability of global free trade (i.e. global free 
trade is neither pairwise stable nor global treaty stable implying that it cannot be 
reached), being in a stable network different from global free trade (e.g. 
regionalism), and the existence of countries occupying a central position in the 
network. In relation to these factors, it is important to highlight the fact that they are 
not exclusive of each other.  On the contrary, they can coexist and this fact may be 
easier to identify in more complex network analysis. For example, it could be 
possible that in some regions of the network, centrality is more relevant, and in 
others policy biases. It is also possible that in a sequence of unstable networks 
some factors become less relevant as the world converges to a determined stable 
network. This means that the traditional argument of policy biases to explain the 
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lack of trade is only one possibility and has to be considered within the current 
network context.  
 
Finally, based on the results obtained in this thesis it is argued that trade 
liberalisation agreements can be considered either as temporary or permanent 
shocks depending on the current international network, the existence of policy 
biases, and the type of asymmetry across countries. For example, in unstable 
networks with governments biased in favour of intermediaries, trade agreements 
can be temporary because there are countries in these networks that are willing to 
break at least one existing agreement. In contrasts, trade agreements can be 
permanent in networks that lead to more integrated structures such as global free 
trade.   
 
7.4 Inter-node and intra-node transfers 
 
The analysis developed in Chapter Six revealed that trade can be promoted by 
means of inter-node and intra-node transfers (see Table 6.43). This knowledge is 
considered in this section to explain how these payments may be used as a 
potential tool to facilitate free trade in the current network configuration of the agri-
food sector. 
 
In relation to the possibility that global free trade is neither pairwise stable nor 
global treaty stable, it is explained in Section 7.3.1 that this always occurs when 
governments are biased in favour of intermediaries. According to Table 6.43, the 
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suitable tool to facilitate both bilateral and global agreements in this case is intra-
node transfers. This is because more integrated networks offer higher levels of 
welfare. As a result, the gains in consumer surplus and producer surplus in a 
country after an agreement is signed are both large enough to compensate the 
losses in profits faced by the intermediaries. In contrast, in this case inter-node 
payments cannot be adopted because if all countries were biased in favour of 
these firms, all of them would require transfers across countries to be 
compensated.  
 
Global free trade is also not a stable outcome when countries are asymmetric in 
terms of market size and when governments are biased in favour of farmers. In 
particular, when countries are involved in bilateral agreements, intra-node transfers 
can be used by large countries in some stages of a path from an inefficient network 
to global free trade in order to compensate the farming sector for losses in 
producer surplus. However, when countries are involved in global agreements, the 
use of intra-node can only work when the world is trapped in some determined 
stable inefficient networks. If this is not the case, then transfers obtained from 
welfare gains in smaller countries would be required to compensate the farming 
sector of large countries.   
 
Let us consider now the case when the world is trapped in an inefficient network as 
the factor that prevents trade liberalisation. As explained in Section 7.3.2, the 
network structure that reflects the current trade pattern in the agri-food sector is the 
one composed of blocks with countries having agreements with each other (i.e. 
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network c’ in Figure 4.5). In this case, when the pairwise stability of this network is 
caused by political biases in favour of the farming sector, it can be broken by 
means of intra-node transfers adopted by large countries in some stages of a path 
that leads to global free trade. However, when the global treaty stability of this 
network arises when governments are unbiased or biased in favour of the farming 
sector, only inter-node payments that involve transfers from small countries to 
large ones can be used. This reflects the fact that the small countries are willing to 
pay for access to the larger market though their ability to do so is limited by the 
potential gains they can acquire as they are only a small country. 
 
Finally, in considering centrality as the factor that prevents trade liberalisation, it is 
concluded when comparing Tables 5.2 and 6.43 that at least in stable networks, 
lump sum transfers can be used to compensate countries for trade losses. In the 
case of central countries, it is more likely that inter-node are needed to 
compensate these countries because passing from an inefficient network to more 
integrated ones normally causes a decrease in consumer surplus, profits and 
producer surplus. 
 
In summary, it is concluded that it might be possible to facilitate free trade in the 
agi-food sector in the current network by means of intra-node and inter-node 
payments. However, the specific type of payment that would be needed would 
depend on the type of policy bias and whether the aim is to facilitate either bilateral 
of global agreements. In some cases, breaking this network might require transfers 
from smaller countries to large countries.  
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7.5 A note on trade-of-terms 
 
The results obtained in this dissertation can also be analysed from the point of view 
of the terms-of-trade (i.e. the ratio between a country's export prices to its import 
prices). However, before explaining this, an important aspect of the model needs to 
be clarified. 
 
The literature on this topic is based on the idea that the terms-of-trade can be 
manipulated by means of tariffs. In particular, in a competitive world, large 
countries have an incentive to place inefficient unilateral policies in order to shift 
costs onto other countries and to take advantage of the resulting terms-of-trade 
effect. In contrast, small countries cannot modify the terms-of-trade implying that 
they have an incentive to place optimal tariffs (Bagwell and Staiger, 2010). In the 
competitive paradigm, a bilateral agreement arises when the mutual tariff reduction 
that is discriminatory against third countries will improve their terms of trade 
against these countries (Bagwell and Staiger, 2005). On the other hand, when 
markets are not competitive, other externalities arise from tariffs policies such as 
the firm-delocation externality (i.e. an increase in tariffs changes the balance of 
competition favouring domestic firms) and  the profit-shifting externality (i.e. and 
increase in tariffs extracts profits from third countries) (Maggi, 2014). According to 
Bagwell and Staiger (2012), even when these externalities are present, the 
rationale for a trade agreement is to remedy the inefficient terms-of-trade caused 
by restrictions in trade volume. 
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Unfortunately it is not possible to study governments‟ incentives to manipulate the 
terms-of-trade by means of tariffs from the international trade network model 
developed in this thesis because, as in Goyal and Joshi (2006), most of the 
analysis was developed under the assumption of exogenous tariffs. This is 
explicitly recognised by these authors who explain that the assumption that 
countries commit to zero tariffs in free trade agreements made to rule out terms-of-
trade deviations (see Goyal and Joshi, 2006, Page 754). In spite of this limitation, it 
is still possible to identify interesting aspects of the terms-of-trade from the model 
under the assumption of exogenous tariffs. That is, some countries can benefit 
from the terms-of-trade depending on the current network structure and the relative 
position that these countries occupy in the network. This is explained as follows. 
 
It is inferred from the results obtained in this dissertation that countries have an 
incentive to stay in a central position of the network and to block further trade 
liberalisation in order to take advantage of the terms-of-trade. The reason relies on 
the fact that central countries can access foreign markets that are less integrated 
and, therefore, obtain high export prices. At the same time, because the domestic 
markets of central countries are more competitive, the price that consumers pay for 
imported good is lower. However, this advantage is no so evident when there are 
non-central small countries because the lower domestic price in a central country 
may not be coupled with higher export prices in the former even if they are less 
competitive. That is, even if a non-central small country has a low degree of 
competition in the domestic market, the price in this market can be lower than the 
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price in the central country when the domestic market of the former is very small. 
This suggests, therefore, that a terms-of-trade advantage is present in countries 
that occupy a central position in the network and that are connected mainly to large 
and medium size countries. This terms-of-trade advantage is another possible 
reason that explains the current lack of agricultural trade liberalisation.  
 
 
7.6 Limitations and potential avenues for future research 
 
There are a number of limitations of the proposed international network model that 
is important to highlight some of which will form the basis of a future research 
agenda. 
 
First, this thesis focuses the analysis of trade agreements on tariffs. However, 
current negotiations are much more complex and include a number of international 
rules governing domestic policies used to mitigate adverse trade effects (this 
complex negotiation approach is referred to as deep integration. For a discussion, 
see Young, 2017). These rules include product standards such as sanitary and 
phytosanitary standards that are relevant for agriculture and the food industry. An 
analysis of deep integration from an international trade network point of view is left 
for future research. 
 
Second, given the complexity and the problem of mathematical tractability, it was 
not possible to obtain results for large networks. As a consequence, it was not 
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possible to assess, for example, whether centrality within blocks of countries rather 
than the full network can eventually explain the lack of trade liberalisation. This 
would provide alternative explanations for the unwillingness to sign agreements by 
countries located in different blocks across the world. The issue of tractability in 
large networks is also a particular challenge especially in the case of endogenous 
tariffs.  
 
Third, this thesis considered concentration as the source of imperfect competition. 
However, as noted by Sexton (2013), imperfect competition can also arise when 
goods are differentiated (e.g. product heterogeneity, different product quality and 
brands). Unfortunately it was not possible to consider this source of imperfection 
given the complexity of the model.  
 
Fourth, it was assumed the existence of a single stage intermediary. However, 
there are cases of successive oligopoly/oligopsony that characterise the supply 
chain of the food industry that may influence trade outcomes as policy biases (see 
Sexton et al. 2007). 
 
Fifth, given the likelihood of networks that are inconsistent with global free trade, it 
would be interesting to consider the potential impacts of shocks through alternative 
forms of networks and, indeed, whether concerns about price volatility also relate 
to the formation of specific trade networks.   
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Sixth, the analysis on bilateral agreements was based on both pairwise and 
strongly pairwise stability. A possible extension would be the adoption of Pairwise 
Farsighted Stability proposed by Zhang et al. (2013). The aim of this stability is to 
compare myopia with farsightedness in an otherwise fixed framework. That is, if 
there is a farsightedly improving path from the current network to another one, then 
each country‟s decision is motivated by the final attainment of the latter. 
 
Seventh, there is a growing attention of global value chains (GVCs) in the 
economics literature. This concept is defined as the value added of all activities 
that are directly and indirectly needed to produce a final product, and is identified in 
the country-industry where the last stage of production takes place (Timmer et al., 
2014). Because different stages of the production process can be located across 
different countries, the expansion of GVCs has strongly increased economic 
interdependence. This effect has recently attracted the attention of researchers 
working in the area of agricultural trade because of the potential impact on the food 
industry (see for example Salvatici and Nenci, 2017). The network model 
developed in this thesis does not account for interdependence caused by the 
GVCs because this model assumes that all the stages in the production of the food 
processed good takes place in the same country. An interesting extension of the 
model would be, therefore, to allow for interdependency by assuming that 
intermediaries purchase the agricultural good from farming sectors located in other 
countries, and to explore how the stable networks identified in the current 
investigation are affected by this extension.  
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Eighth, this thesis shows that inter-node and intra-node transfers can be used to 
reach global free trade through determined network paths. A possible interesting 
extension in relation to this finding would be to compare different paths in terms of 
efficiency and costs. 
 
Ninth, a comparison of the costs implied by inter-node vs. intra-node transfers 
required to achieve the same network could be undertaken in future research.  
 
Finally, the current thesis revealed theoretical results and novel insights to the 
issue of agriculture and food processed goods that, apparently, have not been 
reported so far. Potential extensions would be, therefore, the development of 
empirical works to determine whether these results hold in the real world. All these 
potential extensions are left for future research.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
Simulations for the case of symmetrical countries under exogenous tariffs 
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Simulation 2:  = 1 and  = 0.5 
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Simulation 3:  = 1 and  = 1.5 
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Simulation 1:  = 1 and  = 0 
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k
k gq  = )(
)(
d
l
l gq  = 
)1)(3(2
)()2()(2)1(2 )()(



 d
k
id
i
i gqgq ; CSi(gd) = CSj(gd) = )((
2
1 )(
d
i
i gq  + )(
)(
d
j
i gq  + 
2)( ))( d
k
i gq ; CSk(gd) = CSl(gd) =  
2)()( )()(
2
1
d
k
kd
i
k gqgq  ; )(
)(
d
i
i g  = )(
)(
d
j
j g  = )(
)(
d
i
j g  = 
)()( d
j
i g  =  
2)( )(
2
)2(
d
i
i gq

; )()( d
i
k g  = )(
)(
d
j
l g  =  
2)( )(
2
)2(
d
i
k gq

; )()( d
k
i g  = )(
)(
d
l
j g  
=  2)( )(
2
)2(
d
k
i gq

; )()( d
k
k g  = )(
)(
d
l
l g  =  
2)( )(
2
)2(
d
k
k gq

; PSi(gd) = PSj(gd) = 
 2)()()( )()()(
4
d
i
kd
i
jd
i
i gqgqgq 

; and PSk(ga) =  PSl(ga) =    
2)()( )()(
4
d
k
kd
k
i gqgq 

. 
 
The outputs involved in this network can be obtained by solving the following output matrix: 
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

















































































3
4
3
8123
)1(2
)(
)(
)(
)(
1
)1)(3(2
)2(
0
)1)(3(
)1)(4(2
)3(
1
)1)(4()1)(4(
0
)1)(3(2
1
)1)(3(
)2(
8123
0
8123
)2(
1
2
)(
)(
)(
)(
22


























d
k
k
d
k
i
d
i
k
d
i
i
gq
gq
gq
gq
  
 
Simulation 1:  = 1 and  = 0 
 
The output matrix in this case is given by: 
 











































3333.0
2500.0
3333.0
2500.0
)(
)(
)(
)(
1000
0100
0010
0001
)(
)(
)(
)(
d
k
k
d
k
i
d
i
k
d
i
i
gq
gq
gq
gq
 
 
Therefore, )()( d
i
i gq  = )(
)(
d
j
j gq  = )(
)(
d
i
j gq  = )(
)(
d
j
i gq  = )(
)(
d
k
i gq  = )(
)(
d
l
j gq  = 2500.0 ; 
)()( d
i
k gq  = )(
)(
d
j
l gq  = )(
)(
d
k
k gq  = )(
)(
d
l
l gq  = 3333.0 ; CSi(gd) = CSj(gd) = 2500.0(
2
1
 + 0.25000 
+ 0.2500)
2
 = 0.2813; CSk(gd) = CSl(gd) =  
2
3333.03333.0
2
1
  = 0.2222; )()( d
i
i g  = )(
)(
d
j
j g  
= )()( d
i
j g  = )(
)(
d
j
i g  = )(
)(
d
k
i g  = )(
)(
d
l
j g  =  
2
2500.0  = 0.0625; )()( d
i
k g  = )(
)(
d
j
l g  = 
)()( d
k
k g  = )(
)(
d
l
l g  =  
2
3333.0  = 0.1111; and PSi(gd) = PSj(gd) = PSk(ga) =  PSl(ga) = 0. 
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Simulation 2:  = 1 and  = 0.5 
 
The output matrix in this case corresponds to: 
 















































2857.0
2222.0
2857.0
2034.0
)(
)(
)(
)(
11190.000952.0
1296.010741.00741.0
00476.012381.0
0339.000847.01
)(
)(
)(
)(
d
k
k
d
k
i
d
i
k
d
i
i
gq
gq
gq
gq
 
 
Therefore, )()( d
i
i gq  = )(
)(
d
j
j gq  = )(
)(
d
i
j gq  = )(
)(
d
j
i gq  = 0.1916; )(
)(
d
i
k gq  = )(
)(
d
j
l gq  = 0.2505; 
)()( d
k
i gq  = )(
)(
d
l
j gq  = 0.2189; )(
)(
d
k
k gq  = )(
)(
d
l
l gq  =0.2779; CSi(gd) = CSj(gd) = 1916.0(
2
1
 + 
0.1916 + 0.2189)
2
 = 0.1813; CSk(gd) = CSl(gd) =  
2
2779.02505.0
2
1
  = 0.1396; )()( d
i
i g  = 
)()( d
j
j g  = )(
)(
d
i
j g  = )(
)(
d
j
i g  =  
2
1916.0
2
5.2
 = 0.0459; )()( d
i
k g  = )(
)(
d
j
l g  
=  22505.0
2
5.2
 = 0.0784; )()( d
k
i g  = )(
)(
d
l
j g  =  
2
2189.0
2
5.2
 = 0.0599; )()( d
k
k g  = )(
)(
d
l
l g  
=  22779.0
2
5.2
 = 0.0965; PSi(gd) = PSj(gd) =  
2
2505.01916.01916.0
4
5.0
  = 0.0502; and 
PSk(ga) =  PSl(ga) =  
2
2779.02189.0
4
5.0
  = 0.0309. 
 
Simulation 3:  = 1 and  = 1.5 
 
The output matrix in this case is given by: 
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














































2222.0
1818.0
2222.0
1527.0
)(
)(
)(
)(
12333.001333.0
2455.011091.01091.0
00667.014667.0
0458.001603.01
)(
)(
)(
)(
d
k
k
d
k
i
d
i
k
d
i
i
gq
gq
gq
gq
 
 
Therefore, )()( d
i
i gq  = )(
)(
d
j
j gq  = )(
)(
d
i
j gq  = )(
)(
d
j
i gq  = 0.1346; )(
)(
d
i
k gq  = )(
)(
d
j
l gq  = 0.1704; 
)()( d
k
i gq  = )(
)(
d
l
j gq  = 0.1656; )(
)(
d
k
k gq  = )(
)(
d
l
l gq  = 0.2015; CSi(gd) = CSj(gd) = 1346.0(
2
1
 + 
0.1346 + 0.1656)
2
 = 0.0945; CSk(gd) = CSl(gd) =  
2
2015.01704.0
2
1
  = 0.0692; )()( d
i
i g  = 
)()( d
j
j g  = )(
)(
d
i
j g  = )(
)(
d
j
i g  =  
2
1346.0
2
5.3
 = 0.0317; )()( d
i
k g  = )(
)(
d
j
l g  
=  21704.0
2
5.3
 = 0.0508; )()( d
k
i g  = )(
)(
d
l
j g  =  
2
1656.0
2
5.3
 = 0.0480; )()( d
k
k g  = )(
)(
d
l
l g  
=  22015.0
2
5.3
 = 0.0711; PSi(gd) = PSj(gd) =  
2
1704.01346.01346.0
4
5.1
  = 0.0725; and 
PSk(ga) =  PSl(ga) =    
2
2015.01656.0
4
5.1
  = 0.0505. 
 
Network e 
 
In considering the equations presented in Section 3.3.1.1 it holds that )()( e
i
i gq  = )(
)(
e
i
j gq  = 
)()( e
i
k gq  = )(
)(
e
j
i gq  = )(
)(
e
j
j gq  = )(
)(
e
j
l gq  = )(
)(
e
k
i gq  = )(
)(
e
k
k gq  = )(
)(
e
k
l gq  = )(
)(
e
l
j gq  = 
)()( e
l
k gq  = )(
)(
e
l
l gq  = 
42 

; CSi(ge) = CSj(ge) = CSk(ge) = CSl(ge) = 
 2)()()( )()()(
2
1
e
k
ie
j
ie
i
i gqgqgq  ; )(
)(
e
i
i g  = )(
)(
e
i
j g  = )(
)(
e
i
k g  = )(
)(
e
j
i g  = )(
)(
e
j
j g  = 
)()( e
j
l g  = )(
)(
e
k
i g  = )(
)(
e
k
k g  = )(
)(
e
k
l g  = )(
)(
e
l
j g  = )(
)(
e
l
k g  = )(
)(
e
l
l g  = 
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 2)( )(
2
)2(
e
i
i gq

 ; and PSi(ge) = PSj(ge) = PSk(ge) =  PSl(ge) =   
 2)()()( )()()(
4
e
i
ke
i
je
i
i gqgqgq 

. 
 
Simulation 1:  = 1 and  = 0 
 
)()( e
i
i gq  = )(
)(
e
i
j gq  = )(
)(
e
i
k gq  = )(
)(
e
j
i gq  = )(
)(
e
j
j gq  = )(
)(
e
j
l gq  = )(
)(
e
k
i gq  = )(
)(
e
k
k gq  = 
)()( e
k
l gq  = )(
)(
e
l
j gq  = )(
)(
e
l
k gq  = )(
)(
e
l
l gq  = 
4
1
 = 0.2500; CSi(ge) = CSj(ge) = CSk(ge) = CSl(ge) 
=  22500.02500.02500.0
2
1
  = 0.2813; )()( e
i
i g  = )(
)(
e
i
j g  = )(
)(
e
i
k g  = )(
)(
e
j
i g  = 
)()( e
j
j g  = )(
)(
e
j
l g  = )(
)(
e
k
i g  = )(
)(
e
k
k g  = )(
)(
e
k
l g  = )(
)(
e
l
j g  = )(
)(
e
l
k g  = )(
)(
e
l
l g  = 
 22500.0  = 0.0625; and PSi(ge) = PSj(ge) = PSk(ge) =  PSl(ge) = 0. 
 
Simulation 2:  = 1 and  = 0.5 
 
)()( e
i
i gq  = )(
)(
e
i
j gq  = )(
)(
e
i
k gq  = )(
)(
e
j
i gq  = )(
)(
e
j
j gq  = )(
)(
e
j
l gq  = )(
)(
e
k
i gq  = )(
)(
e
k
k gq  = 
)()( e
k
l gq  = )(
)(
e
l
j gq  = )(
)(
e
l
k gq  = )(
)(
e
l
l gq  = 
41
1

 = 0.2000; CSi(ge) = CSj(ge) = CSk(ge) = 
CSl(ge) =  
2
2000.02000.02000.0
2
1
 = 0.1800; )()( e
i
i g  = )(
)(
e
i
j g  = )(
)(
e
i
k g  = )(
)(
e
j
i g  = 
)()( e
j
j g  = )(
)(
e
j
l g  = )(
)(
e
k
i g  = )(
)(
e
k
k g  = )(
)(
e
k
l g  = )(
)(
e
l
j g  = )(
)(
e
l
k g  = )(
)(
e
l
l g  = 
 22000.0
2
5.2
 = 0.0500; and PSi(ge) = PSj(ge) = PSk(ge) =  PSl(ge) =   2000.0(
4
5.0
 + 0.2000 + 
0.2000)
2
 = 0.0450. 
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Simulation 3:  = 1 and  = 1.5 
 
)()( e
i
i gq  = )(
)(
e
i
j gq  = )(
)(
e
i
k gq  = )(
)(
e
j
i gq  = )(
)(
e
j
j gq  = )(
)(
e
j
l gq  = )(
)(
e
k
i gq  = )(
)(
e
k
k gq  = 
)()( e
k
l gq  = )(
)(
e
l
j gq  = )(
)(
e
l
k gq  = )(
)(
e
l
l gq  = 
43
1

 = 0.1429; CSi(ge) = CSj(ge) = CSk(ge) = 
CSl(ge) =  
2
1429.01429.01429.0
2
1
  = 0.0918; )()( e
i
i g  = )(
)(
e
i
j g  = )(
)(
e
i
k g  = )(
)(
e
j
i g  
= )()( e
j
j g  = )(
)(
e
j
l g  = )(
)(
e
k
i g  = )(
)(
e
k
k g  = )(
)(
e
k
l g  = )(
)(
e
l
j g  = )(
)(
e
l
k g  = )(
)(
e
l
l g  = 
 21429.0
2
5.3
 = 0.0357; and PSi(ge) = PSj(ge) = PSk(ge) =  PSl(ge) =   1429.0(
4
5.1
 + 0.1429 + 
0.1429)
2
 = 0.0689. 
 
Network f 
 
In considering the equations presented in Section 3.3.1.1 it holds that )()( f
i
i gq  = 
)1)(4(
)()3()()1( )()(



 f
i
jf
j
j gqgq
; )()( f
i
j gq  = )(
)(
f
i
k gq  = 
6103
)()2()()1(2
2
)()(



 f
i
if
j
i gqgq
; )()( f
j
j gq   = )(
)(
f
k
k gq  = 
)1)(3(2
)()2()()()1(2 )()()(



 f
j
if
i
jf
i
i gqgqgq
; )()( f
j
i gq  = )(
)(
f
k
i gq  = 
)1)(4(2
)()2()(2)1(2 )()(



 f
j
jf
i
j gqgq
; )()( f
l
l gq  = 
2

; CSi(gf) = 
 2)()()( )()()(
2
1
f
k
if
j
if
i
i gqgqgq  ; CSj(gf) = CSk(gf) = )((
2
1 )(
f
i
j gq  + 
2)( ))( f
j
j gq ;  CSl(gf) = 
 2)( )(
2
1
f
l
l gq ; )(
)(
f
i
i g  =  
2)( )(
2
)2(
f
i
i gq

; )()( f
i
j g  = )(
)(
f
i
k g  =  
2)( )(
2
)2(
f
i
j gq

; 
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)()( f
j
j g  = )(
)(
f
k
k g  =  
2)( )(
2
)2(
f
j
j gq

; )()( f
j
i g  = )(
)(
f
k
i g  =  
2)( )(
2
)2(
f
j
i gq

; 
)()( f
l
l g  =  
2)( )(
2
)2(
f
l
l gq

; PSi(gf) = )((
4
)(
f
i
i gq

 + )()( f
i
j gq  + 
2)( ))( f
i
k gq ; PSj(gf) = PSk(gf) 
=  2)()( )()(
4
f
j
jf
j
i gqgq 

; and PSl(gf) =  
2)( )(
4
f
l
l gq

. 
 
The outputs involved in this network can be obtained by solving the following output matrix: 
 


















































































4
3
6103
)1(2
4
)(
)(
)(
)(
1
)1)(4(2
)2(
)1)(4(
0
)1)(3(2
)2(
1
)1)(3(2)1)(3(2
6103
01
6103
)2(
0
)1)(4()1)(4(
)3(
1
2
)(
)(
)(
)(
22


























f
j
i
f
j
j
f
i
j
f
i
i
gq
gq
gq
gq
 
 
Simulation 1:  = 1 and  = 0 
 
The output matrix in this case is given by: 
 











































2500.0
3333.0
3333.0
2500.0
)(
)(
)(
)(
1000
0100
0010
0001
)(
)(
)(
)(
f
j
i
f
j
j
f
i
j
f
i
i
gq
gq
gq
gq
 
 
Therefore, )()( f
i
i gq  = )(
)(
f
j
i gq  = )(
)(
f
k
i gq  = 0.2500; )(
)(
f
i
j gq  = )(
)(
f
i
k gq  = )(
)(
f
j
j gq   = 
)()( f
k
k gq  = 0.3333; )(
)(
f
l
l gq  = 0.5000; CSi(gf) =  
2
2500.02500.02500.0
2
1
  = 0.2813; 
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CSj(gf) = CSk(gf) =  
2
3333.03333.0
2
1
  = 0.2222;  CSl(gf) =  
2
5000.0
2
1
 = 0.1250; )()( f
i
i g  
= )()( f
j
i g  = )(
)(
f
k
i g  =  
2
2500.0  = 0.0625; )(
)(
f
i
j g  = )(
)(
f
i
k g  = )(
)(
f
j
j g  = )(
)(
f
k
k g  = 
 23333.0  = 0.1111; )()( f
l
l g  =  
2
5000.0  = 0.2500; and PSi(gf) = PSj(gf) = PSk(gf) = PSl(gf) = 
0. 
 
Simulation 2:  = 1 and  = 0.5 
 
The output matrix in this case corresponds to: 
 















































2222.0
2857.0
2553.0
2222.0
)(
)(
)(
)(
10926.00741.00
1190.010476.00476.0
0426.0011064.0
00741.02593.01
)(
)(
)(
)(
f
j
i
f
j
j
f
i
j
f
i
i
gq
gq
gq
gq
 
 
Therefore, )()( f
i
i gq  = 0.1794; )(
)(
f
i
j gq  = )(
)(
f
i
k gq  = 0.2454; )(
)(
f
j
j gq   = )(
)(
f
k
k gq  = 0.2804; 
)()( f
j
i gq  = )(
)(
f
k
i gq  = 0.2144; )(
)(
f
l
l gq  = 0.4000; CSi(gf) =  
2
2144.02144.01794.0
2
1
  = 
0.1850; CSj(gf) = CSk(gf) =  
2
2804.02454.0
2
1
  = 0.1382;  CSl(gf) =  
2
4000.0
2
1
 = 0.0800; 
)()( f
i
i g  =  
2
1794.0
2
5.2
 = 0.0402; )()( f
i
j g  = )(
)(
f
i
k g  =  
2
2454.0
2
5.2
 = 0.0753; )()( f
j
j g  = 
)()( f
k
k g  =  
2
2804.0
2
5.2
 = 0.0983; )()( f
j
i g  = )(
)(
f
k
i g  =  
2
2144.0
2
5.2
 = 0.0575; )()( f
l
l g  
=  24000.0
2
5.2
 = 0.2000; PSi(gf) =  
2
2454.02454.01794.0
4
5.0
  = 0.0561; PSj(gf) = 
PSk(gf) =  
2
2804.02144.0
4
5.0
  = 0.0306; and PSl(gf) =  
2
4000.0
4
5.0
 = 0.0200. 
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Simulation 3:  = 1 and  = 1.5 
 
The output matrix in this case is given by: 
 















































1818.0
2222.0
1802.0
1818.0
)(
)(
)(
)(
11909.01091.00
2333.010667.00667.0
0541.0011892.0
01091.04909.01
)(
)(
)(
)(
f
j
i
f
j
j
f
i
j
f
i
i
gq
gq
gq
gq
 
 
Therefore, )()( f
i
i gq  = 0.1227; )(
)(
f
i
j gq  = )(
)(
f
i
k gq  = 0.1657; )(
)(
f
j
j gq   = )(
)(
f
k
k gq  = 0.2039; 
)()( f
j
i gq  = )(
)(
f
k
i gq  = 0.1610; )(
)(
f
l
l gq  = 0.2857; CSi(gf) =  
2
1610.01610.01227.0
2
1
  = 
0.0989; CSj(gf) = CSk(gf) =  
2
2039.01657.0
2
1
  = 0.0683;  CSl(gf) =  
2
2857.0
2
1
 = 0.0408; 
)()( f
i
i g  =  
2
1227.0
2
5.3
 = 0.0263; )()( f
i
j g  = )(
)(
f
i
k g  =  
2
1657.0
2
5.3
 = 0.0480; )()( f
j
j g  = 
)()( f
k
k g  =  
2
2039.0
2
5.3
 = 0.0728; )()( f
j
i g  = )(
)(
f
k
i g  =  
2
1610.0
2
5.3
 = 0.0454; )()( f
l
l g  
=  22857.0
2
5.3
 = 0.1428; PSi(gf) =  
2
1657.01657.01227.0
4
5.1
  = 0.0773; PSj(gf) = 
PSk(gf) =  
2
2039.01610.0
4
5.1
  = 0.0499; and PSl(gf) =  
2
2857.0
4
5.1
 = 0.0306. 
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Network g 
 
In considering the equations presented in Section 3.3.1.1 it holds that )()( g
i
i gq  = )(
)(
g
i
j gq  = 
)()( g
i
k gq  = )(
)(
g
j
i gq  = )(
)(
g
j
j gq  = )(
)(
g
j
k gq  = )(
)(
g
k
i gq  = )(
)(
g
k
j gq  = )(
)(
g
k
k gq  = 
42 

; 
)()( g
l
l gq  = 
2

; CSi(gg) = CSj(gg) = CSk(gg) =  
2)()()( )()()(
2
1
g
k
ig
j
ig
i
i gqgqgq  ; CSl(gg) = 
 2)( )(
2
1
g
l
l gq ; )(
)(
g
i
i g  = )(
)(
g
i
j g  = )(
)(
g
i
k g  = )(
)(
g
j
i g  = )(
)(
g
j
j g  = )(
)(
g
j
k g  = )(
)(
g
k
i g  = 
)()( g
k
j g  = )(
)(
g
k
k g  =  
2)( )(
2
)2(
g
i
i gq

; )()( g
l
l g  =  
2)( )(
2
)2(
g
l
l gq

; PSi(gg) = PSj(gg) = 
PSk(gg) =   
2)()()( )()()(
4
g
i
kg
i
jg
i
i gqgqgq 

; and PSl(gg) =    
2)( )(
4
g
l
l gq

. 
 
Simulation 1:  = 1 and  = 0 
     
)()( g
i
i gq  = )(
)(
g
i
j gq  = )(
)(
g
i
k gq  = )(
)(
g
j
i gq  = )(
)(
g
j
j gq  = )(
)(
g
j
k gq  = )(
)(
g
k
i gq  = )(
)(
g
k
j gq  = 
)()( g
k
k gq  = 
4
1
 = 0.2500; )()( g
l
l gq  = 
2
1
 = 0.5000; CSi(gg) = CSj(gg) = CSk(gg) = 
 22500.02500.02500.0
2
1
  = 0.2813; CSl(gg) =  
2
5000.0
2
1
 = 0.1250; )()( g
i
i g  = )(
)(
g
i
j g  
= )()( g
i
k g  = )(
)(
g
j
i g  = )(
)(
g
j
j g  = )(
)(
g
j
k g  = )(
)(
g
k
i g  = )(
)(
g
k
j g  = )(
)(
g
k
k g  =  
2
2500.0  
= 0.0625; )()( g
l
l g  =  
2
5000.0  = 0.2500; and PSi(gg) = PSj(gg) = PSk(gg) =  PSl(gg) = 0. 
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Simulation 2:  = 1 and  = 0.5 
 
)()( g
i
i gq  = )(
)(
g
i
j gq  = )(
)(
g
i
k gq  = )(
)(
g
j
i gq  = )(
)(
g
j
j gq  = )(
)(
g
j
k gq  = )(
)(
g
k
i gq  = )(
)(
g
k
j gq  = 
)()( g
k
k gq  = 
41
1

 = 0.2000; )()( g
l
l gq  = 
25.0
1

 = 0.4000; CSi(gg) = CSj(gg) = CSk(gg) = 
 22000.02000.02000.0
2
1
  = 0.1800; CSl(gg) =  
2
4000.0
2
1
 = 0.0800; )()( g
i
i g  = )(
)(
g
i
j g  
= )()( g
i
k g  = )(
)(
g
j
i g  = )(
)(
g
j
j g  = )(
)(
g
j
k g  = )(
)(
g
k
i g  = )(
)(
g
k
j g  = )(
)(
g
k
k g  = 
 22000.0
2
5.2
 = 0.0500; )()( g
l
l g  =  
2
4000.0
2
5.2
 = 0.2000; PSi(gg) = PSj(gg) = PSk(gg) =  
 22000.02000.02000.0
4
5.0
  = 0.0450; and PSl(gg) =    
2
4000.0
4
5.0
 = 0.0200. 
 
Simulation 3:  = 1 and  = 1.5 
 
)()( g
i
i gq  = )(
)(
g
i
j gq  = )(
)(
g
i
k gq  = )(
)(
g
j
i gq  = )(
)(
g
j
j gq  = )(
)(
g
j
k gq  = )(
)(
g
k
i gq  = )(
)(
g
k
j gq  = 
)()( g
k
k gq  = 
43
1

 = 0.1429; )()( g
l
l gq  = 
25.1
1

 = 0.2857; CSi(gg) = CSj(gg) = CSk(gg) = 
 21429.01429.01429.0
2
1
  = 0.0918; CSl(gg) =  
2
2857.0
2
1
 = 0.0408; )()( g
i
i g  = )(
)(
g
i
j g  
= )()( g
i
k g  = )(
)(
g
j
i g  = )(
)(
g
j
j g  = )(
)(
g
j
k g  = )(
)(
g
k
i g  = )(
)(
g
k
j g  = )(
)(
g
k
k g  = 
 21429.0
2
5.3
 = 0.0357; )()( g
l
l g  =  
2
2857.0
2
5.3
 = 0.1428; PSi(gg) = PSj(gg) = PSk(gg) =  
 21429.01429.01429.0
4
5.1
  = 0.0689; and PSl(gg) =    
2
2857.0
4
5.1
 = 0.0306. 
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Network h 
 
In considering the equations presented in Section 3.3.1.1 it holds that )()( h
i
i gq  = 
)1)(5(2
)()4(3)(3)1(2 )()(



 h
i
jh
j
j gqgq
; )()( h
i
j gq  = )(
)(
h
i
k gq  = )(
)(
h
i
l gq  = 
6124
)()2()()1(2
2
)()(



 h
i
ih
j
i gqgq ; )()( h
j
i gq  = )(
)(
h
k
i gq  = )(
)(
h
l
i gq  = 
)1)(5(2
)()2()(3)1(2 )()(



 h
j
jh
i
j gqgq
; )()( h
j
j gq  = )(
)(
h
k
k gq  = )(
)(
h
l
l gq  = 
)1)(3(2
)()2()(2)()1(2 )()()(



 h
j
ih
i
jh
i
i gqgqgq
; CSi(gh) = 
 2)()()()( )()()()(
2
1
h
l
ih
k
ih
j
ih
i
i gqgqgqgq  ; CSj(gh) = CSk(gh) = CSl(gh) = 
 2)()( )()(
2
1
h
j
jh
i
j gqgq  ; )(
)(
h
i
i g  =  
2)( )(
2
)2(
h
i
i gq

; )()( h
i
j g  = )(
)(
h
i
k g  = )(
)(
h
i
l g  = 
 2)( )(
2
)2(
k
i
j gq

; )()( h
j
i g  = )(
)(
h
k
i g  = )(
)(
h
l
i g  =  
2)( )(
2
)2(
h
j
i gq

; )()( h
j
j g  = )(
)(
h
k
k g  
= )()( h
l
l g  =  
2)( )(
2
)2(
h
j
j gq

; PSi(gh) = )((
4
)(
h
i
i gq

 + )()( h
i
j gq  + )(
)(
h
i
k gq  + 
2)( ))( h
i
l gq ; and 
PSj(gh) = PSk(gh) =  PSl(gh) =    
2)()( )()(
4
h
j
jh
j
i gqgq 

.  
 
The outputs involved in this network can be obtained by solving the following output matrix: 
 
 
 
 
 
470 
 


















































































3
5
6124
)1(2
5
)(
)(
)(
)(
1
)1)(3(
)2(
)1)(3()1)(3(2
)1)(5(2
)2(
1
)1)(5(2
3
0
0
6124
1
6124
)2(
)1)(5(2
3
0
)1)(5(2
)4(3
1
2
)(
)(
)(
)(
22


























h
j
j
h
j
i
h
i
j
h
i
i
gq
gq
gq
gq
 
 
Simulation 1:  = 1 and  = 0 
 
The output matrix in this case is given by: 
 











































3333.0
2000.0
3333.0
2000.0
)(
)(
)(
)(
1000
0100
0010
0001
)(
)(
)(
)(
h
j
j
h
j
i
h
i
j
h
i
i
gq
gq
gq
gq
 
 
Therefore, )()( h
i
i gq  = )(
)(
h
j
i gq  = )(
)(
h
k
i gq  = )(
)(
h
l
i gq  = 0.2000; )(
)(
h
i
j gq  = )(
)(
h
i
k gq  = )(
)(
h
i
l gq  
= )()( h
j
j gq  = )(
)(
h
k
k gq  = )(
)(
h
l
l gq  = 0.3333; CSi(gh) = 20000.0(
2
1
 + 0.2000 + 0.2000 + 
0.2000)
2
 = 0.3200; CSj(gh) = CSk(gh) = CSl(gh) =  
2
3333.03333.0
2
1
  = 0.2222; )()( h
i
i g  = 
)()( h
j
i g  = )(
)(
h
k
i g  = )(
)(
h
l
i g  =  
2
2000.0  = 0.0400; )(
)(
h
i
j g  = )(
)(
h
i
k g  = )(
)(
h
i
l g  = 
)()( h
j
j g  = )(
)(
h
k
k g  = )(
)(
h
l
l g  =  
2
3333.0  = 0.1111; and PSi(gh) = PSj(gh) = PSk(gh) =  
PSl(gh) = 0.  
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Simulation 2:  = 1 and  = 0.5 
 
The output matrix in this case corresponds to: 
 















































2857.0
1818.0
2308.0
1818.0
)(
)(
)(
)(
12381.00952.00476.0
0758.010909.00
00385.010962.0
0909.004091.01
)(
)(
)(
)(
h
j
j
h
j
i
h
i
j
h
i
i
gq
gq
gq
gq
 
 
Therefore, )()( h
i
i gq  = 0.1135; )(
)(
h
i
j gq  = )(
)(
h
i
k gq  = )(
)(
h
i
l gq  = 0.2269; )(
)(
h
j
i gq  = )(
)(
h
k
i gq  = 
)()( h
l
i gq  = 0.1820; )(
)(
h
j
j gq  = )(
)(
h
k
k gq  = )(
)(
h
l
l gq  = 0.2694; CSi(gh) = 1135.0(
2
1
 + 0.1820 + 
0.1820 + 0.1820)
2
 = 0.2175; CSj(gh) = CSk(gh) = CSl(gh) =  
2
2694.02269.0
2
1
  = 0.1232; 
)()( h
i
i g  =  
2
1135.0
2
5.2
 = 0.0161; )()( h
i
j g  = )(
)(
h
i
k g  = )(
)(
h
i
l g  =  
2
2269.0
2
5.2
 = 0.0644; 
)()( h
j
i g  = )(
)(
h
k
i g  = )(
)(
h
l
i g  =  
2
1820.0
2
5.2
 = 0.0414; )()( h
j
j g  = )(
)(
h
k
k g  = )(
)(
h
l
l g  = 
 22694.0
2
5.2
 = 0.0907; PSi(gh) =  
2
2269.02269.02269.01135.0
4
5.0
  = 0.0788; and 
PSj(gh) = PSk(gh) =  PSl(gh) =    
2
2694.01820.0
4
5.0
  = 0.0255.  
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Simulation 3:  = 1 and  = 1.5 
 
The output matrix in this case is given by: 
 















































2222.0
1538.0
1515.0
1538.0
)(
)(
)(
)(
14667.01333.00667.0
1615.011385.00
00455.011591.0
1385.007615.01
)(
)(
)(
)(
h
j
j
h
j
i
h
i
j
h
i
i
gq
gq
gq
gq
 
 
Therefore, )()( h
i
i gq  = 0.0661; )(
)(
h
i
j gq  = )(
)(
h
i
k gq  = )(
)(
h
i
l gq  = 0.1476; )(
)(
h
j
i gq  = )(
)(
h
k
i gq  = 
)()( h
l
i gq  = 0.1454; )(
)(
h
j
j gq  = )(
)(
h
k
k gq  = )(
)(
h
l
l gq  = 0.1784; CSi(gh) = 0661.0(
2
1
 + 0.1454+ 
0.1454 + 0.1454)
2
 = 0.1262; CSj(gh) = CSk(gh) = CSl(gh) =  
2
1784.01476.0
2
1
  = 0.0531; 
)()( h
i
i g  =  
2
0661.0
2
5.3
 = 0.0076; )()( h
i
j g  = )(
)(
h
i
k g  = )(
)(
h
i
l g  =  
2
1476.0
2
5.3
 = 0.0381; 
)()( h
j
i g  = )(
)(
h
k
i g  = )(
)(
h
l
i g  =  
2
1454.0
2
5.3
 = 0.0370; )()( h
j
j g  = )(
)(
h
k
k g  = )(
)(
h
l
l g  = 
 21784.0
2
5.3
 = 0.0557; PSi(gh) =  
2
1476.01476.01476.00661.0
4
5.1
  = 0.0971; and 
PSj(gh) = PSk(gh) =  PSl(gh) =    
2
1784.01454.0
4
5.1
  = 0.0393.  
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Network i 
 
In considering the equations presented in Section 3.3.1.1 it holds that )()( i
i
i gq  = )(
)(
i
j
j gq  = 
892
)()2()()3()()()()1(2
2
)()()()()(



 i
i
ki
i
ji
k
li
k
ki
k
i gqgqgqgqgq
; )()( i
i
j gq  = 
)()( i
j
i gq  = 
892
)()2()()3()()()()1(2
2
)()()()()(



 i
i
ki
i
ii
k
li
k
ki
k
i gqgqgqgqgq ; 
)()( i
i
k gq  = )(
)(
i
j
k gq  = 
)1)(5(2
)()3()()3()()()(2)1(2 )()()()()(



 i
i
ji
i
ii
l
li
k
li
k
i gqgqgqgqgq ; 
)()( i
k
i gq  = )(
)(
i
k
j gq  = 
8133
)()3()()3()()(2)()1(2
2
)()()()()(



 i
k
li
k
ki
i
ii
i
ki
i
j gqgqgqgqgq ; 
)()( i
k
k gq  = 
)1)(5(2
)()4()()4(2)()(2)(2)1(2 )()()()()(



 i
k
li
k
ii
l
li
i
ji
i
i gqgqgqgqgq
; 
)()( i
k
l gq  = 
)1)(3(2
)()2()()2(2)()1(2 )()()(



 i
k
ki
k
ii
l
k gqgqgq ; )()( i
l
k gq  = 
)1)(5(2
)()4()()(2)(2)(2)1(2 )()()()()(



 i
l
li
k
li
k
ii
i
ji
i
i gqgqgqgqgq
; )()( i
l
l gq  = 
)1)(3(2
)()2()()(2)1(2 )()()(



 i
l
ki
k
ki
k
i gqgqgq ; CSi(gi) = CSj(gi) = 
 2)()()( )()()(
2
1
i
k
ii
j
ii
i
i gqgqgq  ; CSk(gi) =  
2)()()()( )()()()(
2
1
i
l
ki
k
ki
j
ki
i
k gqgqgqgq  ; CSl(gi) = 
 2)()( )()(
2
1
i
l
li
k
l gqgq  ; )(
)(
i
i
i g  = )(
)(
i
j
j g  =  
2)( )(
2
)2(
i
i
i gq

; )()( i
i
j g  = )(
)(
i
j
i g  = 
 2)( )(
2
)2(
i
i
j gq

; )()( i
i
k g  = )(
)(
i
j
k g  =  
2)( )(
2
)2(
i
i
k gq

; )()( i
k
i g  = )(
)(
i
k
j g  = 
 2)( )(
2
)2(
i
k
i gq

; )()( i
k
k g  =  
2)( )(
2
)2(
i
k
k gq

; )()( i
k
l g  =  
2)( )(
2
)2(
i
k
l gq

; )()( i
l
k g  = 
 2)( )(
2
)2(
i
l
k gq

; )()( i
l
l g  =  
2)( )(
2
)2(
i
l
l gq

; PSi(gi) = PSj(gi) = 
 
 
474 
 
 2)()()( )()()(
4
i
i
ki
i
ji
i
i gqgqgq 

; PSk(gi) =  
2)()()()( )()()()(
4
i
k
li
k
ki
k
ji
k
i gqgqgqgq 

; and  
PSl(gi) =    
2)()( )()(
4
i
l
li
l
k gqgq 

. 
 
The outputs involved in this network can be obtained by solving the following output matrix: 
 






































































































































































































3
5
3
5
8133
)1(2
5
892
)1(2
892
)1(2
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
1
)1)(3(2
)2(
0
)1)(3(2)1)(3(
000
)1)(5(2
)4(
1
)1)(5(2
0
)1)(5(
0
)1)(5()1)(5(
0
)1)(3(2
1
)1)(3(2
)2(
)1)(3(
)2(
000
)1)(5(2
0
)1)(5(2
)4(
1
)1)(5(
)4(
0
)1)(5()1)(5(
00
8133
)3(
8133
)3(
1
8133
2
81338133
)1)(5(2
0
)1)(5(2
0
)1)(5(
1
)1)(5(2
)3(
)1)(5(2
)3(
00
892892892892
)2(
1
892
)3(
00
892892892892
)2(
892
)3(
1
2
2
2
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
22222
22222
22222
























































































i
l
l
i
l
k
i
k
l
i
k
k
i
k
i
i
i
k
i
i
j
i
i
i
gq
gq
gq
gq
gq
gq
gq
gq
 
 
Simulation 1:  = 1 and  = 0 
 
The output matrix in this case is given by: 
 















































































3333.0
2000.0
3333.0
2000.0
2500.0
2000.0
2500.0
2500.0
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
10000000
01000000
00100000
00010000
00001000
00000100
00000010
00000001
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
i
l
l
i
l
k
i
k
l
i
k
k
i
k
i
i
i
k
i
i
j
i
i
i
gq
gq
gq
gq
gq
gq
gq
gq
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Therefore, )()( i
i
i gq  = )(
)(
i
j
j gq  = )(
)(
i
i
j gq  = )(
)(
i
j
i gq  =  )(
)(
i
k
i gq  = )(
)(
i
k
j gq  = 0.2500; )(
)(
i
i
k gq  = 
)()( i
j
k gq  = )(
)(
i
k
k gq  = )(
)(
i
l
k gq  = 0.2000;  )(
)(
i
k
l gq  = )(
)(
i
l
l gq  = 0.3333; CSi(gi) = CSj(gi) = 
 22500.02500.02500.0
2
1
  = 0.2813; CSk(gi) =  
2
2000.02000.02000.02000.0
2
1
  = 
0.3200; CSl(gi) =  
2
3333.03333.0
2
1
  = 0.2222; )()( i
i
i g  = )(
)(
i
j
j g  = )(
)(
i
i
j g  = )(
)(
i
j
i g  = 
)()( i
k
i g  = )(
)(
i
k
j g  =  
2
2500.0  = 0.0625; )()( i
i
k g  = )(
)(
i
j
k g  = )(
)(
i
k
k g  = )(
)(
i
l
k g  =  
 22000.0 = 0.0400;  )()( i
k
l g  = )(
)(
i
l
l g  =  
2
3333.0  = 0.1111; and PSi(gi) = PSj(gi) = PSk(gi) 
=  PSl(gi) = 0. 
 
Simulation 2:  = 1 and  = 0.5 
 
The output matrix in this case corresponds to: 
 























































































2857.0
1818.0
2857.0
1818.0
1967.0
1818.0
2308.0
2308.0
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
11190.000476.00952.0000
1364.010303.000606.000606.00606.0
00476.011190.02381.0000
0303.001364.012727.000606.00606.0
001148.01148.010656.00328.00328.0
0303.000303.000606.011061.01061.0
000385.00385.00385.00962.011346.0
000385.00385.00385.00962.01346.01
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
i
l
l
i
l
k
i
k
l
i
k
k
i
k
i
i
i
k
i
i
j
i
i
i
gq
gq
gq
gq
gq
gq
gq
gq
 
 
Therefore, )()( i
i
i gq  = )(
)(
i
j
j gq  = )(
)(
i
i
j gq  = )(
)(
i
j
i gq  = 0.2081; )(
)(
i
i
k gq  = )(
)(
i
j
k gq  = 0.1643; 
)()( i
k
i gq  = )(
)(
i
k
j gq  =0.1786; )(
)(
i
k
k gq  = 0.1348; )(
)(
i
k
l gq  = 0.2360; )(
)(
i
l
k gq  = 0.1858; 
)()( i
l
l gq  = 0.2870; CSi(gi) = CSj(gi) =  
2
1786.02081.02081.0
2
1
  = 0.1769; CSk(gi) = 
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 21858.01348.01643.01643.0
2
1
   = 0.2107; CSl(gi) =  
2
2870.02360.0
2
1
  = 0.1368; 
)()( i
i
i g  = )(
)(
i
j
j g  = )(
)(
i
i
j g  = )(
)(
i
j
i g  =  
2
2081.0
2
5.2
 = 0.0541; )()( i
i
k g  = )(
)(
i
j
k g  = 
 21643.0
2
5.2
 = 0.0337; )()( i
k
i g  = )(
)(
i
k
j g  =  
2
1786.0
2
5.2
 = 0.0399; )()( i
k
k g  = 
 21348.0
2
5.2
 = 0.0227; )()( i
k
l g  =  
2
2360.0
2
5.2
 = 0.0696; )()( i
l
k g  =  
2
1858.0
2
5.2
 = 
0.0432; )()( i
l
l g  =  
2
2870.0
2
5.2
 = 0.1030; PSi(gi) = PSj(gi) = 2081.0(
4
5.0
 + 0.2081 + 
0.1643)
2
 = 0.0421; PSk(gi) =  
2
2360.01348.01786.01786.0
4
5.0
  = 0.0662; and  PSl(gi) 
=    22870.01858.0
4
5.0
  = 0.0279. 
 
Simulation 3:  = 1 and  = 1.5 
 
The output matrix in this case is given by: 
 























































































2222.0
1538.0
2222.0
1538.0
1460.0
1538.0
1923.0
1923.0
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
12333.000667.01333.0000
2538.010462.000923.000923.00923.0
00667.012333.04667.0000
0462.002538.015077.000923.00923.0
001971.01971.010876.00438.00438.0
0462.000462.000923.012077.02077.0
000577.00577.00577.02019.012596.0
000577.00577.00577.02019.02596.01
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
i
l
l
i
l
k
i
k
l
i
k
k
i
k
i
i
i
k
i
i
j
i
i
i
gq
gq
gq
gq
gq
gq
gq
gq
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Therefore, )()( i
i
i gq  = )(
)(
i
j
j gq  = )(
)(
i
i
j gq  = )(
)(
i
j
i gq  = 0.1503; )(
)(
i
i
k gq  = )(
)(
i
j
k gq  = 0.1194; 
)()( i
k
i gq  = )(
)(
i
k
j gq  = 0.1214; )(
)(
i
k
k gq  = 0.0905; )(
)(
i
k
l gq  = 0.1542; )(
)(
i
l
k gq  = 0.1465; 
)()( i
l
l gq  = 0.2102; CSi(gi) = CSj(gi) =  
2
1214.01503.01503.0
2
1
  = 0.0890; CSk(gi) = 
 21465.00905.01194.01194.0
2
1
  = 0.1132; CSl(gi) =  
2
2102.01542.0
2
1
  = 0.0664; 
)()( i
i
i g  = )(
)(
i
j
j g  = )(
)(
i
i
j g  = )(
)(
i
j
i g  =  
2
1503.0
2
5.3
 = 0.0395; )()( i
i
k g  = )(
)(
i
j
k g  = 
 21194.0
2
5.3
 = 0.0249; )()( i
k
i g  = )(
)(
i
k
j g  =  
2
1214.0
2
5.3
 = 0.0258; )()( i
k
k g  = 
 20905.0
2
5.3
 = 0.0143; )()( i
k
l g  =  
2
1542.0
2
5.3
 = 0.0416; )()( i
l
k g  =  
2
1465.0
2
5.3
 = 
0.0376; )()( i
l
l g  =  
2
2102.0
2
5.3
 = 0.0773; PSi(gi) = PSj(gi) = 1503.0(
4
5.1
 + 0.1503 + 
0.1194)
2
 = 0.0662; PSk(gi) =  
2
1542.00905.01214.01214.0
4
5.1
  = 0.0891; and  PSl(gi) 
=    22102.01465.0
4
5.1
  = 0.0477. 
 
Network j 
 
In considering the equations presented in Section 3.3.1.1 it holds that )()( j
i
i gq  = )(
)(
j
l
l gq  = 
)1)(4(
)()3()()(2)1( )()()(



 j
i
jj
j
ij
j
j gqgqgq
; )()( j
i
j gq  = )(
)(
j
i
k gq  = )(
)(
j
l
j gq  = )(
)(
j
l
k gq  
= 
10153
)()3()(2)(4)1(2
2
)()()(



 j
i
ij
j
jj
j
i gqgqgq
; )()( j
j
j gq  = )(
)(
j
k
k gq  = )(
)(
j
j
k gq  = 
)()( j
k
j gq  = 
10153
)()3(2)(2)(2)1(2
2
)()()(



 j
j
ij
i
jj
i
i gqgqgq
; )()( j
j
i gq  = )(
)(
j
j
l gq  = 
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)()( j
k
i gq  = )(
)(
j
k
l gq  = 
8123
)()2(2)(2)1(2
2
)()(



 j
j
jj
i
j gqgq
; CSi(gj) = CSl(gj) = 
 )(
2
1 )(
j
i
i gq  + )(
)(
j
j
i gq  + 
2)( )( j
k
i gq ; CSj(gj) = CSk(gj) = 
 2)()()()( )()()()(
2
1
j
l
jj
k
jj
j
jj
i
j gqgqgqgq  ; )(
)(
j
i
i g  = )(
)(
j
l
l g  =  
2)( )(
2
)2(
j
i
i gq

; )()( j
i
j g  
= )()( j
i
k g  = )(
)(
j
l
j g  = )(
)(
j
l
k g  =  
2)( )(
2
)2(
j
i
j gq

; )()( j
j
j g  = )(
)(
j
k
k g  = )(
)(
j
j
k g  = 
)()( j
k
j g  =  
2)( )(
2
)2(
j
j
j gq

; )()( j
j
i g  = )(
)(
j
j
l g  = )(
)(
j
k
i g  = )(
)(
j
k
l g  = 
 2)( )(
2
)2(
j
j
i gq

; PSi(gj) = PSl(gj) =    
2)()()( )()()(
4
j
i
kj
i
jj
i
i gqgqgq 

; and PSj(gj) = PSk(gj) 
=    2)()()()( )()()()(
4
j
j
lj
j
kj
j
jj
j
i gqgqgqgq 

. 
 
The output quantities involved in this network can be obtained by solving the following 
output matrix: 
 
























































































8123
)1(2
10153
)1(2
10153
)1(2
4
)(
)(
)(
)(
1
8123
)2(2
8123
2
0
10153
)3(2
1
10153
2
10153
2
10153
4
10153
2
1
10153
)3(
)1)(4()1)(4(
2
)1)(4(
)3(
1
2
2
2
)(
)(
)(
)(
22
222
222






























j
j
i
j
j
j
j
i
j
j
i
i
gq
gq
gq
gq
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Simulation 1:  = 1 and  = 0 
 
The output matrix in this case is given by: 
 











































2500.0
2000.0
2000.0
2500.0
)(
)(
)(
)(
1000
0100
0010
0001
)(
)(
)(
)(
j
j
i
j
j
j
j
i
j
j
i
i
gq
gq
gq
gq
 
 
Therefore, )()( j
i
i gq  = )(
)(
j
l
l gq  = )(
)(
j
j
i gq  = )(
)(
j
j
l gq  = )(
)(
j
k
i gq  = )(
)(
j
k
l gq  = 0.2500; )(
)(
j
i
j gq  
= )()( j
i
k gq  = )(
)(
j
l
j gq  = )(
)(
j
l
k gq  = )(
)(
j
j
j gq  = )(
)(
j
k
k gq  = )(
)(
j
j
k gq  = )(
)(
j
k
j gq  = 0.2000; CSi(gj) 
= CSl(gj) =  22500.02500.02500.0
2
1
  = 0.2813; CSj(gj) = CSk(gj) = 
 22000.02000.02000.02000.0
2
1
  = 0.3200; )()( j
i
i g  = )(
)(
j
l
l g  = )(
)(
j
j
i g  = )(
)(
j
j
l g  
= )()( j
k
i g  = )(
)(
j
k
l g  =  
2
2500.0  = 0.0625; )(
)(
j
i
j g  = )(
)(
j
i
k g  = )(
)(
j
l
j g  = )(
)(
j
l
k g  = 
)()( j
j
j g  = )(
)(
j
k
k g  = )(
)(
j
j
k g  = )(
)(
j
k
j g  =  
2
2000.0  = 0.0400; and PSi(gj) = PSj(gj) = 
PSk(gj) =    PSl(gj) = 0.  
 
Simulation 2:  = 1 and  = 0.5 
 
The output matrix in this case corresponds to: 
 















































2034.0
1644.0
1644.0
2222.0
)(
)(
)(
)(
11695.00678.00
1918.010548.00548.0
1096.00548.010959.0
0741.01481.02593.01
)(
)(
)(
)(
j
j
i
j
j
j
j
i
j
j
i
i
gq
gq
gq
gq
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Therefore, )()( j
i
i gq  = )(
)(
j
l
l gq  = 0.2135; )(
)(
j
i
j gq  = )(
)(
j
i
k gq  = )(
)(
j
l
j gq  = )(
)(
j
l
k gq  = 0.1729; 
)()( j
j
j gq  = )(
)(
j
k
k gq  = )(
)(
j
j
k gq  = )(
)(
j
k
j gq  = 0.1492; )(
)(
j
j
i gq  = )(
)(
j
j
l gq  = )(
)(
j
k
i gq  = 
)()( j
k
l gq  = 0.1898; CSi(gj) = CSl(gj) =  2135.0
2
1
 + 0.1898 + 21898.0   = 0.1759; CSj(gj) = 
CSk(gj) =  
2
1729.01492.01492.01729.0
2
1
  = 0.2075; )()( j
i
i g  = )(
)(
j
l
l g  = 
 22135.0
2
5.2
 = 0.0570; )()( j
i
j g  = )(
)(
j
i
k g  = )(
)(
j
l
j g  = )(
)(
j
l
k g  =  
2
1729.0
2
5.2
 = 0.0374; 
)()( j
j
j g  = )(
)(
j
k
k g  = )(
)(
j
j
k g  = )(
)(
j
k
j g  =  
2
1492.0
2
5.2
 = 0.0278; )()( j
j
i g  = )(
)(
j
j
l g  = 
)()( j
k
i g  = )(
)(
j
k
l g  =  
2
1898.0
2
5.2
 = 0.0450; PSi(gj) = PSl(gj) =  2135.0
4
5.0
 + 0.1729 + 
21729.0  = 0.0391; and PSj(gj) = PSk(gj) =  
2
1898.01492.01492.01898.0
4
5.0
  = 
0.0575. 
 
Simulation 3:  = 1 and  = 1.5 
 
The output matrix in this case is given by: 
 















































1527.0
1274.0
1274.0
1818.0
)(
)(
)(
)(
13206.00916.00
3439.010764.00764.0
1529.00764.011720.0
1091.02182.04909.01
)(
)(
)(
)(
j
j
i
j
j
j
j
i
j
j
i
i
gq
gq
gq
gq
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Therefore, )()( j
i
i gq  = )(
)(
j
l
l gq  = 0.1557; )(
)(
j
i
j gq  = )(
)(
j
i
k gq  = )(
)(
j
l
j gq  = )(
)(
j
l
k gq  = 0.1286; 
)()( j
j
j gq  = )(
)(
j
k
k gq  = )(
)(
j
j
k gq  = )(
)(
j
k
j gq  = 0.1040; )(
)(
j
j
i gq  = )(
)(
j
j
l gq  = )(
)(
j
k
i gq  = 
)()( j
k
l gq  = 0.1311; CSi(gj) = CSl(gj) =  21311.01311.01557.0
2
1
  = 0.0873; CSj(gj) = 
CSk(gj) =  
2
1286.01040.01040.01286.0
2
1
  = 0.1082; )()( j
i
i g  = )(
)(
j
l
l g  = 
 21557.0
2
5.3
 = 0.0424; )()( j
i
j g  = )(
)(
j
i
k g  = )(
)(
j
l
j g  = )(
)(
j
l
k g  =  
2
1286.0
2
5.3
 = 0.0289; 
)()( j
j
j g  = )(
)(
j
k
k g  = )(
)(
j
j
k g  = )(
)(
j
k
j g  =  
2
1040.0
2
5.3
 = 0.0189; )()( j
j
i g  = )(
)(
j
j
l g  = 
)()( j
k
i g  = )(
)(
j
k
l g  =  
2
1311.0
2
5.3
 = 0.0301; PSi(gj) = PSl(gj) =  1557.0
4
5.1
 + 0.1286 + 
21286.0  = 0.0639; and PSj(gj) = PSk(gj) =  
2
1311.01040.01040.01311.0
4
5.1
  = 0.0829. 
 
Network k 
 
In considering the equations presented in Section 3.3.1.1 it holds that )()( k
i
i gq  = )(
)(
k
i
j gq  = 
)()( k
i
k gq  = )(
)(
k
i
l gq  = )(
)(
k
j
i gq  = )(
)(
k
j
j gq  = )(
)(
k
j
k gq  = )(
)(
k
j
l gq  = )(
)(
k
k
i gq  = )(
)(
k
k
j gq  = 
)()( k
k
k gq  = )(
)(
k
k
l gq  = )(
)(
k
l
i gq  = )(
)(
k
l
j gq  = )(
)(
k
l
k gq  = )(
)(
k
l
l gq  = 
105
2


; CSi(gk) = CSj(gk) = 
CSk(gk) = CSl(gk) =  
2)()()()( )()()()(
2
1
k
l
ik
k
ik
j
ik
i
i gqgqgqgq  ; )(
)(
k
i
i g  = )(
)(
k
i
j g  = 
)()( k
i
k g  = )(
)(
k
i
l g  = )(
)(
k
j
i g  = )(
)(
k
j
j g  = )(
)(
k
j
k g  = )(
)(
k
j
l g  = )(
)(
k
k
i g  = )(
)(
k
k
j g  = 
)()( k
k
k g  = )(
)(
k
k
l g  = )(
)(
k
l
i g  = )(
)(
k
l
j g  = )(
)(
k
l
k g  = )(
)(
k
l
l g  =  
2)( )(
2
)2(
k
i
i gq

; and 
PSi(gk) = PSj(gk) = PSk(gk) =  PSl(gk) =    
2)()()()( )()()()(
4
k
i
lk
i
kk
i
jk
i
i gqgqgqgq 

. 
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Simulation 1:  = 1 and  = 0 
  
)()( k
i
i gq  = )(
)(
k
i
j gq  = )(
)(
k
i
k gq  = )(
)(
k
i
l gq  = )(
)(
k
j
i gq  = )(
)(
k
j
j gq  = )(
)(
k
j
k gq  = )(
)(
k
j
l gq  = 
)()( k
k
i gq  = )(
)(
k
k
j gq  = )(
)(
k
k
k gq  = )(
)(
k
k
l gq  = )(
)(
k
l
i gq  = )(
)(
k
l
j gq  = )(
)(
k
l
k gq  = )(
)(
k
l
l gq  = 
2000.0 ; CSi(gk) = CSj(gk) = CSk(gk) = CSl(gk) =  
2
2000.02000.02000.02000.0
2
1
  = 
0.3200; )()( k
i
i g  = )(
)(
k
i
j g  = )(
)(
k
i
k g  = )(
)(
k
i
l g  = )(
)(
k
j
i g  = )(
)(
k
j
j g  = )(
)(
k
j
k g  = 
)()( k
j
l g  = )(
)(
k
k
i g  = )(
)(
k
k
j g  = )(
)(
k
k
k g  = )(
)(
k
k
l g  = )(
)(
k
l
i g  = )(
)(
k
l
j g  = )(
)(
k
l
k g  = 
)()( k
l
l g  =  
2
2000.0  = 0.0400; and PSi(gk) = PSj(gk) = PSk(gk) =  PSl(gk) = 0. 
  
Simulation 2:  = 1 and  = 0.5 
 
)()( k
i
i gq  = )(
)(
k
i
j gq  = )(
)(
k
i
k gq  = )(
)(
k
i
l gq  = )(
)(
k
j
i gq  = )(
)(
k
j
j gq  = )(
)(
k
j
k gq  = )(
)(
k
j
l gq  = 
)()( k
k
i gq  = )(
)(
k
k
j gq  = )(
)(
k
k
k gq  = )(
)(
k
k
l gq  = )(
)(
k
l
i gq  = )(
)(
k
l
j gq  = )(
)(
k
l
k gq  = )(
)(
k
l
l gq  = 
0.1600; CSi(gk) = CSj(gk) = CSk(gk) = CSl(gk) =  
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Simulation 3:  = 1 and  = 1.5 
 
)()( k
i
i gq  = )(
)(
k
i
j gq  = )(
)(
k
i
k gq  = )(
)(
k
i
l gq  = )(
)(
k
j
i gq  = )(
)(
k
j
j gq  = )(
)(
k
j
k gq  = )(
)(
k
j
l gq  = 
)()( k
k
i gq  = )(
)(
k
k
j gq  = )(
)(
k
k
k gq  = )(
)(
k
k
l gq  = )(
)(
k
l
i gq  = )(
)(
k
l
j gq  = )(
)(
k
l
k gq  = )(
)(
k
l
l gq  = 
0.1143; CSi(gk) = CSj(gk) = CSk(gk) = CSl(gk) =  
2
1143.01143.01143.01143.0
2
1
  = 
0.1045; )()( k
i
i g  = )(
)(
k
i
j g  = )(
)(
k
i
k g  = )(
)(
k
i
l g  = )(
)(
k
j
i g  = )(
)(
k
j
j g  = )(
)(
k
j
k g  = 
)()( k
j
l g  = )(
)(
k
k
i g  = )(
)(
k
k
j g  = )(
)(
k
k
k g  = )(
)(
k
k
l g  = )(
)(
k
l
i g  = )(
)(
k
l
j g  = )(
)(
k
l
k g  = 
)()( k
l
l g  =  
2
1143.0
2
5.3
 = 0.0229; and PSi(gk) = PSj(gk) = PSk(gk) =  PSl(gk) =   
 21143.01143.01143.01143.0
4
5.1
  = 0.0784. 
 
 
 
 
484 
 
APPENDIX B 
 
Simulations for the case of symmetrical countries under endogenous tariffs 
 
Network a 
 
In considering the equations presented in Section 4.2.1.4, the following generic expressions 
are obtained: 
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Simulation 4:  = 1 and  = 0 
 
From the generic equations presented above it is concluded that 
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Simulation 5:  = 1 and  = 0.5 
 
From the generic equations presented above it is concluded that: 
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)(0279.0)(0279.0)(3962.0)(0279.01600.0)()( alakajaia
j
j gTgTgTgTgq    
)(0279.0)(3149.0)(0610.0)(0279.01600.0)()( alakajaia
j
k gTgTgTgTgq    
)(3149.0)(0279.0)(0610.0)(0279.01600.0)()( alakajaia
j
l gTgTgTgTgq    
)(0279.0)(0610.0)(0279.0)(3149.01600.0)()( alakajaia
k
i gTgTgTgTgq    
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)(0279.0)(0610.0)(3149.0)(0279.01600.0)()( alakajaia
k
j gTgTgTgTgq   
)(0279.0)(3962.0)(0279.0)(0279.01600.0)()( alakajaia
k
k gTgTgTgTgq     
)(3149.0)(0610.0)(0279.0)(0279.01600.0)()( alakajaia
k
l gTgTgTgTgq    
)(0610.0)(0279.0)(0279.0)(3149.01600.0)()( alakajaia
l
i gTgTgTgTgq    
)(0610.0)(0279.0)(3149.0)(0279.01600.0)()( alakajaia
l
j gTgTgTgTgq   
)(0610.0)(3149.0)(0279.0)(0279.01600.0)()( alakajaia
l
k gTgTgTgTgq    
)(3962.0)(0279.0)(0279.0)(0279.01600.0)()( alakajaia
l
l gTgTgTgTgq  .  
 
Solving by substitution, the following expressions are obtained: )( ai gCS  =
 2)()()()( )()()()(
2
1
a
l
ia
k
ia
j
ia
i
i gqgqgqgq   = 0.5(0.6400  )(5486.0 ai gT  + )(0229.0 aj gT  + 
)(0229.0 ak gT  + )(0229.0 al gT )
2
;  2)()( )(
2
)2(
)( gqg iia
i
i



  = 1.25(0.1600 + 
)(0279.0)(0279.0)(0279.0)(3962.0 alakajai gTgTgTgT  )
2
;  2)()( )(
2
)2(
)( gqg ija
i
j




 
=  2)(0279.0)(0279.0)(3149.0)(0610.01600.025.1 alakajai gTgTgTgT  ; )()( aik g  =  
 2)( )(
2
)2(
gq ik

 
= 1.25(0.1600  )(0610.0 ai gT  + )(0279.0 aj gT   )(3149.0 ak gT  + 
)(0279.0 al gT )
2
;  2)()( )(
2
)2(
)( gqg ila
i
l



  = 1.25(0.1600  )(0610.0 ai gT  + )(0279.0 aj gT  
+ )(0279.0 ak gT   )(3149.0 al gT )
2
;  2)()()()( )()()()(
4
)( a
i
la
i
ka
i
ja
i
iai gqgqgqgqgPS 

 =  
 2)(2311.0)(2311.0)(2311.0)(2133.06400.0125.0 alakajai gTgTgTgT  ; )( ai gTR  = 
 )()()()( )()()( aliakiajiai gqgqgqgT   = )()(0051.0)(9488.0)(4800.0 2 aiajaiai gTgTgTgT   
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 )()(0051.0 aiak gTgT   )()(0051.0 aial gTgT . Thus, the welfare function in this case is 
given by:  
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)()(0051.0)()(0051.0
)()(0051.0)(9488.0)(4800.0
)(2311.0)(2311.0)(2311.0)(2133.06400.0125.0
)(3149.0)(0279.0)(0279.0)(0610.01600.025.1
)(0279.0)(3149.0)(0279.0)(0610.01600.025.1
)(0279.0)(0279.0)(3149.0)(0610.01600.025.1
)(0279.0)(0279.0)(0279.0)(3962.01600.025.1
)(0229.0)(0229.0)(0229.0)(5486.06400.05.0
)()()()()(
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
aialaiak
aiajaiai
alakajai
alakajai
alakajai
alakajai
alakajai
alakajai
aiaiaiaiai
gTgTgTgT
gTgTgTgT
gTgTgTgT
gTgTgTgT
gTgTgTgT
gTgTgTgT
gTgTgTgT
gTgTgTgT
gTRgPSggCSgW








 
   
 
The first and second order conditions of the welfare function are:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
);(0372.0)(0372.0)(0372.0)(1569.12483.0
)(0051.0)(0051.0)(0051.0)(8976.14800.0
)(2311.0)(2311.0)(2311.0)(2133.06400.0)2133.0)(25.0(
)(3149.0)(0279.0)(0279.0)(0610.01600.0)0610.0)(5.2(
)(0279.0)(3149.0)(0279.0)(0610.01600.0)0610.0)(5.2(
)(0279.0)(0279.0)(3149.0)(0610.01600.0)0610.0)(5.2(
)(0279.0)(0279.0)(0279.0)(3962.01600.0)3962.0)(5.2(
)(0229.0)(0229.0)(0229.0)(5486.06400.0)5486.0(
)(
)(
alakajai
alakajai
alakajai
alakajai
alakajai
alakajai
alakajai
alakajai
ai
ai
gTgTgTgT
gTgTgTgT
gTgTgTgT
gTgTgTgT
gTgTgTgT
gTgTgTgT
gTgTgTgT
gTgTgTgT
gT
gW










 
1569.1
)(
)(
2
2



ai
ai
gT
gW
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Therefore the optimal tariff in country i is )(* ai gT = 0.2146 + )(0322.0 aj gT  + 
)(0322.0 ak gT  + )(0322.0 al gT . Given symmetry it is concluded that the optimal tariff that 
maximises welfare in countries i, j, k, and l are )(* ai gT  = )(
*
aj gT  = )(
*
ak gT  = )(
*
al gT  = 
0.2376. Therefore, )( ai gCS  = )( aj gCS  = )( ak gCS  = )( al gCS  = 0.1383; )( ai g  = )( aj g  
= )( ak g  = )( al g  =  0.1203; )( ai gPS  = )( aj gPS  = )( ak gPS  = )( al gPS  = 0.0346; 
)( ai gTR  = )( aj gTR  = )( ak gTR  =  )( al gTR  = 0.0599; 
3531.0)()()()(  alakajai gWgWgWgW . 
 
Simulation 6:  = 1 and  = 1.5 
 
From the generic equations presented above it is concluded that: 
 
)(0337.0)(0337.0)(0337.0)(2416.01143)()( alakajaia
i
i gTgTgTgTgq      
)(0337.0)(0337.0)(2396.0)(0565.01143)()( alakajaia
i
j gTgTgTgTgq     
)(0337.0)(2396.0)(0337.0)(0565.01143)()( alakajaia
i
k gTgTgTgTgq     
)(2396.0)(0337.0)(0337.0)(0565.01143)()( alakajaia
i
l gTgTgTgTgq     
)(0337.0)(0337.0)(0565.0)(2396.01143)()( alakajaia
j
i gTgTgTgTgq     
)(0337.0)(0337.0)(2416.0)(0337.01143)()( alakajaia
j
j gTgTgTgTgq     
)(0337.0)(2396.0)(0565.0)(0337.01143)()( alakajaia
j
k gTgTgTgTgq     
)(2396.0)(0337.0)(0565.0)(0337.01143)()( alakajaia
j
l gTgTgTgTgq     
)(0337.0)(0565.0)(0337.0)(2396.01143)()( alakajaia
k
i gTgTgTgTgq     
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)(0337.0)(0565.0)(2396.0)(0337.01143)()( alakajaia
k
j gTgTgTgTgq     
)(0337.0)(2416.0)(0337.0)(0337.01143)()( alakajaia
k
k gTgTgTgTgq      
)(2396.0)(0565.0)(0337.0)(0337.01143)()( alakajaia
k
l gTgTgTgTgq     
)(0565.0)(0337.0)(0337.0)(2396.01143)()( alakajaia
l
i gTgTgTgTgq     
)(0565.0)(0337.0)(2396.0)(0337.01143)()( alakajaia
l
j gTgTgTgTgq     
)(0565.0)(2396.0)(0337.0)(0337.01143)()( alakajaia
l
k gTgTgTgTgq     
)(2416.0)(0337.0)(0337.0)(0337.01143)()( alakajaia
l
l gTgTgTgTgq      
 
Solving by substitution, the following expressions are obtained: )( ai gCS  = 
2
1
( )()( a
i
i gq  + 
)()( a
j
i gq  + )(
)(
a
k
i gq  + )(
)(
a
l
i gq )
2
 = 0.5(0.4571  )(4770.0 ai gT  + )(0447.0 aj gT  + 
)(0447.0 ak gT  + )(0447.0 al gT )
2
;  2)()( )(
2
)2(
)( gqg iia
i
i



  = 1.75(1143 + 
)(0337.0)(0337.0)(0337.0)(2416.0 alakajai gTgTgTgT  )
2
;  2)()( )(
2
)2(
)( gqg ija
i
j



  
= 1.75(1143  )(0565.0 ai gT   )(2396.0 aj gT  + )(0337.0 ak gT  +  )(0337.0 al gT )
2
  ; 
)()( a
i
k g  =  
2)( )(
2
)2(
gq ik

 = 1.75(1143  )(0565.0 ai gT  + )(0337.0 aj gT   )(2396.0 ak gT  
+  )(0337.0 al gT )
2
;  2)()( )(
2
)2(
)( gqg ila
i
l



  = 1.75(1143  )(0565.0 ai gT  + 
)(0337.0 aj gT  + )(0337.0 ak gT    )(2396.0 al gT )
2
; )( ai gPS  = 
4

( )()( a
i
i gq  + )(
)(
a
i
j gq  + 
)()( a
i
k gq  + )(
)(
a
i
l gq )
2
 = 0.375(0.4571 + )(0722.0 ai gT   )(1383.0 aj gT   )(1383.0 ak gT   
)(1383.0 al gT )
2
; )( ai gTR   = )( ai gT ( )(
)(
a
j
i gq  + )(
)(
a
k
i gq  + )(
)(
a
l
i gq ) =  )(3429.0 ai gT   
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)(7187.0 2 ai gT  + )()(0110.0 aiaj gTgT  + )()(0110.0 aiak gTgT  + )()(0110.0 aial gTgT . Thus, 
the welfare function in this case is given by: 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
)()(0110.0)()(0110.0
)()(0110.0)(7187.0)(3429.0
)(1383.0)(1383.0)(1383.0)(0722.04571.0375.0
)(2396.0)(0337.0)(0337.0)(0565.0114375.1
)(0337.0)(2396.0)(0337.0)(0565.0114375.1
)(0337.0)(0337.0)(2396.0)(0565.0114375.1
)(0337.0)(0337.0)(0337.0)(2416.0114375.1
)(0447.0)(0447.0)(0447.0)(4770.04571.05.0
)()()()()(
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
aialaiak
aiajaiai
alakajai
alakajai
alakajai
alakajai
alakajai
alakajai
aiaiaiaiai
gTgTgTgT
gTgTgTgT
gTgTgTgT
gTgTgTgT
gTgTgTgT
gTgTgTgT
gTgTgTgT
gTgTgTgT
gTRgPSggCSgW








 
    
 
The first and second order conditions of the welfare function are:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)(0528.0)(0528.0)(0528.0)(0498.11722.0
)(0110.0)(0110.0)(0110.0)(4374.13429.0
)(1383.0)(1383.0)(1383.0)(0722.04571.0)0722.0)(75.0(
)(2396.0)(0337.0)(0337.0)(0565.01143)0565.0)(5.3(
)(0337.0)(2396.0)(0337.0)(0565.01143)0565.0)(5.3(
)(0337.0)(0337.0)(2396.0)(0565.01143)0565.0)(5.3(
)(0337.0)(0337.0)(0337.0)(2416.01143)2416.0)(5.3(
)(0447.0)(0447.0)(0447.0)(4770.04571.0)4770.0(
)(
)(
alakajai
alakajai
alakajai
alakajai
alakajai
alakajai
alakajai
alakajai
ai
ai
gTgTgTgT
gTgTgTgT
gTgTgTgT
gTgTgTgT
gTgTgTgT
gTgTgTgT
gTgTgTgT
gTgTgTgT
gT
gW











  
0498.1
)(
)(
2
2



ai
ai
gT
gW
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Therefore the optimal tariff that maximises the welfare function in country i is given by 
)(* ai gT  = 0.1649 + )(0503.0 aj gT  + )(0503.0 ak gT   + )(0503.0 al gT . Given symmetry it 
holds that )(* ai gT  = )(
*
aj gT  = )(
*
ak gT  = )(
*
al gT  = 0.1932. Using these tariffs it is 
concluded that: )( ai gCS  = )( aj gCS  = )( ak gCS  = )( al gCS  = 0.0764; 
0828.0)()()()(  alakajai gggg  ; )( ai gPS  = )( aj gPS  = )( ak gPS  = 
)( al gPS  = 0.0573; )( ai gTR  = )( aj gTR  = )( ak gTR  = )( al gTR  = 0.0406; )( ai gW  = 
)( aj gW  = )( ak gW  = )( al gW  = 0.2572. 
 
Network b 
 
In considering the equations presented in Section 4.2.1.4, the following generic expressions 
are obtained: 
 
   
 
 
  




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i
j
b
l
lb
l
kb
l
jb
j
lb
j
kb
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b
i
i
gqgqgq
gqgqgqgqgqgq
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   
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
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

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   
   
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Simulation 4:  = 1 and  = 0 
 
From the generic equations presented above it is concluded that 
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Using these outputs, the following results are obtained for country i: 
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Therefore the optimal tariff in countries i and k given symmetry are 
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Simulation 5:  = 1 and  = 0.5 
 
From the generic equations presented above it is concluded that: 
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Solving by substitution, the following expressions are obtained for country i: 
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=  2)()()()( )()()()(
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)(2311.0 bj gT  + )(1422.0 bk gT    )(2311.0 bl gT )
2
; and  )()()()( )()( blibjibibi gqgqgTgTR   
= )(3200.0 bi gT   )(8940.0
2
bi gT   )()(0330.0 bibj gTgT  + )()(0965.0 bibk gTgT    
)()(0330.0 bibl gTgT . Therefore welfare in country i is given by: 
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The first and second order conditions of the welfare function are: 
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This implies that the optimal tariff in country i is )(* bi gT  = 0.1133  
)(0033.0)(0346.0)(0033.0 blbkbj gTgTgT  . 
 
On the other hand, the following information is obtained for country j: 
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 = 1.25(0.1600 + )(0483.0 bi gT  + )(3962.0 bj gT  + )(0483.0 bk gT  + 
)(0279.0 bl gT )
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
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 2)(3149.0)(0483.0)(0610.0)(0483.01600.025.1 blbkbjbi gTgTgTgT  ; )( bj gPS  = 
 2)()()()( )()()()(
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j
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i gqgqgqgq 

 = 0.125(0.6400  )(3022.0 bi gT  + )(2133.0 bj gT  
 )(3022.0 bk gT   )(2311.0 bl gT )
2
; and )( bj gTR  = )( bj gT ( )(
)(
b
i
j gq  +  )(
)(
b
k
j gq  +  )(
)(
b
l
j gq ) 
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= )(4800.0 bj gT   )()(0330.0 bjbi gTgT   )(9448.0
2
bj gT   )()(0330.0 bjbk gTgT    
)()(0051.0 bjbl gTgT . Therefore welfare in country j is given by: 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
)()(0051.0)()(0330.0
)(9448.0)()(0330.0)(4800.0
)(2311.0)(3022.0)(2133.0)(3022.06400.0125.0
)(3149.0)(0483.0)(0610.0)(0483.01600.025.1
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The first and second conditions of this welfare function are: 
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This implies that the optimal tariff in country j is )(* bj gT  =  
)(0322.0)(0378.0)(0378.02146.0 blbkbi gTgTgT  . 
 
In relation to country k, the following information is obtained: 
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)(2311.0 bj gT  + )(1422.0 bk gT    )(2311.0 bl gT )
2
;  )()()()( )()( blkbjkbkbk gqgqgTgTR   = 
)(3200.0 bk gT  + )()(0965.0 bkbi gTgT   )()(0330.0 bkbj gTgT   )(8940.0
2
bk gT   
)()(0330.0 bkbl gTgT . Therefore welfare in country k is given by: 
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The first and second order conditions of this function are: 
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Therefore the optimal tariff in country k is given by )(* bk gT  =  
)(0033.0)(0033.0)(0346.01133.0 blbjbi gTgTgT  . 
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Finally, the following information is obtained for country l:  
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bl gT ;. Therefore welfare in country l is given by: 
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The first and second order conditions of this function are: 
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Therefore the optimal tariff in country l is )(* bl gT  = 0.2146 + )(0378.0 bi gT  + 
)(0322.0 bj gT  + )(0378.0 bk gT . 
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In considering the optimal tariff equations for countries i, j, k and l, the following equation 
system is obtained: 
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Optimal tariffs are obtained by solving this system. These tariffs are )(* bi gT  = )(
*
bk gT  = 
0.1158; and 2308.0)()(
**  blbj gTgT . Therefore, 1860.0)()(  bkbi gCSgCS ; )( bj gCS  =  
)( bl gCS  = 0.1363; 1166.0)()(  bkbi gg  ; 1276.0)()(  blbj gg  ; )( bi gPS  = 
)( bk gPS  = 0.0401; 0400.0)()(  blbj gPSgPS ; 0246.0)()(  bkbi gTRgTR ; )( bj gTR  = 
)( bl gTR  = 0.0584 ; 3673.0)()(  bkbi gWgW ; and 3623.0)()(  blbj gWgW . 
 
Simulation 6:  = 1 and  = 1.5 
 
From the generic equations presented above it is concluded that: 
 
)(0337.0)(0377.0)(0337.0)(1611.01143.0)()( blbkbjbib
i
i gTgTgTgTgq    
 
)(0337.0)(0377.0)(2396.0)(0377.01143.0)()( blbkbjbib
i
j gTgTgTgTgq      
)(0337.0)(1611.0)(0337.0)(0377.01143.0)()( blbkbjbib
i
k gTgTgTgTgq     
)(2396.0)(0377.0)(0337.0)(0377.01143.0)()( blbkbjbib
i
l gTgTgTgTgq      
)(0337.0)(0526.0)(0565.0)(3201.01143.0)()( blbkbjbib
j
i gTgTgTgTgq     
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)(0337.0)(0526.0)(2416.0)(0526.01143.0)()( blbkbjbib
j
j gTgTgTgTgq     
)(0337.0)(3201.0)(0565.0)(0526.01143.0)()( blbkbjbib
j
k gTgTgTgTgq     
)(2396.0)(0526.0)(0565.0)(0526.01143.0)()( blbkbjbib
j
l gTgTgTgTgq     
)(0337.0)(0377.0)(0337.0)(1611.01143.0)()( blbkbjbib
k
i gTgTgTgTgq     
)(0337.0)(0377.0)(2396.0)(0377.01143.0)()( blbkbjbib
k
j gTgTgTgTgq     
)(0337.0)(1611.0)(0337.0)(0377.01143.0)()( blbkbjbib
k
k gTgTgTgTgq     
)(2396.0)(0377.0)(0337.0)(0377.01143.0)()( blbkbjbib
k
l gTgTgTgTgq     
)(0565.0)(0526.0)(0337.0)(3201.01143.0)()( blbkbjbib
l
i gTgTgTgTgq     
)(0565.0)(0526.0)(2396.0)(0526.01143.0)()( blbkbjbib
l
j gTgTgTgTgq     
)(0565.0)(3201.0)(0337.0)(0526.01143.0)()( blbkbjbib
l
k gTgTgTgTgq     
)(2416.0)(0526.0)(0337.0)(0526.01143.0)()( blbkbjbib
l
l gTgTgTgTgq      
 
Solving by substitution, the following expressions are obtained for country i: 
 
 2)()()()( )()()()(
2
1
)( b
l
ib
k
ib
j
ib
i
ibi gqgqgqgqgCS   = 0.5(0.4571  )(3180.0 bi gT  + 
)(0447.0 bj gT  + )(0298.0 bk gT  + )(0447.0 bl gT )
2
;  2)()( )(
2
)2(
)( b
i
ib
i
i gqg



  =    
 2)(0337.0)(0377.0)(0337.0)(1611.01143.075.1 blbkbjbi gTgTgTgT  ; )()( bij g  = 
 2)( )(
2
)2(
b
i
j gq

 = 1.75(0.1143  )(0377.0 bi gT   )(2396.0 bj gT   )(0377.0 bk gT  +  
)(0337.0 bl gT )
2
; )()( b
i
k g  =  
2)( )(
2
)2(
b
i
k gq

 = 1.75(0.1143  )(0377.0 bi gT  + 
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)(0337.0 bj gT  + )(1611.0 bk gT  +  )(0337.0 bl gT )
2
; )()( b
i
l g  =  
2)( )(
2
)2(
b
i
l gq

 = 
1.75(0.1143  )(0377.0 bi gT  + )(0337.0 bj gT   )(0377.0 bk gT    )(2396.0 bl gT )
2
; )( bi gPS  
=  2)()()()( )()()()(
4
b
i
lb
i
kb
i
jb
i
i gqgqgqgq 

 = 0.375(0.4571 + )(0481.0 bi gT   
)(1383.0 bj gT  + )(0481.0 bk gT    )(1383.0 bl gT )
2
; and )( bi gTR  = 
 )()()( )()( blibjibi gqgqgT   = )(2286.0 bi gT   )(6402.0 2 bi gT   )()(0227.0 bibj gTgT  + 
)()(1051.0 bibk gTgT   )()(0227.0 bibl gTgT . Therefore welfare in country i is given by:     
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
)()(0227.0)()(1051.0
)()(0227.0)(6402.0)(2286.0
)(1383.0)(0481.0)(1383.0)(0481.04571.0375.0
)(2396.0)(0377.0)(0337.0)(0377.01143.075.1
)(0337.0)(1611.0)(0337.0)(0377.01143.075.1
)(0337.0)(0377.0)(2396.0)(0377.01143.075.1
)(0337.0)(0377.0)(0337.0)(1611.01143.075.1
)(0447.0)(0298.0)(0447.0)(3180.04571.05.0
)()()()()(
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
biblbibk
bibjbibi
blbkbjbi
blbkbjbi
blbkbjbi
blbkbjbi
blbkbjbi
blbkbjbi
bibibibibi
gTgTgTgT
gTgTgTgT
gTgTgTgT
gTgTgTgT
gTgTgTgT
gTgTgTgT
gTgTgTgT
gTgTgTgT
gTRgPSggCSgW








 
   
 
The first and second order conditions of this function are: 
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 
 
 
 
 
 
)(0002.0)(0648.0)(0002.0)(0718.11189.0
)(0227.0)(1051.0)(0227.0)(2804.12286.0
)(1383.0)(0481.0)(1383.0)(0481.04571.0)0481.0)(75.0(
)(2396.0)(0377.0)(0337.0)(0377.01143.0)0377.0)(5.3(
)(0337.0)(1611.0)(0337.0)(0377.01143.0)0377.0)(5.3(
)(0337.0)(0377.0)(2396.0)(0377.01143.0)0377.0)(5.3(
)(0337.0)(0377.0)(0337.0)(1611.01143.0)1611.0)(5.3(
)(0447.0)(0298.0)(0447.0)(3180.04571.0)3180.0(
)(
)(
blbkbjbi
blbkbjbi
blbkbjbi
blbkbjbi
blbkbjbi
blbkbjbi
blbkbjbi
blbkbjbi
bi
bi
gTgTgTgT
gTgTgTgT
gTgTgTgT
gTgTgTgT
gTgTgTgT
gTgTgTgT
gTgTgTgT
gTgTgTgT
gT
gW











  
0718.1
)(
)(
2
2



bi
bi
gT
gW
  
 
Therefore the optimal tariff in country i is )(* bi gT  = 0.1109   )(0002.0 bj gT  + 
)(0605.0 bk gT   )(0002.0 bl gT . 
 
In relation to country j, the following results hold: 
 
 2)()()()( )()()()(
2
1
)( b
l
jb
k
jb
j
jb
i
jbj gqgqgqgqgCS   = 0.5(0.4571 + )(0298.0 bi gT   
)(4771.0 bj gT  + )(0298.0 bk gT  + )(0447.0 bl gT )
2
; )()( b
j
i g  =  
2)( )(
2
)2(
b
j
i gq

 =   
 2)(0337.0)(0526.0)(0565.0)(3201.01143.075.1 blbkbjbi gTgTgTgT  ;  )()( bjj g  = 
 2)( )(
2
)2(
b
j
j gq

 = 1.75(0.1143 + )(0526.0 bi gT  + )(2416.0 bj gT + )(0526.0 bk gT  + 
)(0337.0 bl gT )
2
; )()( b
j
k g  =  
2)( )(
2
)2(
b
j
k gq

 = 1.75(0.1143 + )(0526.0 bi gT   
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)(0565.0 bj gT   )(3201.0 bk gT  + )(0337.0 bl gT )
2
; )()( b
j
l g  =  
2)( )(
2
)2(
b
j
l gq

 = 
1.75(0.1143 + )(0526.0 bi gT   )(0565.0 bj gT  +  )(0526.0 bk gT   )(2396.0 bl gT )
2
; )( bj gPS  
=  2)()()()( )()()()(
4
b
j
lb
j
kb
j
jb
j
i gqgqgqgq 

 = 0.375(0.4571  )(1624.0 bi gT  + 
)(0722.0 bj gT   )(1624.0 bk gT   )(1384.0 bl gT )
2
; )( bj gTR  = )( bj gT ( )(
)(
b
i
j gq  + )(
)(
b
k
j gq  + 
)()( b
l
j gq ) = )(3429.0 bj gT   )()(0228.0 bjbi gTgT   )(7187.0
2
bj gT   )()(0228.0 bjbk gTgT  +  
)()(0110.0 bjbl gTgT . Therefore welfare in country j is given by: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)()(0110.0)()(0228.0
)(7187.0)()(0228.0)(3429.0
)(1384.0)(1624.0)(0722.0)(1624.04571.0375.0
)(2396.0)(0526.0)(0565.0)(0526.01143.075.1
)(0337.0)(3201.0)(0565.0)(0526.01143.075.1
)(0337.0)(0526.0)(2416.0)(0526.01143.075.1
)(0337.0)(0526.0)(0565.0)(3201.01143.075.1
)(0447.0)(0298.0)(4771.0)(0298.04571.05.0
)()()()()(
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
bjblbjbk
bjbjbibj
blbkbjbi
blbkbjbi
blbkbjbi
blbkbjbi
blbkbjbi
blbkbjbi
bjbjbjbjbj
gTgTgTgT
gTgTgTgT
gTgTgTgT
gTgTgTgT
gTgTgTgT
gTgTgTgT
gTgTgTgT
gTgTgTgT
gTRgPSggCSgW








 
  
 
The first and second order conditions of the welfare function are: 
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 
 
 
 
 
 
)(0447.0)(0412.0)(9681.0)(0412.01783.0
)(0110.0)(0228.0)(4374.1)(0228.03429.0
)(1384.0)(1624.0)(0722.0)(1624.04571.0)0722.0)(75.0(
)(2396.0)(0526.0)(0565.0)(0526.01143.0)0565.0)(5.3(
)(0337.0)(3201.0)(0565.0)(0526.01143.0)0565.0)(5.3(
)(0337.0)(0526.0)(2416.0)(0526.01143.0)2416.0)(5.3(
)(0337.0)(0526.0)(0565.0)(3201.01143.0)0565.0)(5.3(
)(0447.0)(0298.0)(4771.0)(0298.04571.0)4771.0(
)(
)(
2
2
2
2
blbkbjbi
blbkbjbi
blbkbjbi
blbkbjbi
blbkbjbi
blbkbjbi
blbkbjbi
blbkbjbi
bj
bj
gTgTgTgT
gTgTgTgT
gTgTgTgT
gTgTgTgT
gTgTgTgT
gTgTgTgT
gTgTgTgT
gTgTgTgT
gT
gW











 
 
9681.0
)(
)(
2
2



bj
bj
gT
gW
  
 
Consequently the optimal tariff in country j is )(
*
bj gT  = 0.1842 + )(0425.0 bi gT  + 
)(0425.0 bk gT  + )(0462.0 bl gT . Using symmetry across countries and the optimal tariff of 
country i it is concluded that )(0004.01180.0)(
*
bjbi gTgT   and )(
*
bj gT  = 0.1931 + 
)(0891.0 bi gT . Solving by substitution, the following optimal tariff of countries i, j, k and l 
are obtained: 1180.0)()( **  bkbi gTgT ; and 2036.0)()(
**  blbj gTgT . Therefore, 
1369.0)()(  bkbi gCSgCS ; 0707.0)()(  blbj gCSgCS ; )( bi g  = )( bk g  = 0.0853; 
0875.0)()(  blbj gg  ; 0637.0)()(  bkbi gPSgPS ; )( bj gPS  = )( bl gPS  = 0.0616; 
0184.0)()(  bkbi gTRgTR ; 0394.0)()(  blbj gTRgTR ; )( bi gW  = )( bk gW  =  0.3043; 
and 0394.0)()(  blbj gWgW . 
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Network c 
 
In considering the equations presented in Section 4.2.1.4, the following generic expressions 
are obtained: 
 
   
   
  
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
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Simulation 4:  = 1 and  = 0 
 
From these generic equations it is concluded that 
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 . Using 
these outputs it is concluded that  2)()()()( )()()()(
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l
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k
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j
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i
ici gqgqgqgqgCS   =  
 2)(4000.08000.05.0 ci gT ; )(
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c
i
i g  =  
2)( )(
2
)2(
c
i
i gq

 = (0.2000 + )(4000.0 ci gT )
2
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i
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2
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c
i
j gq
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2
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4
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2)()()()(  c
i
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i
ici gqgqgqgqgPS

; and )( ci gTR  = )( ci gT ( )(
)(
c
j
i gq  +  
)()( c
l
i gq ) = )(2000.1)(4000.0
2
cici gTgT  . Therefore welfare in country i is given by: 
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The first and second order conditions of this function are: 
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2
2
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

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. By using 
symmetry across countries the following optimal tariffs for countries i, j, k and l are 
obtained: 1250.0)()()()(
****  clckcjci gTgTgTgT . Using these tariffs it is concluded 
that )( ci gCS  = )( cj gCS  = )( ck gCS  = )( cl gCS  = 0.2813; )( ci g  = )( cj g  = )( ck g  = 
)( cl g  = 0.1563; 0)()()()(  clckcjci gPSgPSgPSgPS ; )( ci gTR  = )( cj gTR  = 
)( ck gTR  = )( cl gTR  = 0.0313; and 4689.0)()()()(  clckcjci gWgWgWgW . 
 
Simulation 5:  = 1 and  = 0.5 
 
From the generic equations presented above it is concluded that: 
 
)(0483.0)(0406.0)(0483.0)(2641.01600.0)()( clckcjcic
i
i gTgTgTgTgq      
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Solving by substitution the following expressions are obtained: )( ci gCS  = 
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The first and second order conditions of this function are: 
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Consequently the optimal tariff in country I is given by )(* ci gT  = 0.1133  )(0206.0 cj gT  + 
)(0346.0 ck gT   )(0206.0 cl gT . Given symmetry it is concluded that the optimal tariffs in 
countries i, j, k and l are )(* ci gT  = )(
*
cj gT  = )(
*
ck gT  = )(
*
cl gT  = 0.1125. Using these 
tariffs, he following expressions are obtained: )( ci gCS  = )( cj gCS  = )( ck gCS  = )( cl gCS  
= 0.1824; 1241.0)()()()(  clckcjci gggg  ; )( ci gPS  = )( cj gPS  = )( ck gPS  = 
)( cl gPS  = 0.0456; )( ci gTR  = )( cj gTR  = )( ck gTR  = )( cl gTR  = 0.0239; and 
3760.0)()()()(  clckcjci gWgWgWgW .  
 
Simulation 6:  = 1 and  = 1.5 
 
From the generic equations presented above it is concluded that: 
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l
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Solving by substitution the following expressions are obtained  
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Therefor welfare in country i is given by: 
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The first and second conditions of this function are: 
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Therefore the optimal tariff in country i is: )(* ci gT  = 0.1109  )(0305.0 cj gT  + 
)(0605.0 ck gT   )(0305.0 cl gT . Using symmetry, the optimal tariffs for countries i, j, k and l 
are: 1109.0)()()()(
****  clckcjci gTgTgTgT . Using these tariffs, the following 
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expressions are obtained: 0932.0)()()()(  clckcjci gCSgCSgCSgCS ; 
0886.0)()()()(  clckcjci gggg   ; )( ci gPS  = )( cj gPS  = )( ck gPS  = )( cl gPS  = 
0.0699; 0169.0)()()()(  clckcjci gTRgTRgTRgTR ; and )( ci gW  = )( cj gW  = )( ck gW  
= )( cl gW  = 0.2687.        
 
Network d 
 
In considering the equations presented in Section 4.2.1.4, the following generic expressions 
are obtained: 
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Simulation 4:  = 1 and  = 0 
 
From the generic equations presented above it is concluded that: )()( d
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Therefore welfare in country i is given by: 
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The first and second order conditions of this function are: 
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)(
didi
didi
di
di
gTgT
gTgT
gT
gW




 
4800.1
)(
)(
2
2



di
di
gT
gW
           
 
Therefore, using symmetry it is inferred that 0811.0)()(
**  djdi gTgT  
 
On the other hand, the following expressions hold in country k: 
 
   22)()()()( )(4000.08000.05.0)()()()(
2
1
)( dkd
l
kd
k
kd
j
kd
i
kdk gTgqgqgqgqgCS 
 
   22)()( )(2000.02000.0)(
2
)2(
)( did
k
id
k
i gTgqg 



      
   22)()( )(8000.02000.0)(
2
)2(
)( djd
k
jd
k
j gTgqg 



      
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   22)()( )(4000.02000.0)(
2
)2(
)( dkd
k
kd
k
k gTgqg 



      
   22)()( )(6000.02000.0)(
2
)2(
)( dld
k
ld
k
l gTgqg 



      
  0)()()()(
4
)(
2)()()()(  d
k
ld
k
kd
k
jd
k
idk gqgqgqgqgPS

     
  )(2000.1)(4000.0)()()()( 2)()( dkdkdlkdjkdkdk gTgTgqgqgTgTR      
 
Therefore welfare in country k is given by: 
 
 
     
  )(2000.1)(4000.0)(6000.02000.0
)(4000.02000.0)(8000.02000.0)(2000.02000.0
)(4000.08000.05.0)()()()()(
22
222
2
dkdkdl
dkdjdi
dkdkdkdkdkdk
gTgTgT
gTgTgT
gTgTRgPSggCSgW


 
  
 
The first and second conditions of this function are: 
 
   
)(9200.12400.0)(4000.24000.0
)(4000.02000.0)4000.0)(2()(4000.08000.0)4000.0(
)(
)(
dkdk
dkdk
dk
dk
gTgT
gTgT
gT
gW




 
9200.1
)(
)(
2
2



dk
dk
gT
gW
          
 
Therefore, using symmetry it is concluded that the optimal tariffs in country k and l are 
125.0)()( **  dldk gTgT . Finally, using the optimal tariffs for countries l, j, k and l the 
following expressions are obtained: 3072.0)()(  djdi gCSgCS ; )( dk gCS  = )( dl gCS  = 
0.2813; 1716.0)()(  djdi gg  ; 1431.0)()(  dldk gg  ; )( di gPS  = )( dj gPS  = 
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)( dk gPS  = )( dl gPS  = 0; 0110.0)()(  djdi gTRgTR ; )( dk gTR  = )( dl gTR  = 0.0313; 
)( di gW  = )( dj gW  = 0.4897; 4556.0)()(  dldk gWgW . 
         
Simulation 5:  = 1 and  = 0.5 
 
From the generic equations presented above it is concluded that: 
 
)(0483.0)(0406.0)(0203.0)(1321.01600.0)()( dldkdjdid
i
i gTgTgTgTgq     
)(0483.0)(0406.0)(1321.0)(0203.01600.0)()( dldkdjdid
i
j gTgTgTgTgq     
)(0483.0)(2641.0)(0203.0)(0203.01600.0)()( dldkdjdid
i
k gTgTgTgTgq     
)(4470.0)(0406.0)(0203.0)(0203.01600.0)()( dldkdjdid
i
l gTgTgTgTgq    
)(0406.0)(0483.0)(0203.0)(1321.01600.0)()( dldkdjdid
j
i gTgTgTgTgq     
)(0406.0)(0483.0)(1321.0)(0203.01600.0)()( dldkdjdid
j
j gTgTgTgTgq     
)(0406.0)(4470.0)(0203.0)(0203.01600.0)()( dldkdjdid
j
k gTgTgTgTgq     
)(2641.0)(0483.0)(0203.0)(0203.01600.0)()( dldkdjdid
j
l gTgTgTgTgq     
)(0483.0)(0406.0)(0686.0)(1321.01600.0)()( dldkdjdid
k
i gTgTgTgTgq     
)(0483.0)(0406.0)(5790.0)(0203.01600.0)()( dldkdjdid
k
j gTgTgTgTgq    
)(0483.0)(2641.0)(0686.0)(0203.01600.0)()( dldkdjdid
k
k gTgTgTgTgq     
)(4470.0)(0406.0)(0686.0)(0203.01600.0)()( dldkdjdid
k
l gTgTgTgTgq    
)(0406.0)(0483.0)(0203.0)(5790.01600.0)()( dldkdjdid
l
i gTgTgTgTgq    
)(0406.0)(0483.0)(1321.0)(0686.01600.0)()( dldkdjdid
l
j gTgTgTgTgq     
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)(0406.0)(4470.0)(0203.0)(0686.01600.0)()( dldkdjdid
l
k gTgTgTgTgq    
)(2641.0)(0483.0)(0203.0)(0686.01600.0)()( dldkdjdid
l
l gTgTgTgTgq    
 
Solving by substitution the following expressions hold for country i: 
 
 
 2
2)()()()(
)(0152.0)(0152.0)(0076.0)(1829.06400.05.0
)()()()(
2
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d
l
id
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idi
gTgTgTgT
gqgqgqgqgCS


  
 
 2
2)()(
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)(
2
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)(
dldkdjdi
d
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i
i
gTgTgTgT
gqg





  
 
 2
2)()(
)(0483.0)(0406.0)(1321.0)(0203.01600.025.1
)(
2
)2(
)(
dldkdjdi
d
i
jd
i
j
gTgTgTgT
gqg





  
 
 2
2)()(
)(0483.0)(2641.0)(0203.0)(0203.01600.025.1
)(
2
)2(
)(
dldkdjdi
d
i
kd
i
k
gTgTgTgT
gqg





  
 
 2
2)()(
)(4470.0)(0406.0)(0203.0)(0203.01600.025.1
)(
2
)2(
)(
dldkdjdi
d
i
ld
i
l
gTgTgTgT
gqg





  
 
 2
2)()()()(
)(3022.0)(1422.0)(0711.0)(0711.06400.0125.0
)()()()(
4
)(
dldkdjdi
d
i
ld
i
kd
i
jd
i
idi
gTgTgTgT
gqgqgqgqgPS



  
 
)()(0406.0)()(0483.0)()(0203.0
)(5790.0)(1600.0)()()( 2)(
didldidkdidj
didid
l
ididi
gTgTgTgTgTgT
gTgTgqgTgTR


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 
 
 
 
 
 
)()(0406.0)()(0483.0)()(0203.0
)(5790.0)(1600.0
)(3022.0)(1422.0)(0711.0)(0711.06400.0125.0
)(4470.0)(0406.0)(0203.0)(0203.01600.025.1
)(0483.0)(2641.0)(0203.0)(0203.01600.025.1
)(0483.0)(0406.0)(1321.0)(0203.01600.025.1
)(0483.0)(0406.0)(0203.0)(1321.01600.025.1
)(0152.0)(0152.0)(0076.0)(1829.06400.05.0
)()()()()(
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
didldidkdidj
didi
dldkdjdi
dldkdjdi
dldkdjdi
dldkdjdi
dldkdjdi
dldkdjdi
dididididi
gTgTgTgTgTgT
gTgT
gTgTgTgT
gTgTgTgT
gTgTgTgT
gTgTgTgT
gTgTgTgT
gTgTgTgT
gTRgPSggCSgW




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


 
   
 
The first and second order conditions of this function are: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)(0151.0)(0253.0)(0318.0)(0767.10828.0
)(0406.0)(0483.0)(0203.0)(1580.11600.0
)(3022.0)(1422.0)(0711.0)(0711.06400.0)0711.0)(25.0(
)(4470.0)(0406.0)(0203.0)(0203.01600.0)0203.0)(5.2(
)(0483.0)(2641.0)(0203.0)(0203.01600.0)0203.0)(5.2(
)(0483.0)(0406.0)(1321.0)(0203.01600.0)0203.0)(5.2(
)(0483.0)(0406.0)(0203.0)(1321.01600.0)1321.0)(5.2(
)(0152.0)(0152.0)(0076.0)(1829.06400.0)1829.0(
)(
)(
dldkdjdi
dldkdjdi
dldkdjdi
dldkdjdi
dldkdjdi
dldkdjdi
dldkdjdi
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gTgTgTgT
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gTgTgTgT
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gTgTgTgT
gTgTgTgT
gTgTgTgT
gT
gW

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

di
di
gT
gW
           
 
Therefore the optimal tariff for country i is )(* di gT  = 0.0769  )(0295.0 dj gT  + 
)(0235.0 dk gT    )(0140.0 dl gT . Using symmetry, this optimal tariff converges to the 
following: )(0092.00747.0)(* dkdi gTgT  . 
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On the other hand, the following expressions hold for country k: 
 
 
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Therefore welfare in country k is given by: 
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 
 
 
 
 
 
)()(0813.0)(8940.0
)()(0406.0)()(0483.0)(3200.0
)(3022.0)(1422.0)(3733.0)(0711.06400.0125.0
)(4470.0)(0406.0)(0686.0)(0203.01600.025.1
)(0483.0)(2641.0)(0686.0)(0203.01600.025.1
)(0483.0)(0406.0)(5790.0)(0203.01600.025.1
)(0483.0)(0406.0)(0686.0)(1321.01600.025.1
)(0152.0)(3657.0)(0076.0)(0076.06400.05.0
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The first and second conditions of this function are: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)(0302.0)(4624.1)(0334.0)(0253.01656.0
)(0813.0)(7880.1)(0406.0)(0483.03200.0
)(3022.0)(1422.0)(3733.0)(0711.06400.0)1422.0)(25.0(
)(4470.0)(0406.0)(0686.0)(0203.01600.0)0406.0)(5.2(
)(0483.0)(2641.0)(0686.0)(0203.01600.0)2641.0)(5.2(
)(0483.0)(0406.0)(5790.0)(0203.01600.0)0406.0)(5.2(
)(0483.0)(0406.0)(0686.0)(1321.01600.0)0406.0)(5.2(
)(0152.0)(3657.0)(0076.0)(0076.06400.0)3657.0(
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dldkdjdi
dldkdjdi
dldkdjdi
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

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

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
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
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

dk
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Therefore the optimal tariff in country k is: )(* dk gT  = 0.1133 + )(0173.0 di gT  + 
)(0206.0)(0229.0 dldj gTgT  . Given symmetry this expression converges to )(
*
dk gT  = 
0.1110  +  )(0394.0 di gT . Using this equation, the expression for the optimal tariff of 
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country, and symmetry across countries it was possible to calculate the following values of 
the optimal tariffs in countries i, j, k and l: 0757.0)()(
**  djdi gTgT ; and )(
*
dk gT  = 
)(* dl gT  = 0.1139. Using these tariffs, the following equalities hold: )( di gCS  = )( dj gCS  = 
0.1986; 1807.0)()(  dldk gCSgCS ; 1308.0)()(  djdi gg  ; )( dk g  = )( dl g  = 
0.1196; 0500.0)()(  djdi gPSgPS ; 0448.0)()(  dldk gPSgPS ; )( di gTR  = )( dj gTR  = 
0.0087; 0239.0)()(  dldk gTRgTR ; 3882.0)()(  djdi gWgW ; )( dk gW  = )( dj gW  = 
0.3691. 
 
Simulation 6:  = 1 and  = 1.5 
 
From the generic equations presented above it is concluded that: 
 
)(0526.0)(0377.0)(0188.0)(0805.01143.0)()( dldkdjdid
i
i gTgTgTgTgq   
)(0526.0)(0377.0)(0805.0)(0188.01143.0)()( dldkdjdid
i
j gTgTgTgTgq     
)(0526.0)(1611.0)(0188.0)(0188.01143.0)()( dldkdjdid
i
k gTgTgTgTgq     
)(3201.0)(0377.0)(0188.0)(0188.01143.0)()( dldkdjdid
i
l gTgTgTgTgq    
)(0377.0)(0526.0)(0188.0)(0805.01143.0)()( dldkdjdid
j
i gTgTgTgTgq     
)(0377.0)(0526.0)(0805.0)(0188.01143.0)()( dldkdjdid
j
j gTgTgTgTgq     
)(0377.0)(3201.0)(0188.0)(0188.01143.0)()( dldkdjdid
j
k gTgTgTgTgq    
)(1611.0)(0526.0)(0188.0)(0188.01143.0)()( dldkdjdid
j
l gTgTgTgTgq     
)(0526.0)(0377.0)(0714.0)(0805.01143.0)()( dldkdjdid
k
i gTgTgTgTgq     
537 
 
)(0526.0)(0377.0)(4007.0)(0188.01143.0)()( dldkdjdid
k
j gTgTgTgTgq    
)(0526.0)(1611.0)(0714.0)(0188.01143.0)()( dldkdjdid
k
k gTgTgTgTgq     
)(3201.0)(0377.0)(0714.0)(0188.01143.0)()( dldkdjdid
k
l gTgTgTgTgq    
)(0377.0)(0526.0)(0188.0)(4007.01143.0)()( dldkdjdid
l
i gTgTgTgTgq    
)(0377.0)(0526.0)(0805.0)(0714.01143.0)()( dldkdjdid
l
j gTgTgTgTgq     
)(0377.0)(3201.0)(0188.0)(0714.01143.0)()( dldkdjdid
l
k gTgTgTgTgq    
)(1611.0)(0526.0)(0188.0)(0714.01143.0)()( dldkdjdid
l
l gTgTgTgTgq    
 
Solving by substitution the following expressions hold for country i: 
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Therefore welfare in country i is given by: 
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The first and second order conditions of this function are: 
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Therefore the optimal tariff in country i is: )(* di gT  = 0.0794  )(0386.0 dj gT  + 
)(0433.0 dk gT   )(0219.0 dl gT . By symmetry across countries this expression converges to 
)(0206.00725.0)(* dkdi gTgT  . 
 
On the other hand, the following expressions hold in country k: 
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Therefore welfare in country k is given by: 
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The first and second order conditions of this function are: 
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Therefore the optimal tariff in country k is: )(* dk gT  = 0.1109 + )(0302.0 di gT  + 
)(0235.0 dj gT   )(0305.0 dl gT . By symmetry across countries, this expression converges to
)(0521.01076.0)(* didk gTgT  . Using the optimal tariff in country i, solving by 
substitution, and using symmetry, the following optimal tariffs are obtained for countries i, 
j, k and l: 0788.0)()(
**  djdi gTgT ; and 1118.0)()(
**  dldk gTgT . In considering these 
tariffs, the following expressions hold: 1024.0)()(  djdi gCSgCS ; )( dk gCS  = )( dl gCS  
= 0.0913 ; 0920.0)()(  djdi gg  ; 0869.0)()(  dldk gg  ; )( di gPS  = )( dj gPS  = 
0.0753; 0698.0)()(  dldk gPSgPS ; 0065.0)()(  djdi gTRgTR ; )( dk gTR  = )( dl gTR  = 
0.0167; 2762.0)()(  djdi gWgW ; 2647.0)()(  djdk gWgW . 
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Network e 
 
In considering the equations presented in Section 4.2.1.4, the following generic expressions 
are obtained: 
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Simulation 4:  = 1 and  = 0 
 
From the generic equations presented above it is concluded that: 
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Therefore welfare in country i is given by: 
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The first and second order conditions of this function are: 
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Given symmetry, it is concluded that the optimal tariffs in countries i, j, k and l are )(* ei gT  
= )(
*
ej gT  = )(
*
ek gT  = )(
*
el gT  = 0.0811. Using these tariffs, the following results are 
obtained: 3072.0)()()()(  elekejei gCSgCSgCSgCS ; )( ei g  = )( ej g  = )( ek g  = 
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Simulation 5:  = 1 and  = 0.5 
 
From the generic equations presented above it is concluded that: 
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Solving by substitution, the following expressions are obtained for country i: 
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Therefore welfare in country i is given by: 
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The first and second order conditions of this function are: 
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Consequently the optimal tariff in country i is )(* ei gT  = 0.0769  )(0295.0 ej gT   
)(0295.0 ek gT  + )(0155.0 el gT . Using symmetry it is inferred that the optimal tariffs in 
countries i, j, k and l are: 0737.0)()()()(
****  elekejei gTgTgTgT . Using these tariffs 
the following results were obtained: 1973.0)()()()(  elekejei gCSgCSgCSgCS ; 
)( ei g  = )( ej g  = )( ek g  = )( el g  = 0.1266; )( ei gPS  = )( ej gPS  = )( ek gPS  = )( el gPS  
= 0.0493; 0083.0)()()()(  elekejei gTRgTRgTRgTR ; )( ei gW  = )( ej gW  = )( ek gW  = 
)( el gW  = 0.3816. 
       
Simulation 6:  = 1 and  = 1.5 
 
From the generic equations presented above it is concluded that: 
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Solving by substitution, the following expressions are obtained for country i: 
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Therefore welfare in country i is given by: 
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The first and second order conditions of this function are: 
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Therefore the optimal tariff in country i is )(* ei gT  = 0.0794  )(0386.0 ej gT   
)(0386.0 ek gT  + )(0167.0 el gT . Using symmetry across countries it is concluded that the 
optimal tariffs in countries i, j, k and l are 0749.0)()()()(
****  elekejei gTgTgTgT . 
553 
 
Using these tariffs, the following results are obtained: )( ei gCS  = )( ej gCS  = )( ek gCS  = 
)( el gCS  = 0.1006; 0904.0)()()()(  elekejei gggg  ; )( ei gPS  = )( ej gPS  = 
)( ek gPS  = )( el gPS  = 0.0755; 0060.0)()()()(  elekejei gTRgTRgTRgTR ; and 
2725.0)()()()(  elekejei gWgWgWgW . 
  
Network f 
 
In considering the equations presented in Section 4.2.1.4, the following generic expressions 
are obtained: 
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Simulation 4:  = 1 and  = 0 
 
From the generic equations presented above it is concluded that: 
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 . From these outputs, the following expressions are obtained for 
country i: 
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Therefore welfare in country i is given by: 
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The first and second order conditions of this function are: 
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Therefore the optimal tariff in country i is 0811.0)(
* fi gT  . 
 
On the other hand, the following expressions are obtained for country j: 
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Therefore welfare in country j is given by: 
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The first and second order conditions of this function are: 
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Therefore the optimal tariff in country j is 1250.0)(
* fj gT . Given symmetry across 
countries, it is concluded that 1250.0)()(
**  fkfj gTgT . 
 
Finally, the following expressions are obtained for country l: 
 
   22)()()()( )(6000.08000.05.0)()()()(
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 
)(2000.1)(6000.0
)()()()()(
2
)()()(
flfl
f
k
lf
j
lf
i
lflfl
gTgT
gqgqgqgTgTR


       
 
Therefore welfare in country l is given by: 
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The first and second order conditions of this function are: 
 
   
)(3200.13600.0)(4000.26000.0
)(6000.02000.0)6000.0)(2()(6000.08000.0)6000.0(
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Therefore the optimal tariff in country l is 2727.0)(
* fl gT . 
 
In considering the optimal tariffs in countries i, j, k and l, the following results are obtained: 
3072.0)( fi gCS ; 2813.0)()(  fkfj gCSgCS ; 2025.0)( fl gCS ; 1800.0)( fi g ; 
)( fj g  = )( fk g  =  0.1331; 1817.0)( fl g ; )( fi gPS  = )( fj gPS  = )( fk gPS  = 
)( fl gPS  = 0; 0110.0)( fi gTR ; 0313.0)()(  fkfj gTRgTR ; and 0744.0)( fl gTR ; 
)( fi gW  = 0.4981 ; 4456.0)()(  fkfj gWgW ; 4586.0)( fl gW . 
         
Simulation 5:  = 1 and  = 0.5 
 
From the generic equations presented above it is concluded that: 
 
)(0279.0)(0406.0)(0406.0)(1321.01600.0)()( flfkfjfif
i
i gTgTgTgTgq     
)(0279.0)(0406.0)(2641.0)(0203.01600.0)()( flfkfjfif
i
j gTgTgTgTgq     
)(0279.0)(2641.0)(0406.0)(0203.01600.0)()( flfkfjfif
i
k gTgTgTgTgq     
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)(3149.0)(0406.0)(0406.0)(0203.01600.0)()( flfkfjfif
i
l gTgTgTgTgq     
)(0279.0)(0483.0)(0406.0)(1321.01600.0)()( flfkfjfif
j
i gTgTgTgTgq     
)(0279.0)(0483.0)(2641.0)(0203.01600.0)()( flfkfjfif
j
j gTgTgTgTgq     
)(0279.0)(4470.0)(0406.0)(0203.01600.0)()( flfkfjfif
j
k gTgTgTgTgq    
)(3149.0)(0483.0)(0406.0)(0203.01600.0)()( flfkfjfif
j
l gTgTgTgTgq   
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k
i gTgTgTgTgq   
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k
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k
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k
l gTgTgTgTgq   
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l
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l
k gTgTgTgTgq     
)(3962.0)(0483.0)(0483.0)(0686.01600.0)()( flfkfjfif
l
l gTgTgTgTgq     
 
Solving by substitution, the following expressions are obtained for country i: 
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Therefore welfare in country i is given by: 
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The first and second order conditions of this function are: 
 
 
 
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Therefore the optimal tariff in country i is: )(
*
fi gT  = 0.0769 + )(0235.0 fj gT  + 
)(0235.0 fk gT    )(0435.0 fl gT . Given symmetry across counties, this expression 
converges to )(0435.0)(0470.00769.0)(
*
flfjfi gTgTgT  . 
 
On the other hand, the following expressions are obtained for country j: 
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Therefore welfare in country j is given by: 
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The first and second order conditions of this function are: 
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Therefore the optimal tariff in country j is: )(
*
fj gT  = 0.1133 + )(0173.0 fi gT  + 
)(0402.0 fk gT   )(0033.0 fl gT . Given symmetry this expression converges to )(
*
fj gT  = 
)(* fk gT  = 0.1180 + )(0180.0 fi gT    )(0035.0 fl gT . 
 
On the other hand, the following expressions are obtained for country l: 
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Therefore welfare in country l is: 
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 The first and second order conditions of this function are: 
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 
 
 
 
 
)(1569.1)(0438.0)(0438.0)(0503.02483.0
)(8896.1)(0330.0)(0330.0)(0610.04800.0
)(2133.0)(3022.0)(3022.0)(3733.06400.0)2133.0)(25.0(
)(3962.0)(0483.0)(0483.0)(0686.01600.0)3962.0)(5.2(
)(0610.0)(4470.0)(0483.0)(0686.01600.0)0610.0)(5.2(
)(0610.0)(0483.0)(4470.0)(686.01600.0)0610.0)(5.2(
)(0610.0)(0483.0)(0483.0)(5790.01600.0)0610.0)(5.2(
)(5486.0)(0152.0)(0152.0)(0076.06400.0)5486.0(
)(
)(
flfkfjfi
flfkfjfi
flfkfjfi
flfkfjfi
flfkfjfi
flfkfjfi
flfkfjfi
flfkfjfi
fl
fl
gTgTgTgT
gTgTgTgT
gTgTgTgT
gTgTgTgT
gTgTgTgT
gTgTgTgT
gTgTgTgT
gTgTgTgT
gT
gW











 
1569.1
)(
)(
2
2



fl
fl
gT
gW
           
 
Therefore the optimal tariff in country l is: )(
*
fl gT  = 0.2146 + )(0435.0 fi gT  + 
)(0378.0 fj gT  + )(0378.0 fk gT . Given symmetry across countries, this expression 
converges to: )(0756.0)(0435.02146.0)(
*
fjfifl gTgTgT  . Thus, in considering the 
optimal tariff equations for countries i, j and l, the following matrix system is obtained: 
  


































2146.0
1180.0
0769.0
)(
)(
)(
10756.00435.0
0035.010180.0
0435.00470.01
fl
fj
fi
gT
gT
gT
 
 
By solving this system and by using symmetry across countries, the following optimal 
tariffs for countries i, j, k and l are obtained: 0726.0)(
* fi gT ; 1185.0)()(
**  fkfj gTgT ;  
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2267.0)(* fl gT . Using these tariffs it is concluded that: 2019.0)( fi gCS ; )( fj gCS  = 
)( fk gCS  = 0.1825; 1351.0)( fl gCS ; 1336.0)( fi g ; 1140.0)()(  fkfj gg  ; 
)( fl g  = 0.1323; 0491.0)( fi gPS ; 0412.0)()(  fkfj gPSgPS ; 0435.0)( fl gPS ; 
)( fi gTR  = 0.0084; 0250.0)()(  fkfj gTRgTR ; 0575.0)( fl gTR ; 3930.0)( fi gW ; 
3627.0)()(  fkfj gWgW  ; and 3683.0)( fl gW . 
 
Simulation 6:  = 1 and  = 1.5 
 
From the generic equations presented above it is concluded that: 
 
)(0337.0)(0377.0)(0377.0)(0805.01143.0)()( flfkfjfif
i
i gTgTgTgTgq    
)(0337.0)(0377.0)(1611.0)(0188.01143.0)()( flfkfjfif
i
j gTgTgTgTgq     
)(0337.0)(1611.0)(0377.0)(0188.01143.0)()( flfkfjfif
i
k gTgTgTgTgq     
)(2396.0)(0377.0)(0377.0)(0188.01143.0)()( flfkfjfif
i
l gTgTgTgTgq    
)(0337.0)(0526.0)(0377.0)(0805.01143.0)()( flfkfjfif
j
i gTgTgTgTgq     
)(0337.0)(0526.0)(1611.0)(0188.01143.0)()( flfkfjfif
j
j gTgTgTgTgq     
)(0337.0)(3201.0)(0377.0)(0188.01143.0)()( flfkfjfif
j
k gTgTgTgTgq    
)(2396.0)(0526.0)(0377.0)(0188.01143.0)()( flfkfjfif
j
l gTgTgTgTgq   
)(0337.0)(0377.0)(0526.0)(0805.01143.0)()( flfkfjfif
k
i gTgTgTgTgq    
)(0337.0)(0377.0)(3201.0)(0188.01143.0)()( flfkfjfif
k
j gTgTgTgTgq   
)(0337.0)(1611.0)(0526.0)(0188.01143.0)()( flfkfjfif
k
k gTgTgTgTgq    
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)(2396.0)(0377.0)(0526.0)(0188.01143.0)()( flfkfjfif
k
l gTgTgTgTgq   
)(0565.0)(0526.0)(0526.0)(4007.01143.0)()( flfkfjfif
l
i gTgTgTgTgq    
)(0565.0)(0526.0)(3201.0)(0714.01143.0)()( flfkfjfif
l
j gTgTgTgTgq    
)(0565.0)(3201.0)(0526.0)(0714.01143.0)()( flfkfjfif
l
k gTgTgTgTgq    
)(2416.0)(0526.0)(0526.0)(0714.01143.0)()( flfkfjfif
l
l gTgTgTgTgq    
 
Solving by substitution, the following expressions are obtained for country i: 
     
 
 2
2)()()()(
)(0447.0)(0298.0)(0298.0)(1590.04571.05.0
)()()()(
2
1
)(
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f
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i
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gqgqgqgqgCS
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
  
 
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2)()(
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)(
2
)2(
)(
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f
i
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gTgTgTgT
gqg





  
 
 2
2)()(
)(0337.0)(0377.0)(1611.0)(0188.01143.075.1
)(
2
)2(
)(
flfkfjfi
f
i
jf
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j
gTgTgTgT
gqg





  
 
 2
2)()(
)(0337.0)(1611.0)(0377.0)(0188.01143.075.1
)(
2
)2(
)(
flfkfjfi
f
i
kf
i
k
gTgTgTgT
gqg





  
 
 2
2)()(
)(2396.0)(0377.0)(0377.0)(0188.01143.075.1
)(
2
)2(
)(
flfkfjfi
f
i
lf
i
l
gTgTgTgT
gqg





  
 
 2
2)()()()(
)(1383.0)(0481.0)(0481.0)(0241.04571.0375.0
)()()()(
4
)(
flfkfjfi
f
i
lf
i
kf
i
jf
i
ifi
gTgTgTgT
gqgqgqgqgPS



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 
)()(0565.0)()(0526.0
)()(0526.0)(4007.0)(1143.0)()()( 2)(
fiflfifk
fifjfifif
l
ififi
gTgTgTgT
gTgTgTgTgqgTgTR


  
 
Therefore welfare in country i is given by: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)()(0565.0)()(0526.0
)()(0526.0)(4007.0)(1143.0
)(1383.0)(0481.0)(0481.0)(0241.04571.0375.0
)(2396.0)(0377.0)(0377.0)(0188.01143.075.1
)(0337.0)(1611.0)(0377.0)(0188.01143.075.1
)(0337.0)(0377.0)(1611.0)(0188.01143.075.1
)(0337.0)(0377.0)(0377.0)(0805.01143.075.1
)(0447.0)(0298.0)(0298.0)(1590.04571.05.0
)()()()()(
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
fiflfifk
fifjfifi
flfkfjfi
flfkfjfi
flfkfjfi
flfkfjfi
flfkfjfi
flfkfjfi
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gTgTgTgT
gTgTgTgT
gTgTgTgT
gTgTgTgT
gTgTgTgT
gTgTgTgT
gTgTgTgT
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gTRgPSggCSgW
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
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


 
   
 
The first and second order conditions of this function are: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)(0453.0)(0324.0)(0324.0)(7492.00595.0
)(0565.0)(0526.0)(0526.0)(8014.01143.0
)(1383.0)(0481.0)(0481.0)(0241.04571.0)0241.0)(75.0(
)(2396.0)(0377.0)(0377.0)(0188.01143.0)0188.0)(5.3(
)(0337.0)(1611.0)(0377.0)(0188.01143.0)0188.0)(5.3(
)(0337.0)(0377.0)(1611.0)(0188.01143.0)0188.0)(5.3(
)(0337.0)(0377.0)(0377.0)(0805.01143.0)0805.0)(5.3(
)(0447.0)(0298.0)(0298.0)(1590.04571.0)1590.0(
)(
)(
2
flfkfjfi
flfkfjfi
flfkfjfi
flfkfjfi
flfkfjfi
flfkfjfi
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gT
gW
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
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





(
7492.0
)(
)(
2
2



fi
fi
gT
gW
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Therefore the optimal tariff in country i is: )(
*
fi gT  = 0.0794 + )(0433.0 fj gT  + 
)(0433.0 fk gT    )(0604.0 fl gT . Given symmetry across countries this expression 
converges to: )(0604.0)(0866.00794.0)(
*
flfjfi gTgTgT  . 
 
On the other hand, the following expressions are obtained for country j: 
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 
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2)()()()(
)(1383.0)(1624.0)(0481.0)(0241.04571.0375.0
)()()()(
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flfkfjfi
f
j
lf
j
kf
j
jf
j
ifj
gTgTgTgT
gqgqgqgqgPS
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
  
 
)()(0228.0)()(0149.0)(6402.0
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Therefore welfare in country j is given by: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)()(0228.0)()(0149.0
)(6402.0)()(0526.0)(2286.0
)(1383.0)(1624.0)(0481.0)(0241.04571.0375.0
)(2396.0)(0526.0)(0377.0)(0188.01143.075.1
)(0337.0)(3201.0)(0377.0)(0188.01143.075.1
)(0337.0)(0526.0)(1611.0)(0188.01143.075.1
)(0337.0)(0526.0)(0377.0)(0805.01143.075.1
)(0447.0)(0298.0)(3180.0)(0149.04571.05.0
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The first and second order conditions of this function are: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)(0002.0)(0576.0)(0718.1)(0324.01189.0
)(0228.0)(0149.0)(2804.1)(0526.02286.0
)(1383.0)(1624.0)(0481.0)(0241.04571.0)0481.0)(75.0(
)(2396.0)(0526.0)(0377.0)(0188.01143.0)0377.0)(5.3(
)(0337.0)(3201.0)(0377.0)(0188.01143.0)0377.0)(5.3(
)(0337.0)(0526.0)(1611.0)(0188.01143.0)1611.0)(5.3(
)(0337.0)(0526.0)(0377.0)(0805.01143.0)0377.0)(5.3(
)(0447.0)(0298.0)(3180.0)(0149.04571.0)3180.0(
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Therefore the optimal tariff in country j is: )(* fj gT  = 0.1109 + )(0302.0 fi gT  + 
)(0537.0 fk gT    )(0002.0 fl gT . Given symmetry across countries this expression 
converges to: )(0002.0)(0320.01172.0)()(
**
flfifkfj gTgTgTgT  . 
 
Finally, the following expressions are obtained for country l: 
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Therefore welfare in country l is given by: 
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The first and second order conditions of this function are: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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Therefore the optimal tariff in country l is: )(* fl gT   = 0.1843 + )(0389.0 fi gT  + 
)(0426.0 fj gT  + )(0426.0 fk gT . Given symmetry across countries, this expression 
converges to: )(0851.0)(0389.01843.0)(
*
fjfifl gTgTgT  . Thus, in considering the 
optimal tariff functions of countries i, j and l, the following matrix system is obtained: 
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By solving this system and using symmetry across countries, the following optimal tariffs 
for countries i, j, k and l are obtained: 0778.0)(
* fi gT ; 1197.0)()(
**  fkfj gTgT ; and 
1975.0)(* fl gT . Using these tariffs it is concluded that: 1061.0)( fi gCS ; )( fj gCS  = 
)( fk gCS  = 0.0936; 0689.0)( fl gCS ; 0931.0)( fi g ; 0842.0)()(  fkfj gg  ; 
)( fl g  = 0.0899; 0737.0)( fi gPS ; 0655.0)()(  fkfj gPSgPS ; 0655.0)( fl gPS ; 
0066.0)( fi gTR ; 0184.0)()(  fkfj gTRgTR ; 0377.0)( fl gTR ; 2795.0)( fi gW ; 
2616.0)()(  fkfj gWgW ; 2620.0)( fl gW . 
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Network g 
 
In considering the equations presented in Section 4.2.1.4, the following generic 
expressions are obtained: 
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Simulation 4:  = 1 and  = 0 
 
From the generic equations presented above it is concluded that: 
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 . From these outputs, the following expressions are obtained 
for country i: 
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Therefore welfare in country i is: 
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Therefore the optimal tariff in country i is: 0811.0)(* gi gT . Given symmetry across 
countries it is concluded that: 0811.0)()()( ***  gkgjgi gTgTgT : 
 
On the other hand, the following expressions are obtained for country l: 
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Therefore welfare in country l is: 
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  )(2000.1)(6000.0)(6000.02000.0
)(8000.02000.0)(8000.02000.0)(8000.02000.0
)(6000.08000.05.0)()()()()(
22
222
2
glglgl
gkgjgi
glglglglglgl
gTgTgT
gTgTgT
gTgTRgPSggCSgW


 
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The first and second order conditions of this function are: 
 
   
)(3200.136.0)(4000.26000.0
)(6000.02000.0)6000.0)(2()(6000.08000.0)6000.0(
)(
)(
glgl
glgl
gl
gl
gTgT
gTgT
gT
gW




 
3200.1
)(
)(
2
2



gl
gl
gT
gW
           
 
Therefore the optimal tariff in country l is: 2727.0)(* gl gT . In considering the optimal 
tariff in countries i, j, k and l, the following results are obtained: )( gi gCS  = )( gj gCS  = 
)( gk gCS  = 0.3072; 2025.0)( gl gCS ; 1485.0)()()(  gkgjgi ggg  ; 
1870.0)( gl g ; )( gi gPS  =  = )( gj gPS  = )( gk gPS  = )( gl gPS  = 0; 
0110.0)()()(  gkgjgi gTRgTRgTR ; )( gl gTR  = 0.0744; 
4666.0)()()(  gkgjgi gWgWgW ; and 4639.0)( gl gW . 
 
Simulation 5:  = 1 and  = 0.5 
 
From the generic equations presented above it is concluded that: 
 
)(0279.0)(0203.0)(0203.0)(1321.01600.0)()( glgkgjgig
i
i gTgTgTgTgq     
)(0279.0)(0203.0)(1321.0)(0203.01600.0)()( glgkgjgig
i
j gTgTgTgTgq    
)(0279.0)(1321.0)(0203.0)(0203.01600.0)()( glgkgjgig
i
k gTgTgTgTgq    
)(3149.0)(0203.0)(0203.0)(0203.01600.0)()( glgkgjgig
i
l gTgTgTgTgq    
)(0279.0)(0203.0)(0203.0)(1321.01600.0)()( glgkgjgig
j
i gTgTgTgTgq     
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)(0279.0)(0203.0)(1321.0)(0203.01600.0)()( glgkgjgig
j
j gTgTgTgTgq     
)(0279.0)(1321.0)(0203.0)(0203.01600.0)()( glgkgjgig
j
k gTgTgTgTgq     
)(3149.0)(0203.0)(0203.0)(0203.01600.0)()( glgkgjgig
j
l gTgTgTgTgq    
)(0279.0)(0203.0)(0203.0)(1321.01600.0)()( glgkgjgig
k
i gTgTgTgTgq     
)(0279.0)(0203.0)(1321.0)(0203.01600.0)()( glgkgjgig
k
j gTgTgTgTgq     
)(0279.0)(1321.0)(0203.0)(0203.01600.0)()( glgkgjgig
k
k gTgTgTgTgq     
)(3149.0)(0203.0)(0203.0)(0203.01600.0)()( glgkgjgig
k
l gTgTgTgTgq    
)(0610.0)(0686.0)(0686.0)(5790.01600.0)()( glgkgjgig
l
i gTgTgTgTgq    
)(0610.0)(0686.0)(5790.0)(0686.01600.0)()( glgkgjgig
l
j gTgTgTgTgq     
)(0610.0)(5790.0)(0686.0)(0686.01600.0)()( glgkgjgig
l
k gTgTgTgTgq     
)(3962.0)(0686.0)(0686.0)(0686.01600.0)()( glgkgjgig
l
l gTgTgTgTgq     
 
Solving by substitution, the following expressions are obtained for country i: 
 
 
 2
2)()()()(
)(0229.0)(0076.0)(0076.0)(1829.06400.05.0
)()()()(
2
1
)(
glgkgjgi
g
l
ig
k
ig
j
ig
i
igi
gTgTgTgT
gqgqgqgqgCS


  
 
 2
2)()(
)(0279.0)(0203.0)(0203.0)(1321.01600.025.1
)(
2
)2(
)(
glgkgjgi
g
i
ig
i
i
gTgTgTgT
gqg





  
 
 2
2)()(
)(0279.0)(0203.0)(1321.0)(0203.01600.025.1
)(
2
)2(
)(
glgkgjgi
g
i
jg
i
j
gTgTgTgT
gqg






  
 
 2
2)()(
)(0279.0)(1321.0)(0203.0)(0203.01600.025.1
)(
2
)2(
)(
glgkgjgi
g
i
kg
i
k
gTgTgTgT
gqg






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 
 2
2)()(
)(3149.0)(0203.0)(0203.0)(0203.01600.025.1
)(
2
)2(
)(
glgkgjgi
g
i
lg
i
l
gTgTgTgT
gqg





  
 
 2
2)()()()(
)(2311.0)(0711.0)(0711.0)(0711.06400.0125.0
)()()()(
4
)(
glgkgjgi
g
i
lg
i
kg
i
jg
i
igi
gTgTgTgT
gqgqgqgqgPS



  
 
)()(0610.0)()(0686.0)()(0686.0
)(5790.0)(1600.0)()()( 2)(
giglgigkgigj
gigig
l
igigi
gTgTgTgTgTgT
gTgTgqgTgTR


     
 
Therefore welfare in country i is: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)()(0610.0)()(0686.0
)()(0686.0)(5790.0)(1600.0
)(2311.0)(0711.0)(0711.0)(0711.06400.0125.0
)(3149.0)(0203.0)(0203.0)(0203.01600.025.1
)(0279.0)(1321.0)(0203.0)(0203.01600.025.1
)(0279.0)(0203.0)(1321.0)(0203.01600.025.1
)(0279.0)(0203.0)(0203.0)(1321.01600.025.1
)(0229.0)(0076.0)(0076.0)(1829.06400.05.0
)()()()()(
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
giglgigk
gigjgigi
glgkgjgi
glgkgjgi
glgkgjgi
glgkgjgi
glgkgjgi
glgkgjgi
gigigigigi
gTgTgTgT
gTgTgTgT
gTgTgTgT
gTgTgTgT
gTgTgTgT
gTgTgTgT
gTgTgTgT
gTgTgTgT
gTRgPSggCSgW
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
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

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
 
  
 
 The first and second order conditions of this function are: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)(0469.0)(0571.0)(0571.0)(0767.10828.0
)(0610.0)(0686.0)(0686.0)(1580.11600.0
)(2311.0)(0711.0)(0711.0)(0711.06400.0)0711.0)(25.0(
)(3149.0)(0203.0)(0203.0)(0203.01600.0)0203.0)(5.2(
)(0279.0)(1321.0)(0203.0)(0203.01600.0)0203.0)(5.2(
)(0279.0)(0203.0)(1321.0)(0203.01600.0)0203.0)(5.2(
)(0279.0)(0203.0)(0203.0)(1321.01600.0)1321.0)(5.2(
)(0229.0)(0076.0)(0076.0)(1829.06400.0)1829.0(
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glgkgjgi
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
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



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0767.1
)(
)(
2
2



gi
gi
gT
gW
           
 
Therefore the optimal tariff in country i is: )(* gi gT  = 0.0769 + )(0530.0 gj gT  + 
)(0530.0 gk gT    )(0435.0 gl gT . Given symmetry across countries this expression 
converges to: )(0487.00860.0)()()(
***
glgkgjgi gTgTgTgT  . 
 
On the other hand, the following expressions are obtained for country l: 
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Therefore welfare in country l is given by: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)(9448.0)()(0610.0
)()(0610.0)()(0610.0)(4800.0
)(2133.0)(3733.0)(3733.0)(3733.06400.0125.0
)(3962.0)(0686.0)(0686.0)(0686.01600.025.1
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 The first and second order conditions of this function are: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)(1569.1)(0502.0)(0502.0)(0502.02484.0
)(8896.1)(0610.0)(0610.0)(0610.04800.0
)(2133.0)(3733.0)(3733.0)(3733.06400.0)2133.0)(25.0(
)(3962.0)(0686.0)(0686.0)(0686.01600.0)3962.0)(5.2(
)(0610.0)(5790.0)(0686.0)(0686.01600.0)0610.0)(5.2(
)(0610.0)(0686.0)(5790.0)(0686.01600.0)0610.0)(5.2(
)(0610.0)(0686.0)(0686.0)(5790.01600.0)0610.0)(5.2(
)(5486.0)(0076.0)(0076.0)(0076.06400.0)5486.0(
)(
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Therefore the optimal tariff in country l is: )(
*
gl gT  = 0.2147 + )(0434.0 gi gT  + 
)(0434.0 gj gT  + )(0434.0 gk gT . Given symmetry across countries this expression 
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converges to: )(1302.02147.0)(* gigl gTgT  . In considering the tariff functions of 
countries i and l and by using symmetry across countries, it is concluded that: )(* gi gT  = 
)(* gj gT  = )(
*
gk gT  = 0.0751; and 2245.0)(
* gl gT . Using these tariffs, the following 
results are obtained: )( gi gCS  = )( gj gCS  = )( gk gCS  = 0.2001; 1345.0)( gl gCS ; 
1214.0)()()(  gkgjgi ggg  ; 1354.0)( gl g ; )()()( gkgjgi gPSgPSgPS  = 
0456.0)( gl gPS ; )( gi gTR  = )( gj gTR  = )( gk gTR  = 0.0085; 0571.0)( gl gTR ;
3756.0)()()(  gkgjgi gWgWgW  ; 3725.0)( gl gW . 
           
Simulation 6:  = 1 and  = 1.5 
 
From the generic equations presented above it is concluded that: 
 
)(0337.0)(0188.0)(0188.0)(0805.01143.0)()( glgkgjgig
i
i gTgTgTgTgq     
)(0337.0)(0188.0)(0805.0)(0188.01143.0)()( glgkgjgig
i
j gTgTgTgTgq    
)(0337.0)(0805.0)(0188.0)(0188.01143.0)()( glgkgjgig
i
k gTgTgTgTgq     
)(2396.0)(0188.0)(0188.0)(0188.01143.0)()( glgkgjgig
i
l gTgTgTgTgq    
)(0337.0)(0188.0)(0188.0)(0805.01143.0)()( glgkgjgig
j
i gTgTgTgTgq     
)(0337.0)(0188.0)(0805.0)(0188.01143.0)()( glgkgjgig
j
j gTgTgTgTgq    
)(0337.0)(0805.0)(0188.0)(0188.01143.0)()( glgkgjgig
j
k gTgTgTgTgq     
)(2396.0)(0188.0)(0188.0)(0188.01143.0)()( glgkgjgig
j
l gTgTgTgTgq    
)(0337.0)(0188.0)(0188.0)(0805.01143.0)()( glgkgjgig
k
i gTgTgTgTgq     
)(0337.0)(0188.0)(0805.0)(0188.01143.0)()( glgkgjgig
k
j gTgTgTgTgq    
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)(0337.0)(0805.0)(0188.0)(0188.01143.0)()( glgkgjgig
k
k gTgTgTgTgq     
)(2396.0)(0188.0)(0188.0)(0188.01143.0)()( glgkgjgig
k
l gTgTgTgTgq    
)(0565.0)(0714.0)(0714.0)(4007.01143.0)()( glgkgjgig
l
i gTgTgTgTgq    
)(0565.0)(0714.0)(4007.0)(0714.01143.0)()( glgkgjgig
l
j gTgTgTgTgq    
)(0565.0)(4007.0)(0714.0)(0714.01143.0)()( glgkgjgig
l
k gTgTgTgTgq    
)(2416.0)(0714.0)(0714.0)(0714.01143.0)()( glgkgjgig
l
l gTgTgTgTgq     
 
Solving by substitution, the following expressions are obtained:  
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Therefore welfare in country i is given by: 
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 The first and second order conditions of this function are: 
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Therefore the optimal tariff in country i is: )(* gi gT  = 0.0794 + )(0819.0 gj gT  + 
)(0819.0 gk gT    )(0604.0 gl gT . Given symmetry across countries this expression 
converges to: )(0722.00949.0)()()(
***
glgkgjgi gTgTgTgT  . 
 
On the other hand, the following expressions are obtained for country l: 
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Therefore welfare in country l is given by: 
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The first and second order conditions of this function are: 
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Therefore the optimal tariff in country l is: )(
*
gl gT  = 0.1843 + )(0389.0 gi gT  + 
)(0389.0 gj gT  + )(0389.0 gk gT . Given symmetry across countries it is concluded that:
)(1168.01843.0)(* gigl gTgT  . In considering the optimal tariff equations of countries 
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i and l and using symmetry across countries, the following optimal tariffs for countries 
i, j, k and l are obtained: 0809.0)()()(
***  gkgjgi gTgTgT ; and 1938.0)(
* gl gT . 
Using these tariffs it is concluded that: 1037.0)()()(  gkgjgi gCSgCSgCS ; 
0678.0)( gl gCS ; )( gi g  = )( gj g  = )( gk g  = 0.0881; 0914.0)( gl g ; 
0713.0)()()(  gkgjgi gPSgPSgPS ; 0680.0)( gl gPS ; )( gi gTR  = )( gj gTR  
= 
)( gk gTR  = 0.0067; 0368.0)( gl gTR ; )( gi gW  = )( gj gW  = )( gk gW  = 0.2698; 
2641.0)( gl gW . 
            
 
Network h 
 
In considering the equations presented in Section 4.2.1.4, the following generic 
expressions are obtained: 
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Simulation 4:  = 1 and  = 0 
 
From the generic equations presented above it is concluded that 
10
2
)()( h
i
i gq ; )(
)(
h
i
j gq  
=  
10
)(42 hj gT
; 
10
)(42
)()( hkh
i
k
gT
gq

 ; 
10
)(42
)()( hlh
i
l
gT
gq

 ; 
10
2
)()( h
j
i gq ; )(
)(
h
j
j gq  
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10
)(42 hj gT
; 
10
)(62
)()( hkh
j
k
gT
gq

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10
)(62
)()( hlh
j
l
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
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10
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)()( h
k
i gq ; 
)()( h
k
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)(42
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k
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
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10
)(62
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k
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
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)()( h
l
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)()( h
l
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10
)(62
)()( hkh
l
k
gT
gq

 ; and 
10
)(42
)()( hlh
l
l
gT
gq

 . From these 
outputs, the following expressions are obtained for country i: 
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i
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
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
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  0)()()()(
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2)()()()(  h
i
lh
i
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i
jh
i
ihi gqgqgqgqgPS

     
         
Therefore welfare in country i is given by: 
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     222 )(4000.02000.0)(4000.02000.0)(4000.02000.0
3600.0)()()()()(
hlhkhj
hihihihihi
gTgTgT
gTRgPSggCSgW

 
   
 
Because this country has an agreement with all countries of the world, it holds that
0)(* hi gT . 
 
On the other hand, the following expressions are obtained for country j: 
 
   22)()()()( )(4000.08000.05.0)()()()(
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i
jhj gTgqgqgqgqgCS    
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
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
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j
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
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
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
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
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0)( hj gPS            
  )(2000.1)(4000.0)()()()( 2)()( hjhjhljhkjhjhj gTgTgqgqgTgTR     
 
Therefore welfare in country j is given by: 
 
 
   
  )(2000.1)(4000.0)(6000.02000.0
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The first and second order conditions of this function are: 
 
   
)(9200.12400.0)(4000.24000.0
)(4000.02000.0)4000.0)(2()(4000.08000.0)4000.0(
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gTgT
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
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9200.1
)(
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2
2



hj
hj
gT
gW
           
 
Therefore the optimal tariff in country j is: 125.0)(* hj gT . Given symmetry across 
countries it is concluded that: 125.0)()()(
***  hlhkhj gTgTgT . Using these tariffs, the 
following results are obtained: 3200.0)( hi gCS ; 
2813.0)()()(  hlhkhj gCSgCSgCS ; )( hi g  = 0.2275; 
1338.0)()()(  hlhkhj ggg  ; 0)()()()(  hlhkhjhi gPSgPSgPSgPS ; 
0)( hi gTR ; 0313.0)()()(  hlhkhj gTRgTRgTR ; 5475.0)( hi gW ; and )( hj gW  = 
)( hk gW  = )( hl gW  = 0.4463; ; . 
 
Simulation 5:  = 1 and  = 0.5 
 
From the generic equations presented above it is concluded that: 
 
)(0406.0)(0406.0)(0406.01600.0)()( hlhkhjh
i
i gTgTgTgq      
)(0406.0)(0406.0)(2641.01600.0)()( hlhkhjh
i
j gTgTgTgq       
)(0406.0)(2641.0)(0406.01600.0)()( hlhkhjh
i
k gTgTgTgq       
)(2641.0)(0406.0)(0406.01600.0)()( hlhkhjh
i
l gTgTgTgq       
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)(0483.0)(0483.0)(0406.01600.0)()( hlhkhjh
j
i gTgTgTgq       
)(0483.0)(0483.0)(2641.01600.0)()( hlhkhjh
j
j gTgTgTgq       
)(0483.0)(4470.0)(0406.01600.0)()( hlhkhjh
j
k gTgTgTgq      
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j
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k
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k
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l
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Solving by substitution, the following expressions are obtained for country i: 
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Therefore welfare in country i is: 
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Because this country has agreements with all countries of the world, tariff in country i 
is: 0)(* hi gT .  
 
On the other hand, the following expressions are obtained for country j: 
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Therefore welfare in country j is: 
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 The first and second order conditions of this function are: 
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Therefore the optimal tariff in country j is: 
)(0402.0)(0402.01132.0)(* hlhkhj gTgTgT  . Given symmetry across countries in is 
concluded that 1231.0)()()(
***  hlhkhj gTgTgT . Using these tariffs, the following 
results are obtained: 2084.0)( hi gCS ; )( hj gCS  = )( hk gCS  = )( hl gCS  = 0.1792; 
1512.0)( hi g ; 1151.0)()()(  hlhkhj ggg  ; )( hi gPS  = 0.0599; 
0425.0)()()(  hlhkhj gPSgPSgPS ; 0)( hi gTR ; )( hj gTR  = )( hk gTR  = )( hl gTR  
= 0.0261; 4196.0)( hi gW ; and )( hj gW  = )( hk gW  = )( hl gW  =  0.3629. 
 
Simulation 6:  = 1 and  = 1.5 
 
From the generic equations presented above it is concluded that: 
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)(0377.0)(0377.0)(0377.01143.0)()( hlhkhjh
i
i gTgTgTgq      
)(0377.0)(0377.0)(1611.01143.0)()( hlhkhjh
i
j gTgTgTgq       
)(0377.0)(1611.0)(0377.01143.0)()( hlhkhjh
i
k gTgTgTgq       
)(1611.0)(0377.0)(0377.01143.0)()( hlhkhjh
i
l gTgTgTgq       
)(0526.0)(0526.0)(0377.01143.0)()( hlhkhjh
j
i gTgTgTgq       
)(0526.0)(0526.0)(1611.01143.0)()( hlhkhjh
j
j gTgTgTgq       
)(0526.0)(3201.0)(0377.01143.0)()( hlhkhjh
j
k gTgTgTgq      
)(3201.0)(0526.0)(0377.01143.0)()( hlhkhjh
j
l gTgTgTgq      
)(0526.0)(0377.0)(0526.01143.0)()( hlhkhjh
k
i gTgTgTgq      
)(0526.0)(0377.0)(3201.01143.0)()( hlhkhjh
k
j gTgTgTgq      
)(0526.0)(1611.0)(0526.01143.0)()( hlhkhjh
k
k gTgTgTgq       
)(3201.0)(0377.0)(0526.01143.0)()( hlhkhjh
k
l gTgTgTgq      
)(0377.0)(0526.0)(0526.01143.0)()( hlhkhjh
l
i gTgTgTgq       
)(0377.0)(0526.0)(3201.01143.0)()( hlhkhjh
l
j gTgTgTgq      
)(0377.0)(3201.0)(0526.01143.0)()( hlhkhjh
l
k gTgTgTgq      
)(1611.0)(0526.0)(0526.01143.0)()( hlhkhjh
l
l gTgTgTgq       
 
Solving by substitution, the following expressions are obtained for country i: 
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Therefore welfare in country i is: 
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Because this country has an agreement with all countries of the world, tariff in this 
country is: 0)(* hi gT . 
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On the other hand, the following expressions are obtained for country j: 
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Therefore welfare in country j is: 
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 The first and second order conditions of this function are: 
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Therefore the optimal tariff in country j is: 
)(0537.0)(0537.01110.0)(* hlhkhj gTgTgT  . Given symmetry across countries it is 
concluded that: 1243.0)()()(
***  hlhkhj gTgTgT . Using these tariffs, the following 
results are obtained: 1096.0)( hi gCS ; )( hj gCS  = )( hk gCS  = )( hl gCS  = 0.0903; 
0995.0)( hi g ; 0847.0)()()(  hlhkhj ggg  ; )( hi gPS  = 0.0846; 
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0670.0)()()(  hlhkhj gPSgPSgPS ; 0)( hi gTR ; )( hj gTR  = )( hk gTR  = )( hl gTR  = 
0.0190; 2938.0)( hi gW ; and 2611.0)()()(  hlhkhj gWgWgW . 
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In considering the equations presented in Section 4.2.1.4, the following generic 
expressions are obtained: 
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Simulation 4:  = 1 and  = 0 
 
From the generic equations presented above it is concluded that: 
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Therefore welfare in country i is: 
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The first and second conditions of this function are: 
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Therefore the optimal tariff in country i is: 0811.0)(* ii gT . Given symmetry across 
countries it is concluded that: 0811.0)()(
**  ijii gTgT       
     
On the other hand, the following information is obtained for country k: 
 
    3200.08000.05.0)()()()(
2
1
)(
22)()()()(  i
l
ki
k
ki
j
ki
i
kik gqgqgqgqgCS   
   22)()( )(2000.02000.0)(
2
)2(
)( iii
k
ii
k
i gTgqg 



      
   22)()( )(2000.02000.0)(
2
)2(
)( iji
k
ji
k
j gTgqg 



      
    0400.02000.0)(
2
)2(
)(
22)()( 

 i
k
ki
k
k gqg

       
   22)()( )(4000.02000.0)(
2
)2(
)( ili
k
li
k
l gTgqg 



      
  0)()()()(
4
)(
2)()()()(  i
k
li
k
ki
k
ji
k
iik gqgqgqgqgPS

   
 
Therefore welfare in country k is:   
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Because country i has an agreement with all countries in the world, the tariff in this 
country is: 0)( ik gTR . 
 
Finally, the following information is obtained for country l: 
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Therefore welfare in country l is: 
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The first and second order conditions of this function are: 
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Therefore the optimal tariff in country l is 125.0)(* il gT . In considering this tariff and 
the tariffs in countries i, j and k, the following results are obtained: 
3072.0)()(  ijii gCSgCS ; 3200.0)( ik gCS ; 2813.0)( il gCS ; 
1491.0)()(  ijii gg  ; 1960.0)( ik g ; )( il g  = 0.1390; 
0)()()()(  ilikijii gPSgPSgPSgPS ; 0110.0)()(  ijii gTRgTR ; )( ik gTR  = 0; 
0313.0)( il gTR ; 4672.0)()(  ijii gWgW ; 5160.0)( ik gW ; and 4515.0)( il gW . 
           
Simulation 5:  = 1 and  = 0.5 
 
From the generic equations presented above it is concluded that: 
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Solving by substitution, the following expressions are obtained for country i: 
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Therefore welfare in country i is given by: 
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The first and second order conditions of this function are: 
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Therefore the optimal tariff in country i is: 
)(0140.0)(0530.00769.0)(* ilijii gTgTgT  . Given symmetry across countries it is 
concluded that: )(* ii gT  = )(
*
ij gT  = 0.0812  )(0148.0 il gT .     
      
On the other hand, the following expressions are obtained for country k: 
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Therefore welfare in country k is given by: 
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Because this country has agreements with all countries of the world, the tariff in this 
country is 0)( ik gT . 
 
Finally, the following expressions are obtained for country l: 
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 Therefore welfare in country l is given by: 
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The first and second order conditions of this function are: 
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Therefore the optimal tariff in country l is: 
)(0229.0)(0229.01132.0)(* ijiiil gTgTgT  . Using symmetry across countries, it is 
concluded that: )(0458.01132.0)(* iiil gTgT  . Using the tariff function of country i, 
the following tariffs for countries i, j, k and l are obtained: 0795.0)()(
**  ijii gTgT ; 
0)(* ik gT ; and 1169.0)(
* il gT . Using these tariffs it is concluded that: 
1971.0)()(  ijii gCSgCS ; 2067.0)( ik gCS ; 1791.0)( il gCS ; )( ii g  = )( ij g  = 
0.1228; 1403.0)( ik g ; 1183.0)( il g ; 0474.0)()(  ijii gPSgPS ; )( ik gPS  = 
0.0558; 0446.0)( il gPS ; 0091.0)()(  ijii gTRgTR ; 0)( ik gTR ; 0244.0)( il gTR ; 
3764.0)()(  ijii gWgW ; 4027.0)( ik gW ; and 3664.0)( il gW . 
  
Simulation 6:  = 1 and  = 1.5 
 
From the generic equations presented above it is concluded that: 
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i gTgTgTgq       
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j gTgTgTgq       
)(0526.0)(0188.0)(0188.01143.0)()( ilijiii
i
k gTgTgTgq      
)(3201.0)(0188.0)(0188.01143.0)()( ilijiii
i
l gTgTgTgq      
)(0526.0)(0188.0)(0805.01143.0)()( ilijiii
j
i gTgTgTgq       
)(0526.0)(0805.0)(0188.01143.0)()( ilijiii
j
j gTgTgTgq      
)(0526.0)(0188.0)(0188.01143.0)()( ilijiii
j
k gTgTgTgq       
)(3201.0)(0188.0)(0188.01143.0)()( ilijiii
j
l gTgTgTgq      
618 
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Solving by substitution, the following expressions are obtained for country i: 
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 Therefore welfare in country i is given by: 
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The first and second order conditions of this function are: 
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Therefore the optimal tariff in country i is: 
)(0218.0)(0819.00794.0)(* ilijii gTgTgT  . Using symmetry across countries it is 
concluded that: )(* ii gT  = )(
*
ij gT  = 0.0865  )(0238.0 il gT . 
          
On the other hand, the following expressions are obtained for country k: 
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Therefore welfare in country k is: 
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Because this country has agreements with all countries of the world, the tariff in this 
country is 0)( ik gTR . 
 
Finally, the following expressions are obtained for country l: 
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Therefore welfare in country l is given by: 
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The first and second order conditions of this function are: 
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Therefore the optimal tariff in country l is: 
)(0234.0)(0234.01110.0)(* ijiiil gTgTgT  . Using symmetry across countries it is 
concluded that: )(0469.01110.0)(* iiil gTgT  . Finally, using the tariff function of 
country i it is concluded that: )(* ii gT  = )(
*
ij gT  = 0.0837; 0)(
* ik gT ; and 
1149.0)(* il gT . Using these tariffs, the following results are obtained: 
1006.0)()(  ijii gCSgCS ; 1072.0)( ik gCS ; 0895.0)( il gCS ; )()( ijii gg   = 
0.0888; 0958.0)( ik g ; 0864.0)( il g ; 0734.0)()(  ijii gPSgPS ; 
0817.0)( ik gPS ; )( il gPS  = 0.0698; 0069.0)()(  ijii gTRgTR ; 0)( ik gTR ; 
0171.0)( il gTR ; )( ii gW  = )( ij gW  = 0.2697; 2847.0)( ik gW ; and 2628.0)( il gW . 
         
 
Network j 
 
In considering the equations presented in Section 4.2.1.4, the following generic 
expressions are obtained: 
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Simulation 4:  = 1 and  = 0  
 
From the generic equations presented above it is concluded that: 
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expressions are obtained for country i: 
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Therefore welfare in country i is given by: 
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The first and second order conditions of this function are: 
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Therefore the optimal tariff in country i is 0811.0)(
* ji gT . Using symmetry across 
countries it is concluded that 0811.0)()(
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On the other hand, the following equations are obtained for country j: 
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Therefore welfare in country j is given by: 
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Because this country has agreements with all countries of the world, it is concluded that 
0)( jj gTR . The same holds in country k which implies that 0)( jk gTR . Thus, in 
considering the tariffs in countries i, j, k and l it is concluded that: )( ji gCS  = )( jl gCS  
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Simulation 5:  = 1 and  = 0.5 
 
From the generic equations presented above it is concluded that: 
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Solving by substitution, the following expressions are obtained for country i: 
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Therefore welfare in country i is given by: 
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 The first and second order conditions of this function are: 
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Therefore the optimal tariff in country i is: )(0155.00769.0)(* jlji gTgT  . Using 
symmetry across countries it is concluded that: 0781.0)()( **  jlji gTgT . 
 
On the other hand, the following expressions are obtained for country j: 
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Therefore welfare in country j is given by: 
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Because this country has agreements with all countries of the world, it is concluded that 
0)( jj gTR . The same holds in country k which implies that 0)( jk gTR . Thus, in 
considering the tariffs in countries i, j, k and l it is concluded that: )( ji gCS  = )( jl gCS  
= 0.1961; 2056.0)()(  jkjj gCSgCS ; 1216.0)()(  jjji gg  ; 
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Simulation 6:  = 1 and  = 1.5 
 
From the generic equations presented above it is concluded that: 
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Solving by substitution, the following expressions are obtained for country i: 
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Therefore welfare in country i is given by: 
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 The first and second order conditions of this function are: 
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Therefore the optimal tariff in country i is: )(0168.00794.0)(
*
jlji gTgT  . Using 
symmetry across countries it is concluded that: 0807.0)()( **  jlji gTgT . 
 
On the other hand, the following expressions are obtained for country j: 
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Therefore welfare in country j is given by:
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Because this country has agreements with all countries of the world, it is concluded that 
0)( jj gTR . The same holds in country k which implies that 0)( jk gTR . Thus, in 
considering the tariffs in countries i, j, k and l it is concluded that: )( ji gCS  = )( jl gCS  
= 0.0992; 1056.0)()(  jkjj gCSgCS ; 0885.0)()(  jlji gg  ; 
0931.0)()(  jkjj gg  ; 0739.0)()(  jlji gPSgPS ; 0797.0)()(  jkjj gPSgPS ; 
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2784.0)()(  jkjj gWgW . 
          
Network k 
 
In considering the equations presented in Section 4.2.1.4, the following generic 
expressions are obtained: 
 
 
 
  
















512
)()()()4(
)()()()(
)()()()()(
12
)(
)()()(
)()()()(
)()()()()(
)( k
i
lk
i
kk
i
j
k
l
lk
l
kk
l
jk
k
l
k
k
kk
k
jk
j
lk
j
kk
j
j
k
i
i
gqgqgq
gqgqgqgq
gqgqgqgqgq
gq   
637 
 
 
 
  
















512
)()()()4(
)()()()(
)()()()()(
12
)(
)()()(
)()()()(
)()()()()(
)( k
i
lk
i
kk
i
i
k
l
lk
l
kk
l
ik
k
l
k
k
kk
k
ik
j
lk
j
kk
j
i
k
i
j
gqgqgq
gqgqgqgq
gqgqgqgqgq
gq   
 
 
  
















512
)()()()4(
)()()()(
)()()()()(
12
)(
)()()(
)()()()(
)()()()()(
)( k
i
lk
i
jk
i
i
k
l
lk
l
jk
l
ik
k
l
k
k
jk
k
ik
j
lk
j
jk
j
i
k
i
k
gqgqgq
gqgqgqgq
gqgqgqgqgq
gq   
 
 
  
















512
)()()()4(
)()()()(
)()()()()(
12
)(
)()()(
)()()()(
)()()()()(
)( k
i
kk
i
jk
i
i
k
l
kk
l
jk
l
ik
k
k
k
k
jk
k
ik
j
kk
j
jk
j
i
k
i
l
gqgqgq
gqgqgqgq
gqgqgqgqgq
gq   
 
 
  
















512
)()()()4(
)()()()(
)()()()()(
12
)(
)()()(
)()()()(
)()()()()(
)( k
j
lk
j
kk
j
j
k
l
lk
l
kk
l
jk
k
l
k
k
kk
k
jk
i
lk
i
kk
i
j
k
j
i
gqgqgq
gqgqgqgq
gqgqgqgqgq
gq    
 
 
  
















512
)()()()4(
)()()()(
)()()()()(
12
)(
)()()(
)()()()(
)()()()()(
)( k
j
lk
j
kk
j
i
k
l
lk
l
kk
l
ik
k
l
k
k
kk
k
ik
i
lk
i
kk
i
i
k
j
j
gqgqgq
gqgqgqgq
gqgqgqgqgq
gq    
 
 
  
















512
)()()()4(
)()()()(
)()()()()(
12
)(
)()()(
)()()()(
)()()()()(
)( k
j
lk
j
jk
j
i
k
l
lk
l
jk
l
ik
k
l
k
k
jk
k
ik
i
lk
i
jk
i
i
k
j
k
gqgqgq
gqgqgqgq
gqgqgqgqgq
gq    
 
 
  
















512
)()()()4(
)()()()(
)()()()()(
12
)(
)()()(
)()()()(
)()()()()(
)( k
j
kk
j
jk
j
i
k
l
kk
l
jk
l
ik
k
k
k
k
jk
k
ik
i
kk
i
jk
i
i
k
j
l
gqgqgq
gqgqgqgq
gqgqgqgqgq
gq    
638 
 
 
 
  
















512
)()()()4(
)()()()(
)()()()()(
12
)(
)()()(
)()()()(
)()()()()(
)( k
k
lk
k
kk
k
j
k
l
lk
l
kk
l
jk
j
l
k
j
kk
j
jk
i
lk
i
kk
i
j
k
k
i
gqgqgq
gqgqgqgq
gqgqgqgqgq
gq    
 
 
  
















512
)()()()4(
)()()()(
)()()()()(
12
)(
)()()(
)()()()(
)()()()()(
)( k
k
lk
k
kk
k
i
k
l
lk
l
kk
l
ik
j
l
k
j
kk
j
ik
i
lk
i
kk
i
i
k
k
j
gqgqgq
gqgqgqgq
gqgqgqgqgq
gq    
 
 
  
















512
)()()()4(
)()()()(
)()()()()(
12
)(
)()()(
)()()()(
)()()()()(
)( k
k
lk
k
jk
k
i
k
l
lk
l
jk
l
ik
j
l
k
j
jk
j
ik
i
lk
i
jk
i
i
k
k
k
gqgqgq
gqgqgqgq
gqgqgqgqgq
gq    
 
 
  
















512
)()()()4(
)()()()(
)()()()()(
12
)(
)()()(
)()()()(
)()()()()(
)( k
k
kk
k
jk
k
i
k
l
kk
l
jk
l
ik
j
k
k
j
jk
j
ik
i
kk
i
jk
i
i
k
k
l
gqgqgq
gqgqgqgq
gqgqgqgqgq
gq    
 
 
  
















512
)()()()4(
)()()()(
)()()()()(
12
)(
)()()(
)()()()(
)()()()()(
)( k
l
lk
l
kk
l
j
k
k
lk
k
kk
k
jk
j
l
k
j
kk
j
jk
i
lk
i
kk
i
j
k
l
i
gqgqgq
gqgqgqgq
gqgqgqgqgq
gq    
 
 
  
















512
)()()()4(
)()()()(
)()()()()(
12
)(
)()()(
)()()()(
)()()()()(
)( k
l
lk
l
kk
l
i
k
k
lk
k
kk
k
ik
j
l
k
j
kk
j
ik
i
lk
i
kk
i
i
k
l
j
gqgqgq
gqgqgqgq
gqgqgqgqgq
gq    
 
 
  
















512
)()()()4(
)()()()(
)()()()()(
12
)(
)()()(
)()()()(
)()()()()(
)( k
l
lk
l
jk
l
i
k
k
lk
k
jk
k
ik
j
l
k
j
jk
j
ik
i
lk
i
jk
i
i
k
l
k
gqgqgq
gqgqgqgq
gqgqgqgqgq
gq    
639 
 
 
 
  
















512
)()()()4(
)()()()(
)()()()()(
12
)(
)()()(
)()()()(
)()()()()(
)( k
l
kk
l
jk
l
i
k
k
kk
k
jk
k
ik
j
k
k
j
jk
j
ik
i
kk
i
jk
i
i
k
l
l
gqgqgq
gqgqgqgq
gqgqgqgqgq
gq    
 
 
Simulation 4:  = 1 and  = 0  
 
From the generic equations presented above it is concluded that: )()( k
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outputs, the following expressions are obtained for country i: 
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Therefore welfare in country i is 4800.0)( ki gW . Using symmetry across countries it 
is concluded that: )( ki gCS  = )( kj gCS  = )( kk gCS  = )( kl gCS  = 0.3200; )( ki g  = 
)( kj g  = )( kk g  = )( kl g  = 0.1600; 0)()()()(  klkkkjki gPSgPSgPSgPS ; 
)( ki gTR  = )( kj gTR  = )( kk gTR  = )( kl gTR  = 0; and 
4800.0)()()()(  klkkkjki gWgWgWgW . 
       
Simulation 5:  = 1 and  = 0.5  
 
From the generic equations presented above it is concluded that: )()( k
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outputs, the following expressions are obtained for country i: 
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Therefore welfare in country i is 3840.0)( ki gW . Using symmetry across countries it 
is concluded that: )( ki gCS  = )( kj gCS  = )( kk gCS  = )( kl gCS  = 0.2048; )( ki g  = 
)( kj g  = )( kk g  = )( kl g  = 0.1280; )()()()( klkkkjki gPSgPSgPSgPS   = 
0.0512; )( ki gTR  = )( kj gTR  = )( kk gTR  = )( kl gTR  = 0; and 
3840.0)()()()(  klkkkjki gWgWgWgW . 
 
Simulation 6:  = 1 and  = 1.5  
 
From the generic equations presented above it is concluded that: )()( k
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outputs, the following expressions are obtained for country i: 
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Therefore welfare in country i is 2743.0)( ki gW . Using symmetry across countries it 
is concluded that: )( ki gCS  = )( kj gCS  = )( kk gCS  = )( kl gCS  = 0.1045; )( ki g  = 
)( kj g  = )( kk g  = )( kl g  = 0.0914; )()()()( klkkkjki gPSgPSgPSgPS   = 
0.0784; )( ki gTR  = )( kj gTR  = )( kk gTR  = )( kl gTR  = 0; and 
2743.0)()()()(  klkkkjki gWgWgWgW . 
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APPENDIX C 
 
Simulations for the case of asymmetry in market size 
 
Network a 
 
In considering the equations presented in Section 4.2.1.2 it holds that  =  
 = ; =  = ; CSi(ga) = CSk(ga) = ; 
CSj(ga) = CSl(ga) = ;  =  = ;  = 
 =  ; PSi(ga) = PSk(ga) =  ; and PSj(ga) = PSl(ga) = 
. 
 
Simulation 11:  = 1, = 0 and  = 0 
 
 =   =  = 0.5000; =  = 0; CSi(ga) = CSk(ga) = 
 = 0.1250; CSj(ga) = CSl(ga) = 0;  =  =  = 0.2500; 
 =  = 0 ; PSi(ga) = PSj(ga) = PSk(ga) =  PSl(ga) = 0. 
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Simulation 12:  = 1,  = 0 and  = 0.5 
 
 =   =  = 0.4000; =  = 0; CSi(ga) = CSk(ga) = 
 = 0.0800; CSj(ga) = CSl(ga) = 0;  =  =  = 
0.2000;  =  = 0; PSi(ga) = PSk(ga) =   = 0.0200; and PSj(ga) 
= PSl(ga) = 0. 
 
Simulation 13:  = 1,  = 0 and  = 1.5 
 
 =   =  = 0.2857; =  = 0; CSi(ga) = CSk(ga) = 
 = 0.0408;  CSj(ga) = CSl(ga) = 0;  =  =  = 
0.1428;  =  = 0; PSi(ga) = PSk(ga) =   = 0.0306; and PSj(ga) 
= PSl(ga) = 0. 
 
Simulation 14:  = 1,  = 0.5 and  = 0 
 
 =   =  = 0.5000; =  =  = 0.2500; CSi(ga) = 
CSk(ga) =  = 0.1250; CSj(ga) = CSl(ga) =  = 0.0313;  = 
 =  = 0.2500;  =  =  = 0.0625; and PSi(ga) = 
PSj(ga) = PSk(ga) =  PSl(ga) = 0. 
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Simulation 15:  = 1,  = 0.5 and  = 0.5 
 
 =   =  = 0.4000 =  =  = 0.2000; CSi(ga) = 
CSk(ga) =  = 0.0800; CSj(ga) = CSl(ga) =  = 0.0200;  = 
 =  = 0.2000;  =  =  = 0.0500; 
PSi(ga) = PSk(ga) =   = 0.0200; and PSj(ga) = PSl(ga) =  = 
0.0050. 
 
Simulation 16:  = 1,  = 0.5 and  = 1.5 
 
 =   =  = 0.2857; =  =  = 0.1429; CSi(ga) = 
CSk(ga) =  = 0.0408; CSj(ga) = CSl(ga) =  = 0.0102;  = 
 =  = 0.1428;  =  =  = 0.0357; 
PSi(ga) = PSk(ga) =   = 0.0306; and PSj(ga) = PSl(ga) =  = 
0.0077. 
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In considering the equations presented in Section 4.2.1.2 it holds that  =  
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;  = ;  = ; CSi(gb) = 
; CSj(gb) = ; CSk(gb) = ; 
CSl(gb) = ;  =   = ;  =  
= ;  = ;  = ; 
PSi(gb) = ; PSj(gb) = ; PSk(gb) =  
; and PSl(gb) = . 
 
Simulation 11:  = 1, = 0 and  = 0 
 
 =   =  = 0.3333; =  = 0;  =  = 0.5000; 
 = 0; CSi(gb) =  = 0.2222; CSj(gb) = 0; CSk(gb) = 
 = 0.1250; CSl(gb) = 0;  =   =  = 0.1111; 
 =  = 0;  = ;= 0.2500;  = 0; and PSi(gb) = 
PSj(gb) = PSk(gb) = PSl(gb) = 0. 
 
Simulation 12:  = 1,  = 0 and  = 0.5 
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 = 0.0800; CSl(gb) = 0;  =   =  = 0.1020; 
 =  = 0;  =  = 0.2000;  = 0; PSi(gb) = 
PSj(gb) =  = 0.0102; PSk(gb) =   = 0.0200; and PSl(gb) = 0. 
 
Simulation 13:  = 1,  = 0 and  = 1.5 
 
 =   =  = 0.2222; =  = 0;  =  = 
0.2857;  = 0; CSi(gb) =  = 0.0987; CSj(gb) = 0; CSk(gb) = 
 = 0.0408; CSl(gb) = 0;  =   =  = 0.0864; 
 =  = 0;  =  = 0.1428;  = 0; PSi(gb) = 
PSj(gb) =  = 0.0185; PSk(gb) =   = 0.0306; and PSl(gb) = 0. 
 
Simulation 14:  = 1,  = 0.5 and  = 0 
 
 =   =  = 0.3333; =  =  = 0.1667;  =  
= 0.5000;  =  = 0.2500; CSi(gb) =  = 0.2222; CSj(gb) = 
 = 0.0556; CSk(gb) =  = 0.1250; CSl(gb) =  
= 0.0313;  =   =  = 0.1111;  =  =  
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= 0.0278;  =  = 0.2500;  =  = 0.0625; and PSi(gb) = 
PSj(gb) = PSk(gb) = PSl(gb) = 0. 
 
Simulation 15:  = 1,  = 0.5 and  = 0.5 
 
 =   =  = 0.2769; =  = 
 = 0.1231;  =  = 0.4000;  =  = 0.2000; 
CSi(gb) =  = 0.1533; CSj(gb) =  = 0.0303; 
CSk(gb) =  = 0.0800; CSl(gb) =  = 0.0200;  =   
=  = 0.0958;  =  =  = 0.0189;  
=  = 0.2000;  =  = 0.0500; PSi(gb) = PSj(gb) = 
PSk(gb) = ;= 0.0200; and PSl(gb) =  = 0.0050. 
 
Simulation 16:  = 1, ~  = 0.5 and  = 1.5 
 
 =   =  = 0.2095; =  = 
 = 0.0762;  =  = 0.2857;  =  = 0.1429; 
CSi(gb) =  = 0.0878; CSj(gb) =  = 0.0116; 
CSk(gb) =  = 0.0408; CSl(gb) =  = 0.0102;  =   
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=  = 0.0768;  =  =  = 0.0102;  
=  = 0.1428;  =  = 0.0357; PSi(gb) = PSj(gb) = 
PSk(gb) =  = 0.0306; and PSl(gb) =  = 0.0077. 
 
 
Network c 
 
In considering the equations presented in Section 4.2.1.2 it holds that  =  
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 =  =  = ;  =  = 
; PSi(gc) = PSk(gc)  = ; and PSj(gc) = PSl(gc) = 
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Simulation 11:  = 1, = 0 and  = 0 
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PSi(gc) = PSj(gc) = PSk(gc)  = PSl(gc) = 0. 
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Simulation 12:  = 1,  = 0 and  = 0.5 
 
 =   =  =  =  = 0.2667;  =  = 0; 
CSi(gc) = CSk(gc) =  = 0.1423; CSj(gc) = CSl(gc) = 0;  =  
 =  =  =  = 0.0889;  =  = 0; 
PSi(gc) = PSk(gc)  =  = 0.0356; and PSj(gc) = PSl(gc) = 0. 
 
Simulation 13:  = 1,  = 0 and  = 1.5 
 
 =   =  =  =  = 0.1905;  =  = 0; 
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 =  =  =  = 0.0635;  =  = 0; 
PSi(gc) = PSk(gc)  =  = 0.0544; and PSj(gc) = PSl(gc) = 0. 
 
Simulation 14:  = 1,  = 0.5 and  = 0 
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 = 0.0313;  =   =  =  =  = 
0.1111;  =  =  = 0.0625; and PSi(gc) = PSj(gc) = PSk(gc) = 
PSl(gc) = 0. 
 
Simulation 15:  = 1,  = 0.5 and  = 0.5 
 
 =   =  =  =  = 0.2667;  =  =  
= 0.2000; CSi(gc) = CSk(gc) =  = 0.1422; CSj(gc) = CSl(gc) = 
 = 0.0200;  =   =  =  =  = 
0.0889;  =  =  = 0.0500; PSi(gc) = PSk(gc)  = 
 = 0.0356; and PSj(gc) = PSl(gc) =  = 0.0050. 
 
Simulation 16:  = 1, ~  = 0.5 and  = 1.5 
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 = 0.0102;  =   =  =  =  = 
0.0635;  =  =  = 0.0357; PSi(gc) = PSk(gc)  = 
 = 0.0544; and PSj(gc) = PSl(gc) =  = 0.0077. 
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In considering the equations presented in Section 4.2.1.2 it holds: )()( d
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Simulation 11:  = 1, = 0 and  = 0 
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Simulation 15:  = 1,  = 0.5 and  = 0.5 
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Network e 
 
In considering the equations presented in Section 4.2.1.2 it holds that  = 
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; CSl(ge) = ;  = ;  
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  = ;   = ;   = 
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; PSj(ge)  = ; PSk(ge) = 
; and PSl(ge) = . 
 
The outputs involved in this network can be obtained by solving the following output 
matrix: 
 
 
 
Simulation 11:  = 1, = 0 and  = 0 
 
Because in this case  =  =  = 0, the output matrix becomes: 
 
 
 
Therefore,  =   =   = 0.2500;   =   = 0.3333; 
 =  =  = 0; CSi(ge) =  = 0.2813; 
CSj(ge) = CSl(ge) = 0; CSk(ge) =  = 0.2222;  =   = 
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  =  = 0.0625;  =  =  = 0.1111;  = 
 =   = 0; and PSi(ge) = PSj(ge)  = PSk(ge) = PSl(ge) = 0. 
 
Simulation 12:  = 1,  = 0 and  = 0.5 
 
Because in this case  =  =  = 0, the output matrix becomes: 
 
 
 
Therefore,  =   = 0.1970;   =   = 0.2716;   = 
0.2423;  =  =  = 0; CSi(ge) =  = 
0.2024; CSj(ge) = CSl(ge) = 0; CSk(ge) =  = 0.1475;  = 
  =  = 0.0485;   =   =  = 0.0922; 
  =  = 0.0734;  =   =   = 0; PSi(ge) = 
PSk(ge) =   = 0.0274; PSj(ge)  =  = 0.0073; and 
PSl(ge) = 0. 
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Simulation 13:  = 1,  = 0 and  = 1.5 
 
Because in this case  =  =  = 0, the output matrix becomes: 
 
 
 
Therefore,  =   = 0.1439;   =   = 0.1982;   = 
0.2034;  =  =  = 0; CSi(ge) =  = 
0.1206; CSj(ge) = CSl(ge) = 0; CSk(ge) =  = 0.0786;  = 
  =  = 0.0362;   =   =  = 0.0687; 
  =  = 0.0724;  =   =   = 0; PSi(ge) = 
PSk(ge) =   = 0.0439; PSj(ge)  =  = 0.0155; and 
PSl(ge) = 0. 
 
Simulation 14:  = 1,  = 0.5 and  = 0 
 
The output matrix in this case is given by: 
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Therefore,  =   =   =    = 0.2500;  =   
= 0.1667;   =   = 0.3333; CSi(ge) =  = 
0.2813; CSj(ge) =  = 0.0556; CSk(ge) =  = 
0.2222; CSl(ge) =  = 0.0313;  =   =  =  = 
 = 0.0625;  =  =  = 0.0278;  =  = 
 = 0.1111; PSi(ge) =  PSj(ge)  = PSk(ge) = PSl(ge) = 0. 
 
Simulation 15:  = 1,  = 0.5 and  = 0.5 
 
The output matrix in this case is given by: 
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Therefore,  = 0.1907;  = 0.1000;   = 0.2609;   = 
0.2279;   = 0.1373;   = 0.2050;   = 0.2751;   = 0.2000; 
CSi(ge) =  = 0.1944; CSj(ge) =  = 
0.0282; CSk(ge) =  = 0.1436; CSl(ge) =  = 0.0200; 
 =  = 0.0455;  =  = 0.0125;   = 
 = 0.0851;   =  = 0.0649;   = 
 = 0.0236;  =  = 0.0525;  = 
 = 0.0946;   =  = 0.0500; PSi(ge) = 
 = 0.0380; PSj(ge) =  = 0.0167; 
PSk(ge) =  = 0.0288; and PSl(ge) =  = 0.0050. 
 
Simulation 16:  = 1, ~  = 0.5 and  = 1.5 
 
The output matrix in this case is given by: 
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Therefore,  = 0.1398;  = 0.0467;   = 0.1887;   = 
0.1834;   = 0.0902;   = 0.1506;   = 0.1995;   = 0.1429; 
CSi(ge) = ; = 0.1122; CSj(ge) =  = 
0.0094; CSk(ge) =  = 0.0753; CSl(ge) =  = 0.0102; 
 =  = 0.0342;  =  = 0.0038;   = 
 = 0.0623;   =  = 0.0589;   = 
 = 0.0142;   =  = 0.0397;   = 
 = 0.0697;   =  = 0.0357; PSi(ge) =  
 = 0.0528; PSj(ge)  =  = 0.0281; 
PSk(ge) =  = 0.0460; and PSl(ge) =  = 0.0077. 
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;   = 
;   = ;   
= ;   = 
; CSi(gf) = ; 
CSj(gf) = ; CSk(gf) = ; CSl(gf) = 
;  = ;  = ; 
 = ;  = ;  = 
;   = ;  = ; 
 = ; PSi(gf) =  ; PSj(gf) = 
; PSk(gf) = ; and PSl(gf) = 
. 
 
The outputs involved in this network can be obtained by solving the following output 
matrix: 
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Simulation 11:  = 1, = 0 and  = 0 
 
In this case  =  =  =  =  = 0. Therefore, 
 =  =  = 0.3333;  =  = 0.5000; CSi(gf) = 
 = 0.2222; CSj(gf) = CSl(gf) = 0; CSk(gf) =  = 0.1250; 
 =  =  = 0.1111;  =  = 0.2500; and PSi(gf) 
= PSj(gf) = PSk(gf) = PSl(gf) = 0. 
 
Simulation 12:  = 1,  = 0 and  = 0.5 
 
In this case  =  =  =  =  = 0. Therefore, 
 =  =  = 0.2857;  =  = 0.4000; CSi(gf) = 
 = 0.1632; CSj(gf) = CSl(gf) = 0; CSk(gf) =  = 0.0800; 
 =  =  = 0.1020;  =  = 0.2000; 
PSi(gf) = PSj(gf) =  = 0.0102; PSk(gf) =  = 0.0200; and PSl(gf) 
= 0. 
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Simulation 13:  = 1,  = 0 and  = 1.5 
 
In this case  =  =  =  =  = 0. Therefore, 
 =  =  = 0.2222;  =  = 0.2857; CSi(gf) = 
 = 0.0988; CSj(gf) = CSl(gf) = 0; CSk(gf) =  = 0.0408; 
 =  =  = 0.0864;  =  = 0.1428; 
PSi(gf) = PSj(gf) =  = 0.0185; PSk(gf) =  = 0.0306; and PSl(gf) 
= 0. 
 
Simulation 14:  = 1,  = 0.5 and  = 0 
 
The output matrix in this case is given by: 
 
 
 
Therefore,  =   = 0.3333;  =   =   = 0.1250; 
  =  = 0.5000;   =   = 0.1667; CSi(gf) =  
~
)()( f
i
j gq )(
)(
j
j
j gq )(
)(
f
l
j gq )(
)(
j
j
l gq )(
)(
f
l
l gq
)()( f
i
i gq )(
)(
f
j
i gq
5.4
1
)()( f
k
k gq
5.3
1
 22222.02222.0
2
1
  22857.0
2
1
)()( f
i
i g )(
)(
f
j
i g  
2
2222.0
2
)5.3(
)()( k
k
k g  
2
2857.0
2
)5.3(
 22222.0
4
5.1  22857.0
4
5.1
~





































































1667.0
1250.0
1667.0
1250.0
3333.0
1250.0
3333.0
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
1000000
0100000
010000
0001000
0000100
0000010
0000001
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
f
l
l
f
l
j
f
j
l
f
j
j
f
j
i
f
i
j
f
i
i
gq
gq
gq
gq
gq
gq
gq
)()( f
i
i gq )(
)(
f
j
i gq )(
)(
f
i
j gq )(
)(
f
j
j gq )(
)(
f
l
j gq
)()( f
k
k gq
2
1
)()( f
j
l gq )(
)(
f
l
l gq  
2
3333.03333.0
2
1

665 
 
= 0.2222; CSj(gf) =  = 0.0703; CSk(gf) =  = 
0.1250; CSl(gf) =  = 0.0556;  =  =  = 
0.1111;  =  =  =  = 0.0156;  =  = 
0.2500;  =  =  = 0.0278; and PSi(gf) = PSj(gf) = PSk(gf) = 
PSl(gf) = 0. 
 
Simulation 15:  = 1,  = 0.5 and  = 0.5 
 
The output matrix in this case is given by: 
 
 
 
Therefore,  = 0.2833;  = 0.0944;   = 0.2680;   = 
0.0791;   = 0.1070;   =  = 0.4000;   = 0.1141;   = 
0.1650; CSi(gf) =  = 0.1520; CSj(gf) = 
 = 0.0414; CSk(gf) =  = 0.0800; CSl(gf) = 
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 = 0.0111;  =  = 0.0898;  = 
 = 0.0078;  =  = 0.0143;   = 
 = 0.2000;  =  = 0.0163;  = 
 = 0.0340; PSi(gf) =  = 0.0178; PSj(gf) = 
 = 0.0258; PSk(gf) =  = 0.0200; and PSl(gf) 
=  = 0.0097. 
 
Simulation 16:  = 1, ~  = 0.5 and  = 1.5 
 
The output matrix in this case is given by: 
 
 
 
Therefore,  = 0.2156;  = 0.0580;   = 0.2018;   = 
0.0442;   = 0.0598;   =  = 0.2857;   = 0.0908;   = 
0.1063; CSi(gf) =  = 0.0871; CSj(gf) = 
 = 0.0186; CSk(gf) =  = 0.0408; CSl(gf) = 
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 = 0.0138;  =  = 0.0813;  = 
 = 0.0059;  =  = 0.0713;  = 
 = 0.0034;  =  = 0.0063;  = 
 = 0.1428;  =  = 0.0144;  = 
 = 0.0198; PSi(gf) =  = 0.0281; PSj(gf) = 
 = 0.0351; PSk(gf) =  = 0.0306; and PSl(gf) 
=  = 0.0146. 
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In considering the equations presented in Section 4.2.1.2 it holds that  = 
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;   = 
; CSi(gg) = 
; CSj(gg) = ; CSk(gg) = 
; CSl(gg) = ;  = ; 
 =  =  ;   = ;  = 
 = ;  =  = ;  = 
;  = ; PSi(gg) =  
; PSj(gg)  = ; PSk(gg) = 
; and PSl(gg) = . 
 
The outputs involved in this network can be obtained by solving the following output 
matrix: 
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Simulation 11:  = 1, = 0 and  = 0 
 
Because in this case  =  =  =  = 0, the output matrix 
becomes: 
 
 
 
Therefore,  =  =  =  = 0.2000;   =  = 
0.3333; CSi(gg) =  = 0.32; CSj(gg) = CSl(gg) = 0; 
CSk(gg) =  = 0.2222;  =  =  =  = 
 = 0.0400;  =  =  = 0.1111; and PSi(gg) = PSj(gg) = 
PSk(gg) = PSl(gg) = 0. 
 
Simulation 12:  = 1,  = 0 and  = 0.5 
 
Because in this case  =  =  =  = 0, the output matrix 
becomes: 
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Therefore,  =  = 0.1526;  =  = 0.2748;  = 
 = 0.1985; CSi(gg) =  = 0.2465; CSj(gg) 
= CSl(gg) = 0; CSk(gg) =  = 0.1510;  =  = 
 = 0.0291;   =  =  = 0.0944;  = 
 =  = 0.0493; PSi(gg) = PSk(gg) =  = 
0.0228; and PSj(gg) = PSl(gg) =  = 0.0049. 
 
Simulation 13:  = 1,  = 0 and  = 1.5 
 
Because in this case  =  =  =  = 0, the output matrix 
becomes: 
 
 
 
Therefore,  =  = 0.1115;  =  = 0.2036;  = 
 = 0.1726; CSi(gg) =  = 0.1614; CSj(gg) 
= CSl(gg) = 0; CSk(gg) =  = 0.0829;  =  = 
 = 0.0218;   =  =  = 0.0725;  = 
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 =  = 0.0521; PSi(gg) = PSk(gg) =  = 
0.0372; and PSj(gg) = PSl(gg) =  = 0.0112. 
 
Simulation 14:  = 1,  = 0.5 and  = 0 
 
The output matrix in this case is given by: 
 
 
 
Therefore,  =  =   =   = 0.2000;  =  = 
 =  = 0.1667;  =  = 0.3333; CSi(gg) = 
 = 0.3200; CSj(gg) = CSl(gg) = 
 = 0.0556; CSk(gg) =  = 0.2222;  = 
 =  =  =  = 0.0400;  =  =  
=  =   = 0.0278;  =  =  = 0.1111; and 
PSi(gg) =  PSj(gg)  = PSk(gg) = PSl(gg) = 0. 
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Simulation 15:  = 1,  = 0.5 and  = 0.5 
 
The output matrix in this case is given by: 
 
 
 
Therefore,  = 0.1387;  =  = 0.0939;   = 0.2547; 
 =   = 0.1885;   =   = 0.1437;   = 0.1655; 
  = 0.2815; CSi(gg) =  = 0.2320; CSj(gg) 
= CSl(gg) =  = 0.0282; CSk(gg) =  = 0.1438; 
 =  = 0.0240;  =  =   = 0.0110; 
  =  = 0.0811;  =  =  = 0.0444; 
 =  =  = 0.0258;  =  = 0.0342;
 =  = 0.0991; PSi(gg) =  
 = 0.0422; PSj(gg)  = PSl(gg) = 
 = 0.0138; and PSk(gg) =  = 0.0250. 
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Simulation 16:  = 1, ~  = 0.5 and  = 1.5 
 
The output matrix in this case is given by: 
 
 
 
Therefore,  = 0.1028;  =  = 0.0439;   = 0.1859; 
 =  = 0.1558;   =   = 0.0969;   = 0.1231; 
  = 0.2062; CSi(gg) =  = 0.1445; CSj(gg) 
= CSl(gg) =   = 0.0099; CSk(gg) =  = 0.0769; 
 =  = 0.0185;  =  =   = 0.0034; 
  =  = 0.0605;  =  =  = 0.0425; 
 =  =  = 0.0164;  =  = 0.0265;
 =  = 0.0744; PSi(gg) =  
 = 0.0532; PSj(gg)  = PSl(gg) =
 = 0.0239; and PSk(gg) =  = 0.0407. 
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Network h 
 
In considering the equations presented in Section 4.2.1.2 it holds that  = 
 =  =  = 
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 =  =  = ;  =  =  
;  =  = ;  =  = 
; PSi(gh) = PSk(gh) = ; and PSj(gh) = 
PSl(gh) = . 
 
The outputs involved in this network can be obtained by solving the following output 
matrix: 
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Simulation 11:  = 1, = 0 and  = 0 
 
Because in this case  =  =  =  = 0;  =  
=  =  = 
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)1(2
2 


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 ; and  =   = , 
it holds that  =  =  =  =  =   = ; 
CSi(gh) = CSk(gh) =  = 0.2813; CSj(gh) = CSl(gh) = 0; 
 =  =  =  =  =  =  = 0.0625; 
and PSi(gh) = PSj(gh) = PSk(gh) = PSl(gh) = 0. 
 
Simulation 12:  = 1,  = 0 and  = 0.5 
 
Because in this case  =  =  =  = 0;  =  
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5.0
   = 
0.0207; and PSj(gh) = PSl(gh) =  
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4
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Simulation 13:  = 1,  = 0 and  = 1.5 
 
Because in this case  =  =  =  = 0;  =  
=  =  = 
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Simulation 14:  = 1,  = 0.5 and  = 0 
 
The output matrix in this case is given by: 
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Therefore,  =  =  =  =  =   = 0.2500; 
 =  =  =  = 0.1667; CSi(gh) = CSk(gh) = 
 = 0.2813; CSj(gh) = CSl(gh) =  = 
0.0556;  =  =  =  =  =  =  = 
0.0625;  =  =  =  =  = 0.0278; and PSi(gh) = 
PSj(gh) = PSk(gh) =PSl(gh) = 0. 
 
Simulation 15:  = 1,  = 0.5 and  = 0.5 
 
The output matrix in this case is given by: 
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Therefore,  =  =  =  = 0.1990;  =  = 
0.1063;  =   = 0.2274;   =   = 0.1348; CSi(gh) = CSk(gh) 
=  21990.02274.01990.0
2
1
  = 0.1956; CSj(gh) = CSl(gh) =  
2
1348.01063.0
2
1
   = 
0.0291;  =  =  =  =  21990.0
2
5.2
 = 0.0500;  
=  =  21063.0
2
5.2
 = 0.0141;  =  =  22274.0
2
5.2
 = 0.0646; 
 =  =  21348.0
2
5.2
 = 0.0227; PSi(gh) = PSk(gh) = 
)()( h
i
i gq )(
)(
h
i
k gq )(
)(
h
k
i gq )(
)(
h
k
k gq )(
)(
h
j
i gq )(
)(
h
l
k gq
)()( h
i
j gq )(
)(
h
k
l gq )(
)(
h
j
j gq )(
)(
h
l
l gq
 22500.02500.02500.0
2
1
  21667.01667.0
2
1

)()( h
i
i g )(
)(
h
i
k g )(
)(
h
k
i g )(
)(
h
k
k g )(
)(
h
j
i g )(
)(
h
l
k g  
2
2500.0
)()( h
i
j g )(
)(
h
k
l g )(
)(
h
j
j g )(
)(
h
l
l g  
2
1667.0
~
)()( h
i
i gq )(
)(
h
i
k gq )(
)(
h
k
i gq )(
)(
h
k
k gq )(
)(
h
i
j gq )(
)(
h
k
l gq
)()( h
j
i gq )(
)(
h
l
k gq )(
)(
h
j
j gq )(
)(
h
l
l gq
)()( h
i
i g )(
)(
h
i
k g )(
)(
h
k
i g )(
)(
h
k
k g )(
)(
h
i
j g
)()( h
k
l g )(
)(
h
j
i g )(
)(
h
l
k g
)()( h
j
j g )(
)(
h
l
l g
678 
 
 21990.01063.01990.0
4
5.0
  = 0.0318; and PSj(gh) = PSl(gh) =
 21348.02274.0
4
5.0
  = 0.0164. 
 
Simulation 16:  = 1, ~  = 0.5 and  = 1.5 
 
The output matrix in this case is given by: 
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Therefore,  =  =  =  = 0.1481;  =  = 
0.0541;  =   = 0.1822;   =   = 0.0883; CSi(gh) = CSk(gh) 
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= 0.0274. 
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Network i 
 
In considering the equations presented in Section 4.2.1.2 it holds that  = 
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;  = ;  = ;  
= ;  = ;  = ; 
 = ; PSi(gi) = ; PSj(gi) = 
; PSk(gi) = ; and PSl(gi) = 
. 
 
The outputs involved in this network can be obtained by solving the following output 
matrix: 
 
 
 
Where 0 = ; 1 = ; 2 = ; 3 = 
; 4 = ; 5 = ; 6 = ; 7 = . 
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Simulation 11:  = 1, = 0 and  = 0 
 
Because in this case  =  =  =  =  = 0, the output 
matrix becomes: 
 
 
 
Therefore,  =  =  = 0.2500;  =  = 0.3333; CSi(gi) 
=  = 0.2813; CSj(gi) = CSl(gi) = 0; CSk(gi) = 
 = 0.2222;  =  =  =  = 0.0625; 
 =  =  = 0.1111; and PSi(gi) = PSj(gi) = PSk(gi) = PSl(gi) = 0. 
 
Simulation 12:  = 1,  = 0 and  = 0.5 
 
Because in this case  =  =  =  =  = 0, the output 
matrix becomes: 
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Therefore,  =  = 0.1970;  =  = 0.2716;  = 
0.2423; CSi(gi) =  = 0.2024; CSj(gi) = CSl(gi) = 0; CSk(gi) 
=  = 0.1475;  =  =  = 0.0485; 
  =   =  = 0.0922;  =  = 0.0734; 
PSi(gi) = PSk(gi) =  = 0.0274; PSj(gi) =  = 0.0073; 
and PSl(gi) = 0. 
 
Simulation 13:  = 1,  = 0 and  = 1.5 
 
Because in this case  =  =  =  =  = 0, the output 
matrix becomes: 
 
 
 
Therefore,  =  = 0.1439;  =  = 0.1982;  = 
0.2034; CSi(gi) =  = 0.1206; CSj(gi) = CSl(gi) = 0; CSk(gi) 
=  = 0.0786;  =  =  = 0.0362; 
  =  =  = 0.0687;  =  = 0.0724; 
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PSi(gi) = PSk(gi) =  = 0.0439; PSj(gi) =  = 0.0155; 
and PSl(gi) = 0. 
 
Simulation 14:  = 1,  = 0.5 and  = 0 
 
The output matrix in this case is given by: 
 
 
 
Therefore,  =  =  = 0.2500;  =  =  = 
0.1250;  =  = 0.3333;  =  = 0.1667; CSi(gi) = 
 = 0.2813; CSj(gi) =  = 
0.0703; CSk(gi) =  = 0.2222; CSl(gi) =  = 
0.0556;  =  =  =  = 0.0625;  =  = 
 =  = 0.0156;   =  =   = 0.1111;  = 
 =  = 0.0278; and PSi(gi) = PSj(gi) = PSk(gi) = PSl(gi) = 0. 
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Simulation 15:  = 1,  = 0.5 and  = 0.5 
 
The output matrix in this case is given by: 
 
 
 
Therefore,  = 0.1967;  = 0.0689;   = 0.2639;  = 0.2184; 
 = 0.0906;  = 0.1119;  = 0.2065;  = 0.2738;  = 
0.1218;  = 0.1431; CSi(gi) =  = 0.1932; CSj(gi) = 
 = 0.0396; CSk(gi) =  = 0.1446; 
CSl(gi) =  = 0.0325;  =  = 0.0484;  = 
 = 0.0059;   =   = 0.0871;  = 
 = 0.0596;  =  = 0.0103;  = 
 = 0.0157;  =  = 0.0533;  = 
 = 0.0937;  =  = 0.0185;  = 
 = 0.0256; PSi(gi) =  = 0.0350; PSj(gi) = 
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 = 0.0221; PSk(gi) =  = 0.0288; 
and PSl(gi) =  = 0.0088. 
 
Simulation 16:  = 1, ~  = 0.5 and  = 1.5 
 
The output matrix in this case is given by: 
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 = 0.0688;  =  = 0.0164;  =  
= 0.0189; PSi(gi) =  = 0.0498; PSj(gi) = 
 = 0.0327; PSk(gi) =  = 0.0459; 
and PSl(gi) =  = 0.0151. 
 
Network j 
 
In considering the equations presented in Section 4.2.1.2 it holds that  = 
 =  =  = ; 
 =  = ;  =  = 
;  = 
;  = ; CSi(gj) = CSk(gj) = 
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=  = ;  =  = ;  = 
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; PSj(gj) = ; and PSl(gj) 
= . 
 
The outputs involved in this network can be obtained by solving the following output 
matrix: 
 
 
 
Simulation 11:  = 1, = 0 and  = 0 
 
Because in this case  =  =  =  = 0, it holds that 
 =  =  =  =  =  = 0.2500; CSi(gj) = 
CSk(gj) =  = 0.2813; CSj(gj) = CSl(gj) = 0;  = 
 =  =  =  =  =  = 0.0625; and 
PSi(gj) = PSk(gj) = PSj(gj) = PSl(gj) = 0. 
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Simulation 12:  = 1,  = 0 and  = 0.5 
 
Because in this case  =  =  =  = 0, it holds that 
 =  =  =  =  =  = 0.2105; CSi(gj) = 
CSk(gj) =  = 0.1994; CSj(gj) = CSl(gj) = 0;  = 
 =  =  =  =  =  = 0.0554; 
PSi(gj) = PSj(gj) = PSk(gj) =  = 0.0222; and PSl(gj) = 0. 
 
Simulation 13:  = 1,  = 0 and  = 1.5 
 
Because in this case  =  =  =  = 0, it holds that 
 =  =  =  =  =  = 0.1600; CSi(gj) = 
CSk(gj) =  = 0.1152; CSj(gj) = CSl(gj) = 0;  = 
 =  =  =  =  =  = 0.0448; 
PSi(gj) = PSk(gj) = PSj(gj) =  = 0.0384; and PSl(gj) = 0. 
 
Simulation 14:  = 1,  = 0.5 and  = 0 
 
The output matrix in this case is given by: 
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Therefore,  =  =  =  =  =  =  
= 0.2500;  =  =  = 0.1250; CSi(gj) = CSk(gj) = 
 = 0.2813; CSj(gj) =  = 
0.0703; CSl(gj) =  = 0.0313;  =  =  =  = 
 =  =  =   = 0.0625;  =  =  = 
 = 0.0156; and PSi(gj) = PSj(gj) = PSk(gj) = PSl(gj) = 0. 
 
Simulation 15:  = 1,  = 0.5 and  = 0.5 
 
The output matrix in this case is given by: 
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0.0350; CSl(gj) =  = 0.0200;  =  =  =  = 
 =  =  = 0.0530;  =  =  = 
 = 0.0097;  =  = 0.0500; PSi(gj) = PSj(gj) = 
PSk(gj) =  = 0.0313; and PSl(gj) =  = 
0.0050. 
 
Simulation 16:  = 1, ~  = 0.5 and  = 1.5 
 
The output matrix in this case is given by: 
 
 
 
Therefore,  =  =  =  =  =  = 0.1542; 
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0.0107; CSl(gj) =  = 0.0102;  =  =  =  = 
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 = 0.0042;  =  = 0.0357; PSi(gj) = PSk(gj) = 
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 = 0.0479; PSj(gj) =  = 
0.0478; and PSl(gj) =  = 0.0077. 
 
Network k 
 
In considering the equations presented in Section 4.2.1.2 it holds that  = 
 = ;  =  = 
;  =  = 
;  =  =  =  = 
; CSi(gk) = CSk(gk) = ; 
CSj(gk) = CSl(gk) = ;  =  = 
;  =  =  ;  =  = 
;  =  =  = ; ; 
PSi(gk) = PSk(gk) = ; and PSj(gk) = PSl(gk) = 
. 
 
The outputs involved in this network can be obtained by solving the following output 
matrix: 
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Simulation 11:  = 1, = 0 and  = 0 
 
Because in this case  =  =  =  =  =  
=0, it holds that  =  =  =  =  = 0.3333; CSi(gk) = 
CSk(gk) =  = 0.2222; CSj(gk) = CSl(gk) = 0;  =  = 
 =  =  = 0.1111; and PSi(gk) = PSj(gk) = PSk(gk) = PSl(gk) = 0. 
 
Simulation 12:  = 1,  = 0 and  = 0.5 
 
Because in this case  =  =  =  =  =  
=0, it holds that  =  =  =  =  = 0.2857; CSi(gk) = 
CSk(gk) =  = 0.1632; CSj(gk) = CSl(gk) = 0;  =  = 
 =  =  = 0.1020; and PSi(gk) = PSj(gk) = PSk(gk) = 
PSl(gk) =  = 0.0102. 
 
 


















































































8123
)1(~2
3
4
~
3
)(
)(
)(
)(
1
8123
)2(
0
8123
)1)(3(2
)2(
1
)1)(3(2
0
)1)(4()1)(4(
1
)1)(4(2
)3(
)1)(3(
0
)1)(3(2
)2(
1
2
)(
)(
)(
)(
22 

























k
j
j
k
j
i
k
i
j
k
i
i
gq
gq
gq
gq
~
)()( k
i
j gq )(
)(
k
k
l gq )(
)(
k
j
j gq )(
)(
k
l
l gq )(
)(
k
j
l gq )(
)(
k
l
j gq
)()( k
i
i gq )(
)(
k
j
i gq )(
)(
k
k
k gq )(
)(
k
l
k gq
3
1
 23333.03333.0
2
1
 )(
)(
k
i
i g )(
)(
k
j
i g
)()( k
k
k g )(
)(
k
l
k g  
2
3333.0
~
)()( k
i
j gq )(
)(
k
k
l gq )(
)(
k
j
j gq )(
)(
k
l
l gq )(
)(
k
j
l gq )(
)(
k
l
j gq
)()( k
i
i gq )(
)(
k
j
i gq )(
)(
k
k
k gq )(
)(
k
l
k gq
5.3
1
 22857.02857.0
2
1
 )(
)(
k
i
i g )(
)(
k
j
i g
)()( k
k
k g )(
)(
k
l
k g  
2
2857.0
2
)5.2(
 22857.0
4
5.0
693 
 
Simulation 13:  = 1,  = 0 and  = 1.5 
 
Because in this case  =  =  =  =  =  
=0, it holds that  =  =  =  =  = 0.2222; CSi(gk) = 
CSk(gk) =  = 0.0988; CSj(gk) = CSl(gk) = 0;  =  = 
 =  =  = 0.0864; and PSi(gk) = PSj(gk) = PSk(gk) = 
PSl(gk) =  = 0.0185. 
 
Simulation 14:  = 1,  = 0.5 and  = 0 
 
The output matrix in this case is given by: 
 
 
 
Therefore,  =  =  =  = 0.3333;  =  =
 =  =  =  = 0.1250; CSi(gk) = CSk(gk) = 
 = 0.2222; CSj(gk) = CSl(gk) =  = 
0.0703;  =  =  =  =  = 0.1111;  = 
 =   =  =  =  =  = 0.0156; and 
PSi(gk) = PSj(gk) = PSk(gk) = PSl(gk) = 0. 
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Simulation 15:  = 1,  = 0.5 and  = 0.5 
 
The output matrix in this case is given by: 
 
 
 
Therefore,  =  = 0.2819;  =  = 0.1018;  = 
 = 0.2801;  =  =  =  = 0.0875; CSi(gk) = CSk(gk) 
=  = 0.1579; CSj(gk) = CSl(gk) =  = 
0.0383;  =  =  = 0.0993;  =  =  
 = 0.0130;  =  =  = 0.0981;  = 
 =  =  =  = 0.0096; PSi(gk) = PSk(gk) = 
 = 0.0184; and PSj(gk) = PSl(gk) = 
 = 0.0259. 
 
Simulation 16:  = 1, ~  = 0.5 and  = 1.5 
 
The output matrix in this case is given by: 
 
~















































1017.0
2857.0
1111.0
2857.0
)(
)(
)(
)(
10847.000339.0
1190.010476.00
0741.00741.011296.0
0952.001190.01
)(
)(
)(
)(
k
j
j
k
j
i
k
i
j
k
i
i
gq
gq
gq
gq
)()( k
i
i gq )(
)(
k
k
k gq )(
)(
k
i
j gq )(
)(
k
k
l gq )(
)(
k
j
i gq
)()( k
l
k gq )(
)(
k
j
j gq )(
)(
k
j
l gq )(
)(
k
l
j gq )(
)(
k
l
l gq
 22801.02819.0
2
1
  20875.00875.01018.0
2
1

)()( k
i
i g )(
)(
k
k
k g  
2
2819.0
2
)5.2(
)()( k
i
j g )(
)(
k
k
l g
 21018.0
2
)5.2(
)()( k
j
i g )(
)(
k
l
k g  
2
2801.0
2
)5.2(
)()( k
j
j g
)()( k
j
l g )(
)(
k
l
j g )(
)(
k
l
l g  
2
0875.0
2
)5.2(
 21018.02819.0
4
5.0

 20875.00875.02801.0
4
5.0

695 
 
 
 
Therefore,  =  = 0.2133;  =  = 0.0676;  = 
 = 0.2147;  =  =  =  = 0.0517; CSi(gk) = CSk(gk) 
=  = 0.0916; CSj(gk) = CSl(gk) =  = 
0.0146;  =  =  = 0.0796;  =  =  
 = 0.0080;  =  =  = 0.0807;  = 
 =  =  =  = 0.0047; PSi(gk) = PSk(gk) = 
 = 0.0296; and PSj(gk) = PSl(gk) =  
= 0.0379. 
 
 
Network l 
 
In considering the equations presented in Section 4.2.1.2 it holds that  = 
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;  = 
;  = 
;  = 
; CSi(gl) = CSk(gl) = 
; CSj(gl) = ; CSl(gl) = 
;  =  = ;  =  = 
;  =  = ;  = 
;  = ;  = ;  
= ; PSi(gl) = PSk(gl) = ; PSj(gl) = 
; and PSl(gl) = . 
 
The outputs involved in this network can be obtained by solving the following output 
matrix: 
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Simulation 11:  = 1, = 0 and  = 0 
 
Because in this case  =  =  =  =  =  = 0, 
it holds that  =  =  =  =  = 0.3333; CSi(gl) = CSk(gl) = 
 = 0.2222; CSj(gl) = CSl(gl) = 0;  =  =  = 
 =  = 0.1111; and PSi(gl) = PSj(gl) = PSk(gl) = PSl(gl) = 0.  
 
Simulation 12:  = 1,  = 0 and  = 0.5 
 
Because in this case  =  =  =  =  =  = 0, 
it holds that  =  = 0.2979;  =  = 0.2553; CSi(gl) = 
CSk(gl) =  = 0.1530; CSj(gl) = CSl(gl) = 0;  =  = 
 = 0.1109;  =  =  = 0.0815; PSi(gl) = 
PSk(gl) =  = 0.0111; PSj(gl) =  = 0.0326; and PSl(gl) 
= 0. 
 
Simulation 13:  = 1,  = 0 and  = 1.5 
 
Because in this case  =  =  =  =  =  = 0, 
it holds that  =  = 0.2342;  =  = 0.1802; CSi(gl) = 
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CSk(gl) =  = 0.0859; CSj(gl) = CSl(gl) = 0;  =  = 
 = 0.0960;  =  =  = 0.0568; PSi(gl) = 
PSk(gl) =  = 0.0206; PSj(gl) =  = 0.0487; and PSl(gl) 
= 0. 
 
Simulation 14:  = 1,  = 0.5 and  = 0 
 
The output matrix in this case is given by: 
 
 
 
Therefore,  =  =  =  = 0.3333;  =  = 
 =  = 0.1000;  =  = 0.1667; CSi(gl) = CSk(gl) = 
 = 0.2222; CSj(gl) =  = 
0.0800; CSl(gl) =  = 0.0556;  =  =  = 
 =  = 0.1111;  =  =  =  =  = 
0.0100;  =  =  = 0.0278; and PSi(gl) = PSj(gl) = PSk(gl) = 
PSl(gl) = 0. 
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Simulation 15:  = 1,  = 0.5 and  = 0.5 
 
The output matrix in this case is given by: 
 
 
 
Therefore,  =  = 0.2933;  =  = 0.0820;  = 
 = 0.2461;  = 0.0348;  = 0.0843;  = 0.0869;  = 
0.1577; CSi(gl) = CSk(gl) =  = 0.1455; CSj(gl) = 
 = 0.0408; CSl(gl) =  = 
0.0293;  =  =  = 0.1075;  =  = 
 = 0.0084;  =  =  = 0.0757;  = 
 = 0.0015;  =  = 0.0089;  = 
 = 0.0094;  =  = 0.0311; PSi(gl) = PSk(gl) = 
 = 0.0176; PSj(gl) =  = 
0.0467; and PSl(gl) =  = 0.0075. 
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Simulation 16:  = 1, ~  = 0.5 and  = 1.5 
 
The output matrix in this case is given by: 
 
 
 
Therefore,  =  = 0.2239;  =  = 0.0537;  = 
 = 0.1760;  = 0.0057;  = 0.0319;  = 0.0642;  = 
0.1200; CSi(gl) = CSk(gl) =  = 0.0800; CSj(gl) = 
 = 0.0157; CSl(gl) =  = 
0.0115;  =  =  = 0.0877;  =  = 
 = 0.0050;  =  =  = 0.0542;  = 
 = 0.0001;  =  = 0.0018;  = 
 = 0.0072;  =  = 0.0252; PSi(gl) = PSk(gl) = 
 = 0.0289; PSj(gl) =  = 
0.0569; and PSl(gl) =  = 0.0127. 
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Network m 
 
In considering the equations presented in Section 4.2.1.2 it holds that  = 
;  =  = 
;  =  = 
;  =  = 
;  = 
 = ; 
 = ; CSi(gm) = ; CSj(gm) = CSl(gm) = 
; CSk(gm) = ;  = 
;  =  =  ;  =  = 
;  =  = ;   =  = 
;  = ; PSi(gm) = 
; PSj(gm) = PSl(gm) = 
; and PSk(gm) = . 
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The outputs involved in this network can be obtained by solving the following output 
matrix: 
 
 
Simulation 11:  = 1, = 0 and  = 0 
 
Because in this case  =  =  =  =  =  = 
0, it holds that  =  =  =  = 0.2500;  =  = 0.5000; 
CSi(gm) =  = 0.2813; CSj(gm) = CSl(gm) = 0; CSk(gm) = 
 = 0.1250;  =  =  =  = 0.0625;  
=  = 0.2500; and PSi(gm) = PSj(gm) = PSk(gm) = PSl(gm) = 0. 
 
Simulation 12:  = 1,  = 0 and  = 0.5 
 
Because in this case  =  =  =  =  =  = 
0, it holds that  =  =  =  = 0.2222;  =  = 
0.4000; CSi(gm) =  = 0.2222; CSj(gm) = CSl(gm) = 0; 
CSk(gm) =  = 0.0800;  =  =  =  = 
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0.0617;  =  = 0.2000; PSi(gm) = PSj(gm) = PSl(gm) = 
 = 0.0062; and PSk(gm) =  = 0.0200. 
 
Simulation 13:  = 1,  = 0 and  = 1.5 
 
Because in this case  =  =  =  =  =  = 
0, it holds that  =  =  =  = 0.1818;  =  = 
0.2857; CSi(gm) =  = 0.1487; CSj(gm) = CSl(gm) = 0; 
CSk(gm) =  = 0.0408;  =  =  =  = 
0.0578;  =  = 0.1428; PSi(gm) = PSj(gm) = PSl(gm) = 
 = 0.0124; and PSk(gm) =  = 0.0306. 
 
Simulation 14:  = 1,  = 0.5 and  = 0 
 
The output matrix in this case is given by: 
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 = 0.2813; CSj(gm) = CSl(gm) = 
 = 0.0703; CSk(gm) =  = 0.1250;  = 
 =  =  = 0.0625;  =  =  =  
=  =  =  = 0.0156;  =  = 0.2500; and 
PSi(gm) = PSj(gm) = PSl(gm) = PSk(gm) = 0. 
 
Simulation 15:  = 1,  = 0.5 and  = 0.5 
 
The output matrix in this case is given by: 
 
 
 
Therefore,  =  =  = 0.2117;  =  = 0.0942; 
 =  =  =  = 0.0941;  =  = 0.4000; CSi(gm) 
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 = 0.2000; and PSi(gm) = PSj(gm) = PSk(gm) = PSl(gm) = 
 =  0.0200. 
 
Simulation 16:  = 1, ~  = 0.5 and  = 1.5 
 
The output matrix in this case is given by: 
 
 
 
Therefore,  =  =  = 0.1654;  =  =  = 
 =  =  = 0.0602;  =  = 0.2857; CSi(gm) = 
 = 0.1231; CSj(gm) = CSl(gm) = 
 = 0.0163; CSk(gm) =  = 0.0408;  = 
 =  =  = 0.0479;  =  =  = 
 =  =  =  = 0.0063;  = 
 = 0.1428; and PSi(gm) = PSj(gm) = PSk(gm) = PSl(gm) = 
 = 0.0306. 
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Network n 
 
In considering the equations presented in Section 4.2.1.2 it holds that  = 
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;  = 
;  = 
; CSi(gn) = 
; CSj(gn) = ; CSk(gn) = 
; CSl(gn) = ;  = 
;  = ;   = ;  
= ;  = ;  = ; 
 = ;  = ;  = 
;  = ;  = ;  
= ; PSi(gn) = ; PSj(gn) = 
; PSk(gn) = ; and PSl(gn) = 
. 
 
The outputs involved in this network can be obtained by solving the following output 
matrix: 
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Where 0 = ; 1 = ; 2 = ; 3 = 
; 4 = ; 5 = ; 6 = ; 7 = ; 8 = 
; 9 = . 
 
Simulation 11:  = 1, = 0 and  = 0 
 
In this case  =  =  =  =  = 0. Therefore, the 
output matrix is given by: 
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Therefore,  =  =  =  = 0.2000;   =  = 
 = 0.2500; CSi(gn) =  = 0.3200; CSj(gn) = 
CSl(gn) = 0; CSk(gn) =  = 0.2813;  =  = 
 =  =  = 0.0400;   =  =  =  
= 0.0625; and PSi(gn) = PSj(gn) = PSk(gn) = PSl(gn) = 0. 
 
Simulation 12:  = 1,  = 0 and  = 0.5 
 
In this case  =  =  =  =  = 0. Therefore, the 
output matrix is given by: 
 
 
 
Therefore,  =  =  = 0.1657;   =  =  = 
0.2130;  = 0.2012; CSi(gn) =  = 0.2438; 
CSj(gn) = CSl(gn) = 0; CSk(gn) =  = 0.2042;  = 
 =  =  = 0.0343;   =  =  = 
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 = 0.0567;  =  = 0.0506; PSi(gn) = PSk(gn) = 
PSl(gn) =  = 0.0179; and PSj(gn) =  = 0.0051. 
 
Simulation 13:  = 1,  = 0 and  = 1.5 
 
In this case  =  =  =  =  = 0. Therefore, the 
output matrix is given by: 
 
 
 
Therefore,  =  =  = 0.1273;   =  =  = 
0.1644;  = 0.1766; CSi(gn) =  = 0.1560; 
CSj(gn) = CSl(gn) = 0; CSk(gn) =  = 0.1216;  = 
 =  =  = 0.0284;  =  =  = 
 = 0.0473;  =  = 0.0546; PSi(gn) = PSk(gn) = 
PSl(gn) =  = 0.0319 and PSj(gn) =  = 0.0117. 
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Simulation 14:  = 1,  = 0.5 and  = 0 
 
In this case the output matrix is given by: 
 
 
 
Therefore,  =  =  =  = 0.2000;  =  = 
0.1667;   =  =  = 0.2500;  =  =  = 
0.1250; CSi(gn) =  = 0.3200; CSj(gn) = 
 = 0.0556; CSk(gn) =  = 0.2813; 
CSl(gn) =  = 0.0703;  =  =  = 
 =  = 0.0400;  =  =  = 0.0278;   = 
 =  =  = 0.0625;  =  =  =  
= 0.0156; and PSi(gn) = PSj(gn) = PSk(gn) = PSl(gn) = 0. 
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Simulation 15:  = 1,  = 0.5 and  = 0.5 
 
In this case the output matrix is given by: 
 
 
 
Therefore,  = 0.1527;  = 0.1008;   = 0.1980;  = 0.0804; 
 = 0.1925;  = 0.1405;  =  = 0.1653;  = 
 = 0.2106;  =  = 0.0930; CSi(gn) = 
 = 0.2284; CSj(gn) =  = 
0.0291; CSk(gn) =  = 0.1917; CSl(gn) = 
 = 0.0355;  =  = 0.0291;  
=  = 0.0127;   =  = 0.0490;  = 
 = 0.0081;  =  = 0.0463;  = 
 = 0.0247;  =  =  = 0.0342;  = 
 =  = 0.0554;  =  =  = 0.0108; 
PSi(gn) =  = 0.0354; PSj(gn) = 
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 = 0.0139; and PSk(gn) = PSl(gn) = 
 = 0.0275. 
 
Simulation 16:  = 1, ~  = 0.5 and  = 1.5 
 
In this case the output matrix is given by: 
 
 
 
Therefore,  = 0.1160;  = 0.0494;   = 0.1498;  = 0.0445; 
 = 0.1608;  = 0.0943;  =  = 0.1252;  = 
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 = 0.0156;  =  =  = 0.0274;  = 
 =  = 0.0442;  =  =  = 0.0051; 
PSi(gn) =  = 0.0485; PSj(gn) = 
 = 0.0244; and PSk(gn) = PSl(gn) = 
 = 0.0428. 
 
Network o 
 
In considering the equations presented in Section 4.2.1.2 it holds that  = 
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; CSj(go) = CSl(go) = 
; CSk(go) = ;  = 
;  =  = ;  = 
;  =  = ;  =  = 
 =  = ;  = ;  = 
; PSi(go) = ; PSj(go) = 
PSl(go) = ; and  PSk(go) = . 
 
The outputs involved in this network can be obtained by solving the following output 
matrix: 
 
 
 
Simulation 11:  = 1, = 0 and  = 0 
 
Because in this case  =  =  =  =  =  = 0, 
the output matrix becomes: 
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Therefore,  =  =  =  =  0.2000;  =  = 
0.3333; CSi(go) =  = 0.3200; CSj(go) = CSl(go) = 
0; CSk(go) =  = 0.2222;  =  =  =  
=  = 0.0400;  =  =  = 0.1111; and PSi(go) = PSj(go) 
= PSk(go) = PSl(go) = 0. 
 
Simulation 12:  = 1,  = 0 and  = 0.5 
 
Because in this case  =  =  =  =  =  = 0, 
the output matrix becomes: 
 
 
 
Therefore,  =  = 0.1526;  =  = 0.2748;  = 
 = 0.1985; CSi(go) =  = 0.2465; CSj(go) = 
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CSl(go) = 0; CSk(go) =  = 0.1510;  =  = 
 = 0.0291;  =  =  = 0.0944;  = 
 =  = 0.0493; PSi(go) = PSk(go) =  = 
0.0228; and PSj(go) = PSl(go) =  = 0.0049. 
 
Simulation 13:  = 1,  = 0 and  = 1.5 
 
Because in this case  =  =  =  =  =  = 0, 
the output matrix becomes: 
 
 
 
Therefore,  =  = 0.1115;  =  = 0.2036;  = 
 = 0.1726; CSi(go) =  = 0.1614; CSj(go) = 
CSl(go) = 0; CSk(go) =  = 0.0829;  =  = 
 = 0.0218;  =  =  = 0.0725;  = 
 =  = 0.0521; PSi(go) = PSk(go) =  = 
0.0372; and  PSj(go) = PSl(go) =  = 0.0112. 
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Simulation 14:  = 1,  = 0.5 and  = 0 
 
The output matrix in this case is given by: 
 
 
 
Therefore,  =  =  =  = 0.2000;  =  = 
 =  =  =  = 0.1250;  =  = 0.3333; 
CSi(go) =  = 0.3200; CSj(go) = CSl(go) = 
 = 0.0703; CSk(go) =  = 0.2222; 
 =  =  =  =  = 0.0400;  =  = 
 =  =  =  =   = 0.0156;  =  
=  = 0.1111; and PSi(go) = PSj(go) = PSk(go) = PSl(go) = 0. 
 
Simulation 15:  = 1,  = 0.5 and  = 0.5 
 
The output matrix in this case is given by: 
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Therefore,  = 0.1482;  =  = 0.0702;  = 0.2594;  
=  = 0.1806;  =  =  =  = 0.1026;  = 
0.1682;  = 0.2794; CSi(go) =  = 0.2296; 
CSj(go) = CSl(go) =  = 0.0379; CSk(go) = 
 = 0.1452;  =  = 0.0275;  = 
 =  = 0.0062;  =  = 0.0841;  = 
 =  = 0.0408;  =  =  =  = 
 = 0.0132;  =  = 0.0354;  = 
 = 0.0976; PSi(go) =  = 0.0375; 
PSj(go) = PSl(go) =  = 0.0186; and  PSk(go) = 
 = 0.0250. 
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Simulation 16:  = 1, ~  = 0.5 and  = 1.5 
 
The output matrix in this case is given by: 
 
 
 
Therefore,  = 0.1112;  =  = 0.0326;  = 0.1895;  
=  = 0.1467;  =  =  =  = 0.0680;  = 
0.1262;  = 0.2045; CSi(go) =  = 0.1409; 
CSj(go) = CSl(go) =  = 0.0142; CSk(go) = 
 = 0.0776;  =  = 0.0216;  = 
 =  = 0.0019;  =  = 0.0628;  = 
 =  = 0.0377;  =  =  =  = 
 = 0.0081;  =  = 0.0279;  = 
 = 0.0732; PSi(go) =  = 0.0502; 
PSj(go) = PSl(go) =  = 0.0300; and  PSk(go) = 
 = 0.0410. 
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Network p 
 
In considering the equations presented in Section 4.2.1.2 it holds that  = 
 =  =  = ;  = 
 = ;  =  
= ;   =    = 
  =  = ; CSi(gp) = CSk(gp) = 
; CSj(gp) = CSl(gp) = ; 
 =   =   =  = ;  =  
= ;   =   = ;  =  = 
 =  = ; PSi(gp) = PSk(gp) = 
; and PSj(gp)  = PSl(gp) = 
. 
 
The outputs involved in this network can be obtained by solving the following output 
matrix: 
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Simulation 11:  = 1, = 0 and  = 0 
 
Because in this case  =  =  =  =  =  = 
0, it holds that  =  =  =  =  =  =  = 
0.2500; CSi(gp) = CSk(gp) =  = 0.2813 CSj(gp) = CSl(gp) = 
0;  =   =   =   =  =  =  = 
0.0625; and PSi(gp) = PSj(gp) = PSk(gp) = PSl(gp) = 0. 
 
Simulation 12:  = 1,  = 0 and  = 0.5 
 
Because in this case  =  =  =  =  =  = 
0, it holds that  =  =  =  = 0.2034;  =  
= 0.2373; CSi(gp) = CSk(gp) =  = 0.2074; CSj(gp) = CSl(gp) 
= 0;  =   =   =  =  = 0.0517;   
=   =  = 0.0704; PSi(gp) = PSk(gp) =  = 
0.0207; and PSj(gp)  = PSl(gp) =  = 0.0070. 
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Simulation 13:  = 1,  = 0 and  = 1.5 
 
Because in this case  =  =  =  =  =  = 
0, it holds that  =  =  =  = 0.1527;  =  
= 0.1985; CSi(gp) = CSk(gp) =  = 0.1270; CSj(gp) = CSl(gp) 
= 0;  =   =   =  =  = 0.0408;   
=   =  = 0.0690; PSi(gp) = PSk(gp) =  = 
0.0350; and PSj(gp)  = PSl(gp) =  = 0.0148. 
 
Simulation 14:  = 1,  = 0.5 and  = 0 
 
The output matrix in this case is given by: 
 
 
 
Therefore,  =  =  =  =  =  = 0.2500; 
 =  =  =  =  =  = 0.1250; CSi(gp) = 
CSk(gp) =  = 0.2813; CSj(gp) = CSl(gp) = 
 = 0.0703;  =   =   =   = 
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 =   =   = 0.0625;  =  =  = 
 =  =  =  = 0.0156; and PSi(gp) = PSj(gp)  = PSk(gp) 
= PSl(gp) = 0. 
 
Simulation 15:  = 1,  = 0.5 and  = 0.5 
 
The output matrix in this case is given by: 
 
 
 
Therefore,  =  =  =  = 0.2030;  =  = 
0.0818;  =  = 0.2182;  =  =  =  = 
0.0970; CSi(gp) = CSk(gp) =  = 0.1948; CSj(gp) = CSl(gp) = 
 = 0.0380;  =   =   =  = 
 = 0.0515;  =  =  = 0.0084;   = 
  =  = 0.0595;  =  =  =  = 
 = 0.0118; PSi(gp) = PSk(gp) =  = 0.0297; 
and PSj(gp)  = PSl(gp) =  = 0.0212. 
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Simulation 16:  = 1, ~  = 0.5 and  = 1.5 
 
The output matrix in this case is given by: 
 
 
 
Therefore,  =  =  =  = 0.1517;  =  = 
0.0421;  =  = 0.1722;   =    =   =  = 
0.0626; CSi(gp) = CSk(gp) =  = 0.1131; CSj(gp) = CSl(gp) = 
 = 0.0140;  =   =   =  = 
 = 0.0403;  =  =  = 0.0031;   = 
  =  = 0.0519;  =  =  =  = 
 = 0.0069; PSi(gp) = PSk(gp) =  = 0.0448; 
and PSj(gp)  = PSl(gp) =  = 0.0332. 
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;  =  = 
;   =   = 
;   = 
;   = 
;   = 
;   = 
; CSi(gq) = CSk(gq) = 
; CSj(gq) = ; 
CSl(gq) = ;  =  =  =  = 
;  =  = ;  =  =  
;  = ;  = ; 
 = ;  = ; PSi(gq) = PSk(gq) = 
; PSj(gq) = ; 
and PSl(gq) = . 
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The outputs involved in this network can be obtained by solving the following output 
matrix: 
 
 
 
Simulation 11:  = 1, = 0 and  = 0 
 
In this case  =  =  =  =   =  = 0. 
Therefore it holds that  =  =  =  =  =  
= 0.2500; CSi(gq) = CSk(gq) =  = 0.2813; CSj(gq) = CSl(gq) 
= 0;  =  =  =  =   =  =  = 
0.0625; PSi(gq) = PSj(gq) = PSk(gq) = PSl(gq) = 0. 
 
Simulation 12:  = 1,  = 0 and  = 0.5 
 
In this case  =  =  =  =   =  = 0. 
Therefore it holds that  =  =   =   =  =  
= 0.2105; CSi(gq) = CSk(gq) =  = 0.1994; CSj(gq) = CSl(gq) 
= 0;  =  =  =  =  =  =  
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= 0.0554; PSi(gq) = PSj(gq) = PSk(gq) =  = 0.0222; and PSl(gq) = 
0. 
 
Simulation 13:  = 1,  = 0 and  = 1.5 
 
In this case  =  =  =  =   =  = 0. 
Therefore it holds that  =  =  =  =  =  
= 0.1600; CSi(gq) = CSk(gq) =  = 0.1152; CSj(gq) = CSl(gq) 
= 0;  =  =  =  =   =  = 
 = 0.0448; PSi(gq) = PSj(gq) = PSk(gq) =  = 0.0384; 
and PSl(gq) = 0. 
 
Simulation 14:  = 1,  = 0.5 and  = 0 
 
The output matrix in this case is given by: 
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Therefore, Therefore,  =  =   =   =  =  
= 0.2500;  =  =  =   = 0.1000;   =   = 
0.1667; CSi(gq) = CSk(gq) =  = 0.2813; CSj(gq) = 
 = 0.0800; CSl(gq) =  = 
0.0556;  =  =   =   =  =  =  
= 0.0625;  =  =  =  =  = 0.0100;   = 
  =  = 0.0278; and PSi(gq) = PSj(gq) = PSk(gq) = PSl(gq) = 0. 
 
Simulation 15:  = 1,  = 0.5 and  = 0.5 
 
The output matrix in this case is given by: 
 
 
 
Therefore, Therefore,  =  =  =  = 0.2096;  = 
 = 0.0659;   =   = 0.1977;   = 0.0541;   = 
0.0947;   = 0.1105;   = 0.1511; CSi(gq) = CSk(gq) = 
 = 0.1903; CSj(gq) = 
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 = 0.0439; CSl(gq) =  = 
0.0302;  =  =  =  =  = 0.0549;  
=  =  = 0.0054;  =  =   = 
0.0489;  =  = 0.0037;  =  = 0.0112; 
 =  = 0.0153;  =  = 0.0285; PSi(gq) = 
PSk(gq) =  = 0.0294; PSj(gq) = 
 = 0.0370; and PSl(gq) = 
 = 0.0086. 
 
Simulation 16:  = 1, ~  = 0.5 and  = 1.5 
 
The output matrix in this case is given by: 
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0.0418;   = 0.0936;   = 0.1108; CSi(gq) = CSk(gq) = 
 = 0.1078; CSj(gq) = 
 = 0.0167; CSl(gq) =  = 
0.0116;  =  =  =  =  = 0.0434;  
=  =  = 0.0018;  =  =   = 
0.0391;  =  = 0.0011;  =  = 0.0031; 
 =  = 0.0153;  =  = 0.0215; PSi(gq) = 
PSk(gq) =  = 0.0452; PSj(gq) = 
 = 0.0500; and PSl(gq) =  
= 0.0157. 
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Network r 
 
In considering the equations presented in Section 4.2.1.2 it holds that  = 
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;  = 
;  = 
; CSi(gr) = 
; CSj(gr) = ; CSk(gr) = 
; CSl(gr) = ;  = 
;  = ;   = ;  
= ;  = ;  = ; 
 = ;  = ;  = 
;  = ;  = ;  
= ; PSi(gr) = ; PSj(gr) = 
; PSk(gr) = ; and PSl(gr) = 
. 
 
The outputs involved in this network can be obtained by solving the following output 
matrix: 
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Where 0 = ; 1 = ; 2 = ; 3 = 
; 4 = ; 5 = ; 6 = ; 7 = ; 8 = 
; 9 = . 
 
Simulation 11:  = 1, = 0 and  = 0 
 
In this case  =  =  =  =  =  =  = 
0. Therefore, the output matrix is given by: 
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Therefore,  =  =  = 0.2500;  =  = 0.3333; 
CSi(gr) =  = 0.2813; CSj(gr) = CSl(gr) = 0; CSk(gr) = 
 = 0.2222;  =  =  =  = 0.0625; 
 =  =  = 0.1111; and PSi(gr) = PSj(gr) = PSk(gr) = PSl(gr) = 0. 
 
Simulation 12:  = 1,  = 0 and  = 0.5 
 
In this case  =  =  =  =  =  =  = 
0. Therefore, the output matrix is given by: 
 
 
 
Therefore,  =  = 0.2319;  = 0.2947;  = 0.1881;  
= 0.2633; CSi(gr) =  = 0.2125; CSj(gr) = CSl(gr) = 0; 
CSk(gr) =  = 0.1557;  =  =  = 
0.0672;  =  = 0.1086;  =  = 0.0442; 
 =  = 0.0867; PSi(gr) = PSj(gr) =  = 0.0067; PSk(gr) 
=  = 0.0109; and PSl(gr) =  = 0.0255. 
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Simulation 13:  = 1,  = 0 and  = 1.5 
 
In this case  =  =  =  =  =  =  = 
0. Therefore, the output matrix is given by: 
 
 
 
Therefore,  =  = 0.1922;  = 0.2312;  = 0.1350;  
= 0.1907; CSi(gr) =  = 0.1349; CSj(gr) = CSl(gr) = 0; 
CSk(gr) =  = 0.0890;  =  =  = 
0.0646;  =  = 0.0935;  =  = 0.0319; 
 =  = 0.0636; PSi(gr) = PSj(gr) =  = 0.0139; PSk(gr) 
=  = 0.0200; and PSl(gr) =  = 0.0398. 
 
Simulation 14:  = 1,  = 0.5 and  = 0 
 
In this case the output matrix is given by: 
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Therefore,  =  =  = 0.2500;  =  =  = 
0.1250;   =  =  =  = 0.1000;  =  = 
0.3333; CSi(gr) =  = 0.2813; CSj(gr) = 
 = 0.0703; CSk(gr) =  = 0.2222; 
CSl(gr) =  = 0.0800;  =  = 
 =  = 0.0625;  =  =  =  = 0.0156; 
  =  =  =  =  = 0.0100;  =  =  
 = 0.1111; and PSi(gr) = PSj(gr) = PSk(gr) = PSl(gr) = 0. 
 
Simulation 15:  = 1,  = 0.5 and  = 0.5 
 
In this case the output matrix is given by: 
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Therefore,  =  = 0.2191;  =  = 0.1014;   = 
 = 0.0812;  = 0.2900;  = 0.0862;  = 0.1874;  = 
0.0698;  = 0.2533;  = 0.0495; CSi(gr) =  = 
0.1957; CSj(gr) =  = 0.0372; CSk(gr) = 
 = 0.1476; CSl(gr) =  = 
0.0444;  =  =  = 0.0600;  =  = 
 = 0.0129;   =  =  = 0.0082;  = 
 = 0.1051;  =  = 0.0093;  = 
 = 0.0439;  =  = 0.0061;  = 
 = 0.0802;  =  = 0.0031; PSi(gr) = PSj(gr) = 
 = 0.0202; PSk(gr) =  = 0.0177; 
and PSl(gr) =  = 0.0392. 
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Simulation 16:  = 1, ~  = 0.5 and  = 1.5 
 
In this case the output matrix is given by: 
 
 
 
Therefore,  =  = 0.1716;  =  = 0.0663;   = 
 = 0.0540;  = 0.2211;  = 0.0590;  = 0.1375;  = 
0.0322;  = 0.1819;  = 0.0199; CSi(gr) =  = 
0.1155; CSj(gr) =  = 0.0136; CSk(gr) = 
 = 0.0812; CSl(gr) =  = 
0.0175;  =  =  = 0.0515;  =  = 
 = 0.0077;  =  =  = 0.0051;  = 
 = 0.0855;  =  = 0.0061;  = 
 = 0.0331;  =  = 0.0018;  = 
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 = 0.0320; PSk(gr) =  = 0.0294; 
and PSl(gr) =  = 0.0518. 
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In considering the equations presented in Section 4.2.1.2 it holds that  = 
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 = ;  = ;  = 
;  = ;  = ;  
= ;  = ; PSi(gs) = 
; PSj(gs) = ; 
PSk(gs) = ; and PSl(gs) = 
. 
 
The outputs involved in this network can be obtained by solving the following output 
matrix: 
 
 
 
Where 0 = ; 1 = ; 2 = ; 3 = 
; 4 = ; 5 = ; 6 = ; 7 = . 
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Simulation 11:  = 1, = 0 and  = 0 
 
In this case  =  =  =  =  =  =  = 
0. Therefore, the output matrix is given by: 
 
 
 
Therefore,  =  =  =  = 0.2000;   =  = 
 = 0.2500; CSi(gs) =  = 0.3200; CSj(gs) = 
CSl(gs) = 0; CSk(gs) =  = 0.2813;  =  = 
 =  =  = 0.0400;  =  =  =  = 
0.0625; and PSi(gs) = PSj(gs) = PSk(gs) = PSl(gs) = 0. 
 
Simulation 12:  = 1,  = 0 and  = 0.5 
 
In this case  =  =  =  =  =  =  = 
0. Therefore, the output matrix is given by: 
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Therefore,  =  =  = 0.1657;   =  =  = 
0.2130;  = 0.2012; CSi(gs) =  = 0.2438; 
CSj(gs) = CSl(gs) = 0; CSk(gs) =  = 0.2042;  = 
 =  =  = 0.0343;  =  =  = 
 = 0.0567;  =  = 0.0506; PSi(gs) = PSk(gs) = 
PSl(gs) =  = 0.0179; and PSj(gs) =  = 0.0051. 
 
Simulation 13:  = 1,  = 0 and  = 1.5 
 
In this case  =  =  =  =  =  =  = 
0. Therefore, the output matrix is given by: 
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Therefore, )()()( )()()( s
l
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k
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i
i gqgqgq   = 0.1273; )()()(
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2
1766.0
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 = 0.0117. 
 
Simulation 14:  = 1,  = 0.5 and  = 0 
 
In this case the output matrix is given by: 
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Therefore,  =  =  =  = 0.2000;  =  = 
 = 0.1250;   =  =  = 0.2500;  =  = 
 =  = 0.1000; CSi(gs) =  = 
0.3200; CSj(gs) =  = 0.0703; CSk(gs) = 
 = 0.2813; CSl(gs) = 
 = 0.0800;  =  =  = 
 =  = 0.0400;  =  =  =  = 0.0156; 
  =  =  =  = 0.0625;  =  =  = 
 =  = 0.0100; and PSi(gs) = PSj(gs) = PSk(gs) = PSl(gs) = 0. 
 
Simulation 15:  = 1,  = 0.5 and  = 0.5 
 
In this case the output matrix is given by: 
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 = 0.0896;  = 0.1697;  = 0.2132;  = 0.0744; CSi(gs) = 
 = 0.2268; CSj(gs) = 
 = 0.0366; CSk(gs) =  = 
0.1917; CSl(gs) =  = 0.0427;  =  
=  = 0.0318;  =  =  = 0.0083;   = 
 =  = 0.0515;  =  =  = 0.0052; 
 =  = 0.0427;  =  = 0.0143;  = 
 = 0.0100;  =  = 0.0360;  = 
 = 0.0568;  =  = 0.0069; PSi(gs) = PSl(gs) = 
 = 0.0323; PSj(gs) = 
 = 0.0182; and PSk(gs) = 
 = 0.0261. 
 
Simulation 16:  = 1, ~  = 0.5 and  = 1.5 
 
In this case the output matrix is given by: 
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Therefore,  =  = 0.1215;  =  = 0.0435;   = 
 = 0.1531;  =  = 0.0346;  = 0.1502;  = 0.0722; 
 = 0.0633;  = 0.1296;  = 0.1612;  = 0.0427; CSi(gs) = 
 = 0.1367; CSj(gs) = 
 = 0.0127; CSk(gs) =  = 
0.1092; CSl(gs) =  = 0.0153;  =  
=  = 0.0258;  =  =  = 0.0033;   = 
 =  = 0.0410;  =  =  = 0.0021; 
 =  = 0.0395;  =  = 0.0091;  = 
 = 0.0070;  =  = 0.0294;  = 
 = 0.0455;  =  = 0.0032; PSi(gs) = PSl(gs) = 
 = 0.0466; PSj(gs) = 
 = 0.0306; and PSk(gs) =  
= 0.0417. 
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Network t 
 
In considering the equations presented in Sections Section 4.2.1.2 it holds that  
=  =  =  = 
;  =  =  =  = ; 
 =  =  =  = 
;  =  = 
; CSi(gt) = CSk(gt) = 
; CSj(gt) = CSl(gt) = 
;  =  =  =  = 
;  =  =  =  = ; 
 =  =  =  = ;  =  = 
; PSi(gt) = PSk(gt) = ; and 
PSj(gt) = PSl(gt) = . 
 
The outputs involved in this network can be obtained by solving the following output 
matrix: 
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Simulation 11:  = 1, = 0 and  = 0 
 
Because in this case  =  =  =  =  =  =0, 
it holds:  =  =  =  =  =  =  = 
 = ; CSi(gt) = CSk(gt) =  = 0.3200; 
CSj(gt) = CSl(gt) = 0;  =  =  =  =  =  = 
 =  =  = 0.0400; and PSi(gt) = PSj(gt) = PSk(gt) = PSl(gt) = 0. 
 
Simulation 12:  = 1,  = 0 and  = 0.5 
 
Because in this case  =  =  =  =  =  =0, 
it holds:  =  =  =  =  =  =  = 
 = 0.1739; CSi(gt) = CSk(gt) =  = 0.2419; 
CSj(gt) = CSl(gt) = 0;  =  =  =  =  =  = 
 =  =  = 0.0378; and PSi(gt) = PSj(gt) = PSk(gt) = PSl(gt) 
=  = 0.0151. 
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Simulation 13:  = 1,  = 0 and  = 1.5 
 
Because in this case  =  =  =  =  =  =0, 
it holds:  =  =  =  =  =  =  = 
 = 0.1379; CSi(gt) = CSk(gt) =  = 0.1521; 
CSj(gt) = CSl(gt) = 0;  =  =  =  =  =  = 
 =  =  = 0.0333; and PSi(gt) = PSj(gt) = PSk(gt) = PSl(gt) 
=  = 0.0285. 
 
Simulation 14:  = 1,  = 0.5 and  = 0 
 
The output matrix in this case is given by: 
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 =  =  =  =  =  = 0.0400;  = 
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 =  =  =  =  =  = 0.0156; and PSi(gt) 
= PSj(gt) = PSk(gt) = PSl(gt) = 0. 
 
Simulation 15:  = 1,  = 0.5 and  = 0.5 
 
The output matrix in this case is given by: 
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Therefore,  =  =  =  = 0.1631;  =  = 
 =  = 0.0858;  =  =  =  = 0.1728; 
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Simulation 16:  = 1,  = 0.5 and  = 1.5 
 
The output matrix in this case is given by: 
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Therefore,  =  =  =  = 0.1259;  =  = 
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Network u 
 
In considering the equations presented in Section 4.2.1.2 it holds that )()( u
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)1)(5(2
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)()()()(
)()()()()()(
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k
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i
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j
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)()()()()()1(2
)()()(
)()()()()(
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u
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j
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j
i
u
k
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k
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i
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i
ju
i
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gqgqgqgqgq
; )()( u
j
l gq  = 
)1)(4(2
)()3()()3()()3(
)()()()()()1(~2
)()()(
)()()()()(




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u
j
ku
j
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j
i
u
l
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l
iu
i
ku
i
ju
i
i
gqgqgq
gqgqgqgqgq
; )()( u
k
i gq  = 
)1)(5(2
)()4()()4()()()(
)()()()()()1(2
)()()()()(
)()()()()(




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u
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k
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l
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l
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j
l
u
j
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j
iu
i
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i
ku
i
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gqgqgqgqgq
gqgqgqgqgq
; )()( u
k
j gq  = 
755 
 
)1)(5(2
)()4()()4()()()(
)()()()()()1(~2
)()()()()(
)()()()()(




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u
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l
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l
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j
l
u
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j
iu
i
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i
ku
i
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gqgqgqgqgq
gqgqgqgqgq
; )()( u
k
k gq  = 
)1)(4(2
)()3()()3()()(
)()()()()1(2
)()()()(
)()()()(






u
k
ju
k
iu
j
lu
j
j
u
j
iu
i
lu
i
ju
i
i
gqgqgqgq
gqgqgqgq
; )()( u
l
i gq  = 
)1)(5(2
)()4()()4()()()(
)()()()()()1(2
)()()()()(
)()()()()(






u
l
lu
l
ju
k
ku
k
ju
j
l
u
j
ku
j
ju
i
lu
i
ku
i
j
gqgqgqgqgq
gqgqgqgqgq
; )()( u
l
j gq  = 
)1)(5(2
)()4()()4()()()(
)()()()()()1(~2
)()()()()(
)()()()()(






u
l
lu
l
iu
k
ku
k
iu
j
l
u
j
ku
j
iu
i
lu
i
ku
i
i
gqgqgqgqgq
gqgqgqgqgq
; )()( u
l
l gq  = 
)1)(4(2
)()3()()3()()(
)()()()()1(2
)()()()(
)()()()(






u
l
ju
l
iu
j
ku
j
j
u
j
iu
i
ku
i
ju
i
i
gqgqgqgq
gqgqgqgq
; CSi(gu) = 
 2)()()()( )()()()(
2
1
u
l
iu
k
iu
j
iu
i
i gqgqgqgq  ; CSj(gu) = 
 2)()()()( )()()()(
2
1
u
l
ju
k
ju
j
ju
i
j gqgqgqgq  ; CSk(gu) =  
2)()()( )()()(
2
1
u
k
ku
j
ku
i
k gqgqgq  ; 
CSl(gu) =  
2)()()( )()()(
2
1
u
l
lu
j
lu
i
l gqgqgq  ; )(
)(
u
i
i g  =  
2)( )(
2
)2(
u
i
i gq

; )()( u
i
j g  = 
 2)( )(
2
)2(
u
i
j gq

; )()( u
i
k g  =  
2)( )(
2
)2(
u
i
k gq

; )()( u
i
l g  =  
2)( )(
2
)2(
u
i
l gq

; )()( u
j
i g  
=  2)( )(
2
)2(
u
j
i gq

; )()( u
j
j g  =  
2)( )(
2
)2(
u
j
j gq

; )()( u
j
k g  =  
2)( )(
2
)2(
u
j
k gq

; 
)()( u
j
l g  =  
2)( )(
2
)2(
u
j
l gq

; )()( u
k
i g  =  
2)( )(
2
)2(
u
k
i gq

; )()( u
k
j g  = 
 2)( )(
2
)2(
u
k
j gq

; )()( u
k
k g  =  
2)( )(
2
)2(
u
k
k gq

; )()( u
l
i g  =  
2)( )(
2
)2(
u
l
i gq

; 
)()( u
l
j g  =  
2)( )(
2
)2(
u
l
j gq

; )()( u
l
l g  =  
2)( )(
2
)2(
u
l
l gq

; PSi(gu) = 
756 
 
 2)()()()( )()()()(
4
u
i
lu
i
ku
i
ju
i
i gqgqgqgq 

; PSj(gu) = )((
4
)(
u
j
i gq

 + )()( u
j
j gq  + )(
)(
u
j
k gq  
+ 2)( ))( u
j
l gq ; PSk(gu) =  
2)()()( )()()(
4
u
k
ku
k
ju
k
i gqgqgq 

; and PSl(gu) = 
 2)()()( )()()(
4
u
l
lu
l
ju
l
i gqgqgq 

. 
 
The outputs involved in this network can be obtained by solving the following output 
matrix: 
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Where 0 = 
)1)(5(2
)4(




; 1 = 
)1)(5(2  

; 2 = 
)1)(4(2
)3(




; 3 = 
)1)(4(2  

; 4 = 
5

; 5 = 
5
~


; 6 = 
4

; 7 = 
4
~


. 
 
Simulation 11:  = 1, = 0 and  = 0 
 
In this case )()( u
i
j gq  = )(
)(
u
i
l gq = )(
)(
u
j
j gq  = )(
)(
u
j
l gq  = )(
)(
u
k
j gq  = )(
)(
u
l
j gq  = )(
)(
u
l
l gq  = 
0. Therefore, the output matrix is given by: 
~
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Therefore, )()( u
i
i gq  = )(
)(
u
j
i gq  = )(
)(
u
k
i gq  = )(
)(
u
l
i gq  = 0.2000; )(
)(
u
i
k gq  = )(
)(
u
j
k gq  = 
)()( u
k
k gq  = 0.2500; CSi(gu) =  
2
2000.02000.02000.02000.0
2
1
  = 0.3200; CSj(gu) = 
CSl(gu) = 0; CSk(gu) =  
2
2500.02500.02500.0
2
1
  = 0.2813; )()( u
i
i g  = )(
)(
u
j
i g  = 
)()( u
k
i g  = )(
)(
u
l
i g  =  
2
2000.0  = 0.0400; )()( u
i
k g  = )(
)(
u
j
k g  = )(
)(
u
k
k g  =  
2
2500.0  
= 0.0625; and PSi(gu) = PSj(gu) = PSk(gu) = PSl(gu) = 0. 
 
Simulation 12:  = 1,  = 0 and  = 0.5 
 
In this case )()( u
i
j gq  = )(
)(
u
i
l gq = )(
)(
u
j
j gq  = )(
)(
u
j
l gq  = )(
)(
u
k
j gq  = )(
)(
u
l
j gq  = )(
)(
u
l
l gq  = 
0. Therefore, the output matrix is given by: 
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Therefore, )()( u
i
i gq  = )(
)(
u
j
i gq  = 0.1656; )(
)(
u
i
k gq  = )(
)(
u
j
k gq  = 0.2132; )(
)(
u
k
i gq  = 
0.1708; )()( u
k
k gq  = 0.2123; )(
)(
u
l
i gq  = 0.2012; CSi(gu) = 
 22012.01708.01656.01656.0
2
1
  = 0.2472; CSj(gu) = CSl(gu) = 0; CSk(gu) = 
 22123.02132.02132.0
2
1
  = 0.2040; )()( u
i
i g  = )(
)(
u
j
i g  =  
2
1656.0
2
)5.2(
 = 
0.0343; )()( u
i
k g  = )(
)(
u
j
k g  =  
2
2132.0
2
)5.2(
 = 0.0568; )()( u
k
i g  =  
2
1708.0
2
)5.2(
 = 
0.0365; )()( u
k
k g  =  
2
2123.0
2
)5.2(
 = 0.0563; )()( u
l
i g  =  
2
2012.0
2
)5.2(
 = 0.0506; 
PSi(gu) = PSj(gu) =  
2
2132.01656.0
4
5.0
  = 0.0179; PSk(gu) =  
2
2123.01708.0
4
5.0
  = 
0.0183; and PSl(gu) =  
2
2012.0
4
5.0
 = 0.0051. 
 
Simulation 13:  = 1,  = 0 and  = 1.5 
 
In this case )()( u
i
j gq  = )(
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i
l gq = )(
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j
j gq  = )(
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u
j
l gq  = )(
)(
u
k
j gq  = )(
)(
u
l
j gq  = )(
)(
u
l
l gq  = 
0. Therefore, the output matrix is given by: 
 









































































1538.0
1818.0
1538.0
1818.0
1538.0
1818.0
1538.0
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
10462.000462.000462.00
012455.000545.000545.0
02538.010462.00462.00462.00
000545.012455.000545.0
00462.002538.010462.00
000545.000545.012455.0
00462.000462.002538.01
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
u
l
i
u
k
k
u
k
i
u
j
k
u
j
i
u
i
k
u
i
i
gq
gq
gq
gq
gq
gq
gq
 
 
~
759 
 
Therefore, )()( u
i
i gq  = )(
)(
u
j
i gq  = 0.1271; )(
)(
u
i
k gq  = )(
)(
u
j
k gq  = 0.1648; )(
)(
u
k
i gq  = 
0.1336; )()( u
k
k gq  = 0.1629; )(
)(
u
l
i gq  = 0.1766; CSi(gu) = 
 21766.01336.01271.01271.0
2
1
  = 0.1593; CSj(gu) = CSl(gu) = 0; CSk(gu) = 
 21629.01648.01648.0
2
1
  = 0.1213; )()( u
i
i g  = )(
)(
u
j
i g  =  
2
1271.0
2
)5.3(
 = 
0.0283; )()( u
i
k g  = )(
)(
u
j
k g  =  
2
1648.0
2
)5.3(
 = 0.0475; )()( u
k
i g  =  
2
1336.0
2
)5.3(
 = 
0.0312; )()( u
k
k g  =  
2
1629.0
2
)5.3(
 = 0.0464; )()( u
l
i g  =  
2
1766.0
2
)5.3(
 = 0.0546; 
PSi(gu) = PSj(gu) =  
2
1648.01271.0
4
5.1
  = 0.0320; PSk(gu) =  
2
1629.01336.0
4
5.1
  = 
0.0330; and PSl(gu) =  
2
1766.0
4
5.1
 = 0.0117. 
 
Simulation 14:  = 1,  = 0.5 and  = 0 
 
In this case the output matrix is given by: 
 




































































































































1250.0
1000.0
2000.0
2500.0
1000.0
2000.0
1250.0
2500.0
1000.0
2000.0
1250.0
2500.0
1000.0
2000.0
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
10000000000000
01000000000000
00100000000000
00010000000000
00001000000000
00000100000000
00000010000000
00000001000000
00000000100000
00000000010000
00000000001000
00000000000100
00000000000010
00000000000001
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
u
l
l
u
l
j
u
l
i
u
k
k
u
k
j
u
k
i
u
j
l
u
j
k
u
j
j
u
j
i
u
i
l
u
i
k
u
i
j
u
i
i
gq
gq
gq
gq
gq
gq
gq
gq
gq
gq
gq
gq
gq
gq
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Therefore, )()( u
i
i gq  = )(
)(
u
j
i gq  = )(
)(
u
k
i gq  = )(
)(
u
l
i gq  = 0.2000; )(
)(
u
i
j gq  = )(
)(
u
j
j gq  = 
)()( u
k
j gq  = )(
)(
u
l
j gq  = 0.1000; )(
)(
u
i
k gq  = )(
)(
u
j
k gq  = )(
)(
u
k
k gq  = 0.2500; )(
)(
u
i
l gq  = 
)()( u
j
l gq  = )(
)(
u
l
l gq  = 0.1250; CSi(gu) =  
2
2000.02000.02000.02000.0
2
1
  = 
0.3200; CSj(gu) =  
2
1000.01000.01000.01000.0
2
1
  = 0.0800; CSk(gu) = 
 22500.02500.02500.0
2
1
  = 0.2813; CSl(gu) =  
2
1250.01250.01250.0
2
1
  = 
0.0703; )()( u
i
i g  = )(
)(
u
j
i g  = )(
)(
u
k
i g  = )(
)(
u
l
i g  =  
2
2000.0  = 0.0400; )(
)(
u
i
j g  = 
)()( u
j
j g  = )(
)(
u
k
j g  = )(
)(
u
l
j g  =  
2
1000.0  = 0.0100; )()( u
i
k g  = )(
)(
u
j
k g  = )(
)(
u
k
k g  = 
 22500.0  = 0.0625; )()( u
i
l g  = )(
)(
u
j
l g  = )(
)(
u
l
l g  =  
2
1250.0  = 0.0156; and PSi(gu) 
= PSj(gu) = PSk(gu) = PSl(gu) = 0. 
 
Simulation 15:  = 1,  = 0.5 and  = 0.5 
 
In this case the output matrix is given by: 
 


















































































































































1111.0
0909.0
1818.0
2222.0
0909.0
1818.0
1111.0
2222.0
0909.0
1818.0
1111.0
2222.0
0909.0
1818.0
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
11296.01296.000000370.00370.00370.000370.00370.00370.0
1364.011364.00303.000303.00303.00303.000303.00303.00303.000303.0
1364.01364.010303.00303.000303.00303.00303.000303.00303.00303.00
00011296.01296.00370.000370.00370.00370.000370.00370.0
0303.000303.01364.011364.00303.00303.000303.00303.00303.000303.0
0303.00303.001364.01364.010303.00303.00303.000303.00303.00303.00
00370.00370.000011296.01296.01296.000370.00370.00370.0
00000370.00370.01296.011296.01296.00370.000370.00370.0
0303.000303.00303.000303.01364.01364.011364.00303.00303.000303.0
0303.00303.000303.00303.001364.01364.01364.010303.00303.00303.00
00370.00370.000000370.00370.00370.011296.01296.01296.0
00000370.00370.00370.000370.00370.01296.011296.01296.0
0303.000303.00303.000303.00303.00303.000303.01364.01364.011364.0
0303.00303.000303.00303.000303.00303.00303.001364.01364.01364.01
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
u
l
l
u
l
j
u
l
i
u
k
k
u
k
j
u
k
i
u
j
l
u
j
k
u
j
j
u
j
i
u
i
l
u
i
k
u
i
j
u
i
i
gq
gq
gq
gq
gq
gq
gq
gq
gq
gq
gq
gq
gq
gq
 
 
Therefore, )()( u
i
i gq  = )(
)(
u
j
i gq  = 0.1595; )(
)(
u
i
j gq  = )(
)(
u
j
j gq  = 0.0642; )(
)(
u
i
k gq  = 
)()( u
j
k gq  = 0.2030; )(
)(
u
i
l gq  = )(
)(
u
j
l gq  = 0.0817; )(
)(
u
k
i gq  = 0.1697; )(
)(
u
k
j gq  = 0.0744; 
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)()( u
k
k gq  = 0.2132; )(
)(
u
l
i gq  = 0.1848; )(
)(
u
l
j gq  = 0.0896; )(
)(
u
l
l gq  = 0.1071; CSi(gu) = 
 21848.01697.01595.01595.0
2
1
  = 0.2268; CSj(gu) = 
 20896.00744.00642.00642.0
2
1
  = 0.0427; CSk(gu) = 
 22132.02030.02030.0
2
1
  = 0.1917; CSl(gu) =  
2
1071.00817.00817.0
2
1
  = 
0.0366; )()( u
i
i g  = )(
)(
u
j
i g  =  
2
1595.0
2
)5.2(
 = 0.0318; )()( u
i
j g  = )(
)(
u
j
j g  = 
 20642.0
2
)5.2(
 = 0.0052; )()( u
i
k g  = )(
)(
u
j
k g  =  
2
2030.0
2
)5.2(
 = 0.0515; )()( u
i
l g  = 
)()( u
j
l g  =  
2
0817.0
2
)5.2(
 = 0.0083; )()( u
k
i g  =  
2
1697.0
2
)5.2(
 = 0.0360; )()( u
k
j g  = 
 20744.0
2
)5.2(
 = 0.0069; )()( u
k
k g  =  
2
2132.0
2
)5.2(
 = 0.0568; )()( u
l
i g  = 
 21848.0
2
)5.2(
 = 0.0427; )()( u
l
j g  =  
2
0896.0
2
)5.2(
 = 0.0100; )()( u
l
l g  = 
 21071.0
2
)5.2(
 = 0.0143; PSi(gu) = PSj(gu) =  
2
0817.02030.00642.01595.0
4
5.0
  = 
0.0323; PSk(gu) =  
2
2132.00744.01697.0
4
5.0
  = 0.0261; and PSl(gu) = 
 21071.00896.01848.0
4
5.0
  = 0.0182. 
 
Simulation 16:  = 1,  = 0.5 and  = 1.5 
 
In this case the output matrix is given by: 
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

















































































































































0909.0
0769.0
1538.0
1818.0
0769.0
1538.0
0909.0
1818.0
0769.0
1538.0
0909.0
1818.0
0769.0
1538.0
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
12455.02455.000000545.00545.00545.000545.00545.00545.0
2538.012538.00462.000462.00462.00462.000462.00462.00462.000462.0
2538.02538.010462.00462.000462.00462.00462.000462.00462.00462.00
00012455.02455.00545.000545.00545.00545.000545.00545.0
0462.000462.02538.012538.00462.00462.000462.00462.00462.000462.0
0462.00462.002538.02538.010462.00462.00462.000462.00462.00462.00
00545.00545.000012455.02455.02455.000545.00545.00545.0
00000545.00545.02455.012455.02455.00545.000545.00545.0
0462.000462.00462.000462.02538.02538.012538.00462.00462.000462.0
0462.00462.000462.00462.002538.02538.02538.010462.00462.00462.00
00545.00545.000000545.00545.00545.012455.02455.02455.0
00000545.00545.00545.000545.00545.02455.012455.02455.0
0462.000462.00462.000462.00462.00462.000462.02538.02538.012538.0
0462.00462.000462.00462.000462.00462.00462.002538.02538.02538.01
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
u
l
l
u
l
j
u
l
i
u
k
k
u
k
j
u
k
i
u
j
l
u
j
k
u
j
j
u
j
i
u
i
l
u
i
k
u
i
j
u
i
i
gq
gq
gq
gq
gq
gq
gq
gq
gq
gq
gq
gq
gq
gq
 
Therefore, )()( u
i
i gq  = )(
)(
u
j
i gq  = 0.1215; )(
)(
u
i
j gq  = )(
)(
u
j
j gq  = 0.0346; )(
)(
u
i
k gq  = 
)()( u
j
k gq  = 0.1531; )(
)(
u
i
l gq  = )(
)(
u
j
l gq  = 0.0435; )(
)(
u
k
i gq  = 0.1296; )(
)(
u
k
j gq  = 0.0427; 
)()( u
k
k gq  = 0.1612; )(
)(
u
l
i gq  = 0.1502; )(
)(
u
l
j gq  = 0.0633; )(
)(
u
l
l gq  = 0.0722; CSi(gu) = 
 21502.01296.01215.01215.0
2
1
  = 0.1367; CSj(gu) = 
 20633.00427.00346.00346.0
2
1
  = 0.0153; CSk(gu) = 
 21612.01531.01531.0
2
1
  = 0.1092; CSl(gu) =  
2
0722.00435.00435.0
2
1
  = 
0.0127; )()( u
i
i g  = )(
)(
u
j
i g  =  
2
1215.0
2
)5.3(
 = 0.0258; )()( u
i
j g  = )(
)(
u
j
j g  = 
 20346.0
2
)5.3(
 = 0.0021; )()( u
i
k g  = )(
)(
u
j
k g  =  
2
1531.0
2
)5.3(
 = 0.0410; )()( u
i
l g  = 
)()( u
j
l g  =  
2
0435.0
2
)5.3(
 = 0.0033; )()( u
k
i g  =  
2
1296.0
2
)5.3(
 = 0.0294; )()( u
k
j g  = 
 20427.0
2
)5.3(
 = 0.0032; )()( u
k
k g  =  
2
1612.0
2
)5.3(
 = 0.0455; )()( u
l
i g  = 
 21502.0
2
)5.3(
 = 0.0395; )()( u
l
j g  =  
2
0633.0
2
)5.3(
 = 0.0070; )()( u
l
l g  = 
 20722.0
2
)5.3(
 = 0.0091; PSi(gu) = PSj(gu) =  
2
0435.01531.00346.01215.0
4
5.1
  = 
0.0466; PSk(gu) =  
2
1612.00427.01296.0
4
5.1
  = 0.0417; and PSl(gu) = 
 20722.00633.01502.0
4
5.1
  = 0.0306. 
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Network v 
 
In considering the equations presented in Section 4.2.1.2 it holds that )()( v
i
i gq  = 
)()( v
k
k gq  = 
)1)(4(2
)()3(2)(2)(2)(2)1(2 )()()()(



 v
i
jv
j
lv
j
iv
j
j gqgqgqgq
; )(
)(
v
i
j gq  
= )()( v
i
l gq  = )(
)(
v
k
j gq  = )(
)(
v
k
l gq  = 
10153
)()3()()()(4)1(~2
2
)()()()(



 v
i
iv
j
jv
j
lv
j
i gqgqgqgq
; )()( v
j
i gq  = )(
)(
v
j
k gq  = 
)()( v
l
i gq  = )(
)(
v
l
k gq  = 
8123
)()2()()2()(2)1(2
2
)()()(



 v
j
lv
j
jv
i
j gqgqgq
; 
)()( v
j
j gq  = )(
)(
v
l
l gq  = 
10112
)()4()()3(2)(2)(2)1(~2
2
)()()()(



 v
j
lv
j
iv
i
jv
i
i gqgqgqgq
; )()( v
j
l gq  = 
)()( v
l
j gq  = 
10112
)()4()()3(2)(2)(2)1(~2
2
)()()()(



 v
j
jv
j
iv
i
jv
i
i gqgqgqgq
; 
CSi(gv) = CSk(gv) =  
2)()()( )()()(
2
1
v
l
iv
j
iv
i
i gqgqgq  ; CSj(gv) = CSl(gv) = 
 2)()()()( )()()()(
2
1
v
l
jv
k
jv
j
jv
i
j gqgqgqgq  ; )(
)(
v
i
i g  = )(
)(
v
k
k g  =  
2)( )(
2
)2(
v
i
i gq

; 
)()( v
i
j g  = )(
)(
v
i
l g  = )(
)(
v
k
j g  = )(
)(
v
k
l g  =  
2)( )(
2
)2(
v
i
j gq

; )()( v
j
i g  = )(
)(
v
j
k g  = 
)()( v
l
i g  = )(
)(
v
l
k g  =  
2)( )(
2
)2(
v
j
i gq

; )(
)(
v
j
j g  = )(
)(
v
l
l g  =  
2)( )(
2
)2(
v
j
j gq

; 
)()( v
j
l g  = )(
)(
v
l
j g  =  
2)( )(
2
)2(
v
j
l gq

; PSi(gv) = PSk(gv) = 
 2)()()( )()()(
4
v
i
lv
i
jv
i
i gqgqgq 

; and PSj(gv) = PSl(gv) = 
 2)()()()( )()()()(
4
v
j
lv
j
kv
j
jv
j
i gqgqgqgq 

. 
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The outputs involved in this network can be obtained by solving the following output 
matrix: 
 























































































































10112
)1(~2
10112
)1(~2
8123
)1(2
10153
)1(~2
4
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
1
10112
)4(
10112
)3(2
10112
2
10112
2
10112
)4(
1
10112
)3(2
10112
2
10112
2
8123
)2(
8123
)2(
1
8123
2
0
101531015310153
4
1
10153
)3(
)1)(4()1)(4()1)(4()1)(4(
)3(
1
2
2
2
2
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
2222
2222
222
2222
















































v
j
l
v
j
j
v
j
i
v
i
j
v
i
i
gq
gq
gq
gq
gq
 
 
Simulation 11:  = 1, = 0 and  = 0 
 
In this case )(
)(
v
i
j gq  = )(
)(
v
i
l gq = )(
)(
v
j
j gq  = )(
)(
v
j
l gq  = )(
)(
v
k
j gq  = )(
)(
v
k
l gq  = )(
)(
v
l
j gq  = 
)()( v
l
l gq  = 0. Therefore it holds that )(
)(
v
i
i gq  = )(
)(
v
j
i gq  = )(
)(
v
j
k gq  = )(
)(
v
k
k gq  = 
)()( v
l
i gq  = )(
)(
v
l
k gq  = 0.2500; CSi(gv) = CSk(gv) =  
2
2500.02500.02500.0
2
1
  = 
0.2813; CSj(gv) = CSl(gv) = 0; )(
)(
v
i
i g  = )(
)(
v
j
i g  = )(
)(
v
j
k g  = )(
)(
v
k
k g  = )(
)(
v
l
i g  = 
)()( v
l
k g  =  
2
2500.0  = 0.0625; and PSi(gv) = PSj(gv) = PSk(gv) = PSl(gv) = 0. 
 
Simulation 12:  = 1,  = 0 and  = 0.5 
 
In this case )(
)(
v
i
j gq  = )(
)(
v
i
l gq = )(
)(
v
j
j gq  = )(
)(
v
j
l gq  = )(
)(
v
k
j gq  = )(
)(
v
k
l gq  = )(
)(
v
l
j gq  = 
)()( v
l
l gq  = 0. Therefore it holds that )(
)(
v
i
i gq  = )(
)(
v
k
k gq  = 0.2373; )(
)(
v
j
i gq  = )(
)(
v
j
k gq  = 
)()( v
l
i gq  = )(
)(
v
l
k gq  = 0.2034 CSi(gv) = CSk(gv) =  
2
2034.02034.02373.0
2
1
  = 
~
~
765 
 
0.2074; CSj(gv) = CSl(gv) = 0; )(
)(
v
i
i g  = )(
)(
v
k
k g  =  
2
2373.0
2
)5.2(
 = 0.0704; )()( v
j
i g  
= )()( v
j
k g  = )(
)(
v
l
i g  = )(
)(
v
l
k g  =  
2
2034.0
2
)5.2(
 = 0.0517; PSi(gv) = PSk(gv) = 
 22373.0
4
5.0
 = 0.0070; and PSj(gv) = PSl(gv) =  
2
2034.02034.0
4
5.0
  = 0.0207. 
 
Simulation 13:  = 1,  = 0 and  = 1.5 
 
In this case )(
)(
v
i
j gq  = )(
)(
v
i
l gq = )(
)(
v
j
j gq  = )(
)(
v
j
l gq  = )(
)(
v
k
j gq  = )(
)(
v
k
l gq  = )(
)(
v
l
j gq  = 
)()( v
l
l gq  = 0. Therefore it holds that )(
)(
v
i
i gq  = )(
)(
v
k
k gq  = 0.1985; )(
)(
v
j
i gq  = )(
)(
v
j
k gq  = 
)()( v
l
i gq  = )(
)(
v
l
k gq  = 0.1527; CSi(gv) = CSk(gv) =  
2
1527.01527.01985.0
2
1
  = 
0.1270; CSj(gv) = CSl(gv) = 0; )(
)(
v
i
i g  = )(
)(
v
k
k g  =  
2
1985.0
2
)5.3(
 = 0.0690; )()( v
j
i g  
= )()( v
j
k g  = )(
)(
v
l
i g  = )(
)(
v
l
k g  =  
2
1527.0
2
)5.3(
 = 0.0408; PSi(gv) = PSk(gv) = 
 21985.0
4
5.1
 = 0.0148; and PSj(gv) = PSl(gv) =  
2
1527.01527.0
4
5.1
  = 0.0350. 
 
Simulation 14:  = 1,  = 0.5 and  = 0 
 
In this case the output matrix is given by: 
 
















































1000.0
1000.0
2500.0
1000.0
2500.0
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
10000
01000
00100
00010
00001
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
v
j
l
v
j
j
v
j
i
v
i
j
v
i
i
gq
gq
gq
gq
gq
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~
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Therefore, )()( v
i
i gq  = )(
)(
v
k
k gq  = )(
)(
v
j
i gq  = )(
)(
v
j
k gq  = )(
)(
v
l
i gq  = )(
)(
v
l
k gq  = 0.2500; 
)()( v
i
j gq  = )(
)(
v
i
l gq  = )(
)(
v
k
j gq  = )(
)(
v
k
l gq  = )(
)(
v
j
j gq  = )(
)(
v
l
l gq  = )(
)(
v
j
l gq  = )(
)(
v
l
j gq  = 
0.1000; CSi(gv) = CSk(gv) =  
2
2500.02500.02500.0
2
1
  = 0.2813; CSj(gv) = CSl(gv) = 
 21000.01000.01000.01000.0
2
1
  = 0.0800; )()( v
i
i g  = )(
)(
v
k
k g  = )(
)(
v
j
i g  = 
)()( v
j
k g  = )(
)(
v
l
i g  = )(
)(
v
l
k g  =  
2
2500.0  = 0.0625; )(
)(
v
i
j g  = )(
)(
v
i
l g  = )(
)(
v
k
j g  = 
)()( v
k
l g  = )(
)(
v
j
j g  = )(
)(
v
l
l g  = )(
)(
v
j
l g  = )(
)(
v
l
j g  =  
2
1000.0  = 0.0100; and PSi(gv) 
= PSj(gv) = PSk(gv) = PSl(gv) = 0. 
 
Simulation 15:  = 1,  = 0.5 and  = 0.5 
 
In this case the output matrix is given by: 
 





















































0938.0
0938.0
2034.0
0822.0
2222.0
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
11406.02188.00625.00625.0
1406.012188.00625.00625.0
0847.00847.010678.00
0274.00274.01096.010959.0
0741.00741.00741.02593.01
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
v
j
l
v
j
j
v
j
i
v
i
j
v
i
i
gq
gq
gq
gq
gq
 
 
Therefore, )()( v
i
i gq  = )(
)(
v
k
k gq  = 0.2237; )(
)(
v
i
j gq  = )(
)(
v
i
l gq  = )(
)(
v
k
j gq  = )(
)(
v
k
l gq  = 
0.0859; )()( v
j
i gq  = )(
)(
v
j
k gq  = )(
)(
v
l
i gq  = )(
)(
v
l
k gq  = 0.1989; )(
)(
v
j
j gq  = )(
)(
v
j
l gq  = 
)()( v
l
j gq  = )(
)(
v
l
l gq  = 0.0611; CSi(gv) = CSk(gv) =  
2
1989.01989.02237.0
2
1
  = 
0.1931; CSj(gv) = CSl(gv) =  
2
0611.00859.00611.00859.0
2
1
  = 0.0432; )()( v
i
i g  = 
~
767 
 
)()( v
k
k g  =  
2
2237.0
2
)5.2(
 = 0.0626; )(
)(
v
i
j g  = )(
)(
v
i
l g  = )(
)(
v
k
j g  = )(
)(
v
k
l g  = 
 20859.0
2
)5.2(
 = 0.0092; )()( v
j
i g  = )(
)(
v
j
k g  = )(
)(
v
l
i g  = )(
)(
v
l
k g  =  
2
1989.0
2
)5.2(
 = 
0.0495; )(
)(
v
j
j g  = )(
)(
v
j
l g  = )(
)(
v
l
j g  = )(
)(
v
l
l g  =  
2
0611.0
2
)5.2(
 = 0.0047; PSi(gv) = 
PSk(gv) =  
2
0859.00859.02237.0
4
5.0
  = 0.0196; and PSj(gv) = PSl(gv) = 
 20611.01989.00611.01989.0
4
5.0
  = 0.0338. 
 
Simulation 16:  = 1,  = 0.5 and  = 1.5 
 
In this case the output matrix is given by: 
 





















































0806.0
0806.0
1527.0
0637.0
1818.0
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
12661.04355.00968.00968.0
2661.014355.00968.00968.0
1603.01603.010916.00
0382.00382.01529.011720.0
1091.01091.01091.04909.01
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
v
j
l
v
j
j
v
j
i
v
i
j
v
i
i
gq
gq
gq
gq
gq
 
 
Therefore, )()( v
i
i gq  = )(
)(
v
k
k gq  = 0.1760; )(
)(
v
i
j gq  = )(
)(
v
i
l gq  = )(
)(
v
k
j gq  = )(
)(
v
k
l gq  = 
0.0584; )()( v
j
i gq  = )(
)(
v
j
k gq  = )(
)(
v
l
i gq  = )(
)(
v
l
k gq  = 0.1482; )(
)(
v
j
j gq  = )(
)(
v
j
l gq  = 
)()( v
l
j gq  =  )(
)(
v
l
l gq  = 0.0306; CSi(gv) = CSk(gv) =  
2
1482.01482.01760.0
2
1
  = 
0.1116; CSj(gv) = CSl(gv) =  
2
0306.00584.00306.00584.0
2
1
  = 0.0158; )()( v
i
i g  = 
)()( v
k
k g  =  
2
1760.0
2
)5.3(
 = 0.0542; )(
)(
v
i
j g  = )(
)(
v
i
l g  = )(
)(
v
k
j g  = )(
)(
v
k
l g  = 
 20584.0
2
)5.3(
 = 0.0060; )()( v
j
i g  = )(
)(
v
j
k g  = )(
)(
v
l
i g  = )(
)(
v
l
k g  =  
2
1482.0
2
)5.3(
 = 
0.0384; )(
)(
v
j
j g  = )(
)(
v
j
l g  = )(
)(
v
l
j g  = )(
)(
v
l
l g  =  
2
0306.0
2
)5.3(
 = 0.0016; PSi(gv) = 
~
768 
 
PSk(gv) =  
2
0584.00584.01760.0
4
5.1
  = 0.0321; and PSj(gv) = PSl(gv) = 
 20306.01482.00306.01482.0
4
5.1
  = 0.0480. 
 
Network w 
 
In considering the equations presented in Section 4.2.1.2 it holds that )()( w
i
i gq  = 
)()( w
k
k gq  = 
)1)(4(2
)()3(2)(2)(2)1(2 )()()(



 w
i
jw
j
iw
j
j gqgqgq
; )(
)(
w
i
j gq  = )(
)(
w
i
l gq  
= )(
)(
w
k
j gq  = )(
)(
w
k
l gq  = 
8123
)()2()(2)1(~2
2
)()(



 w
i
iw
j
i gqgq ; )()( w
j
i gq  = )(
)(
w
j
k gq  
= )()( w
l
i gq  = )(
)(
w
l
k gq  = 
8123
)()2()(2)1(2
2
)()(



 w
j
jw
i
j gqgq
; )(
)(
w
j
j gq  = )(
)(
w
l
l gq  = 
)1)(4(2
)()3(2)(2)(2)1(~2 )()()(



 w
j
iw
i
jw
i
i gqgqgq
; CSi(gw) = CSk(gw) = 
 2)()()( )()()(
2
1
w
l
iw
j
iw
i
i gqgqgq  ; CSj(gw) = CSl(gw) =  
2)()()( )()()(
2
1
w
k
jw
j
jw
i
j gqgqgq  ; 
)()( w
i
i g  = )(
)(
w
k
k g  =  
2)( )(
2
)2(
w
i
i gq

; )(
)(
w
i
j g  = )(
)(
w
i
l g  = )(
)(
w
k
j g  = )(
)(
w
k
l g  = 
 2)( )(
2
)2(
w
i
j gq

; )()( w
j
i g  = )(
)(
w
j
k g  = )(
)(
w
l
i g  = )(
)(
w
l
k g  =  
2)( )(
2
)2(
w
j
i gq

; 
)()( w
j
j g  = )(
)(
w
l
l g  =  
2)( )(
2
)2(
w
j
j gq

; PSi(gw) = PSk(gw) = 
 2)()()( )()()(
4
w
i
lw
i
jw
i
i gqgqgq 

; and PSj(gw) = PSl(gw) = 
 2)()()( )()()(
4
w
j
kw
j
jw
j
i gqgqgq 

. 
 
The outputs involved in this network can be obtained by solving the following output 
matrix: 
769 
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
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
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w
i
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w
i
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Simulation 11:  = 1, = 0 and  = 0 
 
In this case )(
)(
w
i
j gq  = )(
)(
w
i
l gq = )(
)(
w
j
j gq  = )(
)(
w
k
j gq  = )(
)(
w
k
l gq  = )(
)(
w
l
l gq  = 0. 
Therefore it holds that )()( w
i
i gq  = )(
)(
w
j
i gq  = )(
)(
w
j
k gq  = )(
)(
w
k
k gq  = )(
)(
w
l
i gq  = )(
)(
w
l
k gq  
= 0.2500; CSi(gw) = CSk(gw) =  
2
2500.02500.02500.0
2
1
  = 0.2813; CSj(gw) = 
CSl(gw) = 0; )(
)(
w
i
i g  = )(
)(
w
j
i g  = )(
)(
w
j
k g  = )(
)(
w
k
k g  = )(
)(
w
l
i g  = )(
)(
w
l
k g  = 
 22500.0  = 0.0625; and PSi(gw) = PSj(gw) = PSk(gw) = PSl(gw) = 0. 
 
Simulation 12:  = 1,  = 0 and  = 0.5 
 
In this case )(
)(
w
i
j gq  = )(
)(
w
i
l gq = )(
)(
w
j
j gq  = )(
)(
w
k
j gq  = )(
)(
w
k
l gq  = )(
)(
w
l
l gq  = 0. 
Therefore it holds that )()( w
i
i gq  = )(
)(
w
k
k gq   = 0.2373; )(
)(
w
j
i gq  = )(
)(
w
j
k gq  = )(
)(
w
l
i gq  = 
)()( w
l
k gq  = 0.2034; CSi(gw) = CSk(gw) =  
2
2034.02034.02373.0
2
1
  = 0.2074; CSj(gw) 
= CSl(gw) = 0; )(
)(
w
i
i g  = )(
)(
w
k
k g  =  
2
2373.0
2
)5.2(
 = 0.0704; )()( w
j
i g  = )(
)(
w
j
k g  = 
~
~
770 
 
)()( w
l
i g  = )(
)(
w
l
k g  =  
2
2034.0
2
)5.2(
 = 0.0517; PSi(gw) = PSk(gw) =  
2
2373.0
4
5.0
 = 
0.0070; and PSj(gw) = PSl(gw) =  
2
2034.02034.0
4
5.0
  = 0.0207. 
 
Simulation 13:  = 1,  = 0 and  = 1.5 
 
In this case )(
)(
w
i
j gq  = )(
)(
w
i
l gq = )(
)(
w
j
j gq  = )(
)(
w
k
j gq  = )(
)(
w
k
l gq  = )(
)(
w
l
l gq  = 0. 
Therefore it holds that )()( w
i
i gq  = )(
)(
w
k
k gq  = 0.1985; )(
)(
w
j
i gq  = )(
)(
w
j
k gq  = )(
)(
w
l
i gq  = 
)()( w
l
k gq  = 0.1527; CSi(gw) = CSk(gw) =  
2
1527.01527.01985.0
2
1
  = 0.1270; CSj(gw) 
= CSl(gw) = 0; )(
)(
w
i
i g  = )(
)(
w
k
k g  =  
2
1985.0
2
)5.3(
 = 0.0690; )()( w
j
i g  = )(
)(
w
j
k g  = 
)()( w
l
i g  = )(
)(
w
l
k g  =  
2
1527.0
2
)5.3(
 = 0.0408; PSi(gw) = PSk(gw) =  
2
1985.0
4
5.1
 = 
0.0148; and PSj(gw) = PSl(gw) =  
2
1527.01527.0
4
5.1
  = 0.0350. 
 
Simulation 14:  = 1,  = 0.5 and  = 0 
 
In this case the output matrix is given by: 
 










































1250.0
2500.0
1250.0
2500.0
)(
)(
)(
)(
1000
0100
0010
0001
)(
)(
)(
)(
w
j
j
w
j
i
w
i
j
w
i
i
gq
gq
gq
gq
 
Therefore, )()( w
i
i gq  = )(
)(
w
j
i gq  = )(
)(
w
j
k gq  = )(
)(
w
k
k gq  = )(
)(
w
l
i gq  = )(
)(
w
l
k gq  = 0.2500; 
)()( w
i
j gq  = )(
)(
w
i
l gq  = )(
)(
w
j
j gq  = )(
)(
w
k
j gq  = )(
)(
w
k
l gq  = )(
)(
w
l
l gq  = 0.1250; CSi(gw) = 
~
~
771 
 
CSk(gw) =  
2
2500.02500.02500.0
2
1
  = 0.2813; CSj(gw) = CSl(gw) = 
 21250.01250.01250.0
2
1
  = 0.0703; )()( w
i
i g  = )(
)(
w
j
i g  = )(
)(
w
j
k g  = )(
)(
w
k
k g  = 
)()( w
l
i g  = )(
)(
w
l
k g  =  
2
2500.0  = 0.0625; )(
)(
w
i
j g  = )(
)(
w
i
l g  = )(
)(
w
j
j g  = )(
)(
w
k
j g  
= )()( w
k
l g  = )(
)(
w
l
l g  =  
2
1250.0  = 0.0156; and PSi(gw) = PSj(gw) = PSk(gw) = PSl(gw) 
= 0. 
 
Simulation 15:  = 1,  = 0.5 and  = 0.5 
 
In this case the output matrix is given by: 
 














































1111.0
2034.0
1017.0
2222.0
)(
)(
)(
)(
12593.00741.00741.0
0847.010678.00
00678.010847.0
0741.00741.02593.01
)(
)(
)(
)(
w
j
j
w
j
i
w
i
j
w
i
i
gq
gq
gq
gq
 
 
Therefore, )()( w
i
i gq  = )(
)(
w
k
k gq  = 0.2182; )(
)(
w
i
j gq  = )(
)(
w
i
l gq  = )(
)(
w
k
j gq  = )(
)(
w
k
l gq  = 
0.0970; )()( w
j
i gq  = )(
)(
w
j
k gq  = )(
)(
w
l
i gq  = )(
)(
w
l
k gq  = 0.2030; )(
)(
w
j
j gq  = )(
)(
w
l
l gq  = 
0.0818; CSi(gw) = CSk(gw) =  
2
2030.02030.02182.0
2
1
  = 0.1948; CSj(gw) = CSl(gw) 
=  20970.00818.00970.0
2
1
  = 0.0380; )()( w
i
i g  = )(
)(
w
k
k g  =  
2
2182.0
2
)5.2(
 = 
0.0595; )(
)(
w
i
j g  = )(
)(
w
i
l g  = )(
)(
w
k
j g  = )(
)(
w
k
l g  =  
2
0970.0
2
)5.2(
 = 0.0118; 
)()( w
j
i g  = )(
)(
w
j
k g  = )(
)(
w
l
i g  = )(
)(
w
l
k g  =  
2
2030.0
2
)5.2(
 = 0.0515; )(
)(
w
j
j g  = 
)()( w
l
l g  =  
2
0818.0
2
)5.2(
 = 0.0084; PSi(gw) = PSk(gw) = 
~
772 
 
 20970.00970.02182.0
4
5.0
  = 0.0212; and PSj(gw) = PSl(gw) = 
 22030.00818.02030.0
4
5.0
  = 0.0297. 
 
Simulation 16:  = 1,  = 0.5 and  = 1.5 
 
In this case the output matrix is given by: 
 














































0909.0
1527.0
0763.0
1818.0
)(
)(
)(
)(
14909.01091.01091.0
1603.010916.00
00916.011603.0
1091.01091.04909.01
)(
)(
)(
)(
w
j
j
w
j
i
w
i
j
w
i
i
gq
gq
gq
gq
 
 
Therefore, )()( w
i
i gq  = )(
)(
w
k
k gq  = 0.1722; )(
)(
w
i
j gq  = )(
)(
w
i
l gq  = )(
)(
w
k
j gq  = )(
)(
w
k
l gq  = 
0.0626; )()( w
j
i gq  = )(
)(
w
j
k gq  = )(
)(
w
l
i gq  = )(
)(
w
l
k gq  = 0.1517; )(
)(
w
j
j gq  = )(
)(
w
l
l gq  = 
0.0421; CSi(gw) = CSk(gw) =  
2
1517.01517.01722.0
2
1
  = 0.1131; CSj(gw) = CSl(gw) 
=  20626.00421.00626.0
2
1
  = 0.0140; )()( w
i
i g  = )(
)(
w
k
k g  =  
2
1722.0
2
)5.3(
 = 
0.0519; )(
)(
w
i
j g  = )(
)(
w
i
l g  = )(
)(
w
k
j g  = )(
)(
w
k
l g  =  
2
0626.0
2
)5.3(
 = 0.0069; 
)()( w
j
i g  = )(
)(
w
j
k g  = )(
)(
w
l
i g  = )(
)(
w
l
k g  =  
2
1517.0
2
)5.3(
 = 0.0403; )(
)(
w
j
j g  = 
)()( w
l
l g  =  
2
0421.0
2
)5.3(
 = 0.0031; PSi(gw) = PSk(gw) = 
 20626.00626.01722.0
4
5.1
  = 0.0332; and PSj(gw) = PSl(gw) = 
 21517.00421.01517.0
4
5.1
  = 0.0448. 
~
773 
 
Network x 
 
In considering the equations presented in Section 4.2.1.2 it holds that )()( x
i
i gq  = 
)()( x
i
k gq  = )(
)(
x
k
i gq  = )(
)(
x
k
k gq  = 
10153
)()3(2)(2)(4)1(2
2
)()()(



 x
i
jx
j
ix
j
j gqgqgq
; 
)()( x
i
j gq  = )(
)(
x
i
l gq  = )(
)(
x
k
j gq  = )(
)(
x
k
l gq  = 
10153
)()3(2)(2)(4)1(~2
2
)()()(



 x
i
ix
j
jx
j
i gqgqgq
; )()( x
j
i gq  = )(
)(
x
j
k gq  = )(
)(
x
l
i gq  = 
)()( x
l
k gq  = 
10153
)()3(2)(2)(4)1(2
2
)()()(



 x
j
jx
i
ix
i
j gqgqgq
; )(
)(
x
j
j gq  = )(
)(
x
j
l gq  = 
)()( x
l
j gq  = )(
)(
x
l
l gq  = 
10153
)()3(2)(2)(4)1(~2
2
)()()(



 x
j
ix
i
jx
i
i gqgqgq
; CSi(gx) = 
CSk(gx) =  
2)()()()( )()()()(
2
1
x
l
ix
k
ix
j
ix
i
i gqgqgqgq  ; CSj(gx) = CSl(gx) = 
 2)()()()( )()()()(
2
1
x
l
jx
k
jx
j
jx
i
j gqgqgqgq  ; )(
)(
x
i
i g  = )(
)(
x
i
k g  = )(
)(
x
k
i g  = )(
)(
x
k
k g  = 
 2)( )(
2
)2(
x
i
i gq

; )(
)(
x
i
j g  = )(
)(
x
i
l g  = )(
)(
x
k
j g  = )(
)(
x
k
l g  =  
2)( )(
2
)2(
x
i
j gq

; 
)()( x
j
i g  = )(
)(
x
j
k g  = )(
)(
x
l
i g  = )(
)(
x
l
k g  =  
2)( )(
2
)2(
x
j
i gq

; )(
)(
x
j
j g  = )(
)(
x
j
l g  = 
)()( x
l
j g  = )(
)(
x
l
l g  =  
2)( )(
2
)2(
x
j
j gq

; PSi(gx) = PSk(gx) = 
 2)()()()( )()()()(
4
x
i
lx
i
kx
i
jx
i
i gqgqgqgq 

; and PSj(gx) = PSl(gx) = 
 2)()()()( )()()()(
4
x
j
lx
j
kx
j
jx
j
i gqgqgqgq 

. 
 
The outputs involved in this network can be obtained by solving the following output 
matrix: 
774 
 
 


























































































10153
)1(~2
10153
)1(2
10153
)1(~2
10153
)1(2
)(
)(
)(
)(
1
10153
)3(2
10153
2
10153
4
10153
)3(2
1
10153
4
10153
2
10153
2
10153
4
1
10153
)3(2
10153
4
10153
2
10153
)3(2
1
2
2
2
2
)(
)(
)(
)(
222
222
222
222
































x
j
j
x
j
i
x
i
j
x
i
i
gq
gq
gq
gq
 
 
Simulation 11:  = 1, = 0 and  = 0 
 
In this case )(
)(
x
i
j gq  = )(
)(
x
j
j gq  = )(
)(
x
k
j gq  = )(
)(
x
l
j gq  = )(
)(
x
i
l gq = )(
)(
x
j
l gq  = )(
)(
x
k
l gq  = 
)()( x
l
l gq  = 0. Therefore it holds that )(
)(
x
i
i gq  = )(
)(
x
i
k gq  = )(
)(
x
j
i gq  = )(
)(
x
j
k gq  = 
)()( x
k
i gq  = )(
)(
x
k
k gq  = )(
)(
x
l
i gq  = )(
)(
x
l
k gq  = 0.2000; CSi(gx) = CSk(gx) = 
 22000.02000.02000.02000.0
2
1
  = 0.3200; CSj(gx) = CSl(gx) = 0; )(
)(
x
i
i g  = 
)()( x
i
k g  = )(
)(
x
j
i g  = )(
)(
x
j
k g  = )(
)(
x
k
i g  = )(
)(
x
k
k g  = )(
)(
x
l
i g  = )(
)(
x
l
k g  = 
 22000.0  = 0.0400; and PSi(gx) = PSj(gx) = PSk(gx) = PSl(gx) = 0. 
 
Simulation 12:  = 1,  = 0 and  = 0.5 
 
In this case )(
)(
x
i
j gq  = )(
)(
x
j
j gq  = )(
)(
x
k
j gq  = )(
)(
x
l
j gq  = )(
)(
x
i
l gq = )(
)(
x
j
l gq  = )(
)(
x
k
l gq  = 
)()( x
l
l gq  = 0. Therefore it holds that )(
)(
x
i
i gq  = )(
)(
x
i
k gq  = )(
)(
x
j
i gq  = )(
)(
x
j
k gq  = 
)()( x
k
i gq  = )(
)(
x
k
k gq  = )(
)(
x
l
i gq  = )(
)(
x
l
k gq  = 0.1739; CSi(gx) = CSk(gx) = 
 21739.01739.01739.01739.0
2
1
  = 0.2419; CSj(gx) = CSl(gx) = 0; )(
)(
x
i
i g  = 
)()( x
i
k g  = )(
)(
x
j
i g  = )(
)(
x
j
k g  = )(
)(
x
k
i g  = )(
)(
x
k
k g  = )(
)(
x
l
i g  = )(
)(
x
l
k g  = 
~
~
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 21739.0
2
)5.2(
 = 0.0378; and PSi(gx) = PSj(gx) = PSk(gx) = PSl(gx) = 
 21739.01739.0
4
5.0
  = 0.0151. 
 
Simulation 13:  = 1,  = 0 and  = 1.5 
 
In this case )(
)(
x
i
j gq  = )(
)(
x
j
j gq  = )(
)(
x
k
j gq  = )(
)(
x
l
j gq  = )(
)(
x
i
l gq = )(
)(
x
j
l gq  = )(
)(
x
k
l gq  = 
)()( x
l
l gq  = 0. Therefore it holds that )(
)(
x
i
i gq  = )(
)(
x
i
k gq  = )(
)(
x
j
i gq  = )(
)(
x
j
k gq  = 
)()( x
k
i gq  = )(
)(
x
k
k gq  = )(
)(
x
l
i gq  = )(
)(
x
l
k gq  = 0.1379; CSi(gx) = CSk(gx) = 
 21379.01379.01379.01379.0
2
1
  = 0.1521; CSj(gx) = CSl(gx) = 0; )(
)(
x
i
i g  = 
)()( x
i
k g  = )(
)(
x
j
i g  = )(
)(
x
j
k g  = )(
)(
x
k
i g  = )(
)(
x
k
k g  = )(
)(
x
l
i g  = )(
)(
x
l
k g  = 
 21379.0
2
)5.3(
 = 0.0333; and PSi(gx) = PSj(gx) = PSk(gx) = PSl(gx) = 
 21379.01379.0
4
5.1
  = 0.0285. 
 
Simulation 14:  = 1,  = 0.5 and  = 0 
 
In this case the output matrix is given by: 
 










































1000.0
2000.0
1000.0
2000.0
)(
)(
)(
)(
1000
0100
0010
0001
)(
)(
)(
)(
x
j
j
x
j
i
x
i
j
x
i
i
gq
gq
gq
gq
 
 
~
~
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Therefore, )()( x
i
i gq  = )(
)(
x
i
k gq  = )(
)(
x
j
i gq  = )(
)(
x
j
k gq  = )(
)(
x
k
i gq  = )(
)(
x
k
k gq  = )(
)(
x
l
i gq  = 
)()( x
l
k gq  = 0.2000; )(
)(
x
i
j gq  = )(
)(
x
i
l gq  = )(
)(
x
j
j gq  = )(
)(
x
j
l gq  = )(
)(
x
k
j gq  = )(
)(
x
k
l gq  = 
)()( x
l
j gq  = )(
)(
x
l
l gq  = 0.1000; CSi(gx) = CSk(gx) = 
 22000.02000.02000.02000.0
2
1
  = 0.3200; CSj(gx) = CSl(gx) = 
 21000.01000.01000.01000.0
2
1
  = 0.0800; )()( x
i
i g  = )(
)(
x
i
k g  = )(
)(
x
j
i g  = 
)()( x
j
k g  = )(
)(
x
k
i g  = )(
)(
x
k
k g  = )(
)(
x
l
i g  = )(
)(
x
l
k g  =  
2
2000.0  = 0.0400; )(
)(
x
i
j g  = 
)()( x
i
l g  = )(
)(
x
j
j g  = )(
)(
x
j
l g  = )(
)(
x
k
j g  = )(
)(
x
k
l g  = )(
)(
x
l
j g  = )(
)(
x
l
l g  = 
 21000.0  = 0.0100; and PSi(gx) = PSj(gx) = PSk(gx) = PSl(gx) = 0. 
 
Simulation 15:  = 1,  = 0.5 and  = 0.5 
 
In this case the output matrix is given by: 
 














































0822.0
1644.0
0822.0
1644.0
)(
)(
)(
)(
11918.00548.01096.0
1918.011096.00548.0
0548.01096.011918.0
1096.00548.01918.01
)(
)(
)(
)(
x
j
j
x
j
i
x
i
j
x
i
i
gq
gq
gq
gq
 
 
Therefore, )()( x
i
i gq  = )(
)(
x
i
k gq  = )(
)(
x
j
i gq  = )(
)(
x
j
k gq  = )(
)(
x
k
i gq  = )(
)(
x
k
k gq  = )(
)(
x
l
i gq  = 
)()( x
l
k gq  = 0.1676; )(
)(
x
i
j gq  = )(
)(
x
i
l gq  = )(
)(
x
j
j gq  = )(
)(
x
j
l gq  = )(
)(
x
k
j gq  = )(
)(
x
k
l gq  = 
)()( x
l
j gq  = )(
)(
x
l
l gq  = 0.0724; CSi(gx) = CSk(gx) = 
 21676.01676.01676.01676.0
2
1
  = 0.2247; CSj(gx) = CSl(gx) = 
 20724.00724.00724.00724.0
2
1
  = 0.0419; )()( x
i
i g  = )(
)(
x
i
k g  = )(
)(
x
j
i g  = 
~
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)()( x
j
k g  = )(
)(
x
k
i g  = )(
)(
x
k
k g  = )(
)(
x
l
i g  = )(
)(
x
l
k g  =  
2
1676.0
2
)5.2(
 = 0.0351; 
)()( x
i
j g  = )(
)(
x
i
l g  = )(
)(
x
j
j g  = )(
)(
x
j
l g  = )(
)(
x
k
j g  = )(
)(
x
k
l g  = )(
)(
x
l
j g  = )(
)(
x
l
l g  
=  20724.0
2
)5.2(
 = 0.0066; and PSi(gx) = PSj(gx) = PSk(gx) = PSl(gx) = 
 20724.01676.00724.01676.0
4
5.0
  = 0.0288. 
 
Simulation 16:  = 1,  = 0.5 and  = 1.5 
 
In this case the output matrix is given by: 
 














































0637.0
1274.0
0637.0
1274.0
)(
)(
)(
)(
13439.00764.01529.0
3439.011529.00764.0
0764.01529.013439.0
1529.00764.03439.01
)(
)(
)(
)(
x
j
j
x
j
i
x
i
j
x
i
i
gq
gq
gq
gq
 
 
Therefore, )()( x
i
i gq  = )(
)(
x
i
k gq  = )(
)(
x
j
i gq  = )(
)(
x
j
k gq  = )(
)(
x
k
i gq  = )(
)(
x
k
k gq  = )(
)(
x
l
i gq  = 
)()( x
l
k gq  = 0.1292; )(
)(
x
i
j gq  = )(
)(
x
i
l gq  = )(
)(
x
j
j gq  = )(
)(
x
j
l gq  = )(
)(
x
k
j gq  = )(
)(
x
k
l gq  = 
)()( x
l
j gq  = )(
)(
x
l
l gq  = 0.0423; CSi(gx) = CSk(gx) = 
 21292.01292.01292.01292.0
2
1
  = 0.1335; CSj(gx) = CSl(gx) = 
 20423.00423.00423.00423.0
2
1
  = 0.0143; )()( x
i
i g  = )(
)(
x
i
k g  = )(
)(
x
j
i g  = 
)()( x
j
k g  = )(
)(
x
k
i g  = )(
)(
x
k
k g  = )(
)(
x
l
i g  = )(
)(
x
l
k g  =  
2
1292.0
2
)5.3(
 = 0.0292; 
)()( x
i
j g  = )(
)(
x
i
l g  = )(
)(
x
j
j g  = )(
)(
x
j
l g  = )(
)(
x
k
j g  = )(
)(
x
k
l g  = )(
)(
x
l
j g  = )(
)(
x
l
l g  
~
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=  20423.0
2
)5.3(
 = 0.0031; PSi(gx) = PSj(gx) = PSk(gx) = PSl(gx) = 
 20423.01292.00423.01292.0
4
5.1
  = 0.0441. 
 
Network y 
 
In considering the equations presented in Section 4.2.1.2 it holds that )(
)(
y
i
i gq  = 
)1)(3(2
)()2()()()1(2 )()()(



 y
i
jy
j
ky
j
j gqgqgq
; )(
)(
y
i
j gq  = 
)1)(4(2
)()3()()()()()1(~2 )()()()()(



 y
i
iy
k
ly
k
ky
j
ky
j
i gqgqgqgqgq
; )(
)(
y
j
i gq  = 
)1)(3(2
)()2()()2()()1(2 )()()(



 y
j
ky
j
jy
i
j gqgqgq
; )(
)(
y
j
j gq  = 
)1)(4(2
)()3()()3()()()()1(~2 )()()()()(



 y
j
ky
j
iy
k
ly
k
ky
i
i gqgqgqgqgq
; 
)()( y
j
k gq  = 
)1)(4(2
)()3()()3()()()()1(2 )()()()()(



 y
j
jy
j
iy
l
ly
k
ly
k
j gqgqgqgqgq
; 
)()( y
k
j gq  = 
)1)(4(2
)()3()()3()()()()1(~2 )()()()()(



 y
k
ly
k
ky
i
iy
j
ky
j
i gqgqgqgqgq
; 
)()( y
k
k gq  = 
)1)(4(2
)()3()()3()()()()1(2 )()()()()(



 y
k
ly
k
jy
l
ly
j
jy
j
i gqgqgqgqgq
; 
)()( y
k
l gq  = 
)1)(3(2
)()2()()2()()1(~2 )()()(



 y
k
ky
k
jy
l
k gqgqgq
; )(
)(
y
l
k gq  = 
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)1)(4(2
)()3()()()()()1(2 )()()()()(



 y
l
ly
k
ly
k
jy
j
jy
j
i gqgqgqgqgq
; )(
)(
y
l
l gq  = 
)1)(3(2
)()2()()()1(~2 )()()(



 y
l
ky
k
ky
k
j gqgqgq
; CSi(gy) =  
2)()( )()(
2
1
y
j
iy
i
i gqgq  ; 
CSj(gy) =  
2)()()( )()()(
2
1
y
k
jy
j
jy
i
j gqgqgq  ; CSk(gy) =  
2)()()( )()()(
2
1
y
l
ky
k
ky
j
k gqgqgq  ; 
CSl(gy) =  
2)()( )()(
2
1
y
l
ly
k
l gqgq  ; )(
)(
y
i
i g  =  
2)( )(
2
)2(
y
i
i gq

; )(
)(
y
i
j g  = 
 2)( )(
2
)2(
y
i
j gq

; )(
)(
y
j
i g  =  
2)( )(
2
)2(
y
j
i gq

;  )(
)(
y
j
j g  =  
2)( )(
2
)2(
y
j
j gq

; 
)()( y
j
k g  =  
2)( )(
2
)2(
y
j
k gq

; )(
)(
y
k
j g  =  
2)( )(
2
)2(
y
k
j gq

; )(
)(
y
k
k g  = 
 2)( )(
2
)2(
y
k
k gq

; )(
)(
y
k
l g  =  
2)( )(
2
)2(
y
k
l gq

; )(
)(
y
l
k g  =  
2)( )(
2
)2(
y
l
k gq

; 
)()( y
l
l g  =  
2)( )(
2
)2(
y
l
l gq

; PSi(gy) =  
2)()( )()(
4
y
i
jy
i
i gqgq 

; PSj(gy) = 
 2)()()( )()()(
4
y
j
ky
j
jy
j
i gqgqgq 

; PSk(gy) =  
2)()()( )()()(
4
y
k
ly
k
ky
k
j gqgqgq 

; and 
PSl(gy) =  
2)()( )()(
4
y
l
ly
l
k gqgq 

. 
 
The outputs involved in this network can be obtained by solving the following output 
matrix: 
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









































































































7
6
7
6
5
6
5
4
5
4
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
011
23333
100
32233
22333
33322
33223
001
33332
110
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
1000000
10000
0100000
01000
00100
00100
00010
0000010
00001
0000001




















y
l
l
y
l
k
y
k
l
y
k
k
y
k
j
y
j
k
y
j
j
y
j
i
y
i
j
y
i
i
gq
gq
gq
gq
gq
gq
gq
gq
gq
gq
 
 
Where 0 = 
)1)(3(2
)2(




; 1 = 
)1)(3(2  

; 2 = 
)1)(4(2
)3(




; 3 = 
)1)(4(2  

; 4 
= 
3

; 5 = 
4
~


; 6 = 
4

; 7 = 
3
~


; 
 
Simulation 11:  = 1, = 0 and  = 0 
 
In this case )(
)(
y
i
j gq  = )(
)(
y
j
j gq  = )(
)(
y
k
j gq  = )(
)(
y
k
l gq  = )(
)(
y
l
l gq  = 0. Therefore, the 
output matrix is given by: 
 
















































2500.0
2500.0
2500.0
3333.0
3333.0
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
10000
01000
00100
00010
00001
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
y
l
k
y
k
k
y
j
k
y
j
i
y
i
i
gq
gq
gq
gq
gq
 
 
Therefore, )(
)(
y
i
i gq  = )(
)(
y
j
i gq  = 0.3333; )(
)(
y
j
k gq  = )(
)(
y
k
k gq  = )(
)(
y
l
k gq  = 0.2500; 
CSi(gy) =  
2
3333.03333.0
2
1
  = 0.2222; CSj(gy) = CSl(gy) = 0; CSk(gy) = 
 22500.02500.02500.0
2
1
  = 0.2813; )(
)(
y
i
i g  = )(
)(
y
j
i g  =  
2
3333.0  = 0.1111; 
~
781 
 
)()( y
j
k g  = )(
)(
y
k
k g  = )(
)(
y
l
k g  =  
2
2500.0  = 0.0625; and PSi(gy) = PSj(gy) = PSk(gy) = 
PSl(gy) =  
2)( )(
4
y
l
k gq

 = 0. 
 
Simulation 12:  = 1,  = 0 and  = 0.5 
 
In this case )(
)(
y
i
j gq  = )(
)(
y
j
j gq  = )(
)(
y
k
j gq  = )(
)(
y
k
l gq  = )(
)(
y
l
l gq  = 0. Therefore, the 
output matrix is given by: 
 



















































2222.0
2222.0
2222.0
2857.0
2857.0
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
1000370.00
0100370.00
0011296.00
001190.010
000476.001
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
y
l
k
y
k
k
y
j
k
y
j
i
y
i
i
gq
gq
gq
gq
gq
 
 
Therefore, )(
)(
y
i
i gq  = 0.2947; )(
)(
y
j
i gq  = 0.2633; )(
)(
y
j
k gq  = 0.1881; )(
)(
y
k
k gq  = 
)()( y
l
k gq  = 0.2319; CSi(gy) =  
2
2633.02947.0
2
1
  = 0.1557; CSj(gy) = CSl(gy) = 0; 
CSk(gy) =  
2
2319.02319.01881.0
2
1
  = 0.2125; )(
)(
y
i
i g  =  
2
2947.0
2
)5.2(
 = 0.1086; 
)()( y
j
i g  =  
2
2633.0
2
)5.2(
 = 0.0867; )(
)(
y
j
k g  =  
2
1881.0
2
)5.2(
 = 0.0442; )(
)(
y
k
k g  = 
)()( y
l
k g  =  
2
2319.0
2
)5.2(
 = 0.0672; PSi(gy) =  
2
2947.0
4
5.0
 = 0.0109; PSj(gy) = 
 21881.02633.0
4
5.0
  = 0.0255; and PSk(gy) = PSl(gy) =  
2
2319.0
4
5.0
 = 0.0067. 
 
 
 
~
782 
 
Simulation 13:  = 1,  = 0 and  = 1.5 
 
In this case )(
)(
y
i
j gq  = )(
)(
y
j
j gq  = )(
)(
y
k
j gq  = )(
)(
y
k
l gq  = )(
)(
y
l
l gq  = 0. Therefore, the 
output matrix is given by: 
 



















































1818.0
1818.0
1818.0
2222.0
2222.0
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
1000545.00
0100545.00
0012455.00
002333.010
000667.001
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
y
l
k
y
k
k
y
j
k
y
j
i
y
i
i
gq
gq
gq
gq
gq
 
 
Therefore, )(
)(
y
i
i gq  = 0.2312; )(
)(
y
j
i gq  = 0.1907; )(
)(
y
j
k gq  = 0.1350; )(
)(
y
k
k gq  = 
)()( y
l
k gq  = 0.1922; CSi(gy) =  
2
1907.02312.0
2
1
  = 0.0890; CSj(gy) = CSl(gy) = 0; 
CSk(gy) =  
2
1922.01922.01350.0
2
1
  = 0.1349; )(
)(
y
i
i g  =  
2
2312.0
2
)5.3(
 = 0.0935; 
)()( y
j
i g  =  
2
1907.0
2
)5.3(
 = 0.0636; )(
)(
y
j
k g  =  
2
1350.0
2
)5.3(
 = 0.0319; )(
)(
y
k
k g  = 
)()( y
l
k g  =  
2
1922.0
2
)5.3(
 = 0.0646; PSi(gy) =  
2
2312.0
4
5.1
 = 0.0200; PSj(gy) = 
 21350.01907.0
4
5.1
  = 0.0398; and PSk(gy) = PSl(gy) =  
2
1922.0
4
5.1
 = 0.0139. 
 
Simulation 14:  = 1,  = 0.5 and  = 0 
 
In this case the output matrix is given by: 
 
~
~
783 
 
































































































1667.0
2500.0
1667.0
2500.0
1250.0
2500.0
1250.0
3333.0
1250.0
3333.0
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
1000000000
0100000000
0010000000
0001000000
0000100000
0000010000
0000001000
0000000100
0000000010
0000000001
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
y
l
l
y
l
k
y
k
l
y
k
k
y
k
j
y
j
k
y
j
j
y
j
i
y
i
j
y
i
i
gq
gq
gq
gq
gq
gq
gq
gq
gq
gq
 
 
Therefore, )(
)(
y
i
i gq  = )(
)(
y
j
i gq  = 0.3333; )(
)(
y
i
j gq  = )(
)(
y
j
j gq  = )(
)(
y
k
j gq  = 0.1250; 
)()( y
j
k gq  = )(
)(
y
k
k gq  = )(
)(
y
l
k gq  = 0.2500; )(
)(
y
k
l gq  = )(
)(
y
l
l gq  = 0.1667; CSi(gy) = 
 23333.03333.0
2
1
  = 0.2222; CSj(gy) =  
2
1250.01250.01250.0
2
1
  = 0.0703; 
CSk(gy) =  
2
2500.02500.02500.0
2
1
  = 0.2813; CSl(gy) =  
2
1667.01667.0
2
1
  = 
0.0556; )(
)(
y
i
i g  = )(
)(
y
j
i g  =  
2
3333.0  = 0.1111; )(
)(
y
i
j g  = )(
)(
y
j
j g  = )(
)(
y
k
j g  = 
 21250.0  = 0.0156; )()( y
j
k g  = )(
)(
y
k
k g  = )(
)(
y
l
k g  =  
2
2500.0  = 0.0625; )(
)(
y
k
l g  = 
)()( y
l
l g  =  
2
1667.0  = 0.0278; and PSi(gy) = PSj(gy) = PSk(gy) = PSl(gy) = 0. 
 
Simulation 15:  = 1,  = 0.5 and  = 0.5 
 
In this case the output matrix is given by: 
 
~
784 
 










































































































1429.0
2222.0
1429.0
2222.0
1111.0
2222.0
1111.0
2857.0
1111.0
2857.0
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
11190.000476.00476.000000
1296.010370.000370.000370.00370.000
00476.011190.01190.000000
0370.001296.011296.000370.00370.000
001296.01296.010370.000370.000370.0
0370.000370.000370.011296.01296.000
000370.00370.001296.011296.000370.0
000001190.01190.010476.00
000370.00370.000370.000370.011296.0
000000476.00476.001190.01
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
y
l
l
y
l
k
y
k
l
y
k
k
y
k
j
y
j
k
y
j
j
y
j
i
y
i
j
y
i
i
gq
gq
gq
gq
gq
gq
gq
gq
gq
gq
 
 
Therefore, )(
)(
y
i
i gq  = 0.2862; )(
)(
y
i
j gq  = 0.1028; )(
)(
y
j
i gq  = 0.2588; )(
)(
y
j
j gq  = 0.0755; 
)()( y
j
k gq  = 0.1916; )(
)(
y
k
j gq  = 0.0957; )(
)(
y
k
k gq  = 0.2118; )(
)(
y
k
l gq  = 0.1170; )(
)(
y
l
k gq  = 
0.2255; )(
)(
y
l
l gq  = 0.1307; CSi(gy) =  
2
2588.02862.0
2
1
  = 0.1485; CSj(gy) = 
 20957.00755.01028.0
2
1
  = 0.0375; CSk(gy) =  
2
2255.02118.01916.0
2
1
  = 
0.1978; CSl(gy) =  
2
1307.01170.0
2
1
  = 0.0307; )(
)(
y
i
i g  =  
2
2862.0
2
)5.2(
 = 0.1024; 
)()( y
i
j g  =  
2
1028.0
2
)5.2(
 = 0.0132; )(
)(
y
j
i g  =  
2
2588.0
2
)5.2(
 = 0.0837;  )(
)(
y
j
j g  = 
 20755.0
2
)5.2(
 = 0.0071; )(
)(
y
j
k g  =  
2
1916.0
2
)5.2(
 = 0.0459; )(
)(
y
k
j g  = 
 20957.0
2
)5.2(
 = 0.0114; )(
)(
y
k
k g  =  
2
2118.0
2
)5.2(
 = 0.0561; )(
)(
y
k
l g  = 
 21170.0
2
)5.2(
 = 0.0171; )(
)(
y
l
k g  =  
2
2255.0
2
)5.2(
 = 0.0636; )(
)(
y
l
l g  = 
 21307.0
2
)5.2(
 = 0.0214; PSi(gy) =  
2
1028.02862.0
4
5.0
  = 0.0189; PSj(gy) = 
 21916.00755.02588.0
4
5.0
  = 0.0346; PSk(gy) =  
2
1170.02118.00957.0
4
5.0
  = 
0.0225; and PSl(gy) =  
2
1307.02255.0
4
5.0
  = 0.0159. 
 
 
785 
 
Simulation 16:  = 1,  = 0.5 and  = 1.5 
 
In this case the output matrix is given by: 
 










































































































1111.0
1818.0
1111.0
1818.0
0909.0
1818.0
0909.0
2222.0
0909.0
2222.0
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
12333.000667.00667.000000
2455.010545.000545.000545.00545.000
00667.012333.02333.000000
0545.002455.012455.000545.00545.000
002455.02455.010545.000545.000545.0
0545.000545.000545.012455.02455.000
000545.00545.002455.012455.000545.0
000002333.02333.010667.00
000545.00545.000545.000545.012455.0
000000667.00667.002333.01
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
y
l
l
y
l
k
y
k
l
y
k
k
y
k
j
y
j
k
y
j
j
y
j
i
y
i
j
y
i
i
gq
gq
gq
gq
gq
gq
gq
gq
gq
gq
 
 
Therefore, )(
)(
y
i
i gq  = 0.2180; )(
)(
y
i
j gq  = 0.0679; )(
)(
y
j
i gq  = 0.1859; )(
)(
y
j
j gq  = 0.0358; 
)()( y
j
k gq  = 0.1392; )(
)(
y
k
j gq  = 0.0626; )(
)(
y
k
k gq  = 0.1660; )(
)(
y
k
l gq  = 0.0698; )(
)(
y
l
k gq  = 
0.1804; )(
)(
y
l
l gq  = 0.0843; CSi(gy) =  
2
1859.02180.0
2
1
  = 0.0816; CSj(gy) = 
 20626.00358.00679.0
2
1
  = 0.0138; CSk(gy) =  
2
1804.01660.01392.0
2
1
  = 
0.1179; CSl(gy) =  
2
0843.00698.0
2
1
  = 0.0119; )(
)(
y
i
i g  =  
2
2180.0
2
)5.3(
 = 0.0832; 
)()( y
i
j g  =  
2
0679.0
2
)5.3(
 = 0.0081; )(
)(
y
j
i g  =  
2
1859.0
2
)5.3(
 = 0.0605;  )(
)(
y
j
j g  = 
 20358.0
2
)5.3(
 = 0.0022; )(
)(
y
j
k g  =  
2
1392.0
2
)5.3(
 = 0.0339; )(
)(
y
k
j g  = 
 20626.0
2
)5.3(
 = 0.0069; )(
)(
y
k
k g  =  
2
1660.0
2
)5.3(
 = 0.0482; )(
)(
y
k
l g  = 
 20698.0
2
)5.3(
 = 0.0085; )(
)(
y
l
k g  =  
2
1804.0
2
)5.3(
 = 0.0570; )(
)(
y
l
l g  = 
 20843.0
2
)5.3(
 = 0.0124; PSi(gy) =  
2
0679.02180.0
4
5.1
  = 0.0307; PSj(gy) = 
~
786 
 
 21392.00358.01859.0
4
5.1
  = 0.0488; PSk(gy) =  
2
0698.01660.00626.0
4
5.1
  = 
0.0334; and PSl(gy) =  
2
0843.01804.0
4
5.1
  = 0.0263. 
 
 
Network z 
 
In considering the equations presented in Section 4.2.1.2 it holds that )()( z
i
i gq  = 
)1)(4(2
)()3(2)(2)1(2 )()(



 z
i
jz
j
j gqgq
; )()( z
i
j gq  = )(
)(
z
i
l gq  = 
6103
)()2()()1(~2
2
)()(



 z
i
iz
j
i gqgq ; )()( z
j
i gq  = )(
)(
z
l
i gq  = 
)1)(4(2
)()2()(2)1(2 )(2
)(



 z
j
j
i
j gqgq
; )()( z
j
j gq  = )(
)(
z
l
l gq  = 
)1)(3(2
)()2()()()1(~2 )()()(



 z
j
iz
i
jz
i
i gqgqgq
; )()( z
k
k gq  = 
2

; CSi(gz) = 
 2)()()( )()()(
2
1
z
l
iz
j
iz
i
i gqgqgq  ; CSj(gz) = CSl(gz) =  
2)()( )()(
2
1
z
j
jz
i
j gqgq  ; CSk(gz) = 
 2)( )(
2
1
z
k
k gq ; )(
)(
z
i
i g  =  
2)( )(
2
)2(
z
i
i gq

; )()( z
i
j g  = )(
)(
z
i
l g  =  
2)( )(
2
)2(
z
i
j gq

; 
)()( z
j
i g  = )(
)(
z
l
i g  =  
2)( )(
2
)2(
z
j
i gq

; )()( z
j
j g  = )(
)(
z
l
l g  =  
2)( )(
2
)2(
z
j
j gq

; 
)()( z
k
k g  =  
2)( )(
2
)2(
z
k
k gq

; PSi(gz) =  
2)()()( )()()(
4
z
i
lz
i
jz
i
i gqgqgq 

; PSj(gz) = 
PSl(gz) =  
2)()( )()(
4
z
j
jz
j
i gqgq 

; and PSk(gz) =  
2)( )(
4
z
k
k gq

. 
 
The outputs involved in this network can be obtained by solving the following output 
matrix: 
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
















































































3
~
4
6103
)1(~2
4
)(
)(
)(
)(
1
)1)(3(2
)2(
)1)(3(2)1)(3(2
)1)(4(2
)2(
1
)1)(4(
0
0
6103
1
6103
)2(
)1)(4(
0
)1)(4(
)3(
1
2
)(
)(
)(
)(
22


























z
j
j
z
j
i
z
i
j
z
i
i
gq
gq
gq
gq
 
 
Simulation 11:  = 1, = 0 and  = 0 
 
In this case )()( z
i
j gq  = )(
)(
z
i
l gq = )(
)(
z
j
j gq  = )(
)(
z
l
l gq  = 0. Therefore it holds that )(
)(
z
i
i gq  
= )()( z
j
i gq  = )(
)(
z
l
i gq  = 0.2500; )(
)(
z
k
k gq  = 0.5000; CSi(gz) = 
 22500.02500.02500.0
2
1
  = 0.2813; CSj(gz) = CSl(gz) = 0; CSk(gz) =  
2
5000.0
2
1
 = 
0.1250; )()( z
i
i g  = )(
)(
z
j
i g  = )(
)(
z
l
i g  =  
2
2500.0  = 0.0625; )()( z
k
k g  =  
2
5000.0  = 
0.2500; and PSi(gz) = PSj(gz) = PSk(gz) = PSl(gz) = 0. 
 
Simulation 12:  = 1,  = 0 and  = 0.5 
 
In this case )()( z
i
j gq  = )(
)(
z
i
l gq = )(
)(
z
j
j gq  = )(
)(
z
l
l gq  = 0. Therefore it holds that )(
)(
z
i
i gq  
= )()( z
j
i gq  = )(
)(
z
l
i gq  = 0.2222; )(
)(
z
k
k gq  = 0.4000; CSi(gz) = 
 22222.02222.02222.0
2
1
  = 0.2222; CSj(gz) = CSl(gz) = 0; CSk(gz) =  
2
4000.0
2
1
 = 
0.0800; )()( z
i
i g  = )(
)(
z
j
i g  = )(
)(
z
l
i g  =  
2
2222.0
2
)5.2(
 = 0.0617; )()( z
k
k g  = 
~
~
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 24000.0
2
)5.2(
 = 0.2000; PSi(gz) = PSj(gz) = PSl(gz) =  
2
2222.0
4
5.0
 = 0.0062; and 
PSk(gz) =  
2
4000.0
4
5.0
 = 0.0200. 
 
Simulation 13:  = 1,  = 0 and  = 1.5 
 
In this case )()( z
i
j gq  = )(
)(
z
i
l gq = )(
)(
z
j
j gq  = )(
)(
z
l
l gq  = 0. Therefore it holds that )(
)(
z
i
i gq  
= )()( z
j
i gq  = )(
)(
z
l
i gq  = 0.1818; )(
)(
z
k
k gq  = 0.2857; CSi(gz) = 
 21818.01818.01818.0
2
1
  = 0.1487; CSj(gz) = CSl(gz) = 0; CSk(gz) =  
2
2857.0
2
1
 = 
0.0408; )()( z
i
i g  = )(
)(
z
j
i g  = )(
)(
z
l
i g  =   
2
1818.0
2
)5.3(
 = 0.0578; )()( z
k
k g  = 
 22857.0
2
)5.3(
 = 0.1428; PSi(gz) = PSj(gz) = PSl(gz) =  
2
1818.0
4
5.1
 = 0.0124; and 
PSk(gz) =  
2
2857.0
4
5.1
 = 0.0306. 
 
Simulation 14:  = 1,  = 0.5 and  = 0 
 
In this case the output matrix is given by: 
 










































1667.0
2500.0
1667.0
2500.0
)(
)(
)(
)(
1000
0100
0010
0001
)(
)(
)(
)(
z
j
j
z
j
i
z
i
j
z
i
i
gq
gq
gq
gq
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Therefore, )()( z
i
i gq  = )(
)(
z
j
i gq  = )(
)(
z
l
i gq  = 0.2500; )(
)(
z
i
j gq  = )(
)(
z
i
l gq  = )(
)(
z
j
j gq  = 
)()( z
l
l gq  = 0.1667; )(
)(
z
k
k gq  = 0.5000; CSi(gz) =  
2
2500.02500.02500.0
2
1
  = 0.2813; 
CSj(gz) = CSl(gz) =  
2
1667.01667.0
2
1
  = 0.0556; CSk(gz) =  
2
5000.0
2
1
 = 0.1250; 
)()( z
i
i g  = )(
)(
z
j
i g  = )(
)(
z
l
i g  =  
2
2500.0  = 0.0625; )(
)(
z
i
j g  = )(
)(
z
i
l g  = )(
)(
z
j
j g  = 
)()( z
l
l g  =  
2
1667.0  = 0.0278; )()( z
k
k g  =  
2
5000.0  = 0.2500; and PSi(gz) = PSj(gz) = 
PSk(gz) = PSl(gz) = 0. 
 
Simulation 15:  = 1,  = 0.5 and  = 0.5 
 
In this case the output matrix is given by: 
 














































1429.0
2222.0
1277.0
2222.0
)(
)(
)(
)(
11190.00476.00476.0
0926.010741.00
00426.011064.0
0741.002593.01
)(
)(
)(
)(
z
j
j
z
j
i
z
i
j
z
i
i
gq
gq
gq
gq
 
 
Therefore, )()( z
i
i gq  = 0.2020; )(
)(
z
i
j gq  = )(
)(
z
i
l gq  = 0.1155; )(
)(
z
j
i gq  = )(
)(
z
l
i gq  = 
0.2185; )()( z
j
j gq  = )(
)(
z
l
l gq  = 0.1320; )(
)(
z
k
k gq  = 0.4000; CSi(gz) = 
 22185.02185.02020.0
2
1
  = 0.2042; CSj(gz) = CSl(gz) =  
2
1320.01155.0
2
1
  = 
0.0306; CSk(gz) =  
2
4000.0
2
1
 = 0.0800; )()( z
i
i g  =  
2
2020.0
2
)5.2(
 = 0.0510; )()( z
i
j g  = 
)()( z
i
l g  =  
2
1155.0
2
)5.2(
 = 0.0167; )()( z
j
i g  = )(
)(
z
l
i g  =  
2
2185.0
2
)5.2(
 = 0.0597; 
)()( z
j
j g  = )(
)(
z
l
l g  =  
2
1320.0
2
)5.2(
 = 0.0218; )()( z
k
k g  =  
2
4000.0
2
)5.2(
 = 0.2000; 
~
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PSi(gz) =  
2
1155.01155.02020.0
4
5.0
  = 0.0234; PSj(gz) = PSl(gz) = 
 21320.02185.0
4
5.0
  = 0.0154; and PSk(gz) =  
2
4000.0
4
5.0
 = 0.0200. 
 
Simulation 16:  = 1,  = 0.5 and  = 1.5 
 
In this case the output matrix is given by: 
 














































1111.0
1818.0
0901.0
1818.0
)(
)(
)(
)(
12333.00667.00667.0
1909.011091.00
00541.011892.0
1091.004909.01
)(
)(
)(
)(
z
j
j
z
j
i
z
i
j
z
i
i
gq
gq
gq
gq
 
 
Therefore, )()( z
i
i gq  = 0.1569; )(
)(
z
i
j gq  = )(
)(
z
i
l gq  = 0.0698; )(
)(
z
j
i gq  = )(
)(
z
l
i gq  = 
0.1730; )()( z
j
j gq  = )(
)(
z
l
l gq  = 0.0859; )(
)(
z
k
k gq  = 0.2857; CSi(gz) = 
 21730.01730.01569.0
2
1
  = 0.1265; CSj(gz) = CSl(gz) =  
2
0859.00698.0
2
1
  = 
0.0121; CSk(gz) =  
2
2857.0
2
1
 = 0.0408; )()( z
i
i g  =  
2
1569.0
2
)5.3(
 = 0.0431; )()( z
i
j g  = 
)()( z
i
l g  =  
2
0698.0
2
)5.3(
 = 0.0085; )()( z
j
i g  = )(
)(
z
l
i g  =  
2
1730.0
2
)5.3(
 = 0.0524; 
)()( z
j
j g  = )(
)(
z
l
l g  =  
2
0859.0
2
)5.3(
 = 0.0129; )()( z
k
k g  =  
2
2857.0
2
)5.3(
 = 0.1428; 
PSi(gz) =  
2
0698.00698.01569.0
4
5.1
  = 0.0330; PSj(gz) = PSl(gz) = 
 20859.01730.0
4
5.1
  = 0.0251; and PSk(gz) =  
2
2857.0
4
5.1
 = 0.0306. 
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Network a’ 
 
In considering the equations presented in Section 4.2.1.2 it holds that )( '
)(
a
i
i gq  = 
)( '
)(
a
k
k gq  = 
)1)(3(2
)()2()()()1(2 '
)(
'
)(
'
)(



 a
i
ja
j
ia
j
j gqgqgq
; )( '
)(
a
i
j gq  = )( '
)(
a
k
j gq  = 
)1)(4(2
)()2()(2)1(~2 '
)(
'
)(



 a
i
ia
j
i gqgq ; )( '
)(
a
j
i gq  = )( '
)(
a
j
k gq  = 
6103
)()2()()1(2
2
'
)(
'
)(



 a
j
ja
i
j gqgq
; )( '
)(
a
j
j gq  = 
)1)(4(2
)()3(2)(2)1(~2 '
)(
'
)(



 a
j
ia
i
i gqgq ; )( '
)(
a
l
l gq  = 
2
~


; CSi(ga’) = CSk(ga’) = 
 2')(')( )()(
2
1
a
j
ia
i
i gqgq  ; CSj(ga’) =  
2
'
)(
'
)(
'
)( )()()(
2
1
a
k
ja
j
ja
i
j gqgqgq  ; CSl(ga’) = 
 2')( )(
2
1
a
l
l gq ; )( '
)(
a
i
i g  = )( '
)(
a
k
k g  =  
2
'
)( )(
2
)2(
a
i
i gq

; )( '
)(
a
i
j g  = )( '
)(
a
k
j g  = 
 2')( )(
2
)2(
a
i
j gq

; )( '
)(
a
j
i g  = )( '
)(
a
j
k g  =  
2
'
)( )(
2
)2(
a
j
i gq

; )( '
)(
a
j
j g  = 
 2')( )(
2
)2(
a
j
j gq

; )( '
)(
a
l
l g  =  
2
'
)( )(
2
)2(
a
l
l gq

; PSi(ga’) = PSk(ga’) = 
 2')(')( )()(
4
a
i
ja
i
i gqgq 

; PSj(ga’) =  
2
'
)(
'
)(
'
)( )()()(
4
a
j
ka
j
ja
j
i gqgqgq 

; and PSl(ga’) = 
 2')( )(
4
a
l
l gq

. 
 
The outputs involved in this network can be obtained by solving the following output 
matrix: 
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
















































































4
~
6103
)1(2
4
~
3
)(
)(
)(
)(
1
)1)(4(
)3(
0
)1)(4(
6103
)2(
1
6103
0
0
)1)(4(
1
)1)(4(2
)2(
)1)(3(2)1)(3(2)1)(3(2
)2(
1
2
'
)(
'
)(
'
)(
'
)(
22


























a
j
j
a
j
i
a
i
j
a
i
i
gq
gq
gq
gq
 
 
Simulation 11:  = 1, = 0 and  = 0 
 
In this case )( '
)(
a
i
j gq  = )( '
)(
a
j
j gq  = )( '
)(
a
k
j gq = )( '
)(
a
l
l gq  = 0. Therefore it holds that 
)( '
)(
a
i
i gq  = )( '
)(
a
j
i gq  = )( '
)(
a
j
k gq  = )( '
)(
a
k
k gq  = 0.3333; CSi(ga’) = CSk(ga’) = 
 23333.03333.0
2
1
  = 0.2222; CSj(ga’) = CSl(ga’) = 0; )( '
)(
a
i
i g  = )( '
)(
a
j
i g  = )( '
)(
a
j
k g  
= )( '
)(
a
k
k g  =  
2
3333.0  = 0.1111; and PSi(ga’) = PSj(ga’) = PSk(ga’) = PSl(ga’) = 0. 
 
Simulation 12:  = 1,  = 0 and  = 0.5 
 
In this case )( '
)(
a
i
j gq  = )( '
)(
a
j
j gq  = )( '
)(
a
k
j gq = )( '
)(
a
l
l gq  = 0. Therefore it holds that 
)( '
)(
a
i
i gq  = )( '
)(
a
k
k gq  = 0.2979; )( '
)(
a
j
i gq  = )( '
)(
a
j
k gq  = 0.2553; CSi(ga’) = CSk(ga’) = 
 22553.02979.0
2
1
  = 0.1530; CSj(ga’) = CSl(ga’) = 0; )( '
)(
a
i
i g  = )( '
)(
a
k
k g  = 
 22979.0
2
)5.2(
 = 0.1109; )( '
)(
a
j
i g  = )( '
)(
a
j
k g  =  
2
2553.0
2
)5.2(
 = 0.0815; PSi(ga’) = 
PSk(ga’) =  
2
2979.0
4
5.0
 = 0.0111; PSj(ga’) =  
2
2553.02553.0
4
5.0
  = 0.0323; and 
PSl(ga’) = 0. 
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Simulation 13:  = 1,  = 0 and  = 1.5 
 
In this case )( '
)(
a
i
j gq  = )( '
)(
a
j
j gq  = )( '
)(
a
k
j gq = )( '
)(
a
l
l gq  = 0. Therefore it holds that 
)( '
)(
a
i
i gq  = )( '
)(
a
k
k gq  = 0.2342; )( '
)(
a
j
i gq  = )( '
)(
a
j
k gq  = 0.1802; CSi(ga’) = CSk(ga’) = 
 21802.02342.0
2
1
  = 0.0859; CSj(ga’) = CSl(ga’) = 0; )( '
)(
a
i
i g  = )( '
)(
a
k
k g  = 
 22342.0
2
)5.3(
 = 0.0960; )( '
)(
a
j
i g  = )( '
)(
a
j
k g  =  
2
1802.0
2
)5.3(
 = 0.0568; PSi(ga’) = 
PSk(ga’) =  
2
2342.0
4
5.1
 = 0.0206; PSj(ga’) =  
2
1802.01802.0
4
5.1
  = 0.0487; and 
PSl(ga’) = 0. 
 
Simulation 14:  = 1,  = 0.5 and  = 0 
 
In this case the output matrix is given by: 
 










































125.0
3333.0
1250.0
3333.0
)(
)(
)(
)(
1000
0100
0010
0001
'
)(
'
)(
'
)(
'
)(
a
j
j
a
j
i
a
i
j
a
i
i
gq
gq
gq
gq
 
 
Therefore, )( '
)(
a
i
i gq  = )( '
)(
a
k
k gq  = )( '
)(
a
j
i gq  = )( '
)(
a
j
k gq  = 0.3333; )( '
)(
a
i
j gq  = )( '
)(
a
k
j gq  = 
)( '
)(
a
j
j gq  = 0.1250; )( '
)(
a
l
l gq  = 0.2500; CSi(ga’) = CSk(ga’) =  
2
3333.03333.0
2
1
  = 
0.2222; CSj(ga’) =  
2
1250.01250.01250.0
2
1
  = 0.0703; CSl(ga’) =  
2
2500.0
2
1
 = 
0.0313; )( '
)(
a
i
i g  = )( '
)(
a
k
k g  = )( '
)(
a
j
i g  = )( '
)(
a
j
k g  =  
2
3333.0  = 0.1111; )( '
)(
a
i
j g  = 
~
~
794 
 
)( '
)(
a
k
j g  = )( '
)(
a
j
j g  =  
2
1250.0  = 0.0156; )( '
)(
a
l
l g  =  
2
2500.0  = 0.0625; and PSi(ga’) 
= PSj(ga’) = PSk(ga’) = PSl(ga’) = 0. 
 
Simulation 15:  = 1,  = 0.5 and  = 0.5 
 
In this case the output matrix is given by: 
 














































1111.0
2553.0
1111.0
2857.0
)(
)(
)(
)(
12593.000741.0
1064.010426.00
00741.010926.0
0476.00476.01190.01
'
)(
'
)(
'
)(
'
)(
a
j
j
a
j
i
a
i
j
a
i
i
gq
gq
gq
gq
 
  
Therefore, )( '
)(
a
i
i gq  = )( '
)(
a
k
k gq  = 0.2886; )( '
)(
a
i
j gq  = )( '
)(
a
k
j gq  = 0.1031; )( '
)(
a
j
i gq  = 
)( '
)(
a
j
k gq  = 0.2526; )( '
)(
a
j
j gq  = 0.0670;  )( '
)(
a
l
l gq  = 0.2000; CSi(ga’) = CSk(ga’) = 
 22526.02886.0
2
1
  = 0.1464; CSj(ga’) =  
2
1031.00670.01031.0
2
1
  = 0.0373; 
CSl(ga’) =  
2
2000.0
2
1
 = 0.0200; )( '
)(
a
i
i g  = )( '
)(
a
k
k g  =  
2
2886.0
2
)5.2(
 = 0.1041; 
)( '
)(
a
i
j g  = )( '
)(
a
k
j g  =  
2
1031.0
2
)5.2(
 = 0.0133; )( '
)(
a
j
i g  = )( '
)(
a
j
k g  =  
2
2526.0
2
)5.2(
 
= 0.0798; )( '
)(
a
j
j g  =  
2
0670.0
2
)5.2(
 = 0.0056; )( '
)(
a
l
l g  =  
2
2000.0
2
)5.2(
 = 0.0500; 
PSi(ga’) = PSk(ga’) =  
2
1031.02886.0
4
5.0
  = 0.0192; PSj(ga’) = 
 22526.00670.02526.0
4
5.0
  = 0.0409; and PSl(ga’) =  
2
2000.0
4
5.0
 = 0.0050. 
 
 
 
~
795 
 
Simulation 16:  = 1,  = 0.5 and  = 1.5 
 
In this case the output matrix is given by: 
 














































0909.0
1802.0
0909.0
2222.0
)(
)(
)(
)(
14909.000667.0
1892.010541.00
00667.011909.0
0667.00667.02333.01
'
)(
'
)(
'
)(
'
)(
a
j
j
a
j
i
a
i
j
a
i
i
gq
gq
gq
gq
 
 
Therefore, )( '
)(
a
i
i gq  = )( '
)(
a
k
k gq  = 0.2212; )( '
)(
a
i
j gq  = )( '
)(
a
k
j gq  = 0.0607; )( '
)(
a
j
i gq  = 
)( '
)(
a
j
k gq  = 0.1802; )( '
)(
a
j
j gq  = 0.0172; )( '
)(
a
l
l gq  = 0.1429; CSi(ga’) = CSk(ga’) = 
 21802.02212.0
2
1
  = 0.0806; CSj(ga’) =  
2
0607.00172.00607.0
2
1
  = 0.0096; 
CSl(ga’) =  
2
1429.0
2
1
 = 0.0102; )( '
)(
a
i
i g  = )( '
)(
a
k
k g  =  
2
2212.0
2
)5.3(
 = 0.0856; 
)( '
)(
a
i
j g  = )( '
)(
a
k
j g  =  
2
0607.0
2
)5.3(
 = 0.0064; )( '
)(
a
j
i g  = )( '
)(
a
j
k g  =  
2
1802.0
2
)5.3(
 
= 0.0568; )( '
)(
a
j
j g  =  
2
0172.0
2
)5.3(
 = 0.0005; )( '
)(
a
l
l g  =  
2
1429.0
2
)5.3(
 = 0.0357; 
PSi(ga’) = PSk(ga’) =  
2
0607.02212.0
4
5.1
  = 0.0298; PSj(ga’) = 
 21802.00172.01802.0
4
5.1
  = 0.0535; and PSl(ga’) =  
2
1429.0
4
5.1
 = 0.0077. 
 
Network b’ 
 
In considering the equations presented in Section 4.2.1.2 it holds that )( '
)(
b
i
i gq  = 
)( '
)(
b
k
k gq  = 
)1)(3(2
)()2()()1(2 '
)(
'
)(



 b
i
jb
j
j gqgq
; )( '
)(
b
i
j gq  = )( '
)(
b
k
l gq  = 
~
796 
 
)1)(3(2
)()2()()1(~2 '
)(
'
)(



 b
i
ib
j
i gqgq ; )( '
)(
b
j
i gq  = )( '
)(
b
l
k gq  = 
)1)(3(2
)()2()()1(2 '
)(
'
)(



 b
j
jb
i
j gqgq
; )( '
)(
b
j
j gq  = )( '
)(
b
l
l gq  = 
)1)(3(2
)()2()()1(~2 '
)(
'
)(



 b
j
ib
i
i gqgq ; CSi(gb’) = CSk(gb’) =  
2
'
)(
'
)( )()(
2
1
b
j
ib
i
i gqgq  ; 
CSj(gb’) = CSl(gb’) =  
2
'
)(
'
)( )()(
2
1
b
j
jb
i
j gqgq  ; )( '
)(
b
i
i g  = )( '
)(
b
k
k g  =  
2
'
)( )(
2
)2(
b
i
i gq

; 
)( '
)(
b
i
j g  = )( '
)(
b
k
l g  =  
2
'
)( )(
2
)2(
b
i
j gq

; )( '
)(
b
j
i g  = )( '
)(
b
l
k g  =  
2
'
)( )(
2
)2(
b
j
i gq

; 
)( '
)(
b
j
j g  = )( '
)(
b
l
l g  =  
2
'
)( )(
2
)2(
b
j
j gq

; PSi(gb’) = PSk(gb’) =  
2
'
)(
'
)( )()(
4
b
i
jb
i
i gqgq 

; 
and PSj(gb’) = PSl(gb’) =  
2
'
)(
'
)( )()(
4
b
j
jb
j
i gqgq 

. 
 
The outputs involved in this network can be obtained by solving the following output 
matrix: 
 














































































3
~
3
3
~
3
)(
)(
)(
)(
1
)1)(3(2
)2(
0
)1)(3(2
)1)(3(2
)2(
1
)1)(3(2
0
0
)1)(3(2
1
)1)(3(2
)2(
)1)(3(2
0
)1)(3(2
)2(
1
'
)(
'
)(
'
)(
'
)(
























b
j
j
b
j
i
b
i
j
b
i
i
gq
gq
gq
gq
 
 
Simulation 11:  = 1, = 0 and  = 0 
 
In this case )( '
)(
b
i
j gq  = )( '
)(
b
j
j gq  = )( '
)(
b
k
l gq = )( '
)(
b
l
l gq  = 0. Therefore it holds that 
)( '
)(
b
i
i gq  = )( '
)(
b
j
i gq  = )( '
)(
b
k
k gq  = )( '
)(
b
l
k gq  = 0.3333; CSi(gb’) = CSk(gb’) = 
~
797 
 
 23333.03333.0
2
1
  = 0.2222; CSj(gb’) = CSl(gb’) = 0; )( '
)(
b
i
i g  = )( '
)(
b
j
i g  = )( '
)(
b
k
k g  
= )( '
)(
b
l
k g  =  
2
3333.0  = 0.1111; and PSi(gb’) = PSj(gb’) = PSk(gb’) = PSl(gb’) = 0. 
 
Simulation 12:  = 1,  = 0 and  = 0.5 
 
In this case )( '
)(
b
i
j gq  = )( '
)(
b
j
j gq  = )( '
)(
b
k
l gq = )( '
)(
b
l
l gq  = 0. Therefore it holds that 
)( '
)(
b
i
i gq  = )( '
)(
b
j
i gq  = )( '
)(
b
k
k gq  = )( '
)(
b
l
k gq  = 0.2857; CSi(gb’) = CSk(gb’) = 
 22857.02857.0
2
1
  = 0.1632; CSj(gb’) = CSl(gb’) = 0; )( '
)(
b
i
i g  = )( '
)(
b
j
i g  = )( '
)(
b
k
k g  
= )( '
)(
b
l
k g  =  
2
2857.0
2
)5.2(
 = 0.1020; and PSi(gb’) = PSj(gb’) = PSk(gb’) = PSl(gb’) = 
 22857.0
4
5.0
 = 0.0102. 
 
Simulation 13:  = 1,  = 0 and  = 1.5 
 
In this case )( '
)(
b
i
j gq  = )( '
)(
b
j
j gq  = )( '
)(
b
k
l gq = )( '
)(
b
l
l gq  = 0. Therefore it holds that 
)( '
)(
b
i
i gq  = )( '
)(
b
j
i gq  = )( '
)(
b
k
k gq  = )( '
)(
b
l
k gq  = 0.2222; CSi(gb’) = CSk(gb’) = 
 22222.02222.0
2
1
  = 0.0988; CSj(gb’) = CSl(gb’) = 0; )( '
)(
b
i
i g  = )( '
)(
b
j
i g  = )( '
)(
b
k
k g  
= )( '
)(
b
l
k g  =  
2
2222.0
2
)5.3(
 = 0.0864; and PSi(gb’) = PSj(gb’) = PSk(gb’) = PSl(gb’) = 
 22222.0
4
5.1
 = 0.0185. 
 
 
 
~
~
798 
 
Simulation 14:  = 1,  = 0.5 and  = 0 
 
In this case the output matrix is given by: 
 










































1667.0
3333.0
1667.0
3333.0
)(
)(
)(
)(
1000
0100
0010
0001
'
)(
'
)(
'
)(
'
)(
b
j
j
b
j
i
b
i
j
b
i
i
gq
gq
gq
gq
 
 
Therefore, )( '
)(
b
i
i gq  = )( '
)(
b
k
k gq  = )( '
)(
b
j
i gq  = )( '
)(
b
l
k gq  = 0.3333; )( '
)(
b
i
j gq  = )( '
)(
b
k
l gq  = 
)( '
)(
b
j
j gq  = )( '
)(
b
l
l gq  = 0.1667; CSi(gb’) = CSk(gb’) =  
2
3333.03333.0
2
1
  = 0.2222; 
CSj(gb’) = CSl(gb’) =  
2
1667.01667.0
2
1
  = 0.0056; )( '
)(
b
i
i g  = )( '
)(
b
k
k g  = )( '
)(
b
j
i g  = 
)( '
)(
b
l
k g  =  
2
3333.0  = 0.1111; )( '
)(
b
i
j g  = )( '
)(
b
k
l g  = )( '
)(
b
j
j g  = )( '
)(
b
l
l g  =  
2
1667.0  
= 0.0278; and PSi(gb’) = PSj(gb’) = PSk(gb’) = PSl(gb’) = 0. 
 
Simulation 15:  = 1,  = 0.5 and  = 0.5 
 
In this case the output matrix is given by: 
 














































1429.0
2857.0
1429.0
2857.0
)(
)(
)(
)(
11190.000476.0
1190.010476.00
00476.011190.0
0476.001190.01
'
)(
'
)(
'
)(
'
)(
b
j
j
b
j
i
b
i
j
b
i
i
gq
gq
gq
gq
 
 
~
~
799 
 
Therefore, )( '
)(
b
i
i gq  = )( '
)(
b
k
k gq  = )( '
)(
b
j
i gq  = )( '
)(
b
l
k gq  = 0.2769; )( '
)(
b
i
j gq  = )( '
)(
b
k
l gq  = 
)( '
)(
b
j
j gq  = )( '
)(
b
l
l gq  = 0.1231; CSi(gb’) = CSk(gb’) =  
2
2769.02769.0
2
1
  = 0.1533; 
CSj(gb’) = CSl(gb’) =  
2
1231.01231.0
2
1
  = 0.0303; )( '
)(
b
i
i g  = )( '
)(
b
k
k g  = )( '
)(
b
j
i g  = 
)( '
)(
b
l
k g  =  
2
2769.0
2
)5.2(
 = 0.0958; )( '
)(
b
i
j g  = )( '
)(
b
k
l g  = )( '
)(
b
j
j g  = )( '
)(
b
l
l g  = 
 21231.0
2
)5.2(
 = 0.0189; PSi(gb’) = PSj(gb’) = PSk(gb’) = PSl(gb’) = 
 21231.02769.0
4
5.0
  = 0.0200. 
 
Simulation 16:  = 1,  = 0.5 and  = 1.5 
 
In this case the output matrix is given by: 
 














































1111.0
2222.0
1111.0
2222.0
)(
)(
)(
)(
12333.000667.0
2333.010667.00
00667.012333.0
0667.002333.01
'
)(
'
)(
'
)(
'
)(
b
j
j
b
j
i
b
i
j
b
i
i
gq
gq
gq
gq
 
 
Therefore, )( '
)(
b
i
i gq  = )( '
)(
b
k
k gq  = )( '
)(
b
j
i gq  = )( '
)(
b
l
k gq  = 0.2095; )( '
)(
b
i
j gq  = )( '
)(
b
k
l gq  = 
)( '
)(
b
j
j gq  = )( '
)(
b
l
l gq  = 0.0762; CSi(gb’) = CSk(gb’) =  
2
2095.02095.0
2
1
  = 0.0878; 
CSj(gb’) = CSl(gb’) =  
2
0762.00762.0
2
1
  = 0.0116; )( '
)(
b
i
i g  = )( '
)(
b
k
k g  = )( '
)(
b
j
i g  = 
)( '
)(
b
l
k g  =  
2
2095.0
2
)5.3(
 = 0.0768; )( '
)(
b
i
j g  = )( '
)(
b
k
l g  = )( '
)(
b
j
j g  = )( '
)(
b
l
l g  = 
~
800 
 
 20762.0
2
)5.3(
 = 0.0102; and PSi(gb’) = PSj(gb’) = PSk(gb’) = PSl(gb’) = 
 20762.02095.0
4
5.1
  = 0.0306. 
 
Network c’ 
 
In considering the equations presented in Section 4.2.1.2 it holds that )( '
)(
c
i
i gq  = 
)( '
)(
c
i
k gq  = )( '
)(
c
k
i gq  = )( '
)(
c
k
k gq  = 
693
)1(2
2 



; )( '
)(
c
j
j gq  = )( '
)(
c
j
l gq  = )( '
)(
c
l
j gq  = 
)( '
)(
c
l
l gq  = 
693
)1(~2
2 



; CSi(gc’) = CSk(gc’) =  
2
'
)(
'
)( )()(
2
1
c
k
ic
i
i gqgq  ; CSj(gc’) = CSl(gc’) 
=  2')(')( )()(
2
1
c
l
jc
j
j gqgq  ; )( '
)(
c
i
i g  = )( '
)(
c
i
k g  = )( '
)(
c
k
i g  = )( '
)(
c
k
k g  = 
 2')( )(
2
)2(
c
i
i gq

; )( '
)(
c
j
j g  = )( '
)(
c
j
l g  = )( '
)(
c
l
j g  = )( '
)(
c
l
l g  =  
2
'
)( )(
2
)2(
c
j
j gq

; 
PSi(gc’) = PSk(gc’) =  
2
'
)(
'
)( )()(
4
c
i
kc
i
i gqgq 

; and PSj(gc’) = PSl(gc’) = 
 2')(')( )()(
4
c
j
lc
j
j gqgq 

. 
 
Simulation 11:  = 1, = 0 and  = 0 
 
In this case )( '
)(
c
j
j gq  = )( '
)(
c
j
l gq  = )( '
)(
c
l
j gq = )( '
)(
c
l
l gq  = 0. Therefore )( '
)(
c
i
i gq  = 
)( '
)(
c
i
k gq  = )( '
)(
c
k
i gq  = )( '
)(
c
k
k gq  = 0.3333; CSi(gc’) = CSk(gc’) =  
2
3333.03333.0
2
1
  = 
0.2222; CSj(gc’) = CSl(gc’) = 0; )( '
)(
c
i
i g  = )( '
)(
c
i
k g  = )( '
)(
c
k
i g  = )( '
)(
c
k
k g  =  
2
3333.0  
= 0.1111; and PSi(gc’) = PSj(gc’) = PSk(gc’) = PSl(gc’) = 0. 
 
~
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Simulation 12:  = 1,  = 0 and  = 0.5 
 
In this case )( '
)(
c
j
j gq  = )( '
)(
c
j
l gq  = )( '
)(
c
l
j gq = )( '
)(
c
l
l gq  = 0. Therefore )( '
)(
c
i
i gq  = 
)( '
)(
c
i
k gq  = )( '
)(
c
k
i gq  = )( '
)(
c
k
k gq  = 0.2667; CSi(gc’) = CSk(gc’) =  
2
2667.02667.0
2
1
  = 
0.1423; CSj(gc’) = CSl(gc’) = 0; )( '
)(
c
i
i g  = )( '
)(
c
i
k g  = )( '
)(
c
k
i g  = )( '
)(
c
k
k g  = 
 22667.0
2
)5.2(
 = 0.0889; PSi(gc’) = PSk(gc’) =  
2
2667.02667.0
4
5.0
  = 0.0356; and 
PSj(gc’) = PSl(gc’) = 0. 
 
Simulation 13:  = 1,  = 0 and  = 1.5 
 
In this case )( '
)(
c
j
j gq  = )( '
)(
c
j
l gq  = )( '
)(
c
l
j gq = )( '
)(
c
l
l gq  = 0. Therefore )( '
)(
c
i
i gq  = 
)( '
)(
c
i
k gq  = )( '
)(
c
k
i gq  = )( '
)(
c
k
k gq  = 0.1905; CSi(gc’) = CSk(gc’) =  
2
1905.01905.0
2
1
  = 
0.0726; CSj(gc’) = CSl(gc’) = 0; )( '
)(
c
i
i g  = )( '
)(
c
i
k g  = )( '
)(
c
k
i g  = )( '
)(
c
k
k g  = 
 21905.0
2
)5.3(
 = 0.0635; PSi(gc’) = PSk(gc’) =  
2
1905.01905.0
4
5.1
  = 0.0544; and 
PSj(gc’) = PSl(gc’) = 0. 
 
Simulation 14:  = 1,  = 0.5 and  = 0 
 
In this case it holds that )( '
)(
c
i
i gq  = )( '
)(
c
i
k gq  = )( '
)(
c
k
i gq  = )( '
)(
c
k
k gq  = 0.3333; )( '
)(
c
j
j gq  = 
)( '
)(
c
j
l gq  = )( '
)(
c
l
j gq  = )( '
)(
c
l
l gq  = 0.1667; CSi(gc’) = CSk(gc’) =  
2
3333.03333.0
2
1
  = 
0.2222; CSj(gc’) = CSl(gc’) =  
2
1667.01667.0
2
1
  = 0.0556; )( '
)(
c
i
i g  = )( '
)(
c
i
k g  = 
~
~
~
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)( '
)(
c
k
i g  = )( '
)(
c
k
k g  =  
2
3333.0  = 0.1111; )( '
)(
c
j
j g  = )( '
)(
c
j
l g  = )( '
)(
c
l
j g  = )( '
)(
c
l
l g  
=  21667.0  = 0.0278; PSi(gc’) = PSj(gc’) = PSk(gc’) = PSl(gc’) = 0. 
 
Simulation 15:  = 1,  = 0.5 and  = 0.5 
 
In this case it holds that )( '
)(
c
i
i gq  = )( '
)(
c
i
k gq  = )( '
)(
c
k
i gq  = )( '
)(
c
k
k gq  = 0.2667; )( '
)(
c
j
j gq  = 
)( '
)(
c
j
l gq  = )( '
)(
c
l
j gq  = )( '
)(
c
l
l gq  = 0.1333; CSi(gc’) = CSk(gc’) =  
2
2667.02667.0
2
1
  = 
0.1423; CSj(gc’) = CSl(gc’) =  
2
1333.01333.0
2
1
  = 0.0355; )( '
)(
c
i
i g  = )( '
)(
c
i
k g  = 
)( '
)(
c
k
i g  = )( '
)(
c
k
k g  =  
2
2667.0
2
)5.2(
 = 0.0889; )( '
)(
c
j
j g  = )( '
)(
c
j
l g  = )( '
)(
c
l
j g  = 
)( '
)(
c
l
l g  =  
2
1333.0
2
)5.2(
 = 0.0222; PSi(gc’) = PSk(gc’) =  
2
2667.02667.0
4
5.0
  = 
0.0356; and PSj(gc’) = PSl(gc’) =  
2
1333.01333.0
4
5.0
  = 0.0089. 
 
Simulation 16:  = 1,  = 0.5 and  = 1.5 
 
In this case it holds that )( '
)(
c
i
i gq  = )( '
)(
c
i
k gq  = )( '
)(
c
k
i gq  = )( '
)(
c
k
k gq  = 0.1905; )( '
)(
c
j
j gq  = 
)( '
)(
c
j
l gq  = )( '
)(
c
l
j gq  = )( '
)(
c
l
l gq  = 0.0952; CSi(gc’) = CSk(gc’) =  
2
1905.01905.0
2
1
  = 
0.0726; CSj(gc’) = CSl(gc’) =  
2
0952.00952.0
2
1
  = 0.0181; )( '
)(
c
i
i g  = )( '
)(
c
i
k g  = 
)( '
)(
c
k
i g  = )( '
)(
c
k
k g  =  
2
1905.0
2
)5.3(
 = 0.0635; )( '
)(
c
j
j g  = )( '
)(
c
j
l g  = )( '
)(
c
l
j g  = 
~
~
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)( '
)(
c
l
l g  =  
2
0952.0
2
)5.3(
 = 0.0159; PSi(gc’) = PSk(gc’) =  
2
1905.01905.0
4
5.1
  = 
0.0544; and PSj(gc’) = PSl(gc’) =  
2
0952.00952.0
4
5.1
  = 0.0136. 
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APPENDIX D 
 
Simulations for the case of asymmetric countries in terms of farmers’ 
productivity 
 
Network a 
 
In considering the equations presented in Section 4.2.1.3, the following results are obtained: 
2857.0)()( )()(  a
k
ka
i
i gqgq ; and 4000.0)()(
)()(  a
l
la
j
j gqgq . Therefore CSi(ga) = CSk(ga) 
=  22857.0
2
1
 = 0.0408; CSj(ga) = CSl(ga) = 0.0800; )( ai g  = )( ak g  =  
2
4000.0
2
)5.4(
 = 
0.1837; )( aj g  = )( al g  =  
2
4000.0
2
)5.4(
 = 0.2000; PSi(ga) = PSk(ga) =   
2
2857.0
4
5.1
 = 
0.0306; PSj(ga) = PSl(ga) =  
2
4000.0
4
5.0
 = 0.0200; )( ai gW  = )( ak gW  = 0.2551; )( aj gW  = 
)( al gW  = 0.3000.  
 
Network b 
 
In considering the equations presented in Section 4.2.1.3, the following results are obtained: 
 
)(0323.0)(2419.01935.0)( )()()( b
j
jb
i
jb
i
i gqgqgq    
)(0323.0)(2419.01935.0)( )()()( b
j
ib
i
ib
i
j gqgqgq   
)(1129.0)(0968.03226.0)( )()()( b
j
jb
i
jb
j
i gqgqgq    
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)(1129.0)(0968.03226.0)( )()()( a
j
ia
i
ia
j
j gqgqgq   
4000.0)()( a
k
k gq   
1600.0)()( a
l
l gq  
 
Solving by substitution, the following expressions are obtained:  
 
)()( b
i
i gq  = )(
)(
b
i
j gq  
= 0.1637; )()( b
j
i gq  = )(
)(
b
j
j gq  
= 0.3041; )()( b
k
k gq  = 0.2857; )(
)(
b
l
l gq  
= 
0.4000; )( bi gCS  = )( bj gCS  = 0.1094; )( bk gCS  = 0.0408; )( bl gCS  = 0.0800; )(
)(
b
i
i g  = 
)()( b
i
j g  
= 0.0603; )()( b
j
i g  = )(
)(
b
j
j g  
= 0.1156; )()( b
k
k g  = 0.1837; )(
)(
b
l
l g  
= 0.2000; 
)( bi gPS  = 0.0402; )( bj gPS  = 0.0462; )( bk gPS  = 0.0306; )( bl gPS  = 0.0200; )( bi gW  = 
0.2703; )( bj gW  = 0.3869; )( bk gW  = 0.2551; and )( bl gW  = 0.3000.  
 
Network c 
 
In considering the equations presented in Section 4.2.1.3, the following results are obtained: 
 
)(0667.0)(2333.02222.0)( )()()( c
k
kc
i
kc
i
i gqgqgq    
)(0667.0)(2333.02222.0)( )()()( c
k
ic
i
ic
i
k gqgqgq    
4000.0)()( c
j
j gq  
)(2333.0)(0667.02222.0)( )()()( c
k
kc
i
kc
k
i gqgqgq    
)(2333.0)(0667.02222.0)( )()()( c
k
ic
i
ic
k
k gqgqgq    
4000.0)()( c
l
l gq  
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Solving by substitution, the following expressions are obtained:  
 
)()( c
i
i gq  = )(
)(
c
i
k gq  = )(
)(
c
k
i gq  = )(
)(
c
k
k gq  = 0.1905; )(
)(
c
j
j gq  
= )()( c
l
l gq  = 0.4000; 
)( ci gCS  = )( ck gCS  = 0.0726; )( cj gCS  = )( cl gCS  = 0.0800; )(
)(
c
i
i g  = )(
)(
c
i
k g  = 
)()( c
k
i g  = )(
)(
c
k
k g  = 0.0816; )(
)(
c
j
j g  
= )()( c
l
l g  
= 0.4000; )( ci gPS  = )( ck gPS  = 
0.0544; )( cj gPS  = )( cl gPS  = 0.0200; )( ci gW  = )( ck gW  = 0.2902; and )( cj gW  = )( cl gW  
= 0.3000.  
 
Network d 
 
In considering the equations presented in Section 4.2.1.3, the following results are obtained: 
 
2857.0)()( d
i
i gq   
)(0476.0)(1190.02857.0)( )()()( d
l
ld
j
ld
j
j gqgqgq   
)(0476.0)(1190.02857.0)( )()()( d
l
jd
j
jd
j
l gqgqgq   
2857.0)()( d
k
k gq   
)(1190.0)(0476.02857.0)( )()()( d
l
ld
j
ld
l
j gqgqgq   
)(1190.0)(0476.02857.0)( )()()( d
l
jd
j
jd
l
l gqgqgq   
 
Solving by substitution, the following expressions are obtained:  
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)()( d
i
i gq  = )(
)(
d
k
k gq  = 0.2857; )(
)(
d
j
j gq  
= )()( d
j
l gq  = )(
)(
d
l
j gq  
= )()( d
l
l gq  = 0.2667; 
)( di gCS  = )( dk gCS  = 0.0408; )( dj gCS  = )( dl gCS  = 0.1422; )(
)(
d
i
i g  = )(
)(
d
k
k g  = 
0.1837; )(
)(
d
j
j g  
= )()( d
j
l g  
= )(
)(
d
l
j g  
= )()( d
l
l g  
= 0.0889; )( di gPS  = )( dk gPS  = 
0.0306; )( dj gPS  = )( dl gPS  = 0.0356; )( di gW  = )( dk gW  = 0.2551; and )( dj gW  = 
)( dl gW  = 0.3556.  
 
Network e 
 
In considering the equations presented in Section 4.2.1.3, the following results are obtained: 
 
)(0486.0)(0270.0)(2514.0)(2514.01622.0)( )()()()()( e
k
ke
j
je
i
ke
i
je
i
i gqgqgqgqgq    
)(0323.0)(2419.0)(2419.01935.0)( )()()()( e
j
ie
i
ke
i
ie
i
j gqgqgqgq   
)(0667.0)(2333.0)(2333.02222.0)( )()()()( e
k
ie
i
je
i
ie
i
k gqgqgqgq    
)(0811.0)(1216.0)(0811.0)(0811.02703.0)( )()()()()( e
k
ke
j
je
i
ke
i
je
j
i gqgqgqgqgq    
)(1129.0)(0968.0)(0968.03226.0)( )()()()( e
j
ie
i
ke
i
ie
j
j gqgqgqgq   
)(2514.0)(0270.0)(0486.0)(0486.01622.0)( )()()()()( e
k
ke
j
je
i
ke
i
je
k
i gqgqgqgqgq    
)(2419.0)(0581.0)(0581.01935.0)( )()()()( e
k
ie
i
je
i
ie
k
k gqgqgqgq    
4000.0)()( e
l
l gq  
 
Solving by substitution, the following expressions are obtained:  
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)()( e
i
i gq  = 0.1008; )(
)(
e
i
j gq  
= 0.1352; )()( e
i
k gq  = 0.1767; )(
)(
e
j
i gq  = 0.2708; )(
)(
e
j
j gq  
= 
0.3189; )()( e
k
i gq  = 0.1425; )(
)(
e
k
k gq  = 0.1728; )(
)(
e
l
l gq  
= 0.2000; )( ei gCS  = 0.1322; 
)( ej gCS  = 0.1031; )( ek gCS  = 0.0611; )( el gCS  = 0.0800; )(
)(
e
i
i g  = 0.0229; )(
)(
e
i
j g  
= 
0.0411; )()( e
i
k g  = 0.0702; )(
)(
e
j
i g  = 0.0917; )(
)(
e
j
j g  
= 0.1271; )()( e
k
i g  = 0.0457; 
)()( e
k
k g  = 0.0672; )(
)(
e
l
l g  
= 0.2000; )( ei gPS  = 0.0638; )( ej gPS  = 0.0435; )( ek gPS  = 
0.0373; )( el gPS  = 0.0200; )( ei gW  = 0.3302; )( ej gW  = 0.3653; )( ek gW  = 0.2112; and 
)( el gW  = 0.3000.  
 
 
Network f 
 
In considering the equations presented in Section 4.2.1.3, the following results are obtained: 
 
)(0323.0)(0323.0)(2419.01935.0)( )()()()( f
j
lf
j
jf
i
jf
i
i gqgqgqgq    
)(0244.0)(0244.0)(0244.0)(2561.01463.0)( )()()()()( f
l
lf
j
lf
j
if
i
if
i
j gqgqgqgqgq   
)(1129.0)(1129.0)(0968.03226.0)( )()()()( f
j
lf
j
jf
i
jf
j
i gqgqgqgq    
)(0407.0)(1260.0)(1260.0)(0732.02439.0)( )()()()()( f
l
lf
j
lf
j
if
i
if
j
j gqgqgqgqgq   
)(0476.0)(1190.0)(1190.02857.0)( )()()()( f
l
jf
j
jf
j
if
j
l gqgqgqgq   
2857.0)()( f
k
k gq   
)(1260.0)(0407.0)(0407.0)(0732.02439.0)( )()()()()( f
l
lf
j
jf
j
if
i
if
l
j gqgqgqgqgq   
)(1190.0)(0476.0)(0476.02857.0)( )()()()( f
l
jf
j
jf
j
if
l
l gqgqgqgq   
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Solving by substitution, the following expressions are obtained:  
 
)()( f
i
i gq  = 0.1787; )(
)(
f
i
j gq  
= 0.1202; )(
)(
f
j
i gq  = 0.2843; )(
)(
f
j
j gq  
= 0.2024; )(
)(
f
j
l gq  
= 
0.2393;
 
)()( f
k
k gq  = 0.2857; )(
)(
f
l
j gq  
= 0.2415; )(
)(
f
l
l gq  
= 0.2801; )( fi gCS  = 0.1072; 
)( fj gCS  = 0.1591; )( fk gCS  = 0.0408; )( fl gCS  = 0.1349; )(
)(
f
i
i g  = 0.0719; )(
)(
f
i
j g  
= 
0.0325; )(
)(
f
j
i g  = 0.1011; )(
)(
f
j
j g  
= 0.0512; )(
)(
f
j
l g  
= 0.0716; )(
)(
f
k
k g  = 0.1837; 
)()( f
l
j g  
= 0.0729; )(
)(
f
l
l g  
= 0.0981; )( fi gPS  = 0.0335; )( fj gPS  = 0.0659; )( fk gPS  = 
0.0306; )( fl gPS  = 0.0340; )( fi gW  = 0.2451; )( fj gW  = 0.4488; )( fk gW  = 0.2551; and 
)( fl gW  = 0.3399.  
 
 
Network g 
 
In considering the equations presented in Section 4.2.1.3, the following results are obtained: 
 
)(0213.0)(0383.0
)(0213.0)(2617.0)(2617.0)(2617.01277.0)(
)()(
)()()()()(
g
l
lg
k
k
g
j
jg
i
lg
i
kg
i
jg
i
i
gqgq
gqgqgqgqgq


  
)(0323.0)(2419.0)(2419.0)(2419.01935.0)( )()()()()( g
j
ig
i
lg
i
kg
i
ig
i
j gqgqgqgqgq   
)(0667.0)(2333.0)(2333.0)(2333.02222.0)( )()()()()( g
k
ig
i
lg
i
jg
i
ig
i
k gqgqgqgqgq    
)(0323.0)(2419.0)(2419.0)(2419.01935.0)( )()()()()( g
l
ig
i
kg
i
jg
i
ig
i
l gqgqgqgqgq   
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)(0355.0)(0638.0
)(1312.0)(0638.0)(0638.0)(0638.02128.0)(
)()(
)()()()()(
g
l
lg
k
k
g
j
jg
i
lg
i
kg
i
jg
j
i
gqgq
gqgqgqgqgq


  
)(1129.0)(0968.0)(0968.0)(0968.03226.0)( )()()()()( g
j
ig
i
lg
i
kg
i
ig
j
j gqgqgqgqgq   
)(0213.0)(2617.0
)(0213.0)(0383.0)(0383.0)(0383.01277.0)(
)()(
)()()()()(
g
l
lg
k
k
g
j
jg
i
lg
i
kg
i
jg
k
i
gqgq
gqgqgqgqgq


  
)(23333.0)(0667.0)(0667.0)(0667.02222.0)( )()()()()( g
k
ig
i
lg
i
jg
i
ig
k
k gqgqgqgqgq    
)(1312.0)(0638.0
)(0355.0)(0638.0)(0638.0)(0638.02128.0)(
)()(
)()()()()(
g
l
lg
k
k
g
j
jg
i
lg
i
kg
i
jg
l
i
gqgq
gqgqgqgqgq


  
)(1129.0)(0968.0)(0968.0)(0968.03226.0)( )()()()()( g
l
ig
i
kg
i
jg
i
ig
l
l gqgqgqgqgq   
 
Solving by substitution, the following expressions are obtained:  
 
)()( g
i
i gq  = 0.0441; )(
)(
g
i
j gq  
= 0.1215; )(
)(
g
i
k gq  = 0.1619; )(
)(
g
i
l gq  
= 0.1215; )(
)(
g
j
i gq  = 
0.2210; )(
)(
g
j
j gq  
= 0.3293; )(
)(
g
k
i gq  = 0.1001; )(
)(
g
k
k gq  = 0.2180; )(
)(
g
l
i gq  = 0.2210; 
)()( g
l
l gq  
= 0.3293; )( gi gCS  = 0.1718; )( gj gCS  = 0.1016; )( gk gCS  = 0.0722; )( gl gCS  = 
0.1016; )(
)(
g
i
i g  = 0.0044; )(
)(
g
i
j g  
= 0.0332; )(
)(
g
i
k g  = 0.0590; )(
)(
g
i
l g  
= 0.0332; 
)()( g
j
i g  = 0.0610; )(
)(
g
j
j g  
= 0.1356; )(
)(
g
k
i g  = 0.0226; )(
)(
g
k
k g  = 0.1069; )(
)(
g
l
i g  = 
0.0610; )(
)(
g
l
l g  
= 0.1356; )( gi gPS  = 0.0756; )( gj gPS  = 0.0379; )( gk gPS  = 0.0380; 
)( gl gPS  = 0.0379; )( gi gW  = 0.3771; )( gj gW  =0.3361; )( gk gW  = 0.2396; and )( gl gW  = 
0.3361.  
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Network h 
 
In considering the equations presented in Section 4.2.1.3, the following results are obtained: 
 
)(0486.0
)(0486.0)(0270.0)(2514.0)(2514.01622.0)(
)(
)()()()()(
h
k
l
h
k
kh
j
jh
i
kh
i
jh
i
i
gq
gqgqgqgqgq


  
)(0323.0)(2419.0)(2419.01935.0)( )()()()( h
j
ih
i
kh
i
ih
i
j gqgqgqgq   
)(0270.0
)(0486.0)(0486.0)(2514.0)(2514.01622.0)(
)(
)()()()()(
h
l
l
h
k
lh
k
ih
i
jh
i
ih
i
k
gq
gqgqgqgqgq


  
)(0811.0
)(0811.0)(1216.0)(0811.0)(0811.02703.0)(
)(
)()()()()(
h
k
l
h
k
kh
j
jh
i
kh
i
jh
j
i
gq
gqgqgqgqgq


  
)(1129.0)(0968.0)(0968.03226.0)( )()()()( h
j
ih
i
kh
i
ih
j
j gqgqgqgq   
)(2514.0
)(2514.0)(0270.0)(0486.0)(0486.01622.0)(
)(
)()()()()(
h
k
l
h
k
kh
j
jh
i
kh
i
jh
k
i
gq
gqgqgqgqgq


  
)(0270.0
)(2514.0)(2514.0)(0486.0)(0486.01622.0)(
)(
)()()()()(
h
l
l
h
k
lh
k
ih
i
jh
i
ih
k
k
gq
gqgqgqgqgq


  
)(0323.0)(2419.0)(2419.01935.0)( )()()()( h
l
kh
k
kh
k
ih
k
l gqgqgqgq   
)(1216.0
)(0811.0)(0811.0)(0811.0)(0811.02703.0)(
)(
)()()()()(
h
l
l
h
k
lh
k
ih
i
jh
i
ih
l
k
gq
gqgqgqgqgq


  
)(1129.0)(0968.0)(0968.03226.0)( )()()()( h
l
kh
k
kh
k
ih
l
l gqgqgqgq   
 
Solving by substitution, the following expressions are obtained:  
 
812 
 
)()( h
i
i gq  = )(
)(
h
i
k gq  = )(
)(
h
k
i gq  = )(
)(
h
k
k gq  = 0.1174; )(
)(
h
i
j gq  
= )()( h
k
l gq   = 0.1456; 
)()( h
j
i gq  = )(
)(
h
l
k gq  = 0.2747; )(
)(
h
j
j gq  
= )()( h
l
l gq  
= 0.3143; )( hi gCS  = )( hk gCS  = 
0.1297; )( hj gCS  = )( hl gCS  = 0.1058; )(
)(
h
i
i g  = )(
)(
h
i
k g  = )(
)(
h
k
i g  = )(
)(
h
k
k g  = 
0.0310; )(
)(
h
i
j g  
= )()( h
k
l g  = 0.0477; )(
)(
h
j
i g  = )(
)(
h
l
k g  = 0.0943; )(
)(
h
j
j g  
= )()( h
l
l g  
= 0.1235; )( hi gPS  = )( hk gPS  = 0.0542; )( hj gPS  = )( hl gPS  = 0.0434; )( hi gW  = )( hk gW  
= 0.2937; and )( hj gW  = )( hl gW  = 0.3669.  
 
 
Network i 
 
In considering the equations presented in Section 4.2.1.3, the following results are obtained: 
 
)(0486.0)(0270.0
)(0270.0)(2514.0)(2514.01622.0)(
)()(
)()()()(
i
k
ki
j
l
i
j
ji
i
ki
i
ji
i
i
gqgq
gqgqgqgq


  
)(0244.0)(0244.0
)(0244.0)(2561.0)(2561.01463.0)(
)()(
)()()()(
i
l
li
j
l
i
j
ii
i
ki
i
ii
i
j
gqgq
gqgqgqgq


 
)(0667.0)(2333.0)(2333.02222.0)( )()()()( i
k
ii
i
ji
i
ii
i
k gqgqgqgq    
)(0811.0)(1216.0
)(1216.0)(0811.0)(0811.02703.0)(
)()(
)()()()(
i
k
ki
j
l
i
j
ji
i
ki
i
ji
j
i
gqgq
gqgqgqgq


  
)(0407.0)(1260.0
)(1260.0)(0732.0)(0732.02439.0)(
)()(
)()()()(
i
l
li
j
l
i
j
ii
i
ki
i
ii
j
j
gqgq
gqgqgqgq


 
)(0476.0)(1190.0)(1190.02857.0)( )()()()( i
l
ji
j
ji
j
ii
j
l gqgqgqgq 
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)(2818.0)(0303.0
)(0303.0)(0545.0)(0545.01818.0)(
)()(
)()()()(
i
k
ki
j
l
i
j
ji
i
ki
i
ji
k
i
gqgq
gqgqgqgq


  
)(2333.0)(0667.0)(0667.02222.0)( )()()()( i
k
ii
i
ji
i
ii
k
k gqgqgqgq    
)(1260.0)(0407.0
)(0407.0)(0732.0)(0732.02439.0)(
)()(
)()()()(
i
l
li
j
l
i
j
ii
i
ki
i
ii
l
j
gqgq
gqgqgqgq


 
)(1190.0)(0476.0)(0476.02857.0)( )()()()( i
l
ji
j
ji
j
ii
l
l gqgqgqgq   
 
Solving by substitution, the following expressions are obtained:  
 
)()( i
i
i gq  = 0.1156; )(
)(
i
i
j gq  
= 0.0882; )()( i
i
k gq  = 0.1850; )(
)(
i
j
i gq  = 0.2531; )(
)(
i
j
j gq  
= 
0.2148; )()( i
j
l gq  
= 0.2420; )()( i
k
i gq  = 0.1542; )(
)(
i
k
k gq  = 0.1998; )(
)(
i
l
j gq  
= 0.2510; 
)()( i
l
l gq  
= 0.2781; )( ii gCS  = 0.1367; )( ij gCS  = 0.1535; )( ik gCS  = 0.0740; )( il gCS  = 
0.1352; )()( i
i
i g  = 0.0300; )(
)(
i
i
j g  
= 0.0175; )()( i
i
k g  = 0.0770; )(
)(
i
j
i g  = 0.0801; 
)()( i
j
j g  
= 0.0577; )()( i
j
l g  
= 0.0732; )()( i
k
i g  = 0.0535; )(
)(
i
k
k g  = 0.0898; )(
)(
i
l
j g  
= 
0.0787; )()( i
l
l g  
= 0.0967; )( ii gPS  = 0.0567; )( ij gPS  = 0.0630; )( ik gPS  = 0.0470; 
)( il gPS  = 0.0350; )( ii gW  = 0.3179; )( ij gW  = 0.4274; )( ik gW  = 0.2644; and )( il gW  = 
0.3457.  
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In considering the equations presented in Section 4.2.1.3, the following results are obtained: 
 
814 
 
)(0486.0)(0486.0
)(0270.0)(0270.0)(2514.0)(2514.01622.0)(
)()(
)()()()()(
j
k
kj
k
j
j
j
kj
j
jj
i
kj
i
jj
i
i
gqgq
gqgqgqgqgq


  
)(0486.0)(0486.0
)(0270.0)(0270.0)(2514.0)(2514.01622.0)(
)()(
)()()()()(
j
k
kj
k
i
j
j
kj
j
ij
i
kj
i
ij
i
j
gqgq
gqgqgqgqgq


 
)(0486.0)(0486.0)(0270.0
)(0270.0)(2514.0)(2514.01622.0)(
)()()(
)()()()(
j
k
jj
k
ij
j
j
j
j
ij
i
jj
i
ij
i
k
gqgqgq
gqgqgqgq


  
)(0811.0)(0811.0
)(1216.0)(1216.0)(0811.0)(0811.02703.0)(
)()(
)()()()()(
j
k
kj
k
j
j
j
kj
j
jj
i
kj
i
jj
j
i
gqgq
gqgqgqgqgq


  
)(0811.0)(0811.0
)(1216.0)(1216.0)(0811.0)(0811.02703.0)(
)()(
)()()()()(
j
k
kj
k
i
j
j
kj
j
ij
i
kj
i
ij
j
j
gqgq
gqgqgqgqgq


 
)(0811.0)(0811.0
)(1216.0)(1216.0)(0811.0)(0811.02703.0)(
)()(
)()()()()(
j
k
jj
k
i
j
j
jj
j
ij
i
jj
i
ij
j
k
gqgq
gqgqgqgqgq


  
)(2514.0)(2514.0
)(0270.0)(0270.0)(0486.0)(0486.01622.0)(
)()(
)()()()()(
j
k
kj
k
j
j
j
kj
j
jj
i
kj
i
jj
k
i
gqgq
gqgqgqgqgq


  
)(2514.0)(2514.0
)(0270.0)(0270.0)(0486.0)(0486.01622.0)(
)()(
)()()()()(
j
k
kj
k
i
j
j
kj
j
ij
i
kj
i
ij
k
j
gqgq
gqgqgqgqgq


 
)(2514.0)(2514.0
)(0270.0)(0270.0)(0486.0)(0486.01622.0)(
)()(
)()()()()(
j
k
jj
k
i
j
j
jj
j
ij
i
jj
i
ij
k
k
gqgq
gqgqgqgqgq


  
4000.0)()( j
l
l gq  
 
Solving by substitution, the following expressions are obtained:  
 
)()( j
i
i gq  = )(
)(
j
i
j gq  
= )(
)(
j
i
k gq  = )(
)(
j
k
i gq  = )(
)(
j
k
j gq  
= )(
)(
j
k
k gq  = 0.1250; )(
)(
j
j
i gq  = 
)()( j
j
j gq  
= )(
)(
j
j
k gq  = 0.2500; )(
)(
j
l
l gq  
= 0.4000; )( ji gCS  = )( jj gCS  = )( jk gCS  = 0.1250; 
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)( jl gCS  = 0.0800; )(
)(
j
i
i g  = )(
)(
j
i
j g  
= )(
)(
j
i
k g  = )(
)(
j
k
i g  = )(
)(
j
k
j g  
= )(
)(
j
k
k g  = 
0.0352; )(
)(
j
j
i g  = )(
)(
j
j
j g  
= )(
)(
j
j
k g  = 0.0781;  )(
)(
j
l
l g  
= 0.0200; )( ji gPS  = )( jk gPS  = 
0.0527; )( jj gPS  = 0.0703; )( jl gPS  = 0.0200; )( ji gW  = )( jk gW  = 0.2832; )( jj gW  = 
0.4297; and )( jl gW  = 0.3000.  
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In considering the equations presented in Section 4.2.1.3, the following results are obtained: 
 
)(0323.0)(0323.0)(2419.01935.0)( )()()()( k
j
lk
j
jk
i
jk
i
i gqgqgqgq    
)(0244.0)(0244.0
)(0244.0)(0244.0)(2561.01463.0)(
)()(
)()()()(
k
l
lk
l
k
k
j
lk
j
ik
i
ik
i
j
gqgq
gqgqgqgq


 
)(1129.0)(1129.0)(0968.03226.0)( )()()()( k
j
lk
j
jk
i
jk
j
i gqgqgqgq    
)(0407.0)(0407.0
)(1260.0)(1260.0)(0732.02439.0)(
)()(
)()()()(
k
l
lk
l
k
k
j
lk
j
ik
i
ik
j
j
gqgq
gqgqgqgq


 
)(0407.0)(0407.0
)(0732.0)(1260.0)(1260.02439.0)(
)()(
)()()()(
k
l
kk
l
j
k
k
kk
j
jk
j
ik
j
l
gqgq
gqgqgqgq


 
)(0323.0)(0323.0)(2419.01935.0)( )()()()( k
l
lk
l
jk
k
lk
k
k gqgqgqgq    
)(0244.0)(0244.0
)(2561.0)(0244.0)(0244.01463.0)(
)()(
)()()()(
k
l
kk
l
j
k
k
kk
j
jk
j
ik
k
l
gqgq
gqgqgqgq


 
)(1260.0)(1260.0
)(0407.0)(0407.0)(0732.02439.0)(
)()(
)()()()(
k
l
lk
l
k
k
j
lk
j
ik
i
ik
l
j
gqgq
gqgqgqgq


 
)(1129.0)(1129.0)(0968.03226.0)( )()()()( k
l
lk
l
jk
k
lk
l
k gqgqgqgq    
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)(1260.0)(1260.0
)(0732.0)(0407.0)(0407.02439.0)(
)()(
)()()()(
k
l
kk
l
j
k
k
kk
j
jk
j
ik
l
l
gqgq
gqgqgqgq


 
 
Solving by substitution, the following expressions are obtained:  
 
)()( k
i
i gq  = )(
)(
k
k
k gq  = 0.1770; )(
)(
k
i
j gq  
= )()( k
k
l gq  
= 0.1254; )()( k
j
i gq  = )(
)(
k
l
k gq  = 0.2864; 
)()( k
j
j gq  
=
 
)()( k
j
l gq  
= )(
)(
k
l
j gq  
= )()( k
l
l gq  
= 0.2141; )( ki gCS  = )( kk gCS  = 0.1074; 
)( kj gCS  = )( kl gCS  = 0.1533; )(
)(
k
i
i g  = )(
)(
k
k
k g  = 0.0705; )(
)(
k
i
j g  
= )()( k
k
l g  
= 0.0354; 
)()( k
j
i g  = )(
)(
k
l
k g  = 0.1025; )(
)(
k
j
j g  
=
 
)()( k
j
l g  
= )(
)(
k
l
j g  
= )()( k
l
l g  
= 0.0573; 
)( ki gPS  = )( kk gPS  = 0.0343; )( kj gPS  = )( kl gPS  = 0.0638; )( ki gW  = )( kk gW  = 0.2476; 
and )( kj gW  = )( kl gW  = 0.4343.  
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In considering the equations presented in Section 4.2.1.3, the following results are obtained: 
 
)(0323.0)(0323.0)(0323.0)(2419.01935.0)( )()()()()( l
j
ll
j
kl
j
jl
i
jl
i
i gqgqgqgqgq    
)(0213.0)(0383.0
)(0213.0)(0213.0)(0213.0)(2617.01277.0)(
)()(
)()()()()(
l
l
ll
k
k
l
j
ll
j
kl
j
il
i
il
i
j
gqgq
gqgqgqgqgq


 
)(1129.0)(1129.0)(1129.0)(0968.03226.0)( )()()()()( l
j
ll
j
kl
j
jl
i
jl
j
i gqgqgqgqgq    
)(0355.0)(0638.0
)(1312.0)(1312.0)(1312.0)(0638.02128.0)(
)()(
)()()()()(
l
l
ll
k
k
l
j
ll
j
kl
j
il
i
il
j
j
gqgq
gqgqgqgqgq


 
)(0968.0)(1129.0)(1129.0)(1129.03226.0)( )()()()()( l
k
jl
j
ll
j
jl
j
il
j
k gqgqgqgqgq    
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)(0476.0)(1190.0)(1190.0)(1190.02857.0)( )()()()()( l
l
jl
j
kl
j
jl
j
il
j
l gqgqgqgqgq 
 
)(0213.0)(2617.0
)(0213.0)(0213.0)(0213.0)(0383.01277.0)(
)()(
)()()()()(
l
l
ll
k
k
l
j
ll
j
kl
j
il
i
il
k
j
gqgq
gqgqgqgqgq


 
)(02419.0)(0323.0)(0323.0)(0323.01935.0)( )()()()()( l
k
jl
j
ll
j
jl
j
il
k
k gqgqgqgqgq    
)(1312.0)(0638.0
)(0355.0)(0355.0)(0355.0)(0638.02128.0)(
)()(
)()()()()(
l
l
ll
k
k
l
j
ll
j
kl
j
il
i
il
l
j
gqgq
gqgqgqgqgq


 
)(1190.0)(0476.0)(0476.0)(0476.02857.0)( )()()()()( l
l
jl
j
kl
j
jl
j
il
l
l gqgqgqgqgq 
 
 
Solving by substitution, the following expressions are obtained:  
 
)()( l
i
i gq  = )(
)(
l
k
k gq  = 0.1878; )(
)(
l
i
j gq  
= )(
)(
l
k
j gq  
= 0.1077; )()( l
j
i gq  = )(
)(
l
j
k gq  = 0.2621; 
)()( l
j
j gq  
= 0.1499; )()( l
j
l gq  
= 0.2162; )(
)(
l
l
j gq  
= 0.2248; )()( l
l
l gq  
= 0.2911; )( li gCS  = 
)( lk gCS  = 0.1012; )( lj gCS  = 0.1741; )( ll gCS  = 0.1286; )(
)(
l
i
i g  = )(
)(
l
k
k g  = 0.0793; 
)()( l
i
j g  
= )(
)(
l
k
j g  
= 0.0261; )()( l
j
i g  = )(
)(
l
j
k g  = 0.0859; )(
)(
l
j
j g  
= 0.0281; )()( l
j
l g  
= 
0.0584;  )(
)(
l
l
j g  
= 0.0632; )()( l
l
l g  
= 0.1059; )( li gPS  = )( lk gPS  = 0.0327; )( lj gPS  = 
0.0991;  )( ll gPS  = 0.0333; )( li gW  = )( lk gW  = 0.2393; )( lj gW  = 0.5314; and )( ll gW  = 
0.3310.  
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In considering the equations presented in Section 4.2.1.3, the following results are obtained: 
 
)(0244.0)(0244.0
)(0244.0)(0244.0)(2561.0)(2561.01463.0)(
)()(
)()()()()(
m
l
lm
l
j
m
j
lm
j
jm
i
lm
i
jm
i
i
gqgq
gqgqgqgqgq


  
)(0244.0)(0244.0
)(0244.0)(0244.0)(2561.0)(2561.01463.0)(
)()(
)()()()()(
m
l
lm
l
i
m
j
lm
j
im
i
lm
i
im
i
j
gqgq
gqgqgqgqgq


 
)(0244.0)(0244.0
)(0244.0)(0244.0)(2561.0)(2561.01463.0)(
)()(
)()()()()(
a
l
ja
l
i
a
j
ja
j
ia
i
ja
i
ia
i
l
gqgq
gqgqgqgqgq


 
)(0407.0)(0407.0
)(1260.0)(1260.0)(02732.0)(0732.02439.0)(
)()(
)()()()()(
m
l
lm
l
j
m
j
lm
j
jm
i
lm
i
jm
j
i
gqgq
gqgqgqgqgq


  
)(0407.0)(0407.0
)(1260.0)(1260.0)(0732.0)(0732.02439.0)(
)()(
)()()()()(
m
l
lm
l
i
m
j
lm
j
im
i
lm
i
im
j
j
gqgq
gqgqgqgqgq


 
)(0407.0)(0407.0
)(1260.0)(1260.0)(0732.0)(0732.02439.0)(
)()(
)()()()()(
m
l
jm
l
i
m
j
jm
j
im
i
jm
i
im
j
l
gqgq
gqgqgqgqgq


 
2857.0)()( m
k
k gq   
)(1260.0)(1260.0
)(0407.0)(0407.0)(0732.0)(0732.02439.0)(
)()(
)()()()()(
m
l
lm
l
j
m
j
lm
j
jm
i
lm
i
jm
l
i
gqgq
gqgqgqgqgq


  
)(1260.0)(1260.0
)(0407.0)(0407.0)(0732.0)(0732.02439.0)(
)()(
)()()()()(
m
l
lm
l
i
m
j
lm
j
im
i
lm
i
im
l
j
gqgq
gqgqgqgqgq


 
)(1260.0)(1260.0
)(0407.0)(0407.0)(0732.0)(0732.02439.0)(
)()(
)()()()()(
m
l
jm
l
i
m
j
jm
j
im
i
jm
i
im
l
l
gqgq
gqgqgqgqgq


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Solving by substitution, the following expressions are obtained:  
 
)()( m
i
i gq  = )(
)(
m
i
j gq  
= )()( m
i
l gq  
= 0.1111; )()( m
j
i gq  = )(
)(
m
j
j gq  
= )()( m
j
l gq  
= )()( m
l
i gq  = 
)()( m
l
j gq  
= )()( m
l
l gq  
= 0.2222; )()( m
k
k gq  = 0.2857; )( mi gCS  = )( mj gCS  = )( ml gCS  = 
0.1543; )( mk gCS  = 0.0408; )(
)(
m
i
i g  = )(
)(
m
i
j g  
=  )()( m
i
l g  
= 0.0278; )()( m
j
i g  = 
)()( m
j
j g  
= )()( m
j
l g  
= )()( m
l
i g  = )(
)(
m
l
j g  
= )()( m
l
l g  
= 0.0617; )()( m
k
k g  = 0.1837;  
)( mi gPS  = 0.0417; )( mj gPS  = )( ml gPS  = 0.0556; )( mk gPS  = 0.0306;  )( mi gW  = 0.2793; 
)( mj gW  = )( ml gW  = 0.3951; and )( mk gW  = 0.2551.  
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In considering the equations presented in Section 4.2.1.3, the following results are obtained: 
 
)(0213.0)(0213.0)(0383.0)(0383.0
)(0213.0)(2617.0)(2617.0)(2617.01277.0)(
)()()()(
)()()()()(
n
l
ln
l
kn
k
ln
k
k
n
j
jn
i
ln
i
kn
i
jn
i
i
gqgqgqgq
gqgqgqgqgq


  
)(0323.0)(2419.0)(2419.0)(2419.01935.0)( )()()()()( n
j
in
i
ln
i
kn
i
in
i
j gqgqgqgqgq 
 
)(0270.0)(0270.0)(0486.0
)(0486.0)(2514.0)(2514.0)(2514.01622.0)(
)()()(
)()()()()(
n
l
ln
l
in
k
l
n
k
in
i
ln
i
jn
i
in
i
k
gqgqgq
gqgqgqgqgq


  
)(0270.0)(0270.0)(0486.0
)(0486.0)(2514.0)(2514.0)(2514.01622.0)(
)()()(
)()()()()(
n
l
kn
l
in
k
k
n
k
in
i
kn
i
jn
i
in
i
l
gqgqgq
gqgqgqgqgq


 
)(0638.0)(0638.0)(0638.0)(0638.0
)(1312.0)(0638.0)(0638.0)(0638.02128.0)(
)()()()(
)()()()()(
n
l
ln
l
kn
k
ln
k
k
n
j
jn
i
ln
i
kn
i
jn
j
i
gqgqgqgq
gqgqgqgqgq


  
)(1129.0)(0968.0)(0968.0)(0968.03226.0)( )()()()()( a
j
ia
i
la
i
ka
i
ia
j
j gqgqgqgqgq   
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)(0213.0)(0213.0)(2617.0)(2617.0
)(0213.0)(0383.0)(0383.0)(0383.01277.0)(
)()()()(
)()()()()(
a
l
la
l
ka
k
la
k
k
a
j
ja
i
la
i
ka
i
ja
k
i
gqgqgqgq
gqgqgqgqgq


  
)(0270.0)(0270.0)(2514.0
)(2514.0)(0486.0)(0486.0)(0486.01622.0)(
)()()(
)()()()()(
n
l
ln
l
in
k
l
n
k
in
i
ln
i
jn
i
in
k
k
gqgqgq
gqgqgqgqgq


  
)(0270.0)(0270.0)(2514.0
)(2514.0)(0486.0)(0486.0)(0486.01622.0)(
)()()(
)()()()()(
n
l
kn
l
in
k
k
n
k
in
i
kn
i
jn
i
in
k
l
gqgqgq
gqgqgqgqgq


 
)(1312.0)(1312.0)(0638.0
)(0638.0)(0638.0)(0638.0)(0638.02128.0)(
)()()(
)()()()()(
n
l
ln
l
kn
k
l
n
k
kn
i
ln
i
kn
i
jn
l
i
gqgqgq
gqgqgqgqgq


  
)(1216.0)(1216.0)(0811.0
)(0811.0)(0811.0)(0811.0)(0811.02703.0)(
)()()(
)()()()()(
n
l
ln
l
in
k
l
n
k
in
i
ln
i
jn
i
in
l
k
gqgqgq
gqgqgqgqgq


  
)(1216.0)(1216.0)(0811.0
)(0811.0)(0811.0)(0811.0)(0811.02703.0)(
)()()(
)()()()()(
n
l
kn
l
in
k
k
n
k
in
i
kn
i
jn
i
in
l
l
gqgqgq
gqgqgqgqgq


 
 
Solving by substitution, the following expressions are obtained:  
 
)()( n
i
i gq  = 0.0642; )(
)(
n
i
j gq  
= 0.1335; )()( n
i
k gq  = )(
)(
n
i
l gq  
= 0.1081; )()( n
j
i gq  = 0.2429; 
)()( n
j
j gq  
= 0.3223;
 
)()( n
k
i gq  = 0.0893;  )(
)(
n
k
k gq  = )(
)(
n
k
l gq  
= 0.1331; )()( n
l
i gq  = 0.1841; 
)()( n
l
k gq  = )(
)(
n
l
l gq  
= 0.2592; )( ni gCS  = 0.1685; )( nj gCS  = 0.1039; )( nk gCS  = )( nl gCS  = 
0.1252; )()( n
i
i g  = 0.0093; )(
)(
n
i
j g  
= 0.0401; )()( n
i
k g  = )(
)(
n
i
l g  
= 0.0263; )()( n
j
i g  = 
0.0737; )(
)(
n
j
j g  
= 0.1298; )()( n
k
i g  = 0.0179; )(
)(
n
k
k g  = )(
)(
n
k
l g  
= 0.0399; )()( n
l
i g  = 
0.0424; )()( n
l
k g  = )(
)(
n
l
l g  
= 0.0840; )( ni gPS  = 0.0643; )( nj gPS  = 0.0399; )( nk gPS  = 
0.0474; )( nl gPS  = 0.0617; )( ni gW  = 0.3347; )( nj gW  = 0.3474; )( nk gW  = 0.2703; and 
)( nl gW  = 0.3972.  
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In considering the equations presented in Section 4.2.1.3, the following results are obtained: 
 
)(0213.0)(0213.0)(0383.0)(0213.0
)(0213.0)(2617.0)(2617.0)(2617.01277.0)(
)()()()(
)()()()()(
o
l
lo
l
jo
k
ko
j
l
o
j
jo
i
lo
i
ko
i
jo
i
i
gqgqgqgq
gqgqgqgqgq


  
)(0244.0)(0244.0)(0244.0
)(0244.0)(2561.0)(2561.0)(2561.01463.0)(
)()()(
)()()()()(
o
l
lo
l
io
j
l
o
j
io
i
lo
i
ko
i
io
i
j
gqgqgq
gqgqgqgqgq


 
)(0667.0)(2333.0)(2333.0)(2333.02222.0)( )()()()()( o
k
io
i
lo
i
jo
i
io
i
k gqgqgqgqgq    
)(0244.0)(0244.0)(0244.0
)(0244.0)(2561.0)(2561.0)(2561.01463.0)(
)()()(
)()()()()(
o
l
jo
l
io
j
j
o
j
io
i
ko
i
jo
i
io
i
l
gqgqgq
gqgqgqgqgq


 
)(0407.0)(0407.0)(0732.0)(1260.0
)(1260.0)(0732.0)(0732.0)(0732.02439.0)(
)()()()(
)()()()()(
o
l
lo
l
jo
k
ko
j
l
o
j
jo
i
lo
i
ko
i
jo
j
i
gqgqgqgq
gqgqgqgqgq


  
)(0407.0)(0407.0)(1260.0
)(1260.0)(0732.0)(0732.0)(0732.02439.0)(
)()()(
)()()()()(
o
l
lo
l
io
j
l
o
j
io
i
lo
i
ko
i
io
j
j
gqgqgq
gqgqgqgqgq


 
)(0407.0)(0407.0)(1260.0
)(1260.0)(0732.0)(0732.0)(0732.02439.0)(
)()()(
)()()()()(
o
l
jo
l
io
j
j
o
j
io
i
ko
i
jo
i
io
j
l
gqgqgq
gqgqgqgqgq


 
)(0213.0)(0213.0)(2617.0)(0213.0
)(0213.0)(0383.0)(0383.0)(0383.01277.0)(
)()()()(
)()()()()(
o
l
lo
l
jo
k
ko
j
l
o
j
jo
i
lo
i
ko
i
jo
k
i
gqgqgqgq
gqgqgqgqgq


  
)(2333.0)(0667.0)(0667.0)(0667.02222.0)( )()()()()( o
k
io
i
lo
i
jo
i
io
k
k gqgqgqgqgq    
)(1260.0)(1260.0)(0703.0)(0407.0
)(0407.0)(0732.0)(0732.0)(0732.02439.0)(
)()()()(
)()()()()(
o
l
lo
l
jo
k
ko
j
l
o
j
jo
i
lo
i
ko
i
jo
l
i
gqgqgqgq
gqgqgqgqgq


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)(1260.0)(1260.0)(0407.0)(0407.0
)(0732.0)(0732.0)(0732.02439.0)(
)()()()(
)()()()(
o
l
lo
l
io
j
lo
j
i
o
i
lo
i
ko
i
io
l
j
gqgqgqgq
gqgqgqgq


 
)(1260.0)(1260.0)(0407.0
)(0407.0)(0732.0)(0732.0)(0732.02439.0)(
)()()(
)()()()()(
o
l
jo
l
io
j
j
o
j
io
i
ko
i
jo
i
io
l
l
gqgqgq
gqgqgqgqgq


  
Solving by substitution, the following expressions are obtained:  
 
)()( o
i
i gq  = 0.0645; )(
)(
o
i
j gq  
= )()( o
i
l gq  
= 0.0863; )()( o
i
k gq  = 0.1739;  )(
)(
o
j
i gq  = )(
)(
o
l
i gq  = 
0.2461; )(
)(
o
j
j gq  
= )()( o
j
l gq  
= )(
)(
o
l
j gq  
= )()( o
l
l gq  
= 0.2273; )()( o
k
i gq  = 0.1043;  )(
)(
o
k
k gq  = 
0.2137;   )( oi gCS  = 0.2185; )( oj gCS  = )( ol gCS  = 0.1462; )( ok gCS  = 0.0751; )(
)(
o
i
i g  = 
0.0094; )(
)(
o
i
j g  
= )()( o
i
l g  
= 0.0168; )()( o
i
k g  = 0.0680; )(
)(
o
j
i g  = )(
)(
o
l
i g  = 0.0757; 
)()( o
j
j g  
= )()( o
j
l g  
= )(
)(
o
l
j g  
= )()( o
l
l g  
= 0.0646; )()( o
k
i g  = 0.0245; )(
)(
o
k
k g  = 0.1027; 
)( oi gPS  = 0.0633; )( oj gPS  = )( ol gPS  = 0.0614; )( ok gPS  = 0.0379; )( oi gW  = 0.3927; 
)( oj gW  = )( ol gW  = 0.4124; and )( ok gW  = 0.2403.  
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In considering the equations presented in Section 4.2.1.3, the following results are obtained: 
 
)(0486.0)(0486.0
)(0270.0)(0270.0)(2514.0)(2514.01622.0)(
)()(
)()()()()(
p
k
lp
k
k
p
j
lp
j
jp
i
kp
i
jp
i
i
gqgq
gqgqgqgqgq


  
)(0244.0)(0244.0
)(0244.0)(0244.0)(2561.0)(2561.01463.0)(
)()(
)()()()()(
p
l
lp
l
k
p
j
lp
j
ip
i
kp
i
ip
i
j
gqgq
gqgqgqgqgq


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)(0270.0)(0270.0
)(0486.0)(0486.0)(2514.0)(2514.01622.0)(
)()(
)()()()()(
p
l
lp
l
j
p
k
lp
k
ip
i
jp
i
ip
i
k
gqgq
gqgqgqgqgq


  
)(0811.0)(0911.0
)(1216.0)(1216.0)(0811.0)(0811.02703.0)(
)()(
)()()()()(
p
k
lp
k
k
p
j
lp
j
jp
i
kp
i
jp
j
i
gqgq
gqgqgqgqgq


  
)(0407.0)(0407.0
)(1260.0)(1260.0)(0732.0)(0732.02439.0)(
)()(
)()()()()(
p
l
lp
l
k
p
j
lp
j
ip
i
kp
i
ip
j
j
gqgq
gqgqgqgqgq


 
)(0407.0)(0407.0
)(0732.0)(0732.0)(1260.0)(1260.02439.0)(
)()(
)()()()()(
p
l
kp
l
j
p
k
kp
k
ip
j
jp
j
ip
j
l
gqgq
gqgqgqgqgq


 
)(2514.0)(2514.0
)(0270.0)(0270.0)(0486.0)(0486.01622.0)(
)()(
)()()()()(
p
k
lp
k
k
p
j
lp
j
jp
i
kp
i
jp
k
i
gqgq
gqgqgqgqgq


  
)(0270.0)(0270.0
)(2514.0)(2514.0)(0486.0)(0486.01622.0)(
)()(
)()()()()(
p
l
lp
l
j
p
k
lp
k
ip
i
jp
i
ip
k
k
gqgq
gqgqgqgqgq


  
)(0244.0)(0244.0)(2561.0
)(2561.0)(0244.0)(0244.01463.0)(
)()()(
)()()()(
p
l
kp
l
jp
k
k
p
k
ip
j
jp
j
ip
k
l
gqgqgq
gqgqgqgq


 
)(1260.0)(1260.0
)(0407.0)(0407.0)(0732.0)(0732.02439.0)(
)()(
)()()()()(
p
l
lp
l
k
p
j
lp
j
ip
i
kp
i
ip
l
j
gqgq
gqgqgqgqgq


 
)(1216.0)(1216.0
)(0811.0)(0811.0)(0811.0)(0811.02703.0)(
)()(
)()()()()(
p
l
lp
l
j
p
k
lp
k
ip
i
jp
i
ip
l
k
gqgq
gqgqgqgqgq


  
)(1260.0)(1260.0
)(0732.0)(0732.0)(0407.0)(0407.02439.0)(
)()(
)()()()()(
p
l
kp
l
j
p
k
kp
k
ip
j
jp
j
ip
l
l
gqgq
gqgqgqgqgq


  
Solving by substitution, the following expressions are obtained:  
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)()( p
i
i gq  = )(
)(
p
i
k gq  = )(
)(
p
k
i gq  = )(
)(
p
k
k gq  = 0.1722; )(
)(
p
i
j gq  
= )(
)(
p
k
l gq  
= 0.1044; 
)()( p
j
i gq  = )(
)(
p
l
k gq  = 0.2539; )(
)(
p
j
j gq  
= )(
)(
p
j
l gq  
= )(
)(
p
l
j gq  
= )(
)(
p
l
l gq  
= 0.2219; 
)( pi gCS  = )( pk gCS  = 0.1292; )( pj gCS  = )( pl gCS  = 0.1503; )(
)(
p
i
i g  = )(
)(
p
i
k g  = 
)()( p
k
i g  = )(
)(
p
k
k g  = 0.0364; )(
)(
p
i
j g  
= )(
)(
p
k
l g  
= 0.0245; )(
)(
p
j
i g  = )(
)(
p
l
k g  = 
0.0806; )(
)(
p
j
j g  
= )(
)(
p
j
l g  
= )(
)(
p
l
j g  
= )(
)(
p
l
l g  
= 0.0616; )( pi gPS  = )( pk gPS  = 
0.0483; )( pj gPS  =  )( pl gPS  = 0.0608; )( pi gW  = )( pk gW  = 0.2748 and )( pj gW  =  )( pl gW  
= 0.4148.  
 
Network q 
 
In considering the equations presented in Section 4.2.1.3, the following results are obtained: 
 
)(0486.0)(0486.0)(0270.0
)(0270.0)(0270.0)(26514.0)(2514.01622.0)(
)()()(
)()()()()(
q
k
kq
k
jq
j
l
q
j
kq
j
jq
i
kq
i
jq
i
i
gqgqgq
gqgqgqgqgq


  
)(0213.0)(0383.0)(0383.0)(0213.0
)(0213.0)(0213.0)(2617.0)(2617.01277.0)(
)()()()(
)()()()()(
q
l
lq
k
kq
k
iq
j
l
q
j
kq
j
iq
i
kq
i
iq
i
j
gqgqgqgq
gqgqgqgqgq


 
)(0486.0)(0486.0)(0270.0
)(0270.0)(0270.0)(2514.0)(2514.01622.0)(
)()()(
)()()()()(
q
k
jq
k
iq
j
l
q
j
jq
j
iq
i
jq
i
iq
i
k
gqgqgq
gqgqgqgqgq


  
)(0811.0)(0811.0)(1216.0
)(1216.0)(1216.0)(0811.0)(0811.02703.0)(
)()()(
)()()()()(
q
k
kq
k
jq
j
l
q
j
kq
j
jq
i
kq
i
jq
j
i
gqgqgq
gqgqgqgqgq


  
)(0355.0)(0638.0)(0638.0)(1312.0
)(1312.0)(1312.0)(0638.0)(0638.02128.0)(
)()()()(
)()()()()(
q
l
lq
k
kq
k
iq
j
l
q
j
kq
j
iq
i
kq
i
iq
j
j
gqgqgqgq
gqgqgqgqgq


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)(0811.0)(0811.0)(1216.0
)(1216.0)(1216.0)(0811.0)(0811.02703.0)(
)()()(
)()()()()(
q
k
jq
k
iq
j
l
q
j
jq
j
iq
i
jq
i
iq
j
k
gqgqgq
gqgqgqgqgq


  
)(0476.0)(1190.0)(1190.0)(1190.02857.0)( )()()()()( q
l
jq
j
kq
j
jq
j
iq
j
l gqgqgqgqgq 
 
)(2514.0)(2514.0)(0270.0
)(0270.0)(0270.0)(0486.0)(0486.01622.0)(
)()()(
)()()()()(
q
k
kq
k
jq
j
l
q
j
kq
j
jq
i
kq
i
jq
k
i
gqgqgq
gqgqgqgqgq


  
)(0213.0)(2617.0)(2617.0)(0213.0
)(0213.0)(0213.0)(0383.0)(0383.01277.0)(
)()()()(
)()()()()(
q
l
lq
k
kq
k
iq
j
l
q
j
kq
j
iq
i
kq
i
iq
k
j
gqgqgqgq
gqgqgqgqgq


 
)(2514.0)(2514.0)(0270.0
)(0270.0)(0270.0)(0486.0)(0486.01622.0)(
)()()(
)()()()()(
q
k
jq
k
iq
j
l
q
j
jq
j
iq
i
jq
i
iq
k
k
gqgqgq
gqgqgqgqgq


  
)(1312.0)(0638.0)(0638.0)(0355.0
)(0355.0)(0355.0)(0638.0)(0638.02128.0)(
)()()()(
)()()()()(
q
l
lq
k
kq
k
iq
j
l
q
j
kq
j
iq
i
kq
i
iq
l
j
gqgqgqgq
gqgqgqgqgq


 
)(1190.0)(0476.0)(0476.0)(0476.02857.0)( )()()()()( q
l
jq
j
kq
j
jq
j
iq
l
l gqgqgqgqgq 
 
 
Solving by substitution, the following expressions are obtained:  
 
)()( q
i
i gq  = )(
)(
q
i
k gq  = )(
)(
q
k
i gq  = )(
)(
q
k
k gq  = 0.1338; )(
)(
q
i
j gq  
= )(
)(
q
k
j gq  
= 0.0885;  )(
)(
q
j
i gq  
= )(
)(
q
j
k gq  = 0.2309; )(
)(
q
j
j gq  
= 0.1674; )(
)(
q
j
l gq  
= 0.2219; )(
)(
q
l
j gq  
= 0.2334; )(
)(
q
l
l gq  
= 
0.2879; )( qi gCS  = )( qk gCS  = 0.1243; )( qj gCS  = 0.1670; )( ql gCS  = 0.1300; )(
)(
q
i
i g  = 
)()( q
i
k g  = )(
)(
q
k
i g  = )(
)(
q
k
k g  = 0.0403; )(
)(
q
i
j g  
= )(
)(
q
k
j g  
= 0.0176; )(
)(
q
j
i g  = 
)()( q
j
k g  = 0.0666; )(
)(
q
j
j g  
= 0.0350; )(
)(
q
j
l g  
= 0.0616;  )(
)(
q
l
j g  
= 0.0681; )(
)(
q
l
l g  
= 
0.1036; )( qi gPS  = )( qk gPS  = 0.0476; )( qj gPS  = 0.0906;  )( ql gPS  = 0.0340; )( qi gW  = 
)( qk gW  = 0.2701; )( qj gW  = 0.4874; and )( ql gW  = 0.3356. 
826 
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In considering the equations presented in Section 4.2.1.3, the following results are obtained: 
 
)(0244.0)(0244.0)(0244.0
)(0244.0)(0244.0)(2561.0)(2561.01463.0)(
)()()(
)()()()()(
r
l
lr
l
kr
l
j
r
j
lr
j
jr
i
lr
i
jr
i
i
gqgqgq
gqgqgqgqgq


  
)(0244.0)(0244.0)(0244.0
)(0244.0)(0244.0)(2561.0)(2561.01453.0)(
)()()(
)()()()()(
r
l
lr
l
kr
l
i
r
j
lr
j
ir
i
lr
i
ir
i
j
gqgqgq
gqgqgqgqgq


 
)(0213.0)(0213.0)(0213.0)(0383.0
)(0213.0)(0213.0)(2617.0)(2617.01277.0)(
)()()()(
)()()()()(
r
l
kr
l
jr
l
ir
k
k
r
j
jr
j
ir
i
jr
i
ir
i
l
gqgqgqgq
gqgqgqgqgq


 
)(0407.0)(0497.0)(0407.0
)(1260.0)(1260.0)(0732.0)(0732.02439.0)(
)()()(
)()()()()(
r
l
lr
l
kr
l
j
r
j
lr
j
jr
i
lr
i
jr
j
i
gqgqgq
gqgqgqgqgq


  
)(0407.0)(0407.0)(0407.0
)(1260.0)(1260.0)(0732.0)(0732.02439.0)(
)()()(
)()()()()(
r
l
lr
l
kr
l
i
r
j
lr
j
ir
i
lr
i
ir
j
j
gqgqgq
gqgqgqgqgq


 
)(0355.0)(0355.0)(0355.0)(0638.0
)(1312.0)(1312.0)(0638.0)(0638.02128.0)(
)()()()(
)()()()()(
r
l
kr
l
jr
l
ir
k
k
r
j
jr
j
ir
i
jr
i
ir
j
l
gqgqgqgq
gqgqgqgqgq


 
)(0323.0)(0323.0)(0323.0)(2419.01935.0)( )()()()()( r
l
lr
l
jr
l
ir
k
lr
k
k gqgqgqgqgq    
)(0213.0)(0213.0)(0213.0)(2617.0
)(0213.0)(0213.0)(0383.0)(0383.01277.0)(
)()()()(
)()()()()(
r
l
kr
l
jr
l
ir
k
k
r
j
jr
j
ir
i
jr
i
ir
k
l
gqgqgqgq
gqgqgqgqgq


 
)(1260.0)(1260.0)(1260.0
)(0407.0)(0407.0)(0732.0)(0732.02439.0)(
)()()(
)()()()()(
r
l
lr
l
kr
l
j
r
j
lr
j
jr
i
lr
i
jr
l
i
gqgqgq
gqgqgqgqgq


  
)(1260.0)(1260.0)(1260.0
)(0407.0)(0407.0)(0732.0)(0732.02439.0)(
)()()(
)()()()()(
r
l
lr
l
kr
l
i
r
j
lr
j
ir
i
lr
i
ir
l
j
gqgqgq
gqgqgqgqgq


 
)(1667.0)(1667.0)(1667.0)(0968.03226.0)( )()()()()( r
l
lr
l
jr
l
ir
k
lr
l
k gqgqgqgqgq    
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)(1312.0)(1312.0)(1312.0)(0638.0
)(0355.0)(0355.0)(0638.0)(0638.02128.0)(
)()()()(
)()()()()(
r
l
kr
l
jr
l
ir
k
k
r
j
jr
j
ir
i
jr
i
ir
l
l
gqgqgqgq
gqgqgqgqgq


 
 
Solving by substitution, the following expressions are obtained:  
 
)()( r
i
i gq  = )(
)(
r
i
j gq  
= 0.1170; )()( r
i
l gq  
= 0.0969; )()( r
j
i gq  = )(
)(
r
j
j gq  
= 0.2299;
 
)()( r
j
l gq  
= 
0.2018; )()( r
k
k gq  = 0.1850; )(
)(
r
k
l gq  
= 0.1116; )()( r
l
i gq  = )(
)(
r
l
j gq  
= 0.2002; )()( r
l
k gq  = 
0.2380; )()( r
l
l gq  
= 0.1721; )( ri gCS  = )( rj gCS  = 0.1497; )( rk gCS  = 0.0895; )( rl gCS  = 
0.1695; )()( r
i
i g  = )(
)(
r
i
j g  
= 0.0308; )()( r
i
l g  
= 0.0211; )()( r
j
i g  = )(
)(
r
j
j g  
= 0.0661; 
)()( r
j
l g  
= 0.0509; )()( r
k
k g  = 0.0770; )(
)(
r
k
l g  
= 0.0280; )()( r
l
i g  = )(
)(
r
l
j g  
= 0.0501; 
)()( r
l
k g  = 0.0708; )(
)(
r
l
l g  
= 0.0370; )( ri gPS  = 0.0410; )( rj gPS  = 0.0547; )( rk gPS  = 
0.0330; )( rl gPS  = 0.0821; )( ri gW  = 0.2734; )( rj gW  = 0.3875; )( rk gW  = 0.2275; and 
)( rl gW  = 0.4596.  
 
Network s 
 
In considering the equations presented in Section 4.2.1.3, the following results are obtained: 
 
)(0213.0
)(0213.0)(0213.0)(0383.0)(0383.0)(0213.0
)(0213.0)(2617.0)(2627.0)(2617.01277.0)(
)(
)()()()()(
)()()()()(
s
l
l
s
l
ks
l
js
k
ls
k
ks
j
l
s
j
js
i
ls
i
ks
i
js
i
i
gq
gqgqgqgqgq
gqgqgqgqgq



  
)(0244.0)(0244.0)(0244.0)(0244.0
)(0244.0)(2561.0)(2561.0)(2561.01463.0)(
)()()()(
)()()()()(
s
l
ls
l
ks
l
is
j
l
s
j
is
i
ls
i
ks
i
is
i
j
gqgqgqgq
gqgqgqgqgq


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)(0270.0)(0270.0)(0270.0)(0486.0
)(0486.0)(2514.0)(2514.0)(2514.01622.0)(
)()()()(
)()()()()(
s
l
ls
l
js
l
is
k
l
s
k
is
i
ls
i
js
i
is
i
k
gqgqgqgq
gqgqgqgqgq


  
)(0213.0
)(0213.0)(0213.0)(0383.0)(0383.0)(0213.0
)(0213.0)(2617.0)(2617.0)(2617.01277.0)(
)(
)()()()()(
)()()()()(
s
l
k
s
l
js
l
is
k
ks
k
is
j
j
s
j
is
i
ks
i
js
i
is
i
l
gq
gqgqgqgqgq
gqgqgqgqgq



 
)(0355.0
)(0355.0)(0355.0)(0638.0)(0638.0)(1312.0
)(1312.0)(0638.0)(0638.0)(0638.02128.0)(
)(
)()()()()(
)()()()()(
s
l
l
s
l
ks
l
js
k
ls
k
ks
j
l
s
j
js
i
ls
i
ks
i
js
j
i
gq
gqgqgqgqgq
gqgqgqgqgq



  
)(0407.0)(0407.0)(0407.0)(1260.0
)(1260.0)(0732.0)(0732.0)(0732.02439.0)(
)()()()(
)()()()()(
s
l
ls
l
ks
l
is
j
l
s
j
is
i
ls
i
ks
i
is
j
j
gqgqgqgq
gqgqgqgqgq


 
)(0355.0
)(0355.0)(0355.0)(0638.0)(0638.0)(1312.0
)(1312.0)(0638.0)(0638.0)(0638.02128.0)(
)(
)()()()()(
)()()()()(
s
l
k
s
l
js
l
is
k
ks
k
is
j
j
s
j
is
i
ks
i
js
i
is
j
l
gq
gqgqgqgqgq
gqgqgqgqgq



 
)(0213.0
)(0213.0)(0213.0)(2617.0)(2617.0)(0213.0
)(0213.0)(0383.0)(0383.0)(0383.01277.0)(
)(
)()()()()(
)()()()()(
s
l
l
s
l
ks
l
js
k
ls
k
ks
j
l
s
j
js
i
ls
i
ks
i
js
k
i
gq
gqgqgqgqgq
gqgqgqgqgq



  
)(0270.0)(0270.0)(0270.0)(2514.0
)(2514.0)(0486.0)(0486.0)(0486.01622.0)(
)()()()(
)()()()()(
s
l
ls
l
js
l
is
k
l
s
k
is
i
ls
i
js
i
is
k
k
gqgqgqgq
gqgqgqgqgq


  
)(0213.0
)(0213.0)(0213.0)(2617.0)(2617.0)(0213.0
)(0213.0)(0383.0)(0383.0)(0383.01277.0)(
)(
)()()()()(
)()()()()(
s
l
k
s
l
js
l
is
k
ks
k
is
j
j
s
j
is
i
ks
i
js
i
is
k
l
gq
gqgqgqgqgq
gqgqgqgqgq



 
)(1312.0
)(1312.0)(1312.0)(0638.0)(0638.0)(0355.0
)(0355.0)(0638.0)(0638.0)(0638.02128.0)(
)(
)()()()()(
)()()()()(
s
l
l
s
l
ks
l
js
k
ls
k
ks
j
l
s
j
js
i
ls
i
ks
i
js
l
i
gq
gqgqgqgqgq
gqgqgqgqgq



  
)(01260.0)(1260.0)(1260.0)(0407.0
)(0407.0)(0732.0)(0732.0)(0732.02439.0)(
)()()()(
)()()()()(
s
l
ls
l
ks
l
is
j
l
s
j
is
i
ls
i
ks
i
is
l
j
gqgqgqgq
gqgqgqgqgq


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)(1216.0)(1216.0)(1216.0)(0811.0
)(0811.0)(0811.0)(0811.0)(0811.02703.0)(
)()()()(
)()()()()(
s
l
ls
l
js
l
is
k
l
s
k
is
i
ls
i
js
i
is
l
k
gqgqgqgq
gqgqgqgqgq


  
)(1312.0
)(1312.0)(1312.0)(0638.0)(0638.0)(0355.0
)(0355.0)(0638.0)(0638.0)(0638.02128.0)(
)(
)()()()()(
)()()()()(
s
l
k
s
l
js
l
is
k
ks
k
is
j
j
s
j
is
i
ks
i
js
i
is
l
l
gq
gqgqgqgqgq
gqgqgqgqgq



 
 
Solving by substitution, the following expressions are obtained:  
 
)()( s
i
i gq  = )(
)(
s
i
l gq  
= 0.0808; )(
)(
s
i
j gq  
= 0.0987; )()( s
i
k gq  = 0.1218; )(
)(
s
j
i gq  = )(
)(
s
j
l gq  
= 
0.2109; )(
)(
s
j
j gq  
= 0.2359; )()( s
k
i gq  = )(
)(
s
k
l gq  
= 0.0993; )()( s
k
k gq  = 0.1403; )(
)(
s
l
i gq  = 
)()( s
l
l gq  
= 0.1811; )(
)(
s
l
j gq  
= 0.2061; )()( s
l
k gq  = 0.2384;  )( si gCS  = )( sl gCS  = 0.1636; 
)( sj gCS  = 0.1462; )( sk gCS  = 0.1252; )(
)(
s
i
i g  = )(
)(
s
i
l g  
= 0.0147; )(
)(
s
i
j g  
= 0.0219; 
)()( s
i
k g  = 0.0334;  )(
)(
s
j
i g  = )(
)(
s
j
l g  
= 0.0556; )(
)(
s
j
j g  
= 0.0696; )()( s
k
i g  = )(
)(
s
k
l g  
= 0.0222; )()( s
k
k g  = 0.0443;  )(
)(
s
l
i g  = )(
)(
s
l
l g  
= 0.0410; )(
)(
s
l
j g  
= 0.0531; )()( s
l
k g  = 
0.0710;  )( si gPS  = 0.0547; )( sj gPS  = 0.0541; )( sk gPS  = 0.0431; )( sl gPS  = 0.0813; 
)( si gW  = 0.3030; )( sj gW  = 0.3810; )( sk gW  = 0.2569; and )( sl gW  = 0.4510.  
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In considering the equations presented in Section 4.2.1.3, the following results are obtained: 
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Solving by substitution, the following expressions are obtained:  
 
)()( t
i
i gq  = )(
)(
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i
k gq  = )(
)(
t
k
i gq  = )(
)(
t
k
k gq  = 0.0777; )(
)(
t
i
j gq  
= )()( t
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l gq  
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k
j gq  
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)()( t
k
l gq  
= 0.1180; )()( t
j
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k gq  = )(
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l
i gq  = )(
)(
t
l
k gq  = 0.2076; )(
)(
t
j
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=   )()( t
l
l gq  
= 0.2641; )( ti gCS  = )( tk gCS  = 0.1628; )( tj gCS  = )( tl gCS  = 0.1250; )(
)(
t
i
i g  = )(
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i
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k
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t
l
k g  = 0.0539; )(
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j
j g  
= )()( t
l
l g  
= 0.0872; )( ti gPS  
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= )( tk gPS  = 0.0574; )( tj gPS  = )( tl gPS  = 0.0577; )( ti gW  = )( tk gW  = 0.3100; and )( tj gW  
= )( tl gW  = 0.3777.  
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In considering the equations presented in Section 4.2.1.3, the following results are obtained: 
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Solving by substitution, the following expressions are obtained:  
 
)()( u
i
i gq  = )(
)(
u
i
j gq  
= 0.0808; )()( u
i
k gq  = 0.1218; )(
)(
u
i
l gq  
= 0.0987; )()( u
j
i gq  = )(
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u
j
j gq  
= 
0.1811; )()( u
j
k gq  = 0.2384; )(
)(
u
j
l gq  
= 0.2061; )()( u
k
i gq  = )(
)(
u
k
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= 0.0993; )()( u
k
k gq  = 
0.1403; )()( u
l
i gq  = )(
)(
u
l
j gq  
= 0.2109; )()( u
l
l gq  
= 0.2359; )( ui gCS  = )( uj gCS  = 0.1636; 
)( uk gCS  = 0.1252; )( ul gCS  = 0.1462; )(
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u
i
i g  = )(
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u
i
j g  
= 0.0147; )()( u
i
k g  = 0.0334; 
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)()( u
i
l g  
= 0.0219; )()( u
j
i g  = )(
)(
u
j
j g  
= 0.0410; )()( u
j
k g  = 0.0710; )(
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j
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= 0.0531; 
)()( u
k
i g  = )(
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u
k
j g  
= 0.0222; )()( u
k
k g  = 0.0443;  )(
)(
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l
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u
l
j g  
= 0.0556; )()( u
l
l g  
= 0.0696; )( ui gPS  = 0.0547; )( uj gPS  = 0.0813; )( uk gPS  = 0.0431; )( ul gPS  = 0.0541; 
)( ui gW  = 0.3030; )( uj gW  = 0.4510; )( uk gW  = 0.2569; and )( ul gW  = 0.3810.  
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In considering the equations presented in Section 4.2.1.3, the following results are obtained: 
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i
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k
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gqgqgqgqgq
gqgqgqgqgq



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)()()()(
)()()()()(
v
l
lv
l
kv
l
jv
j
l
v
j
kv
j
jv
i
lv
i
jv
l
i
gqgqgqgq
gqgqgqgqgq


  
)(1312.0
)(1312.0)(1312.0)(0638.0)(0638.0)(0355.0
)(0355.0)(0355.0)(0638.0)(0638.02128.0)(
)(
)()()()()(
)()()()()(
v
l
l
v
l
kv
l
iv
k
lv
k
kv
j
l
v
j
kv
j
iv
i
lv
i
iv
l
j
gq
gqgqgqgqgq
gqgqgqgqgq



 
)(1260.0)(1260.0)(1260.0)(0732.0
)(0732.0)(0407.0)(0407.0)(0407.02439.0)(
)()()()(
)()()()()(
v
l
lv
l
jv
l
iv
k
l
v
k
jv
j
lv
j
jv
j
iv
l
k
gqgqgqgq
gqgqgqgqgq


  
)(1312.0
)(1312.0)(1312.0)(0638.0)(0638.0)(0355.0
)(0355.0)(0355.0)(0638.0)(0638.02128.0)(
)(
)()()()()(
)()()()()(
v
l
k
v
l
jv
l
iv
k
kv
k
jv
j
k
v
j
jv
j
iv
i
jv
i
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l
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gqgqgqgqgq
gqgqgqgqgq



 
 
Solving by substitution, the following expressions are obtained:  
 
)()( v
i
i gq  = )(
)(
v
k
k gq  = 0.1217; )(
)(
v
i
j gq  
= )()( v
i
l gq  
= )(
)(
v
k
j gq  
= )()( v
k
l gq  
= 0.1031; )()( v
j
i gq  = 
)()( v
j
k gq  = )(
)(
v
l
i gq  = )(
)(
v
l
k gq  = 0.2097; )(
)(
v
j
j gq  
= )()( v
j
l gq  
= )(
)(
v
l
j gq  
= )()( v
l
l gq  
= 0.1837; 
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)( vi gCS  = )( vk gCS  = 0.1464; )( vj gCS  = )( vl gCS  = 0.1645; )(
)(
v
i
i g  = )(
)(
v
k
k g  = 0.0333; 
)()( v
i
j g  
= )()( v
i
l g  
= )(
)(
v
k
j g  
= )()( v
k
l g  
= 0.0239; )()( v
j
i g  = )(
)(
v
j
k g  = )(
)(
v
l
i g  = 
)()( v
l
k g  = 0.0550; )(
)(
v
j
j g  
= )()( v
j
l g  
= )(
)(
v
l
j g  
= )()( v
l
l g  
= 0.0422; )( vi gPS  = )( vk gPS  
= 0.0403; )( vj gPS  = )( vl gPS  = 0.0774; )( vi gW  = )( vk gW  = 0.2679; and )( vj gW  = )( vl gW  
= 0.4363.  
 
Network w 
 
In considering the equations presented in Section 4.2.1.3, the following results are obtained: 
 
)(0244.0)(0244.0
)(0244.0)(0244.0)(2561.0)(2561.01463.0)(
)()(
)()()()()(
w
l
lw
l
k
w
j
kw
j
jw
i
lw
i
jw
i
i
gqgq
gqgqgqgqgq


  
)(0486.0)(0486.0
)(0270.0)(0270.0)(2514.0)(2514.01622.0)(
)()(
)()()()()(
w
k
lw
k
k
w
j
kw
j
iw
i
lw
i
iw
i
j
gqgq
gqgqgqgqgq


 
)(0270.0)(0270.0
)(0486.0)(0486.0)(2514.0)(2514.01622.0)(
)()(
)()()()()(
w
l
kw
l
i
w
k
kw
k
jw
i
jw
i
iw
i
l
gqgq
gqgqgqgqgq


 
)(0407.0)(0407.0
)(1260.0)(1260.0)(0732.0)(0732.02439.0)(
)()(
)()()()()(
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l
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l
k
w
j
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j
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i
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i
jw
j
i
gqgq
gqgqgqgqgq


  
)(0811.0)(0811.0
)(1216.0)(1216.0)(0811.0)(0811.02703.0)(
)()(
)()()()()(
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k
lw
k
k
w
j
kw
j
iw
i
lw
i
iw
j
j
gqgq
gqgqgqgqgq


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)()()()()(
w
l
lw
l
i
w
k
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k
jw
j
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j
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j
k
gqgq
gqgqgqgqgq


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)(2514.0)(2514.0
)(0270.0)(0270.0)(0486.0)(0486.01622.0)(
)()(
)()()()()(
w
k
lw
k
k
w
j
kw
j
iw
i
lw
i
iw
k
j
gqgq
gqgqgqgqgq


 
)(0244.0)(0244.0
)(2561.0)(2561.0)(0244.0)(0244.01463.0)(
)()(
)()()()()(
w
l
lw
l
i
w
k
lw
k
jw
j
jw
j
iw
k
k
gqgq
gqgqgqgqgq


  
)(0270.0)(0270.0
)(2514.0)(2514.0)(0486.0)(0486.01622.0)(
)()(
)()()()()(
w
l
kw
l
i
w
k
kw
k
jw
i
jw
i
iw
k
l
gqgq
gqgqgqgqgq


 
)(1260.0)(1260.0
)(0407.0)(0407.0)(0732.0)(0732.02439.0)(
)()(
)()()()()(
w
l
lw
l
k
w
j
kw
j
jw
i
lw
i
jw
l
i
gqgq
gqgqgqgqgq


  
)(1260.0)(1260.0
)(0732.0)(0732.0)(0407.0)(0407.02439.0)(
)()(
)()()()()(
w
l
lw
l
i
w
k
lw
k
jw
j
jw
j
iw
l
k
gqgq
gqgqgqgqgq


  
)(1216.0)(1216.0
)(0811.0)(0811.0)(0811.0)(0811.02703.0)(
)()(
)()()()()(
w
l
kw
l
i
w
k
kw
k
jw
i
jw
i
iw
l
l
gqgq
gqgqgqgqgq


 
 
Solving by substitution, the following expressions are obtained:  
 
)()( w
i
i gq  = )(
)(
w
k
k gq  = 0.1044; )(
)(
w
i
j gq  
= )()( w
i
l gq  
= )(
)(
w
k
j gq  
= )()( w
k
l gq  
= 0.1272; 
)()( w
j
i gq  = )(
)(
w
j
k gq  = )(
)(
w
l
i gq  = )(
)(
w
l
k gq  = 0.2219; )(
)(
w
j
j gq  
= )()( w
l
l gq  
= 0.2539; 
)( wi gCS  = )( wk gCS  = 0.1503; )( wj gCS  =  )( wl gCS  = 0.1292; )(
)(
w
i
i g  = )(
)(
w
k
k g  = 
0.0245; )(
)(
w
i
j g  
= )()( w
i
l g  
= )(
)(
w
k
j g  
= )()( w
k
l g  
= 0.0364; )()( w
j
i g  = )(
)(
w
j
k g  = 
)()( w
l
i g  = )(
)(
w
l
k g  = 0.0616; )(
)(
w
j
j g  
= )()( w
l
l g  
= 0.0806; )( wi gPS  = )( wk gPS  = 
0.0483; )( wj gPS  = )( wl gPS  = 0.0608; )( wi gW  = )( wk gW  = 0.2959; and )( wj gW  = )( wl gW  
= 0.3937.  
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Network x 
 
In considering the equations presented in Section 4.2.1.3, the following results are obtained: 
 
)(0213.0)(0213.0)(0213.0
)(0383.0)(0383.0)(0383.0)(0213.0)(0213.0
)(0213.0)(2617.0)(2617.0)(2617.01277.0)(
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


  
)(0213.0)(0213.0)(0213.0
)(0383.0)(0383.0)(0383.0)(0213.0)(0213.0
)(0213.0)(2617.0)(2617.0)(2617.01277.0)(
)()()(
)()()()()(
)()()()()(
x
l
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i
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gqgqgqgqgq
gqgqgqgqgq



 
)(0213.0)(0213.0)(0213.0
)(0383.0)(0383.0)(0383.0)(0213.0)(0213.0
)(0213.0)(2617.0)(2617.0)(2617.01277.0)(
)()()(
)()()()()(
)()()()()(
x
l
lx
l
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l
i
x
k
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k
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k
ix
j
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j
j
x
j
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gqgqgq
gqgqgqgqgq
gqgqgqgqgq



 
)(0213.0)(0213.0)(0213.0
)(0383.0)(0383.0)(0383.0)(0213.0)(0213.0
)(0213.0)(2617.0)(2617.0)(2617.01277.0)(
)()()(
)()()()()(
)()()()()(
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l
kx
l
jx
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x
k
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k
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k
ix
j
kx
j
j
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j
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i
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gqgqgq
gqgqgqgqgq
gqgqgqgqgq



 
)(0355.0)(0355.0)(0355.0
)(0638.0)(0638.0)(0638.0)(1312.0)(1312.0
)(1312.0)(0638.0)(0638.0)(0638.02128.0)(
)()()(
)()()()()(
)()()()()(
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l
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l
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l
j
x
k
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jx
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j
k
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j
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gqgqgq
gqgqgqgqgq
gqgqgqgqgq



 
)(0355.0)(0355.0)(0355.0
)(0638.0)(0638.0)(0638.0)(1312.0)(1312.0
)(1312.0)(0638.0)(0638.0)(0638.02128.0)(
)()()(
)()()()()(
)()()()()(
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gqgqgqgqgq
gqgqgqgqgq



 
)(0355.0)(0355.0)(0355.0
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)()()(
)()()()()(
)()()()()(
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gqgqgqgqgq
gqgqgqgqgq



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)(0355.0)(0355.0)(0355.0
)(0638.0)(0638.0)(0638.0)(1312.0)(1312.0
)(1312.0)(0638.0)(0638.0)(0638.02128.0)(
)()()(
)()()()()(
)()()()()(
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x
k
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j
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j
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i
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gqgqgq
gqgqgqgqgq
gqgqgqgqgq



 
)(0213.0)(0213.0)(0213.0
)(2617.0)(2617.0)(2617.0)(0213.0)(0213.0
)(0213.0)(0383.0)(0383.0)(0383.01277.0)(
)()()(
)()()()()(
)()()()()(
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j
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gqgqgqgqgq
gqgqgqgqgq



 
)(0213.0)(0213.0)(0213.0
)(2617.0)(2617.0)(2617.0)(0213.0)(0213.0
)(0213.0)(0383.0)(0383.0)(0383.01277.0)(
)()()(
)()()()()(
)()()()()(
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gqgqgqgqgq



 
)(0213.0)(0213.0)(0213.0
)(2617.0)(2617.0)(2617.0)(0213.0)(0213.0
)(0213.0)(0383.0)(0383.0)(0383.01277.0)(
)()()(
)()()()()(
)()()()()(
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gqgqgqgqgq
gqgqgqgqgq



 
)(0213.0)(0213.0)(0213.0
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)(0213.0)(0383.0)(0383.0)(0383.01277.0)(
)()()(
)()()()()(
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gqgqgqgqgq



 
)(1312.0)(1312.0)(1312.0
)(0638.0)(0638.0)(0638.0)(0355.0)(0355.0
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)()()(
)()()()()(
)()()()()(
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gqgqgqgqgq



 
)(1312.0)(1312.0)(1312.0
)(0638.0)(0638.0)(0638.0)(0355.0)(0355.0
)(0355.0)(0638.0)(0638.0)(0638.02128.0)(
)()()(
)()()()()(
)()()()()(
x
l
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l
kx
l
i
x
k
lx
k
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k
ix
j
lx
j
k
x
j
ix
i
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i
kx
i
ix
l
j
gqgqgq
gqgqgqgqgq
gqgqgqgqgq



 
)(1312.0)(1312.0)(1312.0
)(0638.0)(0638.0)(0638.0)(0355.0)(0355.0
)(0355.0)(0638.0)(0638.0)(0638.02128.0)(
)()()(
)()()()()(
)()()()()(
x
l
lx
l
jx
l
i
x
k
lx
k
jx
k
ix
j
lx
j
j
x
j
ix
i
lx
i
jx
i
ix
l
k
gqgqgq
gqgqgqgqgq
gqgqgqgqgq



 
)(1312.0)(1312.0)(1312.0
)(0638.0)(0638.0)(0638.0)(0355.0)(0355.0
)(0355.0)(0638.0)(0638.0)(0638.02128.0)(
)()()(
)()()()()(
)()()()()(
x
l
kx
l
jx
l
i
x
k
kx
k
jx
k
ix
j
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j
j
x
j
ix
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i
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i
ix
l
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gqgqgq
gqgqgqgqgq
gqgqgqgqgq



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Solving by substitution, the following expressions are obtained:  
 
)()( x
i
i gq  = )(
)(
x
i
j gq  
= )()( x
i
k gq  = )(
)(
x
i
l gq  
= )()( x
k
i gq  = )(
)(
x
k
j gq  
= )()( x
k
k gq  = )(
)(
x
k
l gq  
= 
0.0911; )()( x
j
i gq  = )(
)(
x
j
j gq  
= )()( x
j
k gq  = )(
)(
x
j
l gq  
= )()( x
l
i gq  = )(
)(
x
l
j gq  
= )()( x
l
k gq  = 
)()( x
l
l gq  
= 0.1924; )( xi gCS  = )( xj gCS  = )( xk gCS  = )( xl gCS  = 0.1608; )(
)(
x
i
i g  = 
)()( x
i
j g  
= )()( x
i
k g  = )(
)(
x
i
l g  
= )()( x
k
i g  = )(
)(
x
k
j g  
= )()( x
k
k g  = )(
)(
x
k
l g  
= 0.0187; 
)()( x
j
i g  = )(
)(
x
j
j g  
= )()( x
j
k g  = )(
)(
x
j
l g  
= )()( x
l
i g  = )(
)(
x
l
j g  
= )()( x
l
k g  = )(
)(
x
l
l g  
= 
0.0463; )( xi gPS  = )( xk gPS  = 0.0498; )( xj gPS  = )( xl gPS  = 0.0740; )( xi gW  = )( xk gW  = 
0.2854; and )( xj gW  = )( xl gW  = 0.4199.  
 
Network y 
 
In considering the equations presented in Section 4.2.1.3, the following results are obtained: 
 
)(0323.0)(0323.0)(2419.01935.0)( )()()()( y
j
ky
j
jy
i
jy
i
i gqgqgqgq    
)(0486.0
)(0486.0)(0270.0)(0270.0)(2514.01622.0)(
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)()()()()(
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l
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k
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j
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j
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i
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i
j
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gqgqgqgqgq


 
)(1129.0)(1129.0)(0968.03226.0)( )()()()( y
j
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j
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i
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j
i gqgqgqgq    
)(0811.0
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)()()()()(
y
k
l
y
k
ky
j
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j
iy
i
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j
j
gq
gqgqgqgqgq


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)(0407.0
)(0732.0)(0732.0)(1260.0)(1260.02439.0)(
)(
)()()()()(
y
l
l
y
k
ly
k
jy
j
jy
j
iy
j
k
gq
gqgqgqgqgq


  
)(2514.0
)(2514.0)(0270.0)(0270.0)(0486.01622.0)(
)(
)()()()()(
y
k
l
y
k
ky
j
ky
j
iy
i
iy
k
j
gq
gqgqgqgqgq


 
)(0244.0
)(2561.0)(2561.0)(0244.0)(0244.01463.0)(
)(
)()()()()(
y
l
l
y
k
ly
k
jy
j
jy
j
iy
k
k
gq
gqgqgqgqgq


  
)(0323.0)(2419.0)(2419.01935.0)( )()()()( y
l
ky
k
ky
k
jy
k
l gqgqgqgq   
)(1260.0
)(0732.0)(0732.0)(0407.0)(0407.02439.0)(
)(
)()()()()(
y
l
l
y
k
ly
k
jy
j
jy
j
iy
l
k
gq
gqgqgqgqgq


  
)(1129.0)(0968.0)(0968.03226.0)( )()()()( y
l
ky
k
ky
k
jy
l
l gqgqgqgq 
 
 
Solving by substitution, the following expressions are obtained:  
 
)()( y
i
i gq  = 0.1734; )(
)(
y
i
j gq  
= 0.1439; )(
)(
y
j
i gq  = 0.2853; )(
)(
y
j
j gq  
= 0.2441; )(
)(
y
j
k gq  = 
0.2098; )(
)(
y
k
j gq  
= 0.1221; )(
)(
y
k
k gq  = 0.0977; )(
)(
y
k
l gq  
= 0.1483; )(
)(
y
l
k gq  = 0.2454; 
)()( y
l
l gq  
= 0.3162; )( yi gCS  = 0.1052; )( yj gCS  = 0.1301; )( yk gCS  = 0.1529; )( yl gCS  = 
0.1078; )(
)(
y
i
i g  = 0.0676; )(
)(
y
i
j g  
= 0.0466; )(
)(
y
j
i g  = 0.1017; )(
)(
y
j
j g  
= 0.0745; 
)()( y
j
k g  = 0.0550; )(
)(
y
k
j g  
= 0.0336; )(
)(
y
k
k g  = 0.0215; )(
)(
y
k
l g  
= 0.0495; )(
)(
y
l
k g  = 
0.0753; )(
)(
y
l
l g  
= 0.1249; )( yi gPS  = 0.0378; )( yj gPS  = 0.0683; )( yk gPS  = 0.0508; 
)( yl gPS  = 0.0394; )( yi gW  = 0.2572; )( yj gW  = 0.4296; )( yk gW  = 0.3082; and )( yl gW  = 
0.3475.  
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Network z 
 
In considering the equations presented in Section 4.2.1.3, the following results are obtained: 
 
)(0244.0)(0244.0)(2561.0)(2561.01463.0)( )()()()()( z
l
lz
j
jz
i
lz
i
jz
i
i gqgqgqgqgq    
)(0323.0)(2419.0)(2419.01935.0)( )()()()( z
j
iz
i
lz
i
iz
i
j gqgqgqgq 
 )(0323.0)(2419.0)(2419.01935.0)(
)()()()(
z
l
iz
i
jz
i
iz
i
l gqgqgqgq 
 )(0407.0)(1260.0)(0732.0)(0732.02439.0)(
)()()()()(
z
l
lz
j
jz
i
lz
i
jz
j
i gqgqgqgqgq    
)(1129.0)(0968.0)(0968.03226.0)( )()()()( z
j
iz
i
lz
i
iz
j
j gqgqgqgq   
2857.0)()( z
k
k gq   
)(1260.0)(0407.0)(0732.0)(0732.02439.0)( )()()()()( z
l
lz
j
jz
i
lz
i
jz
l
i gqgqgqgqgq    
)(1129.0)(0968.0)(0968.03226.0)( )()()()( z
l
iz
i
jz
i
iz
l
l gqgqgqgq 
 
 
Solving by substitution, the following expressions are obtained:  
 
)()( z
i
i gq  = 0.0876; )(
)(
z
i
j gq  
= )()( z
i
l gq  
= 0.1450; )()( z
j
i gq  = )(
)(
z
l
i gq  = 0.2380; )(
)(
z
j
j gq  
= 
)()( z
l
l gq  
= 0.3182; )()( z
k
k gq  = 0.2857; )( zi gCS  = 0.1588; )( zj gCS  = )( zl gCS  = 0.1073; 
)( zk gCS  = 0.0408; )(
)(
z
i
i g  = 0.0173; )(
)(
z
i
j g  
= )()( z
i
l g  
= 0.0473; )()( z
j
i g  = )(
)(
z
l
i g  = 
0.0708; )(
)(
z
j
j g  
= )()( z
l
l g  
= 0.1266;
 
)()( z
k
k g  = 0.1837; )( zi gPS  = 0.0534; )( zj gPS  = 
)( zl gPS  = 0.0387; )( zk gPS  = 0.0306; )( zi gW  = 0.3241; )( zj gW  = )( zl gW  = 0.3433; and 
)( zk gW  = 0.2551.  
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Network a’ 
 
In considering the equations presented in Section 4.2.1.3, the following results are obtained: 
 
)(0323.0)(0323.0)(2419.01935.0)( '
)(
'
)(
'
)(
'
)(
a
j
ka
j
ja
i
ja
i
i gqgqgqgq    
)(0486.0)(0270.0)(0270.0)(2514.01622.0)( '
)(
'
)(
'
)(
'
)(
'
)(
a
k
ka
j
ka
j
ia
i
ia
i
j gqgqgqgqgq   
)(1129.0)(1129.0)(0968.03226.0)( '
)(
'
)(
'
)(
'
)(
a
j
ka
j
ja
i
ja
j
i gqgqgqgq    
)(0811.0)(1216.0)(1216.0)(0811.02703.0)( '
)(
'
)(
'
)(
'
)(
'
)(
a
k
ka
j
ka
j
ia
i
ia
j
j gqgqgqgqgq 
 )(0968.0)(1129.0)(1129.03226.0)( '
)(
'
)(
'
)(
'
)(
a
k
ja
j
ja
j
ia
j
k gqgqgqgq    
)(2514.0)(0270.0)(0270.0)(0486.01622.0)( '
)(
'
)(
'
)(
'
)(
'
)(
a
k
ka
j
ka
j
ia
i
ia
k
j gqgqgqgqgq 
 )(2419.0)(0323.0)(0323.01935.0)( '
)(
'
)(
'
)(
'
)(
a
k
ja
j
ja
j
ia
k
k gqgqgqgq    
4000.0)( '
)( a
l
l gq
 
 
Solving by substitution, the following expressions are obtained:  
 
)( '
)(
a
i
i gq  = )( '
)(
a
k
k gq  = 0.1757; )( '
)(
a
i
j gq  
= )( '
)(
a
k
j gq  
= 0.1416; )( '
)(
a
j
i gq  = )( '
)(
a
j
k gq  = 0.2787; 
)( '
)(
a
j
j gq  
= 0.2310; )( '
)(
a
l
l gq  
= 0.4000; )( 'ai gCS  = )( 'ak gCS  = 0.1033; )( 'aj gCS  = 0.1322; 
)( 'al gCS  = 0.0800; )( '
)(
a
i
i g  = )( '
)(
a
k
k g  = 0.0695; )( '
)(
a
i
j g  
= )( '
)(
a
k
j g  
= 0.0451; )( '
)(
a
j
i g  
= )( '
)(
a
j
k g  = 0.0971; )( '
)(
a
j
j g  
= 0.0667; )( '
)(
a
l
l g  
= 0.2000; )( 'ai gPS  = )( 'ak gPS  = 
0.0378; )( 'aj gPS  = 0.0777;  )( 'al gPS  = 0.0200; )( 'ai gW  = )( 'ak gW  = 0.2556; )( 'aj gW  = 
0.4708; and )( 'al gW  = 0.3000.  
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Network b’ 
 
In considering the equations presented in Section 4.2.1.3, the following results are obtained: 
 
)(0323.0)(2419.01935.0)( '
)(
'
)(
'
)(
b
j
jb
i
jb
i
i gqgqgq    
)(0323.0)(2419.01935.0)( '
)(
'
)(
'
)(
b
j
ib
i
ib
i
j gqgqgq   
)(1129.0)(0968.03226.0)( '
)(
'
)(
'
)(
b
j
jb
i
jb
j
i gqgqgq    
)(1129.0)(0968.03226.0)( '
)(
'
)(
'
)(
b
j
ib
i
ib
j
j gqgqgq   
)(0323.0)(2419.01935.0)( '
)(
'
)(
'
)(
b
l
lb
k
lb
k
k gqgqgq    
)(0323.0)(2419.01935.0)( '
)(
'
)(
'
)(
b
l
kb
k
kb
k
l gqgqgq   
)(1129.0)(0968.03226.0)( '
)(
'
)(
'
)(
b
l
lb
k
lb
l
k gqgqgq    
)(1129.0)(0968.03226.0)( '
)(
'
)(
'
)(
b
k
lb
k
kb
l
l gqgqgq 
 
 
Solving by substitution, the following expressions are obtained:  
 
)( '
)(
b
i
i gq  = )( '
)(
b
i
j gq  
= )( '
)(
b
k
k gq  = )( '
)(
b
k
l gq  
= 0.1637; )( '
)(
b
j
i gq  = )( '
)(
b
j
j gq  
= )( '
)(
b
l
k gq  = 
)( '
)(
b
l
l gq  
= 0.3041; )( 'bi gCS  = )( 'bj gCS  = )( 'bk gCS  = )( 'bl gCS  = 0.1094; )( '
)(
b
i
i g  = 
)( '
)(
b
i
j g  
= )( '
)(
b
k
k g  = )( '
)(
b
k
l g  
= 0.0603; )( '
)(
b
j
i g  = )( '
)(
b
j
j g  
= )( '
)(
b
l
k g  = )( '
)(
b
l
l g  
= 
0.1156; )( 'bi gPS  = )( 'bk gPS  = 0.0402; )( 'bj gPS  = )( 'bl gPS  = 0.0462; )( 'bi gW  = )( 'bk gW  = 
0.2703; and )( 'bj gW  = )( 'bl gW  = 0.3869.  
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Network c’ 
 
In considering the equations presented in Section 4.2.1.3, the following results are obtained: 
 
)(0667.0)(2333.02222.0)( '
)(
'
)(
'
)(
c
k
kc
i
kc
i
i gqgqgq    
)(0667.0)(2333.02222.0)( '
)(
'
)(
'
)(
c
k
ic
i
ic
i
k gqgqgq    
)(0476.0)(1190.02857.0)( '
)(
'
)(
'
)(
c
l
lc
j
lc
j
j gqgqgq   
)(0476.0)(1190.02857.0)( '
)(
'
)(
'
)(
c
l
jc
j
jc
j
l gqgqgq 
 )(2333.0)(0667.02222.0)( '
)(
'
)(
'
)(
c
k
kc
i
kc
k
i gqgqgq    
)(2333.0)(0667.02222.0)( '
)(
'
)(
'
)(
c
k
ic
i
ic
k
k gqgqgq    
)(1190.0)(0476.02857.0)( '
)(
'
)(
'
)(
c
l
lc
j
lc
l
j gqgqgq   
)(1190.0)(0476.02857.0)( '
)(
'
)(
'
)(
c
l
jc
j
jc
l
l gqgqgq 
 
 
Solving by substitution, the following expressions are obtained:  
 
)( '
)(
c
i
i gq  = )( '
)(
c
i
k gq  = )( '
)(
c
k
i gq  = )( '
)(
c
k
k gq  = 0.1905; )( '
)(
c
j
j gq  
= )( '
)(
c
j
l gq  
= )( '
)(
c
l
j gq  
= 
)( '
)(
c
l
l gq  
= 0.2667; )( 'ci gCS  = )( 'ck gCS  = 0.0726; )( 'cj gCS  = )( 'cl gCS  = 0.1422; )( '
)(
c
i
i g  
= )( '
)(
c
i
k g  = )( '
)(
c
k
i g  = )( '
)(
c
k
k g  = 0.0816; )( '
)(
c
j
j g  
= )( '
)(
c
j
l g  
= )( '
)(
c
l
j g  
= )( '
)(
c
l
l g  
= 
0.0889; )( 'ci gPS  = )( 'ck gPS  = 0.0544; )( 'cj gPS  = )( 'cl gPS  = 0.0356; )( 'ci gW  = )( 'ck gW  = 
0.2902; and )( 'cj gW  = )( 'cl gW  = 0.3556.  
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Appendix E 
 
Numerical results of the simulations developed in the current research 
 
This appendix shows the numerical results that were obtained from the simulations 
computed in the previous appendix. These results were tabulated as follows. 
 
 
Tables for Simulation 1: i = 0 and i = 1 for all i  N.    
 
Table E.1. Consumer surplus 
 Countries 
Networks i j k l 
a 
b 
c 
d 
e 
f 
g 
h 
i 
j 
k 
0.1250 
0.2222 
0.2222 
0.2813 
0.2813 
0.2813 
0.2813 
0.3200 
0.2813 
0.2813 
0.3200 
0.1250 
0.1250 
0.2222 
0.2813 
0.2813 
0.2222 
0.2813 
0.2222 
0.2813 
0.3200 
0.3200 
0.1250 
0.2222 
0.2222 
0.2222 
0.2813 
0.2222 
0.2813 
0.2222 
0.3200 
0.3200 
0.3200 
0.1250 
0.1250 
0.2222 
0.2222 
0.2813 
0.1250 
0.1250 
0.2222 
0.2222 
0.2813 
0.3200 
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Table E.2. Profits made by the intermediary 
 Countries 
Networks i j k l 
a 
b 
c 
d 
e 
f 
g 
h 
i 
j 
k 
0.2500 
0.2222 
0.2222 
0.2361 
0.1875 
0.2847 
0.1875 
0.3733 
0.1650 
0.1425 
0.1600 
0.2500 
0.2500 
0.2222 
0.2361 
0.1875 
0.1736 
0.1875 
0.1511 
0.1650 
0.2050 
0.1600 
0.2500 
0.2222 
0.2222 
0.1736 
0.1875 
0.1736 
0.1875 
0.1511 
0.2761 
0.2050 
0.1600 
0.2500 
0.2500 
0.2222 
0.1736 
0.1875 
0.2500 
0.2500 
0.1511 
0.1511 
0.1425 
0.1600 
 
 
Table E.3. Welfare 
 Countries 
Networks i j k l 
a 
b 
c 
d 
e 
f 
g 
h 
i 
j 
k 
0.3750 
0.4444 
0.4444 
0.5174 
0.4688 
0.5660 
0.4688 
0.6933 
0.4463 
0.4238 
0.4800 
0.3750 
0.3750 
0.4444 
0.5174 
0.4688 
0.3958 
0.4688 
0.3733 
0.4463 
0.5250 
0.4800 
0.3750 
0.4444 
0.4444 
0.3958 
0.4688 
0.3958 
0.4688 
0.3733 
0.5961 
0.5250 
0.4800 
0.3750 
0.3750 
0.4444 
0.3958 
0.4688 
0.3750 
0.3750 
0.3733 
0.3733 
0.4238 
0.4800 
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Tables for Simulation 2: i = 0.5 and i = 1 for all i  N.    
 
Table E.4. Consumer surplus 
 Countries 
Networks i j k l 
a 
b 
c 
d 
e 
f 
g 
h 
i 
j 
k 
0.0800 
0.1422 
0.1422 
0.1813 
0.1800 
0.1850 
0.1800 
0.2175 
0.1769 
0.1759 
0.2048 
0.0800 
0.0800 
0.1422 
0.1813 
0.1800 
0.1382 
0.1800 
0.1232 
0.1769 
0.2075 
0.2048 
0.0800 
0.1422 
0.1422 
0.1396 
0.1800 
0.1382 
0.1800 
0.1232 
0.2107 
0.2075 
0.2048 
0.0800 
0.0800 
0.1422 
0.1396 
0.1800 
0.0800 
0.0800 
0.1232 
0.1368 
0.1759 
0.2048 
 
 
 
Table E.5. Profits 
 Countries 
Networks i j k l 
a 
b 
c 
d 
e 
f 
g 
h 
i 
j 
k 
0.2000 
0.1778 
0.1778 
0.1702 
0.1500 
0.1908 
0.1500 
0.2093 
0.1419 
0.1318 
0.1280 
0.2000 
0.2000 
0.1778 
0.1702 
0.1500 
0.1558 
0.1500 
0.1321 
0.1419 
0.1456 
0.1280 
0.2000 
0.1778 
0.1778 
0.1564 
0.1500 
0.1558 
0.1500 
0.1321 
0.1721 
0.1456 
0.1280 
0.2000 
0.2000 
0.1778 
0.1564 
0.1500 
0.2000 
0.2000 
0.1321 
0.1462 
0.1318 
0.1280 
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Table E.6. Producer surplus 
 Countries 
Networks i j k l 
a 
b 
c 
d 
e 
f 
g 
h 
i 
j 
k 
0.0200 
0.0356 
0.0356 
0.0502 
0.0450 
0.0561 
0.0450 
0.0788 
0.0421 
0.0391 
0.0512 
0.0200 
0.0200 
0.0356 
0.0502 
0.0450 
0.0306 
0.0450 
0.0255 
0.0421 
0.0575 
0.0512 
0.0200 
0.0356 
0.0356 
0.0309 
0.0450 
0.0306 
0.0450 
0.0255 
0.0662 
0.0575 
0.0512 
0.0200 
0.0200 
0.0356 
0.0309 
0.0450 
0.0200 
0.0200 
0.0255 
0.0279 
0.0391 
0.0512 
 
 
Table E.7. Welfare 
 Countries 
Networks i j k l 
a 
b 
c 
d 
e 
f 
g 
h 
i 
j 
k 
0.3000 
0.3556 
0.3556 
0.4017 
0.3750 
0.4319 
0.3750 
0.5056 
0.3609 
0.3468 
0.3840 
0.3000 
0.3000 
0.3556 
0.4017 
0.3750 
0.3246 
0.3750 
0.2808 
0.3609 
0.4106 
0.3840 
0.3000 
0.3556 
0.3556 
0.3269 
0.3750 
0.3246 
0.3750 
0.2808 
0.4490 
0.4106 
0.3840 
0.3000 
0.3000 
0.3556 
0.3269 
0.3750 
0.3000 
0.3000 
0.2808 
0.3109 
0.3468 
0.3840 
 
 
 
 
 
 
850 
 
Tables for Simulation 3: i = 1.5 and i = 1 for all i  N.    
 
Table E.8. Consumer Surplus 
 Countries 
Networks i j k l 
a 
b 
c 
d 
e 
f 
g 
h 
i 
j 
k 
0.0408 
0.0726 
0.0726 
0.0945 
0.0918 
0.0989 
0.0918 
0.1262 
0.0890 
0.0873 
0.1045 
0.0408 
0.0408 
0.0726 
0.0945 
0.0918 
0.0683 
0.0918 
0.0531 
0.0890 
0.1082 
0.1045 
0.0408 
0.0726 
0.0726 
0.0692 
0.0918 
0.0683 
0.0918 
0.0531 
0.1132 
0.1082 
0.1045 
0.0408 
0.0408 
0.0726 
0.0692 
0.0918 
0.0408 
0.0408 
0.0531 
0.0664 
0.0873 
0.1045 
 
 
Table E.9. Profits 
 Countries 
Networks i j k l 
a 
b 
c 
d 
e 
f 
g 
h 
i 
j 
k 
0.1428 
0.1270 
0.1270 
0.1142 
0.1071 
0.1223 
0.1071 
0.1219 
0.1039 
0.1002 
0.0916 
0.1428 
0.1428 
0.1270 
0.1142 
0.1071 
0.1182 
0.1071 
0.0927 
0.1039 
0.0980 
0.0916 
0.1428 
0.1270 
0.1270 
0.1191 
0.1071 
0.1182 
0.1071 
0.0927 
0.1075 
0.0980 
0.0916 
0.1428 
0.1428 
0.1270 
0.1191 
0.1071 
0.1428 
0.1428 
0.0927 
0.1149 
0.1002 
0.0916 
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Table E.10. Producer Surplus 
 Countries 
Networks i j k l 
a 
b 
c 
d 
e 
f 
g 
h 
i 
j 
k 
0.0306 
0.0544 
0.0544 
0.0725 
0.0689 
0.0773 
0.0689 
0.0971 
0.0662 
0.0639 
0.0784 
0.0306 
0.0306 
0.0544 
0.0725 
0.0689 
0.0499 
0.0689 
0.0393 
0.0662 
0.0829 
0.0784 
0.0306 
0.0544 
0.0544 
0.0505 
0.0689 
0.0499 
0.0689 
0.0393 
0.0891 
0.0829 
0.0784 
0.0306 
0.0306 
0.0544 
0.0505 
0.0689 
0.0306 
0.0306 
0.0393 
0.0477 
0.0639 
0.0784 
 
 
Table E.11. Welfare 
 Countries 
Networks i j k l 
a 
b 
c 
d 
e 
f 
g 
h 
i 
j 
k 
0.2142 
0.2540 
0.2540 
0.2812 
0.2678 
0.2985 
0.2678 
0.3452 
0.2591 
0.2514 
0.2745 
0.2142 
0.2142 
0.2540 
0.2812 
0.2678 
0.2364 
0.2678 
0.1851 
0.2591 
0.2891 
0.2745 
0.2142 
0.2540 
0.2540 
0.2388 
0.2678 
0.2364 
0.2678 
0.1851 
0.3098 
0.2891 
0.2745 
0.2142 
0.2142 
0.2540 
0.2388 
0.2678 
0.2142 
0.2142 
0.1851 
0.2290 
0.2514 
0.2745 
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Tables for Simulation 4: i = 0 and i = 1 for all i  N.    
 
Table E.12. Consumer surplus 
 Countries 
Networks i j k l 
a 
b 
c 
d 
e 
f 
g 
h 
i 
j 
k 
0.2025 
0.2813 
0.2813 
0.3072 
0.3072 
0.3072 
0.3072 
0.3200 
0.3072 
0.3072 
0.3200 
0.2025 
0.2025 
0.2813 
0.3072 
0.3072 
0.2813 
0.3072 
0.2813 
0.3072 
0.3200 
0.3200 
0.2025 
0.2813 
0.2813 
0.2813 
0.3072 
0.2813 
0.3072 
0.2813 
0.3200 
0.3200 
0.3200 
0.2025 
0.2025 
0.2813 
0.2813 
0.3072 
0.2025 
0.2025 
0.2813 
0.2813 
0.3072 
0.3200 
 
 
Table E.13. Profits made by the intermediary 
 Countries 
Networks i j k l 
a 
b 
c 
d 
e 
f 
g 
h 
i 
j 
k 
0.1570 
0.1415 
0.1563 
0.1716 
0.1585 
0.1800 
0.1485 
0.2275 
0.1491 
0.1450 
0.1600 
0.1570 
0.1717 
0.1563 
0.1716 
0.1585 
0.1331 
0.1485 
0.1338 
0.1491 
0.1735 
0.1600 
0.1570 
0.1415 
0.1563 
0.1431 
0.1585 
0.1331 
0.1485 
0.1338 
0.1960 
0.1735 
0.1600 
0.1570 
0.1717 
0.1563 
0.1431 
0.1585 
0.1817 
0.1870 
0.1338 
0.1390 
0.1450 
0.1600 
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Table E.14. Tariff revenue 
 Countries 
Networks i j k l 
a 
b 
c 
d 
e 
f 
g 
h 
i 
j 
k 
0.0744 
0.0313 
0.0313 
0.0110 
0.0110 
0.0110 
0.0110 
0.0000 
0.0110 
0.0110 
0.0000 
0.0744 
0.0744 
0.0313 
0.0110 
0.0110 
0.0313 
0.0110 
0.0313 
0.0110 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0744 
0.0313 
0.0313 
0.0313 
0.0110 
0.0313 
0.0110 
0.0313 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0744 
0.0744 
0.0313 
0.0313 
0.0110 
0.0744 
0.0744 
0.0313 
0.0313 
0.0110 
0.0000 
 
 
Table E.15. Welfare 
 Countries 
Networks i j k l 
a 
b 
c 
d 
e 
f 
g 
h 
i 
j 
k 
0.4339 
0.4541 
0.4689 
0.4898 
0.4767 
0.4982 
0.4667 
0.5475 
0.4673 
0.4632 
0.4800 
0.4339 
0.4486 
0.4689 
0.4898 
0.4767 
0.4457 
0.4667 
0.4464 
0.4673 
0.4935 
0.4800 
0.4339 
0.4541 
0.4689 
0.4557 
0.4767 
0.4457 
0.4667 
0.4464 
0.5160 
0.4935 
0.4800 
0.4339 
0.4486 
0.4689 
0.4557 
0.4767 
0.4586 
0.4639 
0.4464 
0.4516 
0.4632 
0.4800 
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Tables for Simulation 5: i = 0.5 and i = 1 for all i  N.    
 
Table E.16. Consumer surplus 
 Countries 
Networks i j k l 
a 
b 
c 
d 
e 
f 
g 
h 
i 
j 
k 
0.1383 
0.1860 
0.1824 
0.1986 
0.1973 
0.2019 
0.2001 
0.2084 
0.1971 
0.1961 
0.2048 
0.1383 
0.1363 
0.1824 
0.1986 
0.1973 
0.1825 
0.2001 
0.1792 
0.1971 
0.2056 
0.2048 
0.1383 
0.1860 
0.1824 
0.1807 
0.1973 
0.1825 
0.2001 
0.1792 
0.2067 
0.2056 
0.2048 
0.1383 
0.1363 
0.1824 
0.1807 
0.1973 
0.1351 
0.1345 
0.1792 
0.1791 
0.1961 
0.2048 
 
 
Table E.17. Profits 
 Countries 
Networks i j k l 
a 
b 
c 
d 
e 
f 
g 
h 
i 
j 
k 
0.1203 
0.1166 
0.1241 
0.1308 
0.1266 
0.1336 
0.1214 
0.1512 
0.1228 
0.1216 
0.1280 
0.1203 
0.1276 
0.1241 
0.1308 
0.1266 
0.1140 
0.1214 
0.1151 
0.1228 
0.1327 
0.1280 
0.1203 
0.1166 
0.1241 
0.1196 
0.1266 
0.1140 
0.1214 
0.1151 
0.1403 
0.1327 
0.1280 
0.1203 
0.1276 
0.1241 
0.1196 
0.1266 
0.1323 
0.1354 
0.1151 
0.1183 
0.1216 
0.1280 
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Table E.18. Producer surplus 
 Countries 
Networks i j k l 
a 
b 
c 
d 
e 
f 
g 
h 
i 
j 
k 
0.0346 
0.0401 
0.0456 
0.0500 
0.0493 
0.0491 
0.0456 
0.0599 
0.0474 
0.0475 
0.0512 
0.0346 
0.0400 
0.0456 
0.0500 
0.0493 
0.0412 
0.0456 
0.0425 
0.0474 
0.0530 
0.0512 
0.0346 
0.0401 
0.0456 
0.0448 
0.0493 
0.0412 
0.0456 
0.0425 
0.0558 
0.0530 
0.0512 
0.0346 
0.0400 
0.0456 
0.0448 
0.0493 
0.0435 
0.0456 
0.0425 
0.0446 
0.0475 
0.0512 
 
 
Table E.19. Tariff revenue 
 Countries 
Networks i j k l 
a 
b 
c 
d 
e 
f 
g 
h 
i 
j 
k 
0.0599 
0.0246 
0.0239 
0.0087 
0.0083 
0.0084 
0.0085 
0.0000 
0.0091 
0.0088 
0.0000 
0.0599 
0.0584 
0.0239 
0.0087 
0.0083 
0.0250 
0.0085 
0.0261 
0.0091 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0599 
0.0246 
0.0239 
0.0239 
0.0083 
0.0250 
0.0085 
0.0261 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0599 
0.0584 
0.0239 
0.0239 
0.0083 
0.0575 
0.0571 
0.0261 
0.0244 
0.0088 
0.0000 
 
Table E.20. Welfare 
 Countries 
Networks i j k l 
a 
b 
c 
d 
e 
f 
g 
h 
i 
j 
k 
0.3531 
0.3673 
0.3760 
0.3882 
0.3816 
0.3930 
0.3756 
0.4196 
0.3764 
0.3741 
0.3840 
0.3531 
0.3623 
0.3760 
0.3882 
0.3816 
0.3627 
0.3756 
0.3629 
0.3764 
0.3912 
0.3840 
0.3531 
0.3673 
0.3760 
0.3691 
0.3816 
0.3627 
0.3756 
0.3629 
0.4027 
0.3912 
0.3840 
0.3531 
0.3623 
0.3760 
0.3691 
0.3816 
0.3683 
0.3725 
0.3629 
0.3664 
0.3741 
0.3840 
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Tables for Simulation 6: i = 1.5 and i = 1 for all i  N.    
 
Table E.21. Consumer Surplus 
 Countries 
Networks i j k l 
a 
b 
c 
d 
e 
f 
g 
h 
i 
j 
k 
0.0764 
0.0974 
0.0932 
0.1024 
0.1006 
0.1061 
0.1037 
0.1096 
0.1006 
0.0992 
0.1045 
0.0764 
0.0707 
0.0932 
0.1024 
0.1006 
0.0936 
0.1037 
0.0903 
0.1006 
0.1056 
0.1045 
0.0764 
0.0974 
0.0932 
0.0913 
0.1006 
0.0936 
0.1037 
0.0903 
0.1072 
0.1056 
0.1045 
0.0764 
0.0707 
0.0932 
0.0913 
0.1006 
0.0689 
0.0678 
0.0903 
0.0895 
0.0992 
0.1045 
 
 
Table E.22. Profits 
 Countries 
Networks i j k l 
a 
b 
c 
d 
e 
f 
g 
h 
i 
j 
k 
0.0828 
0.0853 
0.0886 
0.0920 
0.0904 
0.0931 
0.0881 
0.0995 
0.0888 
0.0885 
0.0914 
0.0828 
0.0875 
0.0886 
0.0920 
0.0904 
0.0842 
0.0881 
0.0847 
0.0888 
0.0931 
0.0914 
0.0828 
0.0853 
0.0886 
0.0869 
0.0904 
0.0842 
0.0881 
0.0847 
0.0958 
0.0931 
0.0914 
0.0828 
0.0875 
0.0886 
0.0869 
0.0904 
0.0899 
0.0914 
0.0847 
0.0864 
0.0885 
0.0914 
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Table E.23. Producer Surplus 
 Countries 
Networks i j k l 
a 
b 
c 
d 
e 
f 
g 
h 
i 
j 
k 
0.0573 
0.0637 
0.0699 
0.0753 
0.0755 
0.0737 
0.0713 
0.0846 
0.0734 
0.0739 
0.0784 
0.0573 
0.0616 
0.0699 
0.0753 
0.0755 
0.0655 
0.0713 
0.0670 
0.0734 
0.0797 
0.0784 
0.0573 
0.0637 
0.0699 
0.0698 
0.0755 
0.0655 
0.0713 
0.0670 
0.0817 
0.0797 
0.0784 
0.0573 
0.0616 
0.0699 
0.0698 
0.0755 
0.0655 
0.0680 
0.0670 
0.0698 
0.0739 
0.0784 
 
Table E.24. Tariff revenue 
 Countries 
Networks i j k l 
a 
b 
c 
d 
e 
f 
g 
h 
i 
j 
k 
0.0406 
0.0184 
0.0169 
0.0065 
0.0060 
0.0066 
0.0067 
0.0000 
0.0069 
0.0065 
0.0000 
0.0406 
0.0394 
0.0169 
0.0065 
0.0060 
0.0184 
0.0067 
0.0190 
0.0069 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0406 
0.0184 
0.0169 
0.0167 
0.0060 
0.0184 
0.0067 
0.0190 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0406 
0.0394 
0.0169 
0.0167 
0.0060 
0.0377 
0.0368 
0.0190 
0.0171 
0.0065 
0.0000 
 
Table E.25. Welfare 
 Countries 
Networks i j k l 
a 
b 
c 
d 
e 
f 
g 
h 
i 
j 
k 
0.2572 
0.2648 
0.2687 
0.2762 
0.2725 
0.2795 
0.2698 
0.2938 
0.2697 
0.2682 
0.2743 
0.2572 
0.2592 
0.2687 
0.2762 
0.2725 
0.2616 
0.2698 
0.2611 
0.2697 
0.2784 
0.2743 
0.2572 
0.2648 
0.2687 
0.2647 
0.2725 
0.2616 
0.2698 
0.2611 
0.2847 
0.2784 
0.2743 
0.2572 
0.2592 
0.2687 
0.2647 
0.2725 
0.2620 
0.2641 
0.2611 
0.2628 
0.2682 
0.2743 
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Tables for Simulation 11:  = 1, = 0 and  = 0 for all i  N.    
 
Table E.26. Consumer surplus 
 Countries 
Networks i j k l 
a 
b 
c 
d 
e 
f 
g 
h 
i 
j 
k 
l 
m 
n 
o 
p 
q 
r 
s 
t 
u 
v 
w 
x 
y 
z 
a’ 
b’ 
c’ 
0.1250 
0.2222 
0.2222 
0.1250 
0.2813 
0.2222 
0.3200 
0.2813 
0.2813 
0.2813 
0.2222 
0.2222 
0.2813 
0.3200 
0.3200 
0.2813 
0.2813 
0.2813 
0.3200 
0.3200 
0.3200 
0.2813 
0.2818 
0.3200 
0.2222 
0.2813 
0.2222 
0.2222 
0.2222 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.1250 
0.1250 
0.2222 
0.1250 
0.2222 
0.1250 
0.2222 
0.2813 
0.2222 
0.2813 
0.2222 
0.2222 
0.1250 
0.2813 
0.2222 
0.2813 
0.2813 
0.2222 
0.2813 
0.3200 
0.2813 
0.2813 
0.2818 
0.3200 
0.2813 
0.1250 
0.2222 
0.2222 
0.2222 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
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Table E.27. Profits made by the intermediary 
 
 Countries 
Networks i j k l 
a 
b 
c 
d 
e 
f 
g 
h 
i 
j 
k 
l 
m 
n 
o 
p 
q 
r 
s 
t 
u 
v 
w 
x 
y 
z 
a’ 
b’ 
c’ 
0.2500 
0.1111 
0.2222 
0.2500 
0.1736 
0.1111 
0.1511 
0.1250 
0.1736 
0.1250 
0.1111 
0.1111 
0.0625 
0.1025 
0.1511 
0.1250 
0.1250 
0.0625 
0.1025 
0.0800 
0.1025 
0.0625 
0.0625 
0.0800 
0.1111 
0.0625 
0.1111 
0.1111 
0.2222 
0.0000 
0.1111 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0625 
0.1111 
0.0400 
0.0625 
0.0625 
0.1250 
0.1111 
0.2222 
0.0625 
0.0400 
0.0400 
0.0625 
0.1250 
0.0625 
0.0400 
0.0800 
0.1025 
0.1250 
0.1250 
0.0800 
0.1736 
0.0625 
0.2222 
0.1111 
0.0000 
0.2500 
0.2500 
0.2222 
0.2500 
0.1736 
0.2500 
0.1511 
0.1250 
0.1736 
0.1250 
0.1111 
0.1111 
0.2500 
0.1025 
0.1511 
0.1250 
0.1250 
0.1111 
0.1025 
0.0800 
0.1025 
0.0625 
0.0625 
0.0800 
0.0625 
0.2500 
0.1111 
0.1111 
0.2222 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0400 
0.0625 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.1111 
0.0000 
0.0625 
0.1025 
0.0400 
0.0625 
0.0000 
0.1736 
0.1025 
0.0800 
0.0400 
0.1250 
0.1250 
0.0800 
0.0625 
0.0625 
0.0000 
0.1111 
0.0000 
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Table E.28. Welfare 
 
 Countries 
Networks i j k l 
a 
b 
c 
d 
e 
f 
g 
h 
i 
j 
k 
l 
m 
n 
o 
p 
q 
r 
s 
t 
u 
v 
w 
x 
y 
z 
a’ 
b’ 
c’ 
0.3750 
0.3333 
0.4444 
0.3750 
0.4549 
0.3333 
0.4711 
0.4063 
0.4549 
0.4063 
0.3333 
0.3333 
0.3438 
0.4225 
0.4711 
0.4063 
0.4063 
0.3438 
0.4225 
0.4000 
0.4225 
0.3438 
0.3443 
0.4000 
0.3333 
0.3438 
0.3333 
0.3333 
0.4444 
0.0000 
0.1111 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0625 
0.1111 
0.0400 
0.0625 
0.0625 
0.1250 
0.1111 
0.2222 
0.0625 
0.0400 
0.0400 
0.0625 
0.1250 
0.0625 
0.0400 
0.0800 
0.1025 
0.1250 
0.1250 
0.0800 
0.1736 
0.0625 
0.2222 
0.1111 
0.0000 
0.3750 
0.3750 
0.4444 
0.3750 
0.3958 
0.3750 
0.3733 
0.4063 
0.3958 
0.4063 
0.3333 
0.3333 
0.3750 
0.3838 
0.3733 
0.4063 
0.4063 
0.3333 
0.3838 
0.4000 
0.3838 
0.3438 
0.3443 
0.4000 
0.3438 
0.3750 
0.3333 
0.3333 
0.4444 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0400 
0.0625 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.1111 
0.0000 
0.0625 
0.1025 
0.0400 
0.0625 
0.0000 
0.1736 
0.1025 
0.0800 
0.0400 
0.1250 
0.1250 
0.0800 
0.0625 
0.0625 
0.0000 
0.1111 
0.0000 
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Tables for Simulation 12:  = 1,  = 0 and  = 0.5 for all i  N.    
 
Table E.29. Consumer surplus 
 Countries 
Networks i j k l 
a 
b 
c 
d 
e 
f 
g 
h 
i 
j 
k 
l 
m 
n 
o 
p 
q 
r 
s 
t 
u 
v 
w 
x 
y 
z 
a’ 
b’ 
c’ 
0.0800 
0.1632 
0.1423 
0.0800 
0.2024 
0.1632 
0.2465 
0.2074 
0.2024 
0.1994 
0.1632 
0.1530 
0.2222 
0.2438 
0.2465 
0.2074 
0.1994 
0.2125 
0.2438 
0.2419 
0.2472 
0.2074 
0.2074 
0.2419 
0.1557 
0.2222 
0.1530 
0.1632 
0.1423 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0800 
0.0800 
0.1423 
0.0800 
0.1475 
0.0800 
0.1510 
0.2074 
0.1475 
0.1994 
0.1632 
0.1530 
0.0800 
0.2042 
0.1510 
0.2074 
0.1994 
0.1557 
0.2042 
0.2419 
0.2040 
0.2074 
0.2074 
0.2419 
0.2125 
0.0800 
0.1530 
0.1632 
0.1423 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
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Table E.30. Profits 
 Countries 
Networks i j k l 
a 
b 
c 
d 
e 
f 
g 
h 
i 
j 
k 
l 
m 
n 
o 
p 
q 
r 
s 
t 
u 
v 
w 
x 
y 
z 
a’ 
b’ 
c’ 
0.2000 
0.1020 
0.1778 
0.2000 
0.1407 
0.1020 
0.1235 
0.1034 
0.1407 
0.1108 
0.1020 
0.1109 
0.0617 
0.0910 
0.1235 
0.1034 
0.1108 
0.0672 
0.0910 
0.0756 
0.0911 
0.0704 
0.0704 
0.0756 
0.1086 
0.0617 
0.1109 
0.1020 
0.1778 
0.0000 
0.1020 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0734 
0.1020 
0.0493 
0.0704 
0.0734 
0.1108 
0.1020 
0.1630 
0.0617 
0.0506 
0.0493 
0.0704 
0.1108 
0.0672 
0.0506 
0.0756 
0.0911 
0.1034 
0.1034 
0.0756 
0.1309 
0.0617 
0.1630 
0.1020 
0.0000 
0.2000 
0.2000 
0.1778 
0.2000 
0.1407 
0.2000 
0.1235 
0.1034 
0.1407 
0.1108 
0.1020 
0.1109 
0.2000 
0.0910 
0.1235 
0.1034 
0.1108 
0.1086 
0.0910 
0.0756 
0.0928 
0.0704 
0.0704 
0.0756 
0.0672 
0.2000 
0.1109 
0.1020 
0.1778 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0493 
0.0704 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.1020 
0.0000 
0.0617 
0.0910 
0.0493 
0.0704 
0.0000 
0.1309 
0.0910 
0.0756 
0.0506 
0.1034 
0.1034 
0.0756 
0.0672 
0.0617 
0.0000 
0.1020 
0.0000 
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Table E.31. Producer surplus 
 Countries 
Networks i j k l 
a 
b 
c 
d 
e 
f 
g 
h 
i 
j 
k 
l 
m 
n 
o 
p 
q 
r 
s 
t 
u 
v 
w 
x 
y 
z 
a’ 
b’ 
c’ 
0.0200 
0.0102 
0.0356 
0.0200 
0.0274 
0.0102 
0.0228 
0.0207 
0.0274 
0.0222 
0.0102 
0.0111 
0.0062 
0.0179 
0.0228 
0.0207 
0.0222 
0.0067 
0.0179 
0.0151 
0.0179 
0.0070 
0.0070 
0.0151 
0.0109 
0.0062 
0.0111 
0.0102 
0.0356 
0.0000 
0.0102 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0073 
0.0102 
0.0049 
0.0071 
0.0073 
0.0222 
0.0102 
0.0326 
0.0062 
0.0051 
0.0049 
0.0070 
0.0222 
0.0067 
0.0051 
0.0151 
0.0179 
0.0207 
0.0207 
0.0151 
0.0255 
0.0062 
0.0323 
0.0102 
0.0000 
0.0200 
0.0200 
0.0356 
0.0200 
0.0274 
0.0200 
0.0228 
0.0207 
0.0274 
0.0222 
0.0102 
0.0111 
0.0200 
0.0179 
0.0228 
0.0207 
0.0222 
0.0109 
0.0179 
0.0151 
0.0183 
0.0070 
0.0070 
0.0151 
0.0067 
0.0200 
0.0111 
0.0102 
0.0356 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0049 
0.0071 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0102 
0.0000 
0.0062 
0.0179 
0.0049 
0.0070 
0.0000 
0.0255 
0.0179 
0.0151 
0.0051 
0.0207 
0.0207 
0.0151 
0.0067 
0.0062 
0.0000 
0.0102 
0.0000 
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Table E.32. Welfare 
 Countries 
Networks i j k l 
a 
b 
c 
d 
e 
f 
g 
h 
i 
j 
k 
l 
m 
n 
o 
p 
q 
r 
s 
t 
u 
v 
w 
x 
y 
z 
a’ 
b’ 
c’ 
0.3000 
0.2754 
0.3557 
0.3000 
0.3705 
0.2754 
0.3928 
0.3315 
0.3705 
0.3324 
0.2754 
0.2750 
0.2901 
0.3527 
0.3928 
0.3315 
0.3324 
0.2864 
0.3527 
0.3326 
0.3562 
0.2848 
0.2848 
0.3326 
0.2752 
0.2901 
0.2750 
0.2754 
0.3557 
0.0000 
0.1122 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0807 
0.1122 
0.0542 
0.0774 
0.0807 
0.1330 
0.1122 
0.1956 
0.0679 
0.0557 
0.0542 
0.0774 
0.1330 
0.0739 
0.0557 
0.0907 
0.1090 
0.1241 
0.1241 
0.0907 
0.1564 
0.0679 
0.1953 
0.1122 
0.0000 
0.3000 
0.3000 
0.3557 
0.3000 
0.3156 
0.3000 
0.2973 
0.3315 
0.3156 
0.3324 
0.2754 
0.2750 
0.3000 
0.3131 
0.2973 
0.3315 
0.3324 
0.2752 
0.3131 
0.3326 
0.3151 
0.2848 
0.2848 
0.3326 
0.2864 
0.3000 
0.2750 
0.2754 
0.3557 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0542 
0.0774 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.1122 
0.0000 
0.0679 
0.1089 
0.0542 
0.0774 
0.0000 
0.1564 
0.1089 
0.0907 
0.0557 
0.1241 
0.1241 
0.0907 
0.0739 
0.0679 
0.0000 
0.1122 
0.0000 
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Tables for Simulation 13:  = 1,  = 0 and  = 1.5 for all i  N.    
 
Table E.33. Consumer Surplus 
 Countries 
Networks i j k l 
a 
b 
c 
d 
e 
f 
g 
h 
i 
j 
k 
l 
m 
n 
o 
p 
q 
r 
s 
t 
u 
v 
w 
x 
y 
z 
a’ 
b’ 
c’ 
0.0408 
0.0987 
0.0726 
0.0408 
0.1206 
0.0988 
0.1614 
0.1270 
0.1206 
0.1152 
0.0988 
0.0859 
0.1487 
0.1560 
0.1614 
0.1270 
0.1152 
0.1349 
0.1560 
0.1521 
0.1593 
0.1270 
0.1270 
0.1521 
0.0890 
0.1487 
0.0859 
0.0988 
0.0726 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0408 
0.0408 
0.0726 
0.0408 
0.0786 
0.0408 
0.0829 
0.1270 
0.0786 
0.1152 
0.0988 
0.0859 
0.0408 
0.1216 
0.0829 
0.1270 
0.1152 
0.0890 
0.1216 
0.1521 
0.1213 
0.1270 
0.1270 
0.1521 
0.1349 
0.0408 
0.0859 
0.0988 
0.0726 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
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Table E.34. Profits 
 Countries 
Networks i j k l 
a 
b 
c 
d 
e 
f 
g 
h 
i 
j 
k 
l 
m 
n 
o 
p 
q 
r 
s 
t 
u 
v 
w 
x 
y 
z 
a’ 
b’ 
c’ 
0.1428 
0.0864 
0.1270 
0.1428 
0.1049 
0.0864 
0.0943 
0.0816 
0.1049 
0.0896 
0.0864 
0.0960 
0.0578 
0.0757 
0.0943 
0.0816 
0.0896 
0.0646 
0.0757 
0.0666 
0.0758 
0.0690 
0.0690 
0.0666 
0.0935 
0.0578 
0.0960 
0.0864 
0.1270 
0.0000 
0.0864 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0724 
0.0864 
0.0521 
0.0690 
0.0724 
0.0896 
0.0864 
0.1136 
0.0578 
0.0546 
0.0521 
0.0690 
0.0896 
0.0646 
0.0546 
0.0666 
0.0758 
0.0816 
0.0816 
0.0666 
0.0955 
0.0578 
0.1136 
0.0864 
0.0000 
0.1428 
0.1428 
0.1270 
0.1428 
0.1049 
0.1428 
0.0943 
0.0816 
0.1049 
0.0896 
0.0864 
0.0960 
0.1428 
0.0757 
0.0943 
0.0816 
0.0896 
0.0935 
0.0757 
0.0666 
0.0776 
0.0690 
0.0690 
0.0666 
0.0646 
0.1428 
0.0960 
0.0864 
0.1270 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0521 
0.0690 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0864 
0.0000 
0.0578 
0.0757 
0.0521 
0.0690 
0.0000 
0.0955 
0.0757 
0.0666 
0.0546 
0.0816 
0.0816 
0.0666 
0.0646 
0.0578 
0.0000 
0.0864 
0.0000 
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Table E.35. Producer Surplus 
 Countries 
Networks i j k l 
a 
b 
c 
d 
e 
f 
g 
h 
i 
j 
k 
l 
m 
n 
o 
p 
q 
r 
s 
t 
u 
v 
w 
x 
y 
z 
a’ 
b’ 
c’ 
0.0306 
0.0185 
0.0544 
0.0306 
0.0439 
0.0185 
0.0372 
0.0350 
0.0439 
0.0384 
0.0185 
0.0206 
0.0124 
0.0319 
0.0372 
0.0350 
0.0384 
0.0139 
0.0319 
0.0285 
0.0320 
0.0148 
0.0148 
0.0285 
0.0200 
0.0124 
0.0206 
0.0185 
0.0544 
0.0000 
0.0185 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0155 
0.0185 
0.0112 
0.0148 
0.0155 
0.0384 
0.0185 
0.0487 
0.0124 
0.0117 
0.0112 
0.0148 
0.0384 
0.0139 
0.0117 
0.0285 
0.0320 
0.0350 
0.0350 
0.0285 
0.0398 
0.0124 
0.0487 
0.0185 
0.0000 
0.0306 
0.0306 
0.0544 
0.0306 
0.0439 
0.0306 
0.0372 
0.0350 
0.0439 
0.0384 
0.0185 
0.0206 
0.0306 
0.0319 
0.0372 
0.0350 
0.0384 
0.0200 
0.0319 
0.0285 
0.0330 
0.0148 
0.0148 
0.0285 
0.0139 
0.0306 
0.0206 
0.0185 
0.0544 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0112 
0.0148 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0185 
0.0000 
0.0124 
0.0319 
0.0112 
0.0148 
0.0000 
0.0398 
0.0319 
0.0285 
0.0117 
0.0350 
0.0350 
0.0285 
0.0139 
0.0124 
0.0000 
0.0185 
0.0000 
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Table E.36. Welfare 
 Countries 
Networks i j k l 
a 
b 
c 
d 
e 
f 
g 
h 
i 
j 
k 
l 
m 
n 
o 
p 
q 
r 
s 
t 
u 
v 
w 
x 
y 
z 
a’ 
b’ 
c’ 
0.2142 
0.2036 
0.2540 
0.2142 
0.2694 
0.2037 
0.2929 
0.2436 
0.2694 
0.2432 
0.2037 
0.2025 
0.2189 
0.2636 
0.2929 
0.2436 
0.2432 
0.2134 
0.2636 
0.2472 
0.2671 
0.2108 
0.2108 
0.2472 
0.2025 
0.2189 
0.2025 
0.2037 
0.2540 
0.0000 
0.1049 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0879 
0.1049 
0.0633 
0.0838 
0.0879 
0.1280 
0.1049 
0.1623 
0.0702 
0.0663 
0.0633 
0.0838 
0.1280 
0.0785 
0.0663 
0.0951 
0.1078 
0.1166 
0.1166 
0.0951 
0.1353 
0.0702 
0.1623 
0.1049 
0.0000 
0.2142 
0.2142 
0.2540 
0.2142 
0.2274 
0.2142 
0.2144 
0.2436 
0.2274 
0.2432 
0.2037 
0.2025 
0.2142 
0.2292 
0.2144 
0.2436 
0.2432 
0.2025 
0.2292 
0.2472 
0.2319 
0.2108 
0.2108 
0.2472 
0.2134 
0.2142 
0.2025 
0.2037 
0.2540 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0633 
0.0838 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.1049 
0.1136 
0.0702 
0.1076 
0.0633 
0.0838 
0.0000 
0.1353 
0.1076 
0.0951 
0.0663 
0.1166 
0.1166 
0.0951 
0.0785 
0.0702 
0.0000 
0.1049 
0.0000 
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Tables for Simulation 14:  = 1,  = 0.5 and  = 0 for all i  N.    
 
Table E.37. Consumer surplus 
 Countries 
Networks i j k l 
a 
b 
c 
d 
e 
f 
g 
h 
i 
j 
k 
l 
m 
n 
o 
p 
q 
r 
s 
t 
u 
v 
w 
x 
y 
z 
a’ 
b’ 
c’ 
0.1250 
0.2222 
0.2222 
0.1250 
0.2813 
0.2222 
0.3200 
0.2813 
0.2813 
0.2813 
0.2222 
0.2222 
0.2813 
0.3200 
0.3200 
0.2813 
0.2813 
0.2813 
0.3200 
0.3200 
0.3200 
0.2813 
0.2813 
0.3200 
0.2222 
0.2813 
0.2222 
0.2222 
0.2222 
0.0313 
0.0556 
0.0313 
0.0556 
0.0556 
0.0703 
0.0556 
0.0556 
0.0703 
0.0703 
0.0703 
0.0800 
0.0703 
0.0556 
0.0703 
0.0703 
0.0800 
0.0703 
0.0703 
0.0703 
0.0800 
0.0800 
0.0703 
0.0800 
0.0703 
0.0556 
0.0703 
0.0056 
0.0556 
0.1250 
0.1250 
0.2222 
0.1250 
0.2222 
0.1250 
0.2222 
0.2813 
0.2222 
0.2813 
0.2222 
0.2222 
0.1250 
0.2813 
0.2222 
0.2813 
0.2813 
0.2222 
0.2813 
0.3200 
0.2813 
0.2813 
0.2813 
0.3200 
0.2813 
0.1250 
0.2222 
0.2222 
0.2222 
0.0313 
0.0313 
0.0313 
0.0556 
0.0313 
0.0556 
0.0556 
0.0556 
0.0556 
0.0313 
0.0703 
0.0556 
0.0703 
0.0703 
0.0703 
0.0703 
0.0556 
0.0800 
0.0800 
0.0703 
0.0703 
0.0800 
0.0703 
0.0800 
0.0556 
0.0556 
0.0313 
0.0056 
0.0556 
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Table E.38. Profits made by the intermediary 
 Countries 
Networks i j k l 
a 
b 
c 
d 
e 
f 
g 
h 
i 
j 
k 
l 
m 
n 
o 
p 
q 
r 
s 
t 
u 
v 
w 
x 
y 
z 
a’ 
b’ 
c’ 
0.2500 
0.1389 
0.2222 
0.2500 
0.2014 
0.1267 
0.2067 
0.1528 
0.1892 
0.1406 
0.1267 
0.1211 
0.0937 
0.1459 
0.1823 
0.1406 
0.1350 
0.0881 
0.1281 
0.1112 
0.1281 
0.0825 
0.0937 
0.1000 
0.1267 
0.1181 
0.1267 
0.1389 
0.2222 
0.0625 
0.1389 
0.0625 
0.0556 
0.0903 
0.1545 
0.0678 
0.0903 
0.1059 
0.1406 
0.1423 
0.2600 
0.0937 
0.0678 
0.0712 
0.0937 
0.1628 
0.0881 
0.0656 
0.0956 
0.1281 
0.1450 
0.1406 
0.1000 
0.1892 
0.0903 
0.2378 
0.1389 
0.0556 
0.2500 
0.2500 
0.2222 
0.2500 
0.1736 
0.2500 
0.1511 
0.1528 
0.1736 
0.1406 
0.1267 
0.1211 
0.2500 
0.1181 
0.1511 
0.1406 
0.1350 
0.1211 
0.1125 
0.1112 
0.1125 
0.0825 
0.0937 
0.1000 
0.1059 
0.2500 
0.1267 
0.1389 
0.2222 
0.0625 
0.0625 
0.0625 
0.0556 
0.0625 
0.0434 
0.0678 
0.0903 
0.0434 
0.0625 
0.1423 
0.0378 
0.0937 
0.1181 
0.0712 
0.0937 
0.0378 
0.1992 
0.1281 
0.0956 
0.0656 
0.1450 
0.1406 
0.1000 
0.0903 
0.0903 
0.0625 
0.1389 
0.0556 
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Table E.39. Welfare 
 Countries 
Networks i j k l 
a 
b 
c 
d 
e 
f 
g 
h 
i 
j 
k 
l 
m 
n 
o 
p 
q 
r 
s 
t 
u 
v 
w 
x 
y 
z 
a’ 
b’ 
c’ 
0.3750 
0.3611 
0.4444 
0.3750 
0.4827 
0.3489 
0.5267 
0.4341 
0.4705 
0.4219 
0.3489 
0.3433 
0.3750 
0.4659 
0.5023 
0.4219 
0.4163 
0.3694 
0.4481 
0.4312 
0.4481 
0.3638 
0.3750 
0.4200 
0.3489 
0.3994 
0.3489 
0.3611 
0.4444 
0.0938 
0.1945 
0.0938 
0.1112 
0.1459 
0.2248 
0.1234 
0.1459 
0.1762 
0.2109 
0.2126 
0.3400 
0.1640 
0.1234 
0.1415 
0.1640 
0.2428 
0.1584 
0.1359 
0.1659 
0.2081 
0.2250 
0.2109 
0.1800 
0.2595 
0.1459 
0.3081 
0.1445 
0.1112 
0.3750 
0.3750 
0.4444 
0.3750 
0.3958 
0.3750 
0.3733 
0.4341 
0.3958 
0.4219 
0.3489 
0.3433 
0.3750 
0.3994 
0.3733 
0.4219 
0.4163 
0.3433 
0.3938 
0.4312 
0.3938 
0.3638 
0.3750 
0.4200 
0.3872 
0.3750 
0.3489 
0.3611 
0.4444 
0.0938 
0.0938 
0.0938 
0.1112 
0.0938 
0.0990 
0.1234 
0.1459 
0.0990 
0.0938 
0.2126 
0.0934 
0.1640 
0.1884 
0.1415 
0.1640 
0.0934 
0.2792 
0.2081 
0.1659 
0.1359 
0.2250 
0.2109 
0.1800 
0.1459 
0.1459 
0.0938 
0.1445 
0.1112 
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Tables for Simulation 15:  = 1,  = 0.5 and  = 0.5 for all i  N.    
 
Table E.40. Consumer surplus 
 Countries 
Networks i j k l 
a 
b 
c 
d 
e 
f 
g 
h 
i 
j 
k 
l 
m 
n 
o 
p 
q 
r 
s 
t 
u 
v 
w 
x 
y 
z 
a’ 
b’ 
c’ 
0.0800 
0.1533 
0.1422 
0.0800 
0.1944 
0.1520 
0.2320 
0.1956 
0.1932 
0.1908 
0.1579 
0.1455 
0.2017 
0.2284 
0.2296 
0.1948 
0.1903 
0.1957 
0.2268 
0.2257 
0.2268 
0.1931 
0.1948 
0.2247 
0.1485 
0.2042 
0.1464 
0.1533 
0.1422 
0.0200 
0.0303 
0.0200 
0.0355 
0.0282 
0.0414 
0.0282 
0.0291 
0.0396 
0.0350 
0.0383 
0.0408 
0.0399 
0.0291 
0.0379 
0.0380 
0.0439 
0.0372 
0.0366 
0.0377 
0.0427 
0.0432 
0.0380 
0.0419 
0.0375 
0.0306 
0.0373 
0.0303 
0.0355 
0.0800 
0.0800 
0.1422 
0.0800 
0.1436 
0.0800 
0.1438 
0.1956 
0.1446 
0.1908 
0.1579 
0.1455 
0.0800 
0.1917 
0.1452 
0.1948 
0.1903 
0.1476 
0.1917 
0.2257 
0.1917 
0.1931 
0.1948 
0.2247 
0.1978 
0.0800 
0.1464 
0.1533 
0.1422 
0.0200 
0.0200 
0.0200 
0.0355 
0.0200 
0.0370 
0.0282 
0.0291 
0.0325 
0.0200 
0.0383 
0.0293 
0.0399 
0.0355 
0.0379 
0.0380 
0.0302 
0.0444 
0.0427 
0.0377 
0.0366 
0.0432 
0.0380 
0.0419 
0.0307 
0.0306 
0.0200 
0.0303 
0.0355 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
~
873 
 
Table E.41. Profits 
 Countries 
Networks i j k l 
a 
b 
c 
d 
e 
f 
g 
h 
i 
j 
k 
l 
m 
n 
o 
p 
q 
r 
s 
t 
u 
v 
w 
x 
y 
z 
a’ 
b’ 
c’ 
0.2000 
0.1147 
0.1778 
0.2000 
0.1431 
0.1114 
0.1271 
0.1141 
0.1414 
0.1157 
0.1123 
0.1159 
0.0782 
0.0989 
0.1240 
0.1114 
0.1152 
0.0811 
0.0968 
0.0850 
0.0968 
0.0810 
0.0831 
0.0834 
0.1156 
0.0844 
0.1174 
0.1147 
0.1778 
0.0500 
0.1147 
0.0500 
0.0444 
0.0885 
0.1119 
0.0702 
0.0873 
0.0856 
0.1157 
0.1173 
0.1618 
0.0782 
0.0710 
0.0672 
0.0831 
0.1127 
0.0811 
0.0670 
0.0879 
0.0968 
0.1084 
0.1114 
0.0834 
0.1367 
0.0815 
0.1652 
0.1147 
0.0444 
0.2000 
0.2000 
0.1778 
0.2000 
0.1471 
0.2000 
0.1333 
0.1141 
0.1470 
0.1157 
0.1123 
0.1159 
0.2000 
0.1004 
0.1330 
0.1114 
0.1152 
0.1144 
0.0997 
0.0850 
0.0997 
0.0810 
0.0831 
0.0834 
0.0846 
0.2000 
0.1174 
0.1147 
0.1778 
0.0500 
0.0500 
0.0500 
0.0444 
0.0500 
0.0503 
0.0702 
0.0873 
0.0441 
0.0500 
0.1173 
0.0405 
0.0782 
0.1004 
0.0672 
0.0831 
0.0438 
0.1333 
0.0968 
0.0879 
0.0670 
0.1084 
0.1114 
0.0834 
0.0850 
0.0815 
0.0500 
0.1147 
0.0444 
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Table E.42. Producer surplus 
 Countries 
Networks i j k l 
a 
b 
c 
d 
e 
f 
g 
h 
i 
j 
k 
l 
m 
n 
o 
p 
q 
r 
s 
t 
u 
v 
w 
x 
y 
z 
a’ 
b’ 
c’ 
0.0200 
0.0200 
0.0356 
0.0200 
0.0380 
0.0178 
0.0422 
0.0318 
0.0350 
0.0313 
0.0184 
0.0176 
0.0200 
0.0354 
0.0375 
0.0297 
0.0294 
0.0202 
0.0323 
0.0310 
0.0323 
0.0196 
0.0212 
0.0288 
0.0189 
0.0234 
0.0192 
0.0200 
0.0356 
0.0050 
0.0200 
0.0050 
0.0089 
0.0167 
0.0258 
0.0138 
0.0164 
0.0221 
0.0313 
0.0259 
0.0467 
0.0200 
0.0139 
0.0186 
0.0212 
0.0370 
0.0202 
0.0182 
0.0252 
0.0323 
0.0338 
0.0297 
0.0288 
0.0346 
0.0154 
0.0409 
0.0200 
0.0089 
0.0200 
0.0200 
0.0356 
0.0200 
0.0288 
0.0200 
0.0250 
0.0318 
0.0288 
0.0313 
0.0184 
0.0176 
0.0200 
0.0275 
0.0250 
0.0297 
0.0294 
0.0177 
0.0261 
0.0310 
0.0261 
0.0196 
0.0212 
0.0288 
0.0225 
0.0200 
0.0192 
0.0200 
0.0356 
0.0050 
0.0050 
0.0050 
0.0089 
0.0050 
0.0097 
0.0138 
0.0164 
0.0088 
0.0050 
0.0259 
0.0075 
0.0200 
0.0275 
0.0186 
0.0212 
0.0086 
0.0392 
0.0323 
0.0252 
0.0182 
0.0338 
0.0297 
0.0288 
0.0159 
0.0154 
0.0050 
0.0200 
0.0089 
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Table E.43. Welfare 
 Countries 
Networks i j k l 
a 
b 
c 
d 
e 
f 
g 
h 
i 
j 
k 
l 
m 
n 
o 
p 
q 
r 
s 
t 
u 
v 
w 
x 
y 
z 
a’ 
b’ 
c’ 
0.3000 
0.2880 
0.3556 
0.3000 
0.3755 
0.2812 
0.4013 
0.3415 
0.3696 
0.3378 
0.2886 
0.2790 
0.2999 
0.3627 
0.3911 
0.3359 
0.3349 
0.2970 
0.3559 
0.3417 
0.3559 
0.2937 
0.2991 
0.3369 
0.2830 
0.3120 
0.2830 
0.2880 
0.3556 
0.0750 
0.1650 
0.0750 
0.0888 
0.1334 
0.1791 
0.1122 
0.1328 
0.1473 
0.1820 
0.1815 
0.2493 
0.1381 
0.1140 
0.1237 
0.1423 
0.1936 
0.1385 
0.1218 
0.1508 
0.1718 
0.1854 
0.1791 
0.1541 
0.2088 
0.1275 
0.2434 
0.1650 
0.0888 
0.3000 
0.3000 
0.3556 
0.3000 
0.3195 
0.3000 
0.3021 
0.3415 
0.3204 
0.3378 
0.2886 
0.2790 
0.3000 
0.3196 
0.3032 
0.3359 
0.3349 
0.2797 
0.3175 
0.3417 
0.3175 
0.2937 
0.2991 
0.3369 
0.3049 
0.3000 
0.2830 
0.2880 
0.3556 
0.0750 
0.0750 
0.0750 
0.0888 
0.0750 
0.0970 
0.1122 
0.1328 
0.0854 
0.0750 
0.1815 
0.0773 
0.1381 
0.1634 
0.1237 
0.1423 
0.0826 
0.2169 
0.1718 
0.1508 
0.1218 
0.1854 
0.1791 
0.1541 
0.1316 
0.1275 
0.0750 
0.1650 
0.0888 
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Tables for Simulation 16:  = 1,  = 0.5 and  = 1.5 for all i  N.    
 
Table E.44. Consumer Surplus 
 Countries 
Networks i j k l 
a 
b 
c 
d 
e 
f 
g 
h 
i 
j 
k 
l 
m 
n 
o 
p 
q 
r 
s 
t 
u 
v 
w 
x 
y 
z 
a’ 
b’ 
c’ 
0.0408 
0.0878 
0.0726 
0.0408 
0.1122 
0.0871 
0.1445 
0.1144 
0.1114 
0.1070 
0.0916 
0.0800 
0.1231 
0.1390 
0.1409 
0.1131 
0.1078 
0.1155 
0.1367 
0.1346 
0.1367 
0.1116 
0.1131 
0.1335 
0.0816 
0.1265 
0.0806 
0.0878 
0.0726 
0.0102 
0.0116 
0.0102 
0.0181 
0.0094 
0.0186 
0.0099 
0.0101 
0.0162 
0.0107 
0.0146 
0.0157 
0.0163 
0.0103 
0.0142 
0.0140 
0.0167 
0.0136 
0.0127 
0.0128 
0.0153 
0.0158 
0.0140 
0.0143 
0.0138 
0.0121 
0.0096 
0.0116 
0.0181 
0.0408 
0.0408 
0.0726 
0.0408 
0.0753 
0.0408 
0.0769 
0.1144 
0.0762 
0.1070 
0.0916 
0.0800 
0.0408 
0.1094 
0.0776 
0.1131 
0.1078 
0.0812 
0.1092 
0.1346 
0.1092 
0.1116 
0.1131 
0.1335 
0.1179 
0.0408 
0.0806 
0.0878 
0.0726 
0.0102 
0.0102 
0.0102 
0.0181 
0.0102 
0.0138 
0.0099 
0.0101 
0.0140 
0.0102 
0.0146 
0.0115 
0.0163 
0.0116 
0.0142 
0.0140 
0.0116 
0.0175 
0.0153 
0.0128 
0.0127 
0.0158 
0.0140 
0.0143 
0.0119 
0.0121 
0.0102 
0.0116 
0.0181 
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Table E.45. Profits 
 Countries 
Networks i j k l 
a 
b 
c 
d 
e 
f 
g 
h 
i 
j 
k 
l 
m 
n 
o 
p 
q 
r 
s 
t 
u 
v 
w 
x 
y 
z 
a’ 
b’ 
c’ 
0.1428 
0.0870 
0.1270 
0.1428 
0.1003 
0.0872 
0.0858 
0.0819 
0.1028 
0.0874 
0.0876 
0.0927 
0.0605 
0.0706 
0.0882 
0.0837 
0.0886 
0.0643 
0.0722 
0.0636 
0.0722 
0.0662 
0.0657 
0.0647 
0.0913 
0.0601 
0.0920 
0.0870 
0.1270 
0.0357 
0.0870 
0.0357 
0.0318 
0.0731 
0.0810 
0.0589 
0.0717 
0.0664 
0.0874 
0.0901 
0.1103 
0.0605 
0.0608 
0.0539 
0.0657 
0.0824 
0.0643 
0.0556 
0.0694 
0.0722 
0.0800 
0.0837 
0.0647 
0.0966 
0.0653 
0.1141 
0.0870 
0.0318 
0.1428 
0.1428 
0.1270 
0.1428 
0.1094 
0.1428 
0.1009 
0.0819 
0.1090 
0.0874 
0.0876 
0.0927 
0.1428 
0.0767 
0.1011 
0.0837 
0.0886 
0.0916 
0.0781 
0.0636 
0.0781 
0.0662 
0.0657 
0.0647 
0.0636 
0.1428 
0.0920 
0.0870 
0.1270 
0.0357 
0.0357 
0.0357 
0.0318 
0.0357 
0.0342 
0.0589 
0.0717 
0.0353 
0.0357 
0.0901 
0.0324 
0.0605 
0.0767 
0.0539 
0.0657 
0.0368 
0.0935 
0.0722 
0.0694 
0.0556 
0.0800 
0.0837 
0.0647 
0.0694 
0.0653 
0.0357 
0.0870 
0.0318 
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Table E.46. Producer Surplus 
 Countries 
Networks i j k l 
a 
b 
c 
d 
e 
f 
g 
h 
i 
j 
k 
l 
m 
n 
o 
p 
q 
r 
s 
t 
u 
v 
w 
x 
y 
z 
a’ 
b’ 
c’ 
0.0306 
0.0306 
0.0544 
0.0306 
0.0528 
0.0281 
0.0532 
0.0460 
0.0498 
0.0479 
0.0296 
0.0289 
0.0306 
0.0485 
0.0502 
0.0448 
0.0452 
0.0320 
0.0466 
0.0455 
0.0466 
0.0321 
0.0332 
0.0441 
0.0307 
0.0330 
0.0298 
0.0306 
0.0544 
0.0077 
0.0306 
0.0077 
0.0136 
0.0281 
0.0351 
0.0239 
0.0274 
0.0327 
0.0478 
0.0379 
0.0569 
0.0306 
0.0244 
0.0300 
0.0332 
0.0500 
0.0320 
0.0306 
0.0409 
0.0466 
0.0480 
0.0448 
0.0441 
0.0488 
0.0251 
0.0535 
0.0306 
0.0136 
0.0306 
0.0306 
0.0544 
0.0306 
0.0460 
0.0306 
0.0407 
0.0460 
0.0459 
0.0479 
0.0296 
0.0289 
0.0306 
0.0428 
0.0410 
0.0448 
0.0452 
0.0294 
0.0417 
0.0455 
0.0417 
0.0321 
0.0332 
0.0441 
0.0334 
0.0306 
0.0298 
0.0306 
0.0544 
0.0077 
0.0077 
0.0077 
0.0136 
0.0077 
0.0146 
0.0239 
0.0274 
0.0151 
0.0077 
0.0379 
0.0127 
0.0306 
0.0428 
0.0300 
0.0332 
0.0157 
0.0518 
0.0466 
0.0409 
0.0306 
0.0480 
0.0448 
0.0441 
0.0263 
0.0251 
0.0077 
0.0306 
0.0136 
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Table E.47. Welfare 
 Countries 
Networks i j k l 
a 
b 
c 
d 
e 
f 
g 
h 
i 
j 
k 
l 
m 
n 
o 
p 
q 
r 
s 
t 
u 
v 
w 
x 
y 
z 
a’ 
b’ 
c’ 
0.2142 
0.2054 
0.2540 
0.2142 
0.2653 
0.2024 
0.2835 
0.2423 
0.2640 
0.2423 
0.2088 
0.2016 
0.2142 
0.2581 
0.2793 
0.2416 
0.2416 
0.2118 
0.2555 
0.2437 
0.2555 
0.2099 
0.2120 
0.2423 
0.2036 
0.2196 
0.2024 
0.2054 
0.2540 
0.0536 
0.1292 
0.0536 
0.0635 
0.1106 
0.1347 
0.0927 
0.1092 
0.1153 
0.1459 
0.1426 
0.1829 
0.1074 
0.0955 
0.0981 
0.1129 
0.1491 
0.1099 
0.0989 
0.1231 
0.1341 
0.1438 
0.1425 
0.1231 
0.1592 
0.1025 
0.1772 
0.1292 
0.0635 
0.2142 
0.2142 
0.2540 
0.2142 
0.2307 
0.2142 
0.2185 
0.2423 
0.2311 
0.2423 
0.2088 
0.2016 
0.2142 
0.2289 
0.2197 
0.2416 
0.2416 
0.2022 
0.2290 
0.2437 
0.2290 
0.2099 
0.2120 
0.2423 
0.2149 
0.2142 
0.2024 
0.2054 
0.2540 
0.0536 
0.0536 
0.0536 
0.0635 
0.0536 
0.0626 
0.0927 
0.1092 
0.0644 
0.0536 
0.1426 
0.0566 
0.1074 
0.1311 
0.0981 
0.1129 
0.0641 
0.1628 
0.1341 
0.1231 
0.0989 
0.1438 
0.1425 
0.1231 
0.1076 
0.1025 
0.0536 
0.1292 
0.0635 
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Tables for Simulation 17:  = 3 for  = {i, k};  = 1 for  = {j, l};  = 0.5; and  = 
1.   
 
Table E.48. Consumer Surplus 
 Countries 
Networks i j k l 
a 
b 
c 
d 
e 
f 
g 
h 
i 
j 
k 
l 
m 
n 
o 
p 
q 
r 
s 
t 
u 
v 
w 
x 
y 
z 
a’ 
b’ 
c’ 
0.0408 
0.1094 
0.0726 
0.0408 
0.1322 
0.1072 
0.1718 
0.1297 
0.1367 
0.1250 
0.1074 
0.1012 
0.1543 
0.1685 
0.2185 
0.1292 
0.1243 
0.1497 
0.1636 
0.1628 
0.1636 
0.1464 
0.1503 
0.1608 
0.1052 
0.1588 
0.1033 
0.1094 
0.0726 
0.0800 
0.1094 
0.0800 
0.1422 
0.1031 
0.1591 
0.1016 
0.1058 
0.1535 
0.1250 
0.1533 
0.1741 
0.1543 
0.1039 
0.1462 
0.1503 
0.1670 
0.1497 
0.1462 
0.1250 
0.1636 
0.1645 
0.1292 
0.1608 
0.1301 
0.1073 
0.1322 
0.1094 
0.1422 
0.0408 
0.0408 
0.0726 
0.0408 
0.0611 
0.0408 
0.0722 
0.1297 
0.0740 
0.1250 
0.1074 
0.1012 
0.0408 
0.1252 
0.0751 
0.1292 
0.1243 
0.0895 
0.1252 
0.1628 
0.1252 
0.1464 
0.1503 
0.1608 
0.1529 
0.0408 
0.1033 
0.1094 
0.0726 
0.0800 
0.0800 
0.0800 
0.1422 
0.0800 
0.1349 
0.1016 
0.1058 
0.1352 
0.0800 
0.1533 
0.1286 
0.1543 
0.1252 
0.1462 
0.1503 
0.1300 
0.1695 
0.1636 
0.1250 
0.1462 
0.1645 
0.1292 
0.1608 
0.1078 
0.1073 
0.0800 
0.1094 
0.1422 
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Table E.49. Profits 
 Countries 
Networks i j k l 
a 
b 
c 
d 
e 
f 
g 
h 
i 
j 
k 
l 
m 
n 
o 
p 
q 
r 
s 
t 
u 
v 
w 
x 
y 
z 
a’ 
b’ 
c’ 
0.1837 
0.1207 
0.1633 
0.1837 
0.1342 
0.1044 
0.1298 
0.1097 
0.1245 
0.1055 
0.1059 
0.1054 
0.0833 
0.1020 
0.1109 
0.0973 
0.0983 
0.0827 
0.0847 
0.0898 
0.0847 
0.0812 
0.0973 
0.0748 
0.1142 
0.1118 
0.1146 
0.1207 
0.1633 
0.2000 
0.2312 
0.2000 
0.1778 
0.2187 
0.2238 
0.1966 
0.2178 
0.2109 
0.2344 
0.2171 
0.2582 
0.1852 
0.2036 
0.2048 
0.2037 
0.2299 
0.1831 
0.1807 
0.1950 
0.2061 
0.1943 
0.2037 
0.1851 
0.2312 
0.1974 
0.2609 
0.2312 
0.1778 
0.1837 
0.1837 
0.1633 
0.1837 
0.1129 
0.1837 
0.1295 
0.1097 
0.1434 
0.1055 
0.1059 
0.1054 
0.1837 
0.0977 
0.1272 
0.0973 
0.0983 
0.1050 
0.0886 
0.0898 
0.0886 
0.0812 
0.0973 
0.0748 
0.1045 
0.1837 
0.1146 
0.1207 
0.1633 
0.2000 
0.2000 
0.2000 
0.1778 
0.2000 
0.1710 
0.1966 
0.2178 
0.1754 
0.2000 
0.2171 
0.1691 
0.1852 
0.2103 
0.2048 
0.2037 
0.1717 
0.2080 
0.2061 
0.1950 
0.1807 
0.1943 
0.2037 
0.1851 
0.2002 
0.1974 
0.2000 
0.2312 
0.1778 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
882 
 
Table E.50. Producer Surplus 
 Countries 
Networks i j k l 
a 
b 
c 
d 
e 
f 
g 
h 
i 
j 
k 
l 
m 
n 
o 
p 
q 
r 
s 
t 
u 
v 
w 
x 
y 
z 
a’ 
b’ 
c’ 
0.0306 
0.0402 
0.0544 
0.0306 
0.0638 
0.0335 
0.0756 
0.0542 
0.0567 
0.0527 
0.0343 
0.0327 
0.0417 
0.0643 
0.0633 
0.0483 
0.0476 
0.0410 
0.0547 
0.0574 
0.0547 
0.0403 
0.0483 
0.0498 
0.0378 
0.0534 
0.0378 
0.0402 
0.0544 
0.0200 
0.0462 
0.0200 
0.0356 
0.0435 
0.0659 
0.0379 
0.0434 
0.0630 
0.0703 
0.0638 
0.0991 
0.0556 
0.0399 
0.0614 
0.0608 
0.0906 
0.0547 
0.0541 
0.0577 
0.0813 
0.0774 
0.0608 
0.0740 
0.0683 
0.0387 
0.0777 
0.0462 
0.0356 
0.0306 
0.0306 
0.0544 
0.0306 
0.0373 
0.0306 
0.0380 
0.0542 
0.0470 
0.0527 
0.0343 
0.0327 
0.0306 
0.0474 
0.0379 
0.0483 
0.0476 
0.0330 
0.0431 
0.0574 
0.0431 
0.0403 
0.0483 
0.0498 
0.0508 
0.0306 
0.0378 
0.0402 
0.0544 
0.0200 
0.0200 
0.0200 
0.0356 
0.0200 
0.0340 
0.0379 
0.0434 
0.0350 
0.0200 
0.0638 
0.0333 
0.0556 
0.0617 
0.0614 
0.0608 
0.0340 
0.0821 
0.0813 
0.0577 
0.0541 
0.0774 
0.0608 
0.0740 
0.0394 
0.0387 
0.0200 
0.0462 
0.0356 
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Table E.51. Welfare 
 Countries 
Networks i j k l 
a 
b 
c 
d 
e 
f 
g 
h 
i 
j 
k 
l 
m 
n 
o 
p 
q 
r 
s 
t 
u 
v 
w 
x 
y 
z 
a’ 
b’ 
c’ 
0.2551 
0.2703 
0.2902 
0.2551 
0.3302 
0.2451 
0.3771 
0.2937 
0.3179 
0.2832 
0.2476 
0.2393 
0.2793 
0.3347 
0.3927 
0.2748 
0.2701 
0.2734 
0.3030 
0.3100 
0.3030 
0.2679 
0.2959 
0.2854 
0.2572 
0.3241 
0.2556 
0.2703 
0.2902 
0.3000 
0.3869 
0.3000 
0.3556 
0.3653 
0.4488 
0.3361 
0.3669 
0.4274 
0.4297 
0.4343 
0.5314 
0.3951 
0.3474 
0.4124 
0.4148 
0.4874 
0.3875 
0.3810 
0.3777 
0.4510 
0.4363 
0.3937 
0.4199 
0.4296 
0.3433 
0.4708 
0.3869 
0.3556 
0.2551 
0.2551 
0.2902 
0.2551 
0.2112 
0.2551 
0.2396 
0.2937 
0.2644 
0.2832 
0.2476 
0.2393 
0.2551 
0.2703 
0.2403 
0.2748 
0.2701 
0.2275 
0.2569 
0.3100 
0.2569 
0.2679 
0.2959 
0.2854 
0.3082 
0.2551 
0.2556 
0.2703 
0.2902 
0.3000 
0.3000 
0.3000 
0.3556 
0.3000 
0.3399 
0.3361 
0.3669 
0.3457 
0.3000 
0.4343 
0.3310 
0.3951 
0.3972 
0.4124 
0.4148 
0.3356 
0.4596 
0.4510 
0.3777 
0.3810 
0.4363 
0.3937 
0.4199 
0.3475 
0.3433 
0.3000 
0.3869 
0.3556 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
884 
 
Appendix F 
 
Simulations for the case of governments biased in favour of consumers 
 
This appendix shows and discusses the results obtained from the simulations 
carried out for the case of governments biased in favour of consumers. These 
results are presented as follows. 
 
F.1 Simulations for bilateralism under symmetric countries 
 
Two groups of simulations were developed for the case of symmetrical countries. 
One of them includes simulations under the assumption of exogenous tariffs and 
the other includes simulations under the assumption of endogenous tariffs.  
 
F.1.1 Bilateralism under exogenous tariffs and symmetric countries 
 
The simulations included in this group consider three different levels of 
monopsonistic power: (i) no monopsonistic power (i.e. ϕi = 0 in Equation 4.1 which 
corresponds to the original model by Goyal and Joshi (2006)); (ii) moderate levels 
of monopsonistic power (i.e. ϕi = 0.5 in Equation 4.1); and (iii) high levels of 
monopsonistic power (i.e. ϕi = 1.5 in Equation 4.1). The results of these simulations 
for the case of governments biased in favour of consumers are presented as 
follows. 
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F.1.1.1 Simulation 1: i = 0 and i = 1 for all i  N.    
 
In considering Table 4.1 it is inferred that the set of link deletion and link addition 
proof networks are D = {a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j, k, Eq} and A = {k}, respectively. 
Consequently, the set of pairwise stable networks when governments are biased in 
favour of consumers is P = D  A = {k}, that is, global free trade.  
 
The stability of this network is explained by the oligopolistic power exercised by the 
intermediaries. That is, when two countries sign an agreement, their domestic 
markets become more competitive because more intermediaries compete in these 
markets. Consumers are better off because consumer surplus increases when 
markets are more competitive. This explains why global free trade is the only 
stable network when governments are biased in favour of consumers: signing 
additional agreements always increases consumer surplus in this model reflecting 
the higher level of competition that is caused by free trade.  
 
F.1.1.2 Simulation 2: i = 0.5 and i = 1 for all i  N.    
 
In considering Table E.4, it was inferred that the sets of link deletion proof and link 
addition proof networks when governments are biased in favour of consumers are 
given by D = {a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j, k, Eq} and A = {k}. This implies that the set of 
pairwise stable networks in this case is given by P = D  A = {k}. This is the same 
result obtained by Goyal and Joshi (2006). That is, when governments care about 
consumers, the pairwise stable network is global free trade and this is unique. 
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According to this result, the only stable network when governments are biased in 
favour of consumers is global free trade because this increases competition in 
domestic markets increasing consumer surplus. This is the same result as that 
found in Goyal and Joshi’s world implying that their results are robust when there is 
a farming sector only when governments are biased in favour of consumers. 
 
F.1.1.3 Simulation 3: i = 1.5 and i = 1 for all i  N.    
 
In this simulation it is inferred from Table E.8 in Appendix E that the sets of link 
deletion and link addition proof networks are D = {a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j, k, Eq}, A 
= {k}, respectively. This implies that the set of pairwise stable networks in this case 
is P = D  A = {k}. This is the same result obtained in the previous simulation. This 
implies that this result is robust through different levels of monopsonistic power 
when governments are biased in favour of consumers. 
 
F.1.2 Bilateralism under endogenous tariffs and symmetric countries 
 
Simulations for the case of endogenous tariffs were developed only for politically 
unbiased governments as a consequence of the mathematical complexity of the 
model when assuming policy biases.  
 
 
887 
 
F.2 Simulations on bilateralism under asymmetric countries 
 
This section extends the analysis by allowing asymmetry across countries. Two 
types of asymmetry are considered in this study: (1) asymmetry in market size: and 
(2) asymmetry in farmer’s productivity. 
 
F.2.1 Bilateralism under exogenous tariffs and asymmetry in market size 
 
Asymmetry in market size is introduced by assuming that countries i and k have 
the same market size denoted by , and countries j and l have the same market 
size denoted by  ~  (see Section 4.2.1.2). Using this assumption, six 
simulations were developed (i.e. simulations 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, and 16). The three 
first simulations considers the extreme case when ~ = 0. That is, they consider the 
case when countries j and l are extremely small in the sense that they don’t have a 
domestic market. This assumption is relaxed in the next three simulations with the 
purpose of studying the incentive of large countries to trade with middle size 
countries. In these simulations it is assumed ~ = 0.5. That is, countries j and l are 
small but still have a significant domestic market. 
 
F.2.1.1 Simulation 11:  = 1, = 0 and  = 0 for all i  N.    
 
In this simulation it is assumed that there is no monopsonistic power (i.e. i = 0). 
This implies that this simulation converges to the original model by Goyal and Joshi 
(2006) under asymmetry in market size. 
~
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According to the information presented in Table E.26, D = {a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j, 
k, l, m, n, o, p, q, r, s, t, u, v, w, x, y, z, a’, b’, c’, Eq} and A = {t, x}. Consequently, 
the set of pairwise stable networks when governments are biased in favour of 
consumers is P = D  A = {t, x}. 
 
In contrast to the case of symmetric countries where global free trade is the only 
pairwise stable network, in the asymmetric case there are two stable networks: t 
and x. The stability of global free trade is explained by the fact large countries are 
unwilling to break an existing agreement because this causes a loss in consumer 
surplus as a result of the lower level of competition in their domestic markets. On 
the other hand, small countries are indifferent because they do not have relevant 
domestic markets. Consequently, breaking an existing agreement does not affect 
the level of consumer surplus in these countries because in any case consumer 
surplus is cero. On the other hand, network t is stable because the small countries 
are indifferent about breaking or signing a new agreement as this does not change 
the level of consumer surplus. Again, this is due to the fact that these countries do 
not have domestic markets and, therefore, consumer surplus is always cero. 
 
F.1.1.2 Simulation 12:  = 1,  = 0 and  = 0.5 for all i  N.    
 
This simulation introduces the farming sector into the analysis. This is done by 
assuming moderate level of monopsonistic power (i.e.  = 0.5 for all i  N).  
 
~
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In considering Table E.29, it is inferred that the sets of link deletion proof and link 
addition proof networks when governments are biased in favour of consumers are 
given by D = {a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j, k, l, m, n, o, p, q, r, s, t, u, v, w, x, y, z, a’, b’, 
c’, Eq} and A = {t, x}. This implies that the set of pairwise stable networks in this 
case is given by P = D  A = {t, x}. This is the same result than the one obtained in 
the previous simulation. 
 
This result revealed that when governments are biased in favour of consumers, the 
same pairwise stable networks are obtained with respect to the previous 
simulation. This implies that the results obtained from Goyal and Joshi’s world are 
robust under relatively low levels of monopsonistic power.  
 
F.2.1.3 Simulation 13:  = 1,  = 0 and  = 1.5 for all i  N.    
 
The objective of this simulation is to determine whether the results obtained in the 
previous one are affected when intermediaries exercise larger levels of 
monopsonistic power (i.e. when  = 1.5).   
 
In considering Table E.33, it is inferred that the sets of link deletion proof and link 
addition proof networks when governments are biased in favour of consumers are 
D = {a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j, k, l, m, n, o, p, q, r, s, t, u, v, w, x, y, z, a’, b’, c’, Eq}, A 
= {t, x} and P = D  A = {t, x}. This is the same result that the one obtained in the 
previous simulation. It is concluded therefore that the network pairwise stability is 
~
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not affected by different levels of monopsonistic power when countries are biased 
in favour of consumers. 
 
F.2.1.4 Simulation 14:  = 1,  = 0.5 and  = 0 for all i  N.    
 
The next three simulation were introduced with the purpose of identifying the 
pairwise stable networks when there large and medium size countries (i.e.  = 1 
and  = 0.5, respectively) under different degrees of monopsonistic power. The 
current simulation in particular considers the case when there is no monopsonistic 
power (i.e. Goyal and Joshi’s world when there are large and medium size 
countries).  
 
In considering Table E.37 it is inferred that when governments are politically biased 
in favour of consumers, D = {a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j, k, l, m, n, o, p, q, r, s, t, u, v, w, 
x, y, z, a’, b’, c’, Eq} and A = {x}. Consequently, the set of pairwise stable networks 
in this case is P = D  A = {x}, that is, global free trade. This differs from the results 
obtained in Simulation 11. In that simulation network t is also stable and this is 
explained by the fact that the very small countries j and l in network t are indifferent 
about having an agreement with each other because they don’t have domestic 
markets. In contrast, when countries j and l are medium size, they have relevant 
domestic markets that become more competitive after the agreement increasing in 
this way consumer surplus. This explains why network t is not stable in the current 
simulation.  
 
~
~
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F.2.1.5 Simulation 15:  = 1,  = 0.5 and  = 0.5 for all i  N.    
 
The objective of this simulation is to introduce the farming sector into the model 
when networks are formed of large and medium size countries. This is reflected by 
the assumption that intermediaries exercise a moderate level of monopsonistic 
power. (i.e. i = 0.5). 
 
In considering Table E.40, it is inferred that the sets of link deletion proof and link 
addition proof networks when governments are biased in favour of consumers are 
D = {a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j, k, m, n, o, p, q, r, s, t, u, v, w, x, y, z, a’, b’, c’, Eq} and 
A = {x}, respectivelly. This implies that the set of pairwise stable networks in this 
case is given by P = D  A = {x}. The same set of pairwise stable networks was 
obtained in the symmetrical case and the previous simulation. This implies 
therefore that the results obtained from Goyal and Joshi’s when governments are 
biased in favour of consumers are robust through different moderate levels 
monopsonistic power and asymmetric countries in market size that do not include 
very small countries. However, a deviation was found in the set of link deletion 
proof networks with respect to the previous simulation. That is, network l is not link 
deletion proof when there is a farming sector. Likewise, a deviation was found in 
the set of pairwise stable networks in the simulation that considers moderate levels 
of monopsonistic power and very small countries (see Section 4.4.1.2). In that 
simulation network t is also pairwise stable. These deviations are explained as 
follows.  
 
~
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In the case of biased governments in favour of consumers the only pairwise stable 
network is global free trade and this differs from the case of large countries and 
very small countries with moderate level of monopsonistic power. In that case 
network t is also pairwise stable because the very small countries j and k are very 
small implying that they are indifferent about having an agreement with each other. 
That is, an agreement will not make any difference on consumer surplus because 
they have irrelevant domestic markets. In contrast when countries j and k are 
medium size, an agreement with each other will increase consumer surplus as 
their domestic markets become more competitive. It is concluded therefore that 
when governments are biased in favour of consumers and when the level of 
monopsonistic power exercised by intermediaries is moderate, deviations from 
global free trade are expected to be found in networks containing very small 
countries.  
 
On the other hand, it was found in the previous simulation that network l is link 
deletion proof. However, this changes when there is a farming sector. This network 
is the star network with centre the medium size country j. In the previous simulation 
this network is link deletion proof because country j is unwilling to break any of the 
existing agreements. Breaking an agreement implies reducing the level of 
competition negatively affection consumer surplus in this country. In contrast, when 
there is a moderate level of monopsonistic power, this is not the case because the 
medium size country j has an incentive to break an existing agreement with a large 
country. The reason is because the agreement with a large country increases the 
export output to the latter country pushing the agricultural price up in the former. In 
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order to deal with this higher cost, the intermediary of country j decreases the 
output that is sold in the domestic market in order to release pressure on the 
agricultural price and, in this way, improve the competitive position when exporting 
the food processed good to the large country. As a result, the agreement lowers 
the level of competition in the central medium size country j negatively affecting 
consumer surplus. This is why network l is not link deletion proof. This also proves 
the fact that free trade not always increases consumer surplus as is normally 
believed. Depending on the network, there are cases where consumer surplus 
decreases in medium size countries that occupy a central position in the network 
when there is a farming sector which is explained by the influence of this sector on 
the cost faced by the intermediaries.  
 
F.2.1.6 Simulation 16:  = 1,  = 0.5 and  = 1.5 for all i  N.    
 
This last simulation in the section of asymmetry in market size introduced to study 
the effects of very high levels of monopsonistic power on the international trade 
system.  
 
In considering Table E.44 it is concluded that when governments are biased in 
favour of consumers, the sets of link deletion proof, link addition proof and pairwise 
stable networks are D = {a, b, c, d, e, f,  j, k, m, n, o, p, q, r, s, t, u, v, x, y, z, b’, c’, 
Eq}, A = {x, c’} and P = D  A = {x, c’}, respectively. This result is different from the 
one obtained in the previous simulation. In that simulation only global free trade is 
stable. This suggests therefore that high levels of monosponistic power can 
~
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negatively affect the incentives of governments when they are biased in favour of 
consumers. The intuition behind this result is explained as follows. 
 
In relation to the case of governments biased in favour of consumer surplus, the 
results revealed that when monopsonistic power if high, two networks become 
pairwise stable: global free trade; and network c’. The latter networks is composed 
of two blocks, one is formed of the large countries i and k and the other is formed 
of the medium size countries j and l. According to Table E.44, the medium size 
countries are unwilling to sign an agreement with a large size country (this can be 
seen when comparing consumer surplus in networks c’ and h in Figure 4.5). The 
reason is because the agreement causes a net decrease in the total output that is 
sold in the domestic market of the medium size country reducing in this way the 
level of competition in this market. That is, the intermediary of this country has 
access to a large market after the agreement which implies a large quantity that is 
exported to the large country. This additional output pushes the price paid to 
farmers up as a consequence of the high monopsonistic power. In order cushion 
this increase in price, the intermediary decreases the output sold in the domestic 
market of the medium size country in order to take advantage of the large size of 
the external market. This decrease in output in the domestic market of the medium 
size country is not compensated by the additional output imported from the large 
country. As a result, the agreement causes a net decrease in the output that is 
traded in this country negatively affecting consumer surplus. It is concluded 
therefore that high levels of monopsonistic power negatively affect international 
trade when governments are biased in favour of consumers and when the network 
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is formed of large and medium size countries. Under these conditions, regionalism 
of the south-north type arises. This is an interesting results because it is commonly 
believed that free trade always increase competition and consumer surplus by 
making cheaper the goods that are traded internationally. However, as shown in 
this simulation, this is not always the case. As proved in this section, the effect of 
free trade on consumer surplus depends on the architecture of the network, the 
level of monopsonistic power, and the existence of asymmetries across countries.  
 
F.2.2 Bilateralism under exogenous tariffs and asymmetry in farmers’ 
productivity 
 
A key result obtained in the previous simulations is that monopsonistic power has 
an important effect on the architecture and stability of international networks of 
food processed goods. The objective of the simulation presented in this section is 
to assess how this type of imperfection affects the network architecture when 
farming sectors in different countries are asymmetric.  
 
F.2.2.1 Simulation 17:  = 3 for  = {i, k};  = 1 for  = {j, l};  = 0.5; and  = 1.   
 
In considering Table E.48, it was found that the sets of link deletion proof and link 
addition proof networks when governments are biased in favour of consumers are 
given by D = {a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j, k, l, m, n, o, p, q, r, s, t, u, v, w, x, y, z, a’, b’, 
c’, Eq} and A = {x}. This implies that the set of pairwise stable networks in this case 
is given by P = D  A = {x}.  
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This result is the same as the ones obtained for the cases of symmetric countries 
with different levels of monosonistic power. This means that the same conclusions 
discussed in these simulations applies to the case of asymmetry in farmers’ 
productivity when governments are politically biased in favour of consumers. 
 
F.3 Simulations for global agreements under symmetric countries 
 
This section explores the issue of global agreements when governments are 
biased in favour of consumers and when countries are symmetric. For this 
purpose, the global treaty stability developed in this dissertation is considered. 
 
F.3.1 Global agreements under exogenous tariffs and symmetric countries 
 
This part includes the simulations that assume symmetrical countries and 
exogenous tariffs. Each of these simulations corresponds to different levels of 
monopsonistic power associated with specific values of the parameter i in 
equation 4.1: i = 0; i = 0.5; and i = 1.5 for all i  N. These simulations are 
explained as follows. 
 
F.3.1.1 Simulation 1: i = 0 and i = 1 for all i  N.    
 
The information presented in Table 4.1 revealed that when countries are biased in 
favour of consumers, the sets of strong link deletion proof networks and global 
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treaty proof networks are DS = {a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j, k, Eq} and  = {h, i, j, k, Eq}, 
respectively. Therefore the set of global treaty stable networks is GT = DS   = {h, 
i, j, k, Eq}. 
 
According to the results, the global stable networks in this case are networks h, i, j 
and k. The stability of the first three networks is explained by the fact that they 
contain at least one country that is indifferent about signing a global agreement in 
agriculture. The stability of network k, on the other hand, is explained by the fact 
that no country in this network is willing to break one or more links simultaneously. 
These networks are shown in Figure F.1. The countries that are indifferent about 
signing a global agreement are depicted as nodes highlighted with circles.  
  
 
 
 
 
            (h)                                    (i)                                 (j)                                 (k) 
Figure F.1. Global treaty networks when governments are biased in favour of 
consumers. 
 
To understand why networks h, i and j are global treaty stable, let us consider 
network h as an example. In this network, country i is connected with all countries 
of the world. As a result, the domestic market of this country has reached the 
highest possible level of competition as all players in the world are present in this 
market. This implies that country i enjoys the highest possible level of consumer 
i i i i j j j j 
k k k k l 
l l l 
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surplus as a consequence of this high level of competition. Thus, if this country 
signed a global agreement in agriculture, the same countries would be playing in 
its domestic market because country i already have bilateral agreements with 
them. This means that this agreement would not affect the level of competition in 
the domestic market of country i and, therefore, the level of consumer surplus 
would remain the same. This is why this country is indifferent about signing a 
global agreement. The same explanation applies to networks i and j. It is 
concluded therefore that when countries are already connected to the other 
countries of the world, then biased governments in favour of consumers of the 
former are indifferent about signing a global agreement in agriculture because this 
would not affect the current level of consumer surplus.  
 
In relation to network k, on the other hand, this network is global treaty stable 
because no country in this structure is willing to break one or more agreements 
simultaneously. If they did, then the resulting lower competition in the domestic 
market would negatively affect consumer surplus.  
 
F.3.1.2 Simulation 2: i = 0.5 and i = 1 for all i  N.    
 
This simulation introduces the farming sector in order to assess how moderate 
levels of monopsonistic power (i.e. i = 0.5) affects the global treaty stable 
networks identified in the previous case.  
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Using the information presented in Table E.4 it was found that when countries are 
biased in favour of consumers, the sets of strong link deletion proof networks and 
global treaty proof networks are DS = {a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j, k, Eq} and  = {h, i, j, 
k, Eq}, respectively. Therefore the set of global treaty stable networks is GT = DS  
 = {h, i, j, k, Eq}. 
 
According to this result, the global treaty stability of the networks identified in the 
previous simulation is not affected either. However, while this sector does not 
affect this stability, it affects the incentives of the governments of central countries. 
To illustrate this effect, consider as an example the global treaty stable network h. 
In the previous section, this stability is explained by the fact that the central country 
i is indifferent about signing a global agreement because this does not affect 
consumer surplus. That is, because this country already has agreements with all 
countries in the world in network h, a global agreement does not increase the level 
of competition in this country. In contrast, when there is a farming sector, a global 
agreement causes an increase in the total output that is traded internationally. This 
pushes the price paid to the farming sector up implying that the intermediaries in 
the world face a higher marginal cost after the agreement. In order to adjust to this 
higher cost, these individuals reduce the total output that is traded globally 
negatively affecting the level of consumer surplus in the central country. This 
implies that when there is a farming sector, the governments of central countries 
are unwilling to sign a global agreement rather than being indifferent.  
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It is concluded therefore that the presence of the farming sector has a negative 
effect on the incentives of biased governments in favour of consumers in central 
countries because it reinforces the unwillingness to sign a global agreement in 
agriculture. It is also concluded that the claim arguing that global free trade always 
causes a gain in consumer surplus is not necessarily true. Rather, it depends on 
the existence of a farming sector and the position of countries in the network. This 
finding reinforces the advantage of studying agricultural trade liberalisation using a 
network approach as this framework can inform about the incentive of single 
countries in the network.  
 
F.3.1.3 Simulation 3: i = 1.5 and i = 1 for all i  N.    
 
This simulation was introduced with the purpose of investigating whether the 
results obtained under moderate levels of monopsonistic power remains robust 
when this power is high. The results are presented as follows. 
 
It is inferred from Table E.8 in Appendix E that when countries are biased in favour 
of consumers, the sets of strong link deletion proof networks and global treaty 
proof networks are DS = {a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j, k, Eq} and  = {h, i, j, k, Eq}, 
respectively. Therefore the set of global treaty stable networks is GT = DS   = {h, 
i, j, k, Eq}. 
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This is the same result than the one obtained in the previous simulation. It is 
concluded therefore that the identified global treaty stable networks remain robust 
thtough different levels of monopsonistic power.  
 
F.3.2 Global agreements under endogenous tariffs and symmetric countries 
 
Given the complexity of the model when tariffs are placed endogenously, only the 
politically unbiased governments case was explored in the relevant simulations. 
 
F.3.3 Global agreements under exogenous tariffs and asymmetry in market 
size 
 
The objective of this section is to extend the analysis to determine whether 
asymmetry in market size can also affect the global treaty stability when countries 
are involved in global agreements.  
 
F.3.3.1 Simulation 11:  = 1, = 0 and  = 0 for all i  N.    
 
This simulation considers a world composed of large and very small countries 
without monopsonistic power. That is, it corresponds to Goyal and Joshis’ world 
under this type of asymmetry. 
 
According to information presented in Table E.26 in Appendix E the sets of strong 
link deletion proof networks and global treaty proof networks when governments 
~
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are biased in favour of consumers are DS =  = {a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j, k, l, m, n, o, 
p, q, r, s, t, u, v, w, x, y, z, a’, b’, c’, Eq}. Therefore the set of global treaty stable 
networks is GT = DS   = {a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j, k, l, m, n, o, p, q, r, s, t, u, v, w, 
x, y, z, a’, b’, c’, Eq}. 
 
According to the results, when governments are biased in favour of consumers, all 
the networks in Figure 4.5 are the global treaty stable. In contrast, in the 
symmetrical case only networks having central countries that are connected to all 
the countries of the world are global treaty stable. This difference is explained by 
the incentives of the very small countries. That is, because these countries have a 
very small domestic market, any gain in consumer surplus from a global agreement 
is irrelevant. This is why they are indifferent about signing an agreement in any 
possible network. This is also valid for large central countries that are connected to 
all countries of the world: because they are already connected to all countries of 
the world, a global agreement will not increase the level of competition in their 
domestic markets. It is concluded therefore that the only countries that are willing 
to sign a global agreement when governments are biased in favour of consumers 
are large countries that are not fully connected. This is because this agreement 
allows them to connect to all countries of the world and this, in turn, increases the 
level of competition positively affecting consumer surplus.  
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F.3.3.2 Simulation 12:  = 1,  = 0 and  = 0.5 for all i  N.    
 
This simulation investigates how the results obtained in the previous simulation are 
affected when intermediaries exercise moderate levels of monopsonistic power 
(i.e.  = 0.5 in all i  N). 
 
According to the information presented in Table E.29 in Appendix E, the sets of 
strong link deletion proof networks and global treaty proof networks when countries 
are biased in favour of consumers are DS =  = {a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j, k, l, m, n, o, 
p, q, r, s, t, u, v, w, x, y, z, a’, b’, c’, Eq}. Therefore, the set of global treaty stable 
networks is GT = DS   = {a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j, k, l, m, n, o, p, q, r, s, t, u, v, w, 
x, y, z, a’, b’, c’, Eq}. 
 
According to the results, the same networks are global treaty stable when 
governments are biased in favour of either consumers or intermediaries. This 
implies that the results obtained from Goyal and Joshis’ model are robust through 
moderate monopsonistic power when the world is composed of large and very 
small countries.  
 
F.3.3.3 Simulation 13:  = 1,  = 0 and  = 1.5 for all i  N.    
 
This last simulation in the case of a world composed of large and very small 
countries is introduced to determine how the international trade structure of 
~
~
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processed agricultural goods is affected when the level of monopsonistic power is 
high (i.e. when  = 1.5 for all i  N).    
 
According to the information presented in Table E.33 in Appendix E, the sets of 
strong link deletion proof networks and global treaty proof networks when countries 
are biased in favour of consumers are DS =  = {a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j, k, l, m, n, o, 
p, q, r, s, t, u, v, w, x, y, z, a’, b’, c’, Eq}. Therefore the set of global treaty stable 
networks is GT = DS   = {a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j, k, l, m, n, o, p, q, r, s, t, u, v, w, 
x, y, z, a’, b’, c’, Eq}. 
 
This is the same result that the one obtained in the previous simulations. It is 
concluded therefore that the identified global treaty stable networks remain robust 
through different levels of monoipsonistic power when governments are biased in 
favour of consumers.  
  
F.3.3.4 Simulation 14:  = 1,  = 0.5 and  = 0 for all i  N.    
 
The next three simulation are introduced to study global agreements when the 
world is composed of large and medium size countries (i.e.  = 1 and  = 0.5, 
respectively) under different degrees of monopsonistic power. The current 
simulation in particular considers the case when there is not monopsonistic power 
(i.e. Goyal and Joshi’s world). 
 
~
~
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Using Table E.39 in Appendix E, it is concluded that when countries are biased in 
favour of consumers, the sets of strong link deletion proof networks and global 
treaty proof networks are DS = {a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j, k, l, m, n, o, p, q, r, s, t, u, v, 
w, x, y, z, a’, b’, c’, Eq} and  = {g, l, n, o, q, r, s, t, u, v, x, Eq}, respectively. 
Therefore the set of global treaty stable networks is GT = DS   = {g, l, n, o, q, r, 
s, t, u, v, x, Eq}. 
 
In Section 5.4.3.1, it was found that when the world is composed of large and very 
small countries, all networks are global treaty stable. The reason is because the 
very small countries are indifferent about signing a global agreement because they 
have irrelevant domestic markets. Consequently, a global agreement does not help 
them to increase consumer surplus. In contrast, when the world is formed of large 
and medium size countries, the latter have domestic markets that are large enough 
to offer them gains in consumer surplus from a global agreement. However, there 
are a number of global treaty stable networks other than global free trade that is 
explained by centrality. That is networks g, l, n, o, q, r, s, t, u and v in Figure 4.5 
are all global treaty stable because they contain at least one country that is fully 
connected (i.e. they contain at least one central country). Now, because these 
countries are fully connected, they have already achieved the maximum possible 
level of competition in their domestic market and, therefore, the maximum possible 
level of consumer surplus. This is why these central countries are indifferent about 
signing a global agreement and why networks g, l, n, o, q, r, s, t, u and v are global 
treaty stable in the current simulation.  
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F.3.3.5 Simulation 15:  = 1,  = 0.5 and  = 0.5 for all i  N.    
 
In this simulation it is assumed a world composed of large and medium size 
countries with intermediaries that exercise moderate levels of monopsonistic power 
(i.e. i = 0.5).  
 
Using the information presented in Table E.40 in Appendix E, it is concluded that 
when countries are biased in favour of consumers, the sets of strong link deletion 
proof, global treaty proof, and global treaty networks are DS = {a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, 
j, k,  m, n, o, p, q, r, s, t, u, v, w, x, y, z, a’, b’, c’, Eq},  = {g, n, o, q, r, s, t, u, v, x, 
Eq}, and GT = DS   = {g, n, o, q, r, s, t, u, v, x, Eq}, respectively. 
 
The results revealed that when governments are biased in favour of consumers, 
network l is neither strong link deletion proof nor global treaty proof. This is 
explained by the incentives of the medium size country j. Note that this country is a 
central country in network l. Thus, because this country has already an agreement 
with all countries of the world, it is indifferent about signing a global agreement as 
this does not increase the level of competition and, therefore, consumer surplus. 
This is why network l is global treaty proof. However, when monopsonistic power is 
moderate, a global agreement increases the level of competition in non-central 
countries negatively affecting the output that is exported by the intermediary of the 
central country j to these countries. This net decrease in output pushed the price 
paid to the farming sector down. Thus, in response to this lower cost, the 
intermediary increases the level of output that is sold in the domestic market 
~
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increasing competition and, therefore, consumer surplus. This is why in the current 
simulation country j has an incentive to sign a global agreement when there is 
monopsonistic power.  
 
On the other hand, the central country j is not willing to break an existing 
agreement when there is not a farming sector because this lowers competition in 
the domestic market negatively affecting consumer surplus. However, when there 
is monopsonistic power this country is willing to break an existing agreement with a 
large country. This is because breaking this agreement causes a net decrease in 
the output that is traded by the intermediary of country j that pushes the price paid 
to the farming sector down. This lower price incentives the intermediary to increase 
the output that is sold in the domestic market positively affecting consumer surplus. 
This is why country j can increase consumer surplus by breaking the agreement 
with a large country, and this is another example that shows that free trade not 
always favour consumers.  
 
F.3.3.6 Simulation 16:  = 1,  = 0.5 and  = 1.5 for all i  N.    
 
This last simulation in this section studies the global treaty stability of the 
international trade system when the world is composed of large countries and 
medium size countries and when monopsonistic power is high (i.e. ϕ = 1.5).  
 
Using the information presented in Table E.44 in Appendix E it is concluded that 
when countries are biased in favour of consumers, the sets of strong link deletion 
~
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proof, global treaty proof, and global treaty networks are DS = {a, b, c, d, e, f, j, k,  
m, n, o, p, r, s, t, u, v, w, x, y, z, b’, c’, Eq},  = {d, f, g, i, k, l, m, n, o, q, r, s, t, u, v, 
x, c’, Eq}, and GT = DS   = {d, f, k, m, n, o, r, s, t, u, v, x, c’, Eq}, respectively. 
 
In the case of governments biased in favour of consumers, the results revealed 
that the number of networks included in the set of strong link deletion proof 
networks decreases when monopsonistic power increases from ϕ = 0.5 to ϕ = 1.5 
implying that countries have more incentives to break existing agreements. The 
networks that do not belong to this set when monopsonistic power is high are 
networks g, h, i, q and a’ in Figure 4.5. The reason of why these networks are not 
strong link deletion proof is explained by the fact that medium size countries are 
unwilling to keep their agreements with large countries under high levels of 
monopsonistic power. Breaking and agreement with a large country reduces the 
total output that is traded by the intermediary of the medium size country pushing 
the price paid to the farming sector down. In response to this lower cost, the 
intermediary increases the level of output that is sold in the domestic market 
positively affecting consumer surplus. However, when monopsonistic power is 
moderate, this lower cost effect is not strong enough to offsets the negative effect 
of lower competition on consumer surplus that arises when the agreement is 
broken. This is why in the previous simulation networks g, h, i, q and a’ are all 
strong link deletion proof. 
 
The results also reveal that for the case of governments biased in favour of 
consumers, the number of networks in the set of global treaty proof increases 
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when monopsonistic power increases from ϕ = 0.5 to ϕ = 1.5. This means that 
there are more network structures where countries are unwilling to sign a global 
agreement under high levels of monopsonistic power. These networks are d, f, i, k, 
l, m and c’ in Figure 4.5. The reason why these networks become global treaty 
proof is because they contain medium size countries that are unwilling to sign a 
global agreement. For example, the medium size countries j and l are not 
connected to the large countries. By signing a global agreement, this connection 
would cause a large increase in export output that would strongly increase the 
price paid to the farming sector in the medium size countries. In response to this 
higher cost, the intermediaries of these countries would reduce the output that is 
sold in the domestic market negatively affecting consumer surplus. Another 
example is network l. In this case the medium size country j is a central country 
that is connected to all countries of the world. This country is unwilling to sign a 
global agreement because this agreement would increase the level of trade in the 
non-central countries pushing the price paid to the farming sector up. In response 
to this higher cost, the intermediaries of the non-central countries would decrease 
the output that is exported to the central country negatively affecting consumer 
surplus. This is why country j is against a global agreement. 
 
Finally, it was found for the case of governments biased in favour of consumers 
that the set of global treaty stable networks includes new networks (i.e. d, f, k, m 
and c’), but it does not contains network q. This is a consequence of the changes 
discussed above and the main implications of this result are that high levels of 
monopsonistic power play against free trade, regionalism is a possible outcome, 
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and centrality involving medium size central countries against a global agreement 
is also a possible outcome.  
 
F.3.4 Global agreements under exogenous tariffs and asymmetry in farmers’ 
productivity 
 
The objective of this section is to extend the analysis to determine whether 
asymmetry in farmers’ productivity (i.e. different levels of monopsonistic power 
across countries) affects countries’ incentives to sign a global agreement. For this 
purpose, the same simulation developed in Section 4.4.2 is considered in this 
analysis.  
 
F.3.4.1 Simulation 17:  = 3 for  = {i, k};  = 1 for  = {j, l};  = 0.5; and  = 1.   
 
In considering Table E.48, it was found that the sets of strong link deletion proof 
and global treaty proof networks when governments are biased in favour of 
consumers are DS = {a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j, k, l m, n, o, p, q, r, s, t, u, v, w, x, y, z, 
a’, b’, c’} and  = {g, l, n, o, q, r, s, t, u, v, x}, respectively. This implies that the set 
of global treaty stable networks in this case is given by GT = DS   = {g, l, n, o, q, 
r, s, t, u, v, x}. 
 
According to the results obtained in the current simulation, there are no differences 
between the symmetric (see Sections 5.4.1.2 and 5.4.1.3) and the asymmetric 
cases when governments are biased in favour of consumers. 
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Abstract The stability of international trade networks has been investigated using the pairwise 
stability concept. This concept is suitable to study the formation of bilateral agreements. However, 
it cannot be used to determine the stability of global trade agreements. This article proposes an 
alternative stability concept that can be adopted to determine the stability of global agreements 
such as the Doha agreement. This concept is named in this paper Global Treaty Stability. 
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1. Introduction 
The international trade network model that extends the contribution of Jackson and 
Wolinsky (1996) was introduced independently by Goyal and Joshi (2006) and Furusawa and 
Konishi (2007). These researchers introduced this approach with the purpose of determining the 
possible stable trade networks when countries are involved in bilateral agreements. For this 
purpose, they adopted the pairwise stability concept proposed by Jackson and Wolinsky (2006). 
Unfortunately this stability concept cannot be used to study the stability of global trade 
agreements (e.g. current Doha negotiations). The reason is because this concept assumes that 
countries can only sign or break one international agreement at time. Nonetheless, at least two 
conditions are needed to determine stability of a global agreement. Firstly, countries have to be 
able to sign several links simultaneously in order to form the multilateral agreement. Secondly, 
this stability demands that no country has an incentive to deviate unilaterally by breaking one or 
more agreements simultaneously. 
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In order to see why pairwise stability fails in capturing the outcome of a global agreement, 
note that according to the original model developed by Goyal and Joshi (2006), global free trade is 
always pairwise stable. This result implies that if all countries decided to sign an agreement 
simultaneously, then this agreement would be stable because this particular network is always 
pairwise stable. Nonetheless, current evidence shows that a global agreement of this nature has 
been unsuccessful. A good example of this failure is found in the agricultural sector. The first effort 
to achieve a global agreement in agriculture was the Uruguay Round Agreement in Agriculture 
(URRA) which concluded in 1993. The URRA is considered as an important achievement because it 
provided for the first time a foundation for establishing a rule-based world trading system that 
included both developed and developing countries (Athukorala and Kelegama, 1998; Anderson 
and Morris, 2000; and Anderson et al., 2001). However, this agreement has been considered 
unsuccessful because tariffs in agriculture remain high and also because agricultural trade 
liberalisation post URAA has been modest (Messerlin, 2003; and Gale, 1995). According to Josling 
(1998), tariffs on manufactured goods in the second half of the 1990s were of the order of 5-10%. 
In contrast, agricultural tariffs were on average 40% with tariffs picks of over 300% revealing that 
the URRA did little to liberalise trade in agriculture.  
During the second half of the 1990s, the next step in promoting further integration of the 
agro-food sector into the multilateral trading system was carried out. This was triggered by three 
main factors: (i) lack of agricultural trade liberalisation post URRA; (ii) export subsidies and 
domestic support policies still being used by developed countries after this agreement; and (iii) the 
mandate in Article 20 of the URRA to hold new negotiations (Young et al., 1999; Coleman and 
Meilke, 2000; and Josling, 2000). These three factors led to new multilateral trade negotiations on 
agriculture with the purpose of strengthening the disciplines already established under the URRA 
(Devadoss, 2002). These negotiations were formally included in a round referred to as the Doha 
Round or the Doha Development Agenda (DDA). The DDA was launched at the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO)’s Fourth Ministerial Conference in Doha (Qatar) in November 2001, and was 
planned for conclusion in January 2005 (Matthews, 2001). After twelve years of talks, the Doha 
Round still has no framework (modalities) deal. In fact, the Geneva Ministerial Meeting in 
December 2009 ended without any substantial progress (Cho, 2010). The Doha’s failure suggests 
that a global agreement in agriculture might never be attainable, a fact that has been recognised 
by some researchers (see, for example, Scott and Wilkinson, 2010). 
This example illustrates the fact that the model developed by Goyal and Joshi (2006) is not 
able to capture the outcome of current global trade negotiations. As argued above, the main 
reason is because these researchers adopted pairwise stability which is not the most appropriate 
stability concept to analyse the issue of global agreements. The objective of the present article is 
to propose an alternative stability concept that is suitable to determine the stability of 
international trade networks when countries are involved in global trade agreements. This 
concept is called in this paper Global treaty stability.  
In order to show how this stability concept works, an example based on the international 
network model of Goyal and Joshi (2006) is provided. According to these researchers, global free 
trade is stable because no country has an incentive to break a single agreement, a fact that is 
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captured by pairwise stability. In contrast, global free trade is not always global treaty stable 
because biased countries have an incentive to simultaneously break several agreements. The 
reason of why this is the case is formally explained in Section 3. 
 
2. Global Treaty Stability 
Before defining global treaty stability, it is important to establish the international network 
model. The following version is based on Goyal and Joshi (2006). In this model, each node stands 
for a country with a single firm producing a home-based commodity. A network is a set of 
undirected binary links between these nodes/countries representing bilateral free trade treaties. 
Formally, an international agreement between countries i and j is described by a link, given by a 
binary variable gij  {0,1}. If gij = 0, then no agreement exist between countries i and j. If gij = 1, 
then an agreement exists between them. A network g  {(gij)ijN} is a description of the 
international agreements that exist between the countries in N, where N = {1, 2,..., N} is the set of 
identical countries, and N is the total number of countries. Network gc is the complete network (gij 
= 1  i,j  N) and corresponds to multilateral free trade (i.e. all countries have an agreement with 
each other), and Network ge is the empty network (gij = 0  i,j  N) and corresponds to the 
network in which all countries are in unattached. Let G denote the set of all possible networks of 
international agreements between countries. Let Ni(g) = {j  N : gij = 1} be the set of countries with 
whom country i has an international trade agreement in network g. Assume that  i  Ni(g). That is, 
gii = 1. The cardinality of Ni(g) is denoted by i(g). As described above, in this model i(g) is also 
the number of active firms in country i and in network g because of the assumption that each 
country has a single firm producing a home-based commodity. Let Li(g) = {(gij)ijN : j  Ni(g)} be the 
set of links existing in country i in network g. Note that gii  Li(g). Let hi  Li(g) – {gii} be a link 
subset of the links existing in country i. Finally, let Wi(g), CSi(g) and i(g) be welfare, consumer 
surplus, and total profit, respectively, in country i and in network g. In this setting governments 
maximise the following welfare function: 
 
Wi(g) = aiCSi(g) + bii(g)    (1) 
 
Where ai ≥ 0 and bi ≥ 0 represent weights that the government puts on consumer surplus and 
profits, respectively. 
Let us now explain the global treaty stability concept. Gilles and Sarangi (2010), Gilles et al. 
(2012), and Chakrabarti and Gilles (2007) proposed a refinement of the pairwise stability concept 
introduced Jackson and Wolinsky (1996). This refinement is referred to as strongly pairwise 
stability and is based on the following concepts: (a) the marginal benefit of country i when 
deleting at the same time hi  Li(g) – {gii} international agreements is: Di(g, hi) = Wi(g) – Wi(g – hi); 
(b) a network g  G is strong link deletion proof if for every player i  N and every hi  Li(g) – {gii} it 
holds that Di(g, hi)  0; and (c) a network g  G is link addition proof if for all i,j  N: Wi(g + gij) > 
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Wi(g) implies that Wj(g + gij) < Wj(g). A network g  G is strongly pairwise stable if g is strong link 
deletion proof as well as link addition proof. 
The global treaty stability proposed in this article is a refinement of strongly pairwise 
stability that replaces the link addition proof condition by an alternative condition that has been 
named global treaty proofness. This is explained as follows. Let the marginal benefit of country i 
when forming a global agreement be i(g
c) = Wi(g
c) – Wi(g). A network g  G is global treaty 
proofness if for at least one country i  N it holds that i(g
c)  0. In words, a network g  G is 
global treaty proofness if at least one country i  N does not have an incentive to form a global 
agreement. Using this definition, a network g  G is said to be global treaty stable if g is strong link 
deletion proof as well as global treaty proofness. That is, network g is global treaty stable if: (i) no 
country has an incentive to break one or more international agreements; and (ii) at least one 
country is not willing to form a global trade agreement. 
 
3. Examples 
This section provides some examples showing that the use of global treaty stability in 
Goyal and Joshi’s model generates results that are not the same than the ones identified by these 
researchers.  
The first subsection considers examples assuming the case of exogenous tariffs (i.e. each 
country establishes a prohibitive tariff avoiding any trade between them. If two countries decide 
to sign an agreement, then each one offers the other a free market access). The reason for 
assuming exogenous tariffs is because most of the analysis developed by Goyal and Joshi (2006) 
was made under this assumption as the model becomes untractable in mathematic terms when 
adopting endogenous tariffs (this has formally pointed out by Goyal and Joshi, 2006, 768). 
Consequently, the main differences between global treaty stability and pairwise stability when 
considering the work of these researchers are better understood under the assumption of 
exogenous tariffs. 
In recognising the relevance of endogenous tariffs and given the mathematical complexity 
of the model when adopting this assumption, the second subsection provides some examples 
based on simulations to identify differences between global treaty stability and pairwise stability 
under endogenous tariffs.  
 
3.1. Examples under Exogenous Tariffs 
 
Example 1 
In order to show a concrete application of the global treaty stability concept, let us 
consider the following example based on the model of Goyal and Joshi (2006). In particular, this 
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example is based on the case of exogenous tariffs and unbiased governments which means that 
governments put the same weight on the components of the welfare function, namely, consumer 
surplus and firms’ profits. Using pairwise stability, Goyal and Joshi found that in this case two 
networks are pairwise stable: Global free trade; and a network composed of a complete 
component (i.e. a set of countries having an agreement with each other) and a singleton (i.e. an 
unattached country). The aim of this example is to show that among these two equilibriums, only 
global free trade is global treaty stable. As it will be shown, the reason is because the singleton is 
unwilling to sign a single agreement with a country of the complete component. This is because 
the gain it makes from accessing the new market is lower than the loss arising from the decrease 
in market power in the domestic market as a result of shearing this market with the new partner 
country. In contrast, the singleton is willing to sign a global agreement because in this case the 
gain from simultaneously accessing several foreign markets is larger than the loss associate with 
the lower market power in the domestic market after the global agreement.   
Formally, assume that tariffs are determined exogenously and that governments are 
politically unbiased (i.e. ai = bi = 1 in Equation 1). According to Goyal and Joshi’s results, two 
networks are pairwise stable in this case: (i) the complete network (i.e. gc); and (ii) a network 
composed of one complete component of size N − 1 and a singleton (i.e. gN-1). In order to show 
that the latter network is not global treaty stable, the following expressions were adopted (see 
Goyal and Joshi, 2006, 755). Note that it was assumed for simplicity and without losing generality 
that  −  = 11. 
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Proposition 1: The following statements hold in the case of unbiased governments and exogenous 
tariffs:(a) The complete network gc is the unique network that is pairwise stable as well as global 
treaty stable; and (b) there exist global treaty stable networks that are not pairwise stable. 
Proof: Let us first prove statement (a). For this purpose, it will be proved that the following 
networks cannot be global treaty stable: (i) the empty network; (ii) a network formed of one or 
more complete components with one or more singletons; (iii) and a network formed of complete 
components without singletons. Firstly, note that the strong link deletion proof condition (i.e. Di(g, 
hi) = Wi(g) – Wi(g – hi) ≥ 0) is satisfied in all the countries that belong to these networks. In the case 
                                                          
1
 In Goyal and Joshi’s model, the inverse demand for the homogeneous commodity in a determined country i 
is given by Pi =  − Qi, where Pi denotes the price of the commodity,  is a parameter representing market 
size, and Qi is the total output demanded in that country. On the other hand, the parameter  represents the 
marginal cost faced by the firms producing the commodity. The expression  −  appears in the equations that 
result from the solution of the Cournot game adopted by Goyal and Joshi (2006).  
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of singleton countries, this is verified because for definition they cannot delete links as a 
consequence of being singletons (i.e. they do not have an incentive to delete inexistent links). Let 
us consider now the case of a country i that belongs to a complete component of size . Using 
expressions 2 and 3, welfare in this country is given by 
22
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)1()1(2
1
)(
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





gWi . Likewise, 
welfare in this country when the government deletes hi links is given by 
222
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ii hgW , where  <  is the number of agreements in 
country i in network g  hi. Simple calculations shows that )()( iii hgWgW  when (  )(2  
1) + (  )(42) > 0 which is valid for all  > . This result implies, therefore, that no country in 
the networks described above has an incentive to break one or more existing agreements 
simultaneously. Secondly, the global treaty proofness condition (i.e. i(g
c) = Wi(g
c) – Wi(g) < 0) is 
not satisfied in any of the countries that belong to these networks. To see why, note that welfare 
in an arbitrary country i in gc is given by 
22
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gW ci ; welfare in a singleton is 
given by 
8
3
)'( gWi ; and welfare in a country that belongs to a complete component is given by 
22
2
)1()1(2
1
)''(








gWi . Because 0)'()(  gWgW i
c
i implies N
2 + 2N  3 > 0 which is 
valid for all N > 1, and because 0)''()(  gWgW i
c
i implies N >  which is valid for definition, it is 
concluded that all countries in the networks described above have an incentive to form a global 
agreement. As a consequence, these networks are not global treaty stable. The main implication 
of this finding is that if the current network is consistent with any of the ones described above, 
then countries will sign a global agreement. Because the pairwise stable network gN-1 identified by 
Goyal and Joshi (2006) is actually one of these networks, it is concluded that this network is not 
global treaty stable. In contrast, the complete network is global treaty stable because this is a 
complete component. As shown in the proof, the strong link deletion proof condition is always 
satisfied when countries belong to complete components.  
Let us now prove statement (b). We know from the results obtained above that networks 
composed of complete components cannot be global treaty stable. However, there are networks 
composed of incomplete components that can be. An example is a network composed of at least 
one incomplete star component (i.e. a component in which a country has a central position; it has 
a links with all the countries of the component; and the latter do not have an agreement with each 
other). Figure 1 shows an example of a network of this nature. This network is referred to as 
network g. 
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Figure 1: Network g composed of a complete component and an incomplete star component. 
 
We know from the previous results that countries in the complete component do not have an 
incentive to break one or more existing agreements simultaneously. We also know that these 
countries are willing to sign a global agreement. Let us now analyse the motivation of the 
countries that belong to the incomplete component. For this purpose, consider the following 
information obtained from Expressions 2 and 3:  
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Because )()()()( vwvuwuvu ggWggWgWgW  , it is concluded that countries u 
and v do not have an incentive to break their existing agreements with country w. Likewise, 
because )()()( vwwuwww ggWggWgW   and )(gWw  > )( vwuww gggW  , it is concluded 
that country w does not have an incentive to break one or more of their agreements 
simultaneously. It is concluded from this analysis that the strong link deletion proof condition is 
i j 
k l 
u v 
w 
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satisfied in this network. Let us now consider the global treaty proofness condition. According to 
this condition, a network g is global treaty stable if at least one country is not willing to form a 
global trade agreement. This is actually verified in country w. To see why, note that 
)()( cww gWgW   when 22
2
)1()1(2
1
288
163




N
N
N
N
. By rearranging terms, 19N2 + 38N +163 > 
0 which holds for all N > 0.  
 
This simple example illustrates the advantage of using the global treaty stability concept to 
study the stability of international networks when countries are involved in global agreements. 
That is, not all pairwise stable networks are global treaty stable networks; and not all global treaty 
stable networks are pairwise stable networks. As a consequence, pairwise stability fails in 
informing the possible outcomes of global international trade agreements. 
 
Example 2 
 According to Proposition 5 in Goyal and Joshi (2006), the following networks are pairwise 
stable when governments are fully biased in favour of their domestic firms (i.e. ai = 0 and bi = 1 in 
Equation 1): the empty network; the complete network; networks composed of complete 
component if different size; and networks composed of complete components of different size 
with one or more singletons. The following proposition shows that among these networks, only 
the empty network is global treaty stable.  
Proposition 2: Among the pairwise stable networks identified by Goyal and Joshi (2006) in their 
Proposition 5, only the empty network is global treaty stable.  
Proof: The proof consists of showing that the strong link deletion proof condition does not hold 
when countries are organised in complete components. Using expression 3, welfare in an arbitrary 
country i that belongs to a complete component of size  is given by Wi(g) = /( + 1)
2. Let 
network g* be the network in which country i is unattached. Because Wi(g*) = 1/4 > Wi(g) = /( + 
1)2 for all  > 1, it is concluded that any country that belongs to a complete component (including 
the complete network) has an incentive to break all its existing agreements simultaneously. This 
means that the only pairwise stable network identified by Goyal and Joshi (2006) that is strong link 
deletion proof for the case of biased countries in favour of their domestic firms is the empty 
network. From the same analysis it is concluded that the global treaty proofness condition holds in 
this network.    
 
 This result can better be understood by considering the trade effects arising when 
breaking one or more agreements simultaneously. When a country breaks one or more 
agreements, the profit that the domestic firm in this country makes in the domestic market 
increases because this market becomes less competitive (we call this change in profits the 
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competition effect). However, this firm also loses the profits that it made in the ex-partner 
countries (we call this change in profits the expansion effect). Consequently, if the competition 
effect dominates the expansion effect, then the government has an incentive to break one or 
more agreements simultaneously. This is the key aspect that explains why pairwise stability differs 
from global treaty stability. In Goyal and Joshi’s model global free trade is stable because countries 
are allowed to break only one agreement at time, and it is in this particular case when the 
competition effect is dominated by the expansion effect. However, if countries are allowed to 
break several links simultaneously, then the dominance of these effects is reversed. This is shown 
in the following figure: 
 
    
Figure 2: Total profit made by the domestic firm when the government deviates from global free 
trade. 
 This figure shows a simulation assuming the existence of 50 countries in the world. 
According to this figure, total profit made by the domestic firm of a determined country decreases 
as this country signs additional agreements. This trend is valid only until the country reaches about 
15 agreements. After that, total profit increases as the country signs further agreements. As a 
result, if this country is in global free trade, then breaking a single link (i.e. passing from 50 to 49 
agreements in the figure) decreases total profits making this change inappropriate if the country is 
only allowed to break one link. As explained above, this is why global free trade is pairwise stable. 
In contrast, if the country is allowed to break several agreements simultaneously, then the 
domestic firm can make higher profits in a less integrated network than in global free trade. This is 
why global free trade is not global treaty stable. 
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3.2. Examples under Endogenous Tariffs 
 As explained above, Goyal and Joshi’s model becomes untractable in mathematic terms 
when assuming endogenous tariffs. It is for this reason that simulations assuming the existence of 
four countries in the world were adopted to overcome this problem to some extent. For a detailed 
explanation of the equations used in the simulations, please refer to Goyal and Joshi (2006, 765). 
 The simulations consider the set of possible networks that can be formed by countries i, j, 
k and l. These networks are shown in the following figure: 
 
Figure 3: Possible network architectures formed by countries i, j, k and l.   
  
Note that several possible network architectures were omitted. For example, country l in 
network g in this figure is a singleton. Similar network architectures could have been introduced in 
order to represent the cases when the other countries are singleton. However, information about 
these network topologies can be inferred from network g as a result of the assumption of 
symmetrical countries.  
Using these network architectures, a simulation was developed assuming unbiased 
governments. The simulation is presented in Table 1. 
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Table 1. Welfare under the assumption of unbiased governments. 
Network  Country   Total 
 i j k l  
 
a 
b 
c 
d 
e 
f 
g 
h 
i 
j 
k 
 
0.4339 
0.4540 
0.4688 
0.4897 
0.4766 
0.4981 
0.4666 
0.5475 
0.4672 
0.4631 
0.4800 
 
  
0.4339 
0.4486 
0.4688 
0.4897 
0.4766 
0.4456 
0.4666 
0.4463 
0.4672 
0.4935 
0.4800 
 
0.4339 
0.4540 
0.4688 
0.4556 
0.4766 
0.4456 
0.4666 
0.4463 
0.5160 
0.4935 
0.4800 
 
0.4339 
0.4486 
0.4688 
0.4556 
0.4766 
0.4586 
0.4639 
0.4463 
0.4515 
0.4631 
0.4800 
 
1.7355 
1.8053 
1.8750 
1.8908 
1.9065 
1.8480 
1.8638 
1.8863 
1.9020 
1.9133 
1.9200 
 
 Using this simulation it is possible to infer that networks a, b, c, e and g are not global 
treaty stable because all countries in these networks have an incentive to form a global agreement 
(i.e. network k). Network d is not global treaty stable because country l has an incentive to break 
its agreement with country j (i.e. passing from network d to network f). Network f is not global 
treaty stable because country j has an incentive to break its agreement with country i (i.e. passing 
from network f to network b). Network h is not global treaty stable because country l has an 
incentive to break its agreement with country i (i.e. passing from network h to network f). Network 
i is not global treaty stable because country l has an incentive to break its agreement with country 
k (i.e. passing from network i to network g). Network j is not global treaty stable because country l 
has an incentive to break its agreements with countries k and j simultaneously (i.e. passing from 
network j to network g). In this simulation, the only global treaty stable network is network k, that 
is, global free trade. 
 It is interesting to note that two networks in this simulation are pairwise stable: networks 
g and k. However, only network k is also global treaty stable. This finding is consistent with the 
analysis conducted for the case of exogenous tariffs in that global treaty stability provides results 
that cannot been identified from pairwise stability. This confirms the fact that the analysis of 
global trade agreements cannot be conducted using pairwise stability.  
 The following table shows a second simulation that was developed with the purpose of 
proving that global free trade is not necessarily global treaty stable when governments are 
politically biased in favour of domestic firms. This simulation assumes that governments place the 
following weights on consumer surplus, profits and tariffs revenue, respectively, in Equation 27 of 
Goyal and Joshi (2006, 766): 0.75;1; and 1.  
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Table 2. Welfare under the assumption of biased governments. 
Network  Country   Total 
 i j k l  
 
a 
b 
c 
d 
e 
f 
g 
h 
i 
j 
k 
 
0.3739 
0.3847 
0.3973 
0.4184 
0.3997 
0.4334 
0.3908 
0.4912 
0.3881 
0.3816 
0.4000 
 
  
0.3739 
0.3866 
0.3973 
0.4184 
0.3997 
0.3697 
0.3908 
0.3669 
0.3881 
0.4181 
0.4000 
 
0.3739 
0.3847 
0.3973 
0.3786 
0.3997 
0.3697 
0.3908 
0.3669 
0.4485 
0.4181 
0.4000 
 
0.3739 
0.3866 
0.3973 
0.3786 
0.3997 
0.3955 
0.4008 
0.3669 
0.3722 
0.3816 
0.4000 
 
1.4957 
1.5425 
1.5893 
1.5941 
1.5988 
1.5683 
1.5731 
1.5920 
1.5968 
1.5994 
1.6000 
 
It is not difficult to see in this simulation that the only global treaty stable network is 
network g. To see why, note that countries in networks a, b, c and e have an incentive to form a 
global agreement because welfare in network k is higher. This implies that networks a, b, c and e 
are not global treaty stable. On the other hand, network k is not global treaty stable because 
country l has an incentive to break all its agreements simultaneously (i.e. passing from network k 
to network g). The same holds for networks j and i: country l is better off in network g. Network h 
is not global treaty stable because country l has an incentive to break its agreement with country i 
(i.e. passing from network h to network f). Network f is not global treaty stable because country j 
has an incentive to break its agreement with country i (i.e. passing from network f to network b). 
Finally, network d is not global treaty stable because country l has an incentive to break its 
agreement with country j (i.e. passing from network d to network f). 
 The main implication of this simulation is that global free trade may not be reached when 
governments are involved in global agreements and when they are biased in favour of their 
domestic firms. This is consistent with the result obtained under the assumption of exogenous 
tariffs. This result, again, suggests that pairwise stability is not the best stability concept to study 
the issue of global agreements. To reinforce this argument, note that in this simulation global free 
trade is pairwise stable. This means that in the world of Goyal and Joshi, if countries were allowed 
to sign a global free agreement, then such an agreement would be feasible given the pairwise 
stability of this network. But as proved in this article, countries have an incentive to break several 
agreements simultaneously. As a consequence, results obtained under pairwise stability should be 
considered with caution. 
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5. Conclusions 
The objective of this article is to propose a stability concept referred to as global treaty 
stability to study the stability of international networks when countries are involved in global 
agreements. Simple examples were used to show how this stability concept can be applied to 
identify stable networks when countries are involved in this type of agreements. Using these 
examples, two key results were found. Firstly, global free trade is not always global treaty stable. 
Secondly, pairwise stability is not able to identify some global treaty stable networks. This proves 
that fact that the proposed stability concept is more appropriate to study the formation of 
international network when countries are involved in global trade agreements. 
It would be interesting to use this stability concept to determine the possible global treaty 
stable networks under different policy biases. Likewise, it would be interesting to use this concept 
to predict the outcome of the Doha agreement. These relevant extensions are left for future 
research. 
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